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(Video) The Diabolical Things Vietcong & US Soldiers Did During Vietnam War

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(Video) China's Plan to Take Over the World

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(Video) The REAL reasons America lost dogfights over Vietnam

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December 28, 2022

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May 14, 2018

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(Video) China's Plan to Attack 5 Nations at Once (South China Sea)

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December 20, 1972


U.S. PLANS PROLONGED ROLE IN VIETNAM (1) u.s. plans prolonged role[15393271].pdf14.45 MB


Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) b)(3) . � i ; 1 i 1Z:1) 1/41 r7-'1 ; .7) ' ri /Th. �'1 ' ' , ; � 4 1 ".1 , LJ L'ierea LI L,1 By Rlorested E. Vivira Despite press 'speculation a 'peace agreement for Vietnam may soon be con-cluded, there is concrete evidence indicating the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict .and will attempt to subvert any peace ac-cords. U.S. procrastination in - Paris, intensified bombing and the huge shipments of arms to Saigon, among other developments, are all indicators that the ,White House has no desire for true peace and has not abandoned its neo-colonial designs in Indochina. An even more ominous proof of U.S. intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes in Indochina, .was the apparent effort by presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of November, which would have virtually scrapped the agreement reached in October by Kissinger and Le Due Tho of the DRV: _ There have been various hypotheses put forward in the Western press concerning Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly every possible explanation has been proposed by the pundits except the most plausible one. The U.S stalling in Paris does not represent any deference to its Saigon puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely an instrument. U.S. expressions of "support" for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to the extent they are not fictions for deceiving American opinion, are fundamentally ex-pressions of the aims and designs of the U.S. G nira time In essence, American procrastination in Paris has been an effort to gain time for augmenting Saigon's war machine and setting up a hype clandestine network of "civilian advisors" which will attempt to pitOlorig the iarunnle in Vietnam, as well as in the rest of Indochina, after formal peace anretraents have been reached. "Even as the U.S. military is packing up for its expected exit ' from Vietnam, American officials here are secretly plan-ning a major postwar presence of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military," wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times. Without' alluding to the delay in Paris, Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the process of augmenting its "civilian advisory" force in Vietnam, from 5000 to 10,000, its peak level at the stage of maximum U.S. military presence in Vietnam. But it should be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus could not be assembled overnight, anymore than the enormous flow of 'U.S. arms could be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air force was increased , two-fold, from ap-proximately 1030 to 2030 aircraft during the pest two montias, to give only one item of U.S. supply effort. To place recent developments in their proper perspective, it must be noted that there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy ect in motion last spring in the wake of tine lone-sustained offensive by the Liberation Armed Forties in South Vietnam. . DeEpite administration efforts to play down the Strength of the offensive, it is evident that once again the whole. U.S. strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed. Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the war prevented the complete collapse of the Salp,on regime and its armed forces: the blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial escalation against the DRV and liberated areas of South Vietnam (while heavy bombing of Laos and Cambodia was sustained), and unprecedented' aerial tac-tical and logistics support for the Saigon forces. The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics support .fer� Saigon's forces during the of-fensive surged from a monthly average of about nine million pounds of cargo before the offensive to 60 million pounds in-May. Auraented U.S. "support" for Saigon after the offensive began, raised total U.S. ex-penditures on the war by an annual rate of approximately 510 billion or nearly double the rate .prior to the offensive. � The Nixon administration concealed this augmentation by requesting additional war funding only for the period ending Sept. 30. At about the same time the administration presented Congress with a request for these funds in June-, Air America and Continental Air Services, the CIA contractual "civilian" airlines, began stepping up recruiting among Air Force personnel in Indochina, according to a Dec.1 report of Dispatch News Service, by John Burgess. He quoted from a con-fidentinl recruiting brochure which, among other points, stated; Cletsdestiaac warfare � � "The flyina, is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government amencjes Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO27924 sucn as Li um. uonfu, uoio, etc. vv iile these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the techinical know-how and you fiy the air.-The brochure makes it clear that "civilian flying" is merely a cover for clandestine military activity: "Although flights mainly serve U.S. offiical personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, on of enemy captives; or in the transport of care() more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going . on. Use your imagination!" In what Burgess describes as a "hastily"addcd postreipt, the brochure states: "Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in Rvil (Republic. of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expeeted that a boom among contract operators will result. ... . " In other words, here we have the first .concrete indication that the White House was jinplicitly admitting defeat of its "Vietnernitettion" program and reverting to a less costly program of clandestine warfare: The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally dictated by a desire to further diminish the polltieaiimpeet of the war on American opieion -and finally by a desire to diminish tite blow to U.S. prestige in the event of if:tit-mete failure, that is the collapse of the peeinet regimes. .1 U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this development as long as possible, but it also wants to avoid the impression of being engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. in-tervention at the time, which sooner or later Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable. Even if they cannot face this reality, they are now in deadly earnest about maintaining support for the puppet regimes, regardless of any peace -agreement. If the U.S. honestly adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's political collapse would quickly follow. That is why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine support for the Saigon regime, military aid disnuised as civilian "contractual" aid, provided mainly by U.S, private military contractors. There is a relationship between the U.S. arms build-up Indochina and the program or secret contractual aid. Before the Dc' tober peace agreement, the U.S. made little effort to. keep the program ' secret. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 13,.Air Force Maj. Gen. Joseph It. DeLuca explained in detail U.S. , plans for contracting for personnel to train Saigon Air Force members. In the area of maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to make contracts for $54 million of one to three years to train Saigon personnel, ac-cording to DeLuca. 62 1_ Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C.02792462 'THE NATION 18 Dec 1972 (b)(3 .ral:111 OL411.1,113 � ' � 'II . iirhe Carpet-nags fa2 No doubt some kind . of simulated cease-fire will ix patched up in Vietnam, and probably before the end of the year; failure to achieve anything would be too cm-barrassing for the Administration. It will be a militan stand-still without a political foundation or, . in propel bureaucratese, infrastructure. So it is quite natural that, in an adaptation of Clausewitz's famous saying,. it wil: be war carried on by other means. A .recent report from Saigon by George McArthur, headlined in the Los Angelo Times: "Vietnam Future: U. S. Planners Thinking Big," gives .a printout of the future. McArthur leads off his dispatch with the not veri surprising news that, while the negotiations proceed by fits and starts in Paris,. U. S. bureaucrats in Saigon "arc confidently using the time to blue-print empires in South Vietnam." Some of them have acquired villas there; they find the climate congenial, and would like to stay on, enjoying the good life to which they have grown accus-tomed. It is impossible to get any accurate estimate of how many U. S. civilians are hanging out in South .Vietnam with some kind of official connection with the American Embassy, or the armed forces, or intelli-gence, or whatever, else in the way of ."programs" may be Under way. And if. that is impossible, how can any-one estimate what number of bodies will be required to carry on a simulated peace? The only thing certain is that proliferation is under way; the bureaucrats are "thinking big." "No single person or headquarters," writes McArthur, "seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic .replay of the great buildup of 1965." Of course, .microscopic can turn into macroscopic. The planners, at first stunned by Kissinger's forecast that "peace" was close at hand, are regaining their vigor and redoubling their efforts. They intend to stay on.� Clothes may not make the man, but they can make him look different, and by all indications such transfor-mations will be taking place on a large scale. It takes only a few minutes and some pieces of paper to change a colonel in uniform into a civilian bureaucrat in color-ful sport shirt and slacks. Or he may. be nominally a civilian already, a Central Intelligence Agency type, striv-ing to win the hearts and minds of the people. In ad-dition to CIA, AID, CORDS and other organizations whose full names are rarely used, the United States now has four consulates in South Vietnam. McArthur pre-� diets that these peace-loving, offices, complete with mili-tary attaches, State Department political officers, CIA operatives, et at., will be installed permanently 'at Can Tho, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Da. Nang�"by cointi-dence" the present locations of headquarters for. the four Army corps of the million-man South Vietnamese Army. Four consulates may be thought a reasonable number, since. in France, with 50 million Frenchmen and hordes of U.S. tourists, we have five consulates in all. There is also a legal side to this. orgy of preparation fOr "peace"; it centers in Washington. Having had prac-tically nothing to say about the start of the war, Con-gress may want to be in at the finish. Constitutionally, this is no simple matter. Since we do not recognize North Vietnam, except for the purposes of killing and bombing; an agreement with Hanoi would not be a treaty and the Senate would have nothing to say about it. But we do recognize South Vietnam, so if they sign, wouldn't that constitute a treaty? Some lawyers think so, but it is a safe bet that President Nixon will not. As Commander in Chief he can order a cease-fire at his pleasure. Sen. J. William Fulbright thinks an agreement to e.nd the war should be submitted to the Senate for its scru-tiny. But the Senate wants a cease-fire and will doubt-less be reluctant to appear to be meddling in the inter-minable negotiations. All the same, the time will come when the Senate must insist on 'a say. "I would assume," Senator Fulbright observes, "any agreement would in-volve obligations to spend several billions of dollars, a commitment that should be submitted to the' Congress." And. further, "with these' secret agreements, we find so often that they, have obligations on our treasury or to send troops abroad, so it seems only fair that Congress have a chance to examine them." If Congress hopes to maintain some degree of control over what happens in Vietnam after a cease-fire, it should note what is happen-ing there now. 'The bureaucrats are "thinking big" and will no doubt set programs in motion without initial Congressional approval, and then, as in the past, gamble that they can induce the Senate and House to continue and even expand them. So the time for vigilance is now. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 .LOS ANGELES IIMES 13 DEC 1972 New LS Buildup in Vietnam� President Nixon has reduced the American mill= tary forces in Vietnam from almost 600,000 in the '.first months of his Presidency to 25,200. The num-ber now is frozen pending clarification of where the - - Paris peace talks are going. But the remaining troops are organized for withdrawal on a 57-day .schedule to conform with the 60-day limit written Into the nine-point peace plan tentatively agreed on two months ago. At the same time, the United States is quietly and � slowly building up its civilian forces in South Viet-- nam, actively recruiting additional personnel, re-portedly authorizing the transfer of some soldiers to civilian status, alerting Indochina experts now in other posts that they soon may be sent to Vietnam. � � Unofficial estimates indicate that a civilian force of as many as 10,000 Americans is being prepared for � Vietnam. There is no official explanation because, official-.)y, there is only a denial of such a buildup. But it is clear from some of the categories being recruited .that the new band of Americans in mufti will be - doing in the future some of the things that Ameri-cans in uniform are doing now, including such tasks as operating computers for the Saigon milita-' ry 'command, advising troops in action, repairing, .servicing and perhaps flying combat and transport aircraft, and assisting with espionage and sabo-'4age. To put it bluntly, there is evidence. that the American government has no intention of ending �American involvement in Indochina, that it is only _working to convert the involvement to the form.. that prevailed before the massive buildup and di--red; battlefield role of 1965 and 1966. If this is the intention, it is time for Mr. Nixon to be very clear about it. It must be explained. It must ,be debated. The ultimate decision must represent the will of Congress, a national consensus. As matters now stand, we know of no good rea- . � son to justify the buildup. Of course, it can be argued that there are not enough skilled Vietnamese to operate the sophisti-cated Weapons and instruments of war that were given.them by the United States. But the point is that peace, not war, is to be waged now. Of course, it can be argued that President Nguy-en Van Thieu will be weaker without the Ameri-cans, more vulnerable to overthrow, and it can be anticipated that there will be cheating on a cease-fire, and perhaps no absolute peace for years and years. But it is no more reasonable to propose a , prolongation of the American commitment than to advocate the right of Hanoi to recruit advisers from Moscow and Peking. Aid there must be, aid both to the north and the south, a reconstruction of Vietnam, regardless of ideology and political commitment, but not aid that is a screen to preserve American influence and pro- . long American commitment. It is not in the American interest to talk, as American officials now are talking, of enlarging the number of U.S. consulates in South Vietnam and placing them just where U.S.- Army corps � headquarters have been operating. It is a travesty to suggest that the military attache in the U.S. Em-bassy requires "hundreds" on his staff. There is no logic to recruiting a 100-man team of Americans to monitor the cease-fire unless the United States would be looking for an excuse to reenter the hos-tilities. It is follylo leave even a suspicion that the reconstruction contractors may be operatives of the CIA. Mr. Nixon sought office in 1968' and reelection in � 1972 on a commitment to get out of Vietnam. That is what the American people understand is being arranged in Paris. That is what the American peo-ple have shown so clearly that they want. � They want to get out not just because they are weary of the war, not just because they now recog-nize the madness of the war. They want to get out because they now know that this is not and never was their business. It is not for the Americans, it is for the Vietnamese to decide the future of Viet-nam�the Vietnamese by themselves, not through the-mask of a new and clandestine army of Ameri-cans. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 11,J0,-)11/1A 1 Lh."1 12 De c- 1912. (b)(3) . , By John P. Roche ,\T /V LLL'iiLLt -1 -T1 ,c-:1-1 H Ever since the Supreme Court held that the relationship between aereporter and his sources was not privileged (that is, protected from scrutiny on the model of the lawyer-client connection), there has been a great deal of discussion - about curbs on freedom of the press. This controversy was intensified when the Supreme Court held that a Harvard assistant professor, Samuel Popkin, had to answer a grand jury's questions on the Pentagon Papers or go to jail for contempt. A handcuffed Popkin was seen en route to prison. (He was sub-sequently freed.) There are two aspects of this problem, one of which has been almost entirely overlooked. Understandably, emphasis has been placed on the moral obligatioa � of a ,newsman to protect a confidential source.. (Or, in Popkin's case, on the duty of a...scholar to safeguard his infor-mants.) But very little has been said about the inherent dangers � to journal-ism as to scholarship � of using unveri-fiable sources. Let us look first at the legal issue, which is historically simple. In the American majoritarian tradition there Were no inherently privileged relation-ships. Indeed, the very foundation of a democratic order is that every citizen is a cop, that laws are enforced by the citi-zenry not by the police. This major-itarianisre, which somewhat resembled vigilantism, would only tolerate privi-�0 6-1ii ii � I�I 111 .4-4. leged relationships if they received stat-utory approval. Given the role of law-yers in politics, the first privilege to re-ceive general acceptance was - that be-tween lawyer and client. Contrary to supposition, the doctor-pa-tient and minister-parishioner relation-ships have largely rested on custom, not statute. Indeed, a case can be made that to privide special privilege to the priest or minister Icould violate the separation of church and state. In practice it is hard to conceive of a grand jury throw-ing a priest in jail for protecting the se-crets of the confessional. However, not more than a year or so ago in New York a psychiatrist was forced to testify, the state courts holding (correctly) that only � a statue could'provide immunity. The answer to the press' (and Dr. Popidn's) problem then (as the Supreme Court pointed out) is an act of Congress stipulating immunity for the reporter or � the scholar. In the meantime reporters or professors who choose to protect their sources just have to take certain risks, and in the process thank God they are not dealing with British judges, who really throw the contempt power around. But what about the other side of this matter the growing use of unverifiable "confidential sources"? Of course, jour-nalists have done th'is routinely for years. It is a practice I try to avoid because, having been one, I are suspicious of the motives of "high White House sources," rfilT o7 -.1 "f- /7--N-11 -� f Li 0 who are normally trying to play the press like a salmon. However, with: the advent of "instant history," we now find whole volumes whick at crucial eviden-tial points rests on a "confidential source." Or worse perhaps, on no eitred source whatsoever Imagine my interest when, in Herbert Parmet's "Eisenhower and the Amen-can Crusadcs," I learned that "one- of Dulles' closest confidants" had reVealed that Ngo Dinh Diem was "discovered" by the CIA and "rammed" into office in 1954 by John Foster Dulles. Later V:T are told that during President; Eisen-hower's 1955 heart attack. Dulles was the "quarterback," that `!nothing, was done without . his approval." This is in-teresting because 1) it sounds like Dul-les' view of his own role, and 2) it is in contradiction to what others have said. Good, let's find out check footnote "Confidential source." Thanks a lot; ; Parmet, however, is a small-time Op-erator when it comes to "confidential - Sources." David Halherstam has just turned out a 665-page book on the Ken-nedy-Johnson era in which a number of people are quoted in extraordinary fash-ion, and even more non-people (a "John-son aide," a "Kennedy confidant," etc.) turn up saying the strangest (but sing-ularly useful from Halberstam's view-point) things. There is not a single foot-note in the book! I suppose if you can't heat 'em, join 'cm: Did I ever tell yo_u how Jack Kennedy told me never to-be-lieve anything ken Galbraith said? Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 N. in Aim .11LITIQ Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � vec.: .L ;I G r.. ,,trs1.71,,,,-,i.-.?1-,771-11.:=7,777,.--' 1 i ati.i.,w,u,tuiL g SP0a-aiNG ME:. SPOOKS: . the victor marchetti story by jams otis "I'm a scoutmaster" says Victor Marchetti. He is, in fact, more than a scoutmaster. Until 1969 he was executive assis-tant to the deputy director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Rufus Taylor. More 'recently, he has been the subject of a legal case which could crack open � the darkest recesses of America's clan-destine government. "I am the kind of a guy who manages Little League teams," he goes on. "Well, my scouts and ball players began to grow up on me and they became draft age. They let their hair grow; they changed. Now I know these were good boys, and they started to get to rue. They began saying, 'I'm not going to go and get shot in Vietnam, because it's an unjust war.' " Doubts, gnawing doubts about Vietnam and the CIA's role in foreign affairs. He -says that he saw himself becoming a lifer, an intelligence bu-reaucrat, and he "didn't want to play the game any longer." After 14 years as 'a spy for America, Marchetti quit. That was 1969. Now, in August, 1972, in Washington, D. C., he sat in a Chinese restaurant � known as a place frequented by CIA agents. Far from the taciturn and glamorous killer, Mar-chetti looked stolidly middle class, of conservative mien and � talkative manner. As he spoke, he furtively sized up the occupants of the other tables and mentally chronicled the comings and going of all patrons, pre-sumably out of habit. Did he think the interview was being bugged? "It's not beyond them," he replied, his face a mixture of edginess and resignation. It had not always been like this. He had left the agency on the best of terms, his boss assuring him that he "had a home to come back to." "In the first year I was away, it was just as e47,17,,,rf I.Z17.W.)V173-7.75rr;:;--15,7,9 Pi":71:,:t7';51 Ti I il 1'1 11.11111I1 VAM,ye.,4,& if I was at the Agency. I was going to dinner parties ... we'd sit around and talk. In fact, I saw as much of Agency people as I did when I was working." But somewhere along the line he got the notion that he wanted to blow the whistle on the CIA: "I would go down to a shopping center and walk around. For the first time in 15 years, I began to look at a check-out clerk as a human being, instead of a check-out clerk. I got interested in people and my ideas about the Agency became firmer and sharper, and I began to Marchetti: Blowing the whistle focus on precisely what was bothering me." Victor Marchetti decided to write a book. While the process of writing can be a solitary and private experience, he could scarcely expect to scribble away, merrily exposing his former em-ployers, without it coming to their horrified attention. True, the CIA's record has been afflicted with tragi-comic vicissitudes, but it can pre-sumably keep tabs on its own. � Within weeks of his book outline being shown to various New York publishers, the CIA obtained a copy through a source within the industry. It immediately sought, and received, a court injunction against any further revelation of the book's contents. The order additionally restrains Marchetti from even discussing the as yet un-written book with his literary agent, publishers, or wife. It is an injunction of unprecedented scope�never before has the government gone to court to prevent former employees from speak-ing or writing. At the heart of the case lies a basic conflict between the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the government's interest in keep-ing a lid on its various clandestine--and often illegal�activities. Provoked by the wave of "whistle-blowing" atten-dant on Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers, the conflict arises because of official activity which of-fends the moral sensibilities of rather ordinary, and very loyal, publio ser-vants like Victor Marchetti. If the Su-preme Court backs Marchetti's right to talk, it could open a floodgate for a torrent of revelations about the ne-farious activities of American spy agencies. If it upholds the CIA, it could cut down on the trickle of infor-mation which currently keeps the In-visible Government on its guard. Aside . from the broader implica-tions of the case, the CIA has good reason to fear what Marchetti himself might reveal about his erstwhile em-ployers. He is unquestionably the highest-ranking intelligence official to threaten exposure of the Agency's more questionable endeavors. He knows where the skeletons are hidden. Indeed, Marchetti is given credit for developing the surveillance techniques which led the CIA to discover Russian missiles in Cuba and thereby provoked. the 1962 Missile Crisis. As Marchetti tells the story, "After I was with the Agency for five or six years, I was assigned to the Cuban problem. This was exciting and per-sonally very satisfying because another fellow and I evolved a strange analyti-cal working tool which we called crateology. With it we were able to identify the merchant ships that were arms carriers.. Over a period of time, since the Soviets were very methodi-cal, we began to learn which crate i-contained a SAM 2 and which crate Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 U DEC 1972 L :I ATI 0 C CIV - A profile of Mai. Gen. By Stanley Karnow As he walks his poodle along the shaded street near his split-level Alexandria home, Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale resembles any number of retired officers pasturing in the Washington sub-urbs. He is still lean and erect de-spite his 64 years, and, like so many military, pensioners, he finds life somewhat tame after his adventurous career. But in contrast to the .superan-nuated colonels who reconstruct, battles at the dinner table, Lans-dale's experiences Were of a high order. For he was in times past a dynamic, , influential and often controversial figure who single-handedly managed foreign gov-ernments and v.vhose behind-the-scenes counsel helped to shape U.S. policy and practice at critical junctures , in recent his-tory. In the Philippines during the early 1950s, for example, Lansdale Virtually directed the campaign against the Communist-led Huks in his capacity as special adviser to Ramon Magsaysay, then that country's defense secretary. In Saigon not long after, he effec-tively kept South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in of-fice by conspiring to crush his do-mestic foes while . persuading Washington to support him. Later, as the Vietnam war esca-lated,Lansdale was instrumental in convincing President Eisenhower and Kennedy that the United States and its Vietnamese clients could defeat the Vietcong by rely-ing on counterinsurgency techni-ques. Some of these techniques, as disclosed in the secret Penta-gon Papers, have revealed him to be considerably less savory than the public image of him as an ide-alist. Little of' the exotic drama that Characterized LanSclale's career is apparent in his present man ner.He � Edwin' Lansdale, the original "Ugly America is a gray, unassuming man whose subdued style borders on self-effacement. Some of his friends suggest that he has lost, much of his verve since his wife's death last spring, and he himself con-cedes that her passing has left him lonely and dispirited. Except for occasional evenings with old .cronies, many of them Asia veter-ans like himself, he leads a rather secluded existence. Other friends point out that he is weary after years of battling bureaucrats who oppose his un-conventional ideas; and Lansdale himself substantiates that view with bitter humor when he says that "the knives going in don't seem to hurt anymore. Yet, as he Speaks, it is clear that he still burns with a hard flame that is nearly religious in fervor. His reli-gion, he explains, is not formal. It is his faith that the United States could have successfully played world policeman by propagating its political philosophy. At the core. of Lansdale's doc-trine is the conviction that Com-munist guerrillas can be defeated in brushfire wars by "winning the hearts and minds' of people. In Vietnam, according to this thesis, the United States should have exported American democratic principles along with guns; mon-ey, machinery and food. ."We couldn't afford to be just against the Communists," Lansdale has written. "We had to be for some-thing." Lansdale's proposals often pro-voked the fury of Establishment strategists, some powerful enough to block his advance-ment. He has also been derided as a dreamer whose perception of reality was, at best, blurred. At the same time, though, he in-spired a coterie of disciples who regarded him as nearly infallible. The debate over him polarized several years ago in two cele-. . Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 validity of their arguments, a least endowed him with a meas ure of literary immortality. ham J. Lederer and Eugene Bur-. dick portrayed him in The Ugly American as Col. Edwin Barnum HilJendale, whose sweet harmon-ica purportedly stimulated rural Filipinos to oppose Communism. Graham Greene, on the other hand, depicted him in The Quiet American as.AIden Pyle, the naive U.S. official who believed that he could mobilize Vietnamese peas-ants to resist the Communists by instilling them with the precepts ' of Town Hall democracy. Although the old soldier has faded away, the debate lingers on. Just as Lederer and Burdick approvingly quote their hero as saying that "if you use the right key, you can maneuver any per-son or nation any way you want," so Lansdale's disciples still con-tend that the United States could have attained its objectives in Vi-etnam by developing psychologi-cal warfare methods more effica-cious than those employed by the Communists. This view, which became popular during the Ken-nedy Administration, is best artic-ulated in the articles of Lansdale's close friend, Robert Shaplen, the New Yorker correspondent in Sai-gon, who has long asserted that the United States and its South Vi-etnamese proteges could have beat the Communists by preempting the revolution. And just as Graham Greene indirectly reproved Lansdale by declaring that Vietnamese "don't want our white skins around telling them what they want," so his present-day critics claim that he never ac-Stanley Karnow is the former Washington Post AsianS corre-spondent and the author of Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution. bOntinued (Former Green Beret Capt. Dobert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were in-volved in one of the major controversies of the Viet-nam War in 1969 when ac-cused of murdering, a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed hy Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recall-ing events surrounding the assassination that lie says never were made public). By THOMAS MICHALSKI Journal Staff Writer �The Central Intelligence. A'7cyi U S Special TorFEes in an "unsanctioned ,fiidOer�ive. re GreetiliBerets frommmilitary Custody in September...1969eby me anS --ora-ITHIRmeclibl& . es ripe fii that involved a parachute diiFInioo- ri-Yen on._,Lesng tiiihTand a flight lo_Burernae ..according to former_ Cant. 'LTMar a.soo.. Marasco, one of the eight. charged with the murder of Vietnamese triple-aeenj Thai Kbar. Chu en, said the highly secret, unorthodox and uncoil--ventional" escape plan has never' before been made public. In telling the story to The Daily Journal, Marasco said the parachutists would have distracted base personnel enough to allow the landing of a twin-engine C-7A Caribou On a roadway at Long Binh, pick up the Berets and fly off to Burma. � Once in Burma, Marasco sa itiTiTirno�lierets;r�Willi CI A .... fli_p_d_would have established guerrilla forces for counter-intelligence work in Red China and other parts or Asia. We were in the stockade three weeks," Marasco said. "We were in maximum security where they al d rapists and murderers � . ." 'PT-TV Tr/ ATirprnr.1" iii T TN A TT V -r nrrrvivr T Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462`1-u auv 1.y IC "Officers arc never put in jail. They are usually held in house arrest." Such was the case of Col. Robert B. Rheault, Green Beret commander. who also was involved in the Chuyen incident. Marasco's cell Was four by seven. It bad no Leila facili-ties. A 206-watt bulb burned continuously, and the average-temperature, he said, was 120 degrees. We lay in these cells in undershorts," Marasco recalled. "When you had to go to the latrine you had ts scream, 'Guard, prisoner in Cell Two has to go to the bath-room Marasco said, "We were, in fact, prisoners of war. POWs of the American miltary." "The jail's commander, a lieutenant colonel, made our lives as bearable as possible with books; cigarettes, things like that." While in. the Lone Binh stockade, the Berets were "still convinced that eventually somebody woulft find out what was going on and that we would be let out." In early August an Ameri-can newspaperman was in an enlisted man's club when he heard two military policemen talking about the case. "Be went to MACV � Mili-tary Assistance Command, Vietnam � and started asking questions." Marasco said. On Aug. 15 the Army. after having- held the Berets for over three weeks without officially charging them with any crime, issued a news release Mat ,said "right Greco Berets are loOng held for murder and conspiracy to commit murder.-Murder e,e-ries a minimum of life sentence anti consiraey a Ina xi 11111111 of life imprison-/1'MA. "Noo that it was all out iit .the open we said to the CIA :You'd better get the word }back to Washington that if you continue this foolishness you have to assume the potential of us compromising every high mesesseesseeelexeneeeseesse Fourth of 5 articles es-,..seeseee.:-..eoss see sec. level intelligence operation in Southeast Asia," Marasco said. .Me didn't do anything that wasn't done regularly," Marasco said.. "The only difference is that it was usually given to t h e Vietnamese to do for us. "But, because Project Gamma . was a unilateral operation�we couldn't do that." Marasco Laid, "The Vietnanfie.se 'ac-tent serineeed to know Project Gamma existed." Military attorneys for .the Bemets were -joined by a host, of well - known stateside lawyers. One of the civilian attorneys said. "1 have. evidence to prove that the CIO 117IS f)Fi-irreci ohee_killiensmEent frectitated_the killing. or over 100 people in _Smith Vietnain, during the past yEarre ' Coide \V, egor , attorney for Major Thomas C. Middleton Jr.. cabled Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird to charge that the Berets were heing held under "inhuman conditions." Shortly afterward, the men o ere released from Long Binh jail and allowed to stay in regular billets. The handling or the case also stirred reaction among SMIle cOngreSSinco. Sen. Ernest F. Hollings of South. Carolina said, "Thc Se men are soldiers who were doing a job that-had to be done." Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, charman of the I louse Armed :-.;eis.,ices Committee, said ''this worse. Attorneys for some of the men, meanwhile, contended that their clients could not get a fair trial in Vietnam because Gen. Creighton Abrams. commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, and Maj. Gen. G .L. Mabry, commander of support troops in. Vietnam, were "prejudiced because they have prejudged the defendants." "Abrams caused this whole thing simply because of service rivalry between the regular Army and elite Green Berets," one attorney told the Associated Press. eZlemialijlemtetesehreat by the Berets to expose othermea. secret operations gotobacke.to CIA Chief_ Richard_tio.ims, "Ivo saCclown_oviaPresident NiXQ11�.." Marasco _said. . Marasco said a few days later Abrams met with President Nixon at the Western White House to discuss troop withdrawals. "The next day Nixon's military aide called us and said. 'Forget it. you're not coming -home," Marasco said. "Abrams, the aide said, told President Nixon that if he wanted the troop withdrawals to go smoothly, without prohlems. he wanted the Green Berets." Abrams, Marasco said, . pointed out to the President that as military commander in Vietnam he should be allowed to handle the case. The exchange, Marasco said, occurred in Septemher, 1909, when troop withdrawals Nvere in their early stages. Presidcio, Nixon, he said, agreed to allow Abrams to handle the Green Beret case. (b)(3) (b)(3) :"' Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Tan Deal L F. Stone a 4, �Washington The pending cease-fire agreement, as so far disclosed by Hanoi and Washington, is like a delicate watch, intricately fabricated to make sure it won't work: No agreement ever had so many in-genious provisions calculated to keep it from Succeeding. If by chance one spring doesn't break down, there is another in reserve that almost surely will, and if by some unforeseen mishap that one also Should work, there is still another which will certainly go blooey sooner or later.. The fragility of the agreement to .end the second Indochinese war is put in better focus if one compares..it with the eease-fire which ended the first, at Geneva in 1954. The only signed document that emerged from the Geneva conference was a cease-fire agreement between the military com-mands on both sides. It was accom-panied by a . final declaration which nobody signed and to which the .United States and the separate state the- French.. had created in the south objected; theh as now the puppet was more obdurate than the master. The first Indochinese war ended, as the second seems to be doing, with a cease-fire but no political settlement. The prime defect, the "conceptual" flaw, to borrow a favorite word of Kissinger's, lay in the effort to end a profoundly political struggle without a political settlement. A cease-fire then, .as now, left the political problem unresolved and thus led inevitably to a resumption of the conflict, It will be a miracle if the new cease-fire does not breed � another, a third, Indochinese war. � A political � solution was left to mailana 'and "free elections." But the 'Geneva cease-fire agreement, . dis-appointing as its results proved to be, was far more precise in its promise of free elections than is the new cease-fire. It set a firm date�July, I956�for the balloting; specified that the purpose of the elections was "to bring about the unification of Vietnam"; provided for the release within thirty days not only of POWs but of "civilian in-ternees"; and made clear that it meant political prisoners defining civilian internees as Approved for 261 -8/61730602-792462 P I; Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 -3'0 NOV 1972. raL7-21.�:77 B7fir#T,6' k. � Y ... all persons who, having in any way contributed- to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.l _ Nobody knows how many thousands of political prisoners are in Thicu's jails. The most famous is.Truong Dinh Dzu, the peace candidate who came in crippled. Arrests have been ihtensified in preparation for a cease-fire. The fate of the political prisoners figured prominently in the peace nego-tiations. The seven-point. program put forward by the other side in July of last year called for the dismantling of Thieu's concentration. camps and the release of all political prisoners. The eight-point proposal put forward by Washington and 'Saigon last -January left their fate in doubt. It called for the simultaneous release of all POWs and "innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina.'' The ambiguous phrasing seemed designed to -exclude politicals since these were neither "cap-tured" nor, in 'the eyes of the Thieu regime, "innocent." The new cease-fire terms do not bother with such ambiguity. Dr. Kissin-ger in his press conference of October 26 seemed to take satisfaction in the fact that the return of US POWs "is not conditional on the 'disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails." Their future, he explained, will be determined ."through negotiations among the South Viet-namese parties," i.e., between Thieu and the PRG. So the politicals will stay in jail until Thieu agrees to let them out. This may. easily coincide with the Second Corning.. This is only one of the many built-in (b)(3) The new cease-fire agreement gives him . far more pOwer than he would have ' had under the proposals he and Nixon made jointly in January. Under Point 3 of those proposals, there was to have been "a free and deniocratic presi-dential [my italics] election" in South Vietnam within six months. One month before the election, Thieu and his vice president were to resign. The president of the senate was to head a caretaker government which would "as., sume administrative responsibilities ex-second in the 1967 presidential elec-.eept for those pertaining to the elec-tion, the first and only contested one. lions" (my italics). Thieu's most notorious instrument for Administrative responsibility for the these round-ups was Operation Phoe- election, according to those Nixon-nix, which the CIA ran for him.. A hiett terms, was to be taken out. of Saigon Ministry of Information pain- the hands of the. Saigon regime and phlet, Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace put in those of a .specially created and Prosperity, boasts that Operation electoral commission "organized. and Phoenix killed 40,994 militants and run by .an. independent body repre-activists during those years.2 These are senting all political forces in South the opposition's civilian troops, the Vietnam which will assume its re-cadres without which organizational sponsibilities on the date of the agree-effort in any free election would be. ment�"3 � Finally the joint proposals of last January indicated that the electoral commission would be free from the inhibitions of the Thieu constitution, under which communist and neutralist candidates can be declared ineligible. According to those proposals, "All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates." How much weaker is the setup under the new cease-fire agreement: There is no provision for Thieu's resignation .before the election. The existing government is no longer ex-cluded_ from responsibility in holding the elections; no clear line is drawn between what the Thieu government can do and what an electoral commis-sion will do: what happens if the latter-is reduced to observing the irregu-larities of the former? Thieu will continue to be in control of the army and the police, and there is no way to� keep him from using them to harass the Opposition and herd the. voters. - Instead of an electoral commission, the new .agreement would set up a tripartite Council of National Recon-ciliation and Concord .for much the H IL PARIS, LE 1OUVEL OBSERVATEUR Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 R'� Lc Michel R. Lam berti et. Catherine Lam our ont fait le tour- du monde pour remonter toutes les fiVres qui m?nent aux vrais patrons de la drogue c Si nous ne venons pas a bout de ice fleau, e'est lui qui viendra _. ,out de nous ), s'exclamait, le 7 juin 1971, le president Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de telespectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste pri-vilege de compter le plus grand nombre d'horoThomanes du monde ! plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mine pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpetres dans les grandes villes sprit directement lies a la drague : on tue pour se procurer l'argent necessaire a l'achat d'une. dose d'heroine. Le phenomene.n'est pas seulement ameriL cain : tous les pays europeens voient croitre a une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de - leurs heroThomanes. En France, o�a pe-netration de la drogue n'a ete sensible qu'a partir de 1968, on en compte dela vingt mine. Et le ministere de la Sante estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mule heroinomanes en 1976. COUper Ea source La drogue !fest plus un simple pro-bleme de police. Partant du principe evi-dent, expos�ernierement a un journaliste americain de c U.S. News and World Report ) par l'ancien directeur des Doua-nes amoricaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et scion lequel c on ne pew pas devour toxico-inane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupe-fiants }, Washington a decide de remon--foe a la source, c'est-kdire a la produc-tion merne de l'opium, dont Pherolne est tut derive. Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de poli ciere, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de Plus en .t gendarmes du monde ) mais, .cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe a discuter le bien-fonde, les Etats-Unis se sont lances dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouee a l'echec. On produit, en effet, chaque armee, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvision-ner les cinq cent mule heroinomanes arne-ricains pendant cinquante ans : deux 5 trots mule tonnes, dont In moitie settle-ment est destinee a l'industrie pharmaceu-tique. Le reste passe sur le marche entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvision-nent les fumeurs d'opium et les heroIno-manes. L.es trafiquants peuvent se fournir a deux sources differentes O 1) Les pays dans Iesquels la culture du pavot est legate et contrOlee par l'Etat, mais oi une partie de la recolte. echappe aux autorites achninistratives. � 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens materiels et poll-tiques ��ou le desir � de faire respecter cette loi. La Turquie, troisierne producteur mon-dial, entrait clans la premiere . categoric. Jusqu'a cc que le gouvernement d'Ankara decide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc ii partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium etait de-tournee vers le marche elandesiin, alors qu'elle aurait dii. en principe, etre entiere-. ment achetee par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul a connaitre pareil probleme, une enquete effectuee par le service strategi-que des renseignements du Bureau des.Nar-cotiques arnericain (B.N.D.D.) donnai.t, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants. : Production (1) ecoulee sur le rnarehe !tette Production ecoulee sur le marche clandestin Turquie 150 Ind!) 1 200 Pakistan 6 Iran 150 U.R.S.S 115 Republique popu-laire de Chine 100 Yougosavie 0,83 Japan ' 5 Triangle d' or (Thailande - Sir-rnanie - Laos) Afghanistan Mexique (1) En tonnes. 35 a 50 250 . - 175-200 1,7 750 100-150 5-15 Contrairement a cc que l'on pourrait penser, les C fuitcs ) ne sont pas propor-tionnelles a l'importance de la produttion licite ni a celle des superficies cultivees en pavot. Elles dependent du plus o mins grand sous-developpement admini: tratif du pays concerne et de la capacit des autorites locales a exercer un control effectif sur les paysans;.au moment cit rocoltes. Pourtant, meme des controles rigot reux ne suffisent pas a eviter les detou: nements, compte tenu de In difference d( prix pratiques sur le marche officiel et st le =retie clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inc le prouve, oi, en depit dun s:ysteme controle gouvernemental cite en exemp par toutes les instances internationales, Ii fuites s'elevent a 18 c,,19 de la productir totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait echappi pres de 70 % de sa production. Le Paki tan, enfin, qui produit 1L.ralement Six toi nes d'opium, contribuerait pour pres deux cents tonnes a l'approvisionnemei des trafiquants. Le pavot vartovit Dans unc cleuxieme categoric de Pa} . la production de l'opium est illegale. n'existe evidemment aucun organiSil d'Etat charg�e controler une Iproducti( qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestin la recolte d'opium est entierement ecold sur le marche parallele. Scion le 13.N.D.J.: ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent ci quante a mine tonnes a l'approvisionn ment du trafic. D'autres regions, sur lesquelles on I possede absolument aucune informatic produisent de l'opium en quantite appt ciable : le Nepal et, probablement, la Syi et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale au, l'apparition de champs de pavots en Are rique du Sud. Contrairement a cc que a sonvent affirme, la culture du pavot requiert pas de conditions geog,raphiqu ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle reclar seulement une main-d'carire abondante bon marche car la recolte demande bea coup de soins et de minutie. Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas e producteurs traditionnels d'opium poi raient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre a cuitiN du pavot.. C'est le cas tout recent du pan. La production d'opium a, de cc tendance a croitre en fonction de la rnande et pourrait encore augmenter con derablement. Des indices nombreux trt, Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2." Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 4.2m0-Aa4z1J, ''7 :Vietnam Fu.tur 1U,S, Planners Thihking, Big ,.Civilian Advisers,Rising; Bureaucrats See Country � Taking on American Tone ' BY GEORGE 11IcARTHUR Times Staff Writer SAIGON�While cease-fire ne-gotiations proceed with questiona-ble progress in Paris and elsewhere, the U.S. .bureaucrats of .Saigon are confidently "using the tie to blue-print- future. empires in South .Viet-ham. � As of .now, their vision is unset-tling, � � Although past American exper ienees-in Laos and Cambodia can hardly be called successful, the plan-ners are casually using those coun-tries as partial models for. the Viet-narn blueprints. � President 'Nixon's senior wordsmith, H erbert G. Klein, has denied plans to station "either civilian or Military advisers" with South Vietnam's army after a cease-fire. He was treading a semantic tightrope, according to all the evidence in Vietnam. itself. The American military population has at least � temporarily levelled off at about 27,000 men. But the overall .presence in South Vietnam once . gain has started .to - slowly 'grow. Civilian technicians have ar-rived in significant numbers and ci-vilian* contractors are stepping up �operations in dozens of areas like training, maintenance and supply. . . Impossible to Get Estimate . ; At this Moment' it is imposSible to "get an accurate estimate of the num-ber of U.S. civilians in South Viet-nam with some kind of official con-nection with the U.S. Embassy, mili-.4ary, intelligence Or others. No single person or headquartecs seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microcopie replay of the great. buildup of 1965. No one seems to expect this civilian �2 9 NOV -,371 , minibuildnp to get Out of hand. But nobody has yet said. "stop." Part of the problem is that. Wash-ington has not stepped in to nrOvide answers to some specific bureau-cratic questions. � With Saigon's military warehouses bulging with liquor, PX goods and other supplies for some 30,000 men, the supply officials naturally want to know "how long?." and, more sup-plies are en route by ship already. Planners Regain Vigor Meanwhile, the planners, who were stunned by the mid-October revelation that a cease-fire was near, have regained their vigor. Having been frozen out of earlier planning by the secrecy of .the talks, they are tedoubling their efforts. "Plans are proliferating prodi-giously," admitted one staff colonel, who retained a sense of. humor and perspective despite a tiring and un;-ending round of 'committee meet-ings. The plans,. -partial plans, contin-gency plans and perhaps some wish-ful dreaming on paper now provide for � a South Vietnam with a pro-nounced American .govermental east. While many of the new experts or technicians (or advisers) will be wearing civilian sportshirts, the sus-picion is strong that underneath they will have dogtags, or at least retirement papers, And, 'the civili-ans already here, including many/ Central Intelligence Agen-cy types, will simply change titles and continue what they are doing, and possibly do more. � One.staff officer, already sporting civilian clothes much of. the time, admits that the biggest change in his office will be the remo-val of some awards and military knickknacks, in-cluding a mounted enemy. AK-47 rifle, which would not fit his "new" identity.. 'He also admits that he .could get different orders tomorrow, and he halfway expect t them, "To tell you the truth," 'one colonel admitted, "ho-body can make flat state-ments around .heS:e."..* � - � The new plans seem in so:me measure to be an outgrowth of this military insecurity. ;"When in doubt plan for. everything," 'joked .an en-listed clerk soon to depart Vietnam., , the initial days :fel-loWing Washington's � an-. nouncement� that it had. agreed to a 60-day evacua-� tip. period following 'a cease-fire, the 'U.S. cm-il-1-nand was mainly con-Cerned with the. crash pro-. gram to bring. in aircraft, guns and priority military equipment. � , Planning Activities ��, the negotiations be-canie more and more ex-tended, so did the plan-ning activities at. the U.S. Embassy and MACV Military Assistance Corn-nand Vietnam. Recom-mendations began to load the coded radio circuits back to Washington. In more or less finished form, a dozen or more ma-jor plans now exist. The first is a troop with-drawal sched u 1 e, with evacuation starting the �day after a tease-fire is signed and extending until about D-plus-57,.when the last evacuation- flight will depart Tan on Nhut Air-port (probably to be fol-lowed-on the runway by a .jet -landing with mail for ..the U.S. military attache's office). . Other plans cover setting up various military at-tache offices and speci-fying the troop numbers -needed, the setting up of !finance teams (as required iv U.S. law) to check on ' Vietnamese use of Ty equipment, provisions to provide military infor-mation to international su-pervisory teams and a new cloak for an agency known as CORDS�Civil Opera-tions and Rural Develop-ment Support. . � The CORDS agency is a scheduled casualty since it is now largely manned by 7. military officers and is di-rectly under the U.S. mili-tary command. � As the chief "civilian" agency .for pacification, CORDS al-ways has included many young State DepartMent officers, although it has , been directed by either a � L' CIA man or a retired mili-tary officer. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 CC_:. rrit-rm 'yr -rg nn-rm-ru. 1\T T A T.T Trverr,NT Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462u-Lu cy no Ly (b)(3) 777 71 Ifear,Ari 77- 7r sl Next' (Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were in-volved in one of the ma.jor controversies of the Viet-nam War in 11;tifi when ac-cused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, be spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recall-ing events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public). By THOMAS NlICHALSKI .Journal Staff Writer The murder of a South Viet-namese triple-agent in June 1969 came to light when one of the eight Green Berets involved "blew the whistle" because he thought "he was next. on the list." Former Capt. Robert F. Marasco said a sergeant, Alvin L. Smith Jr., started a chain of events that caused the commander of the U.S. .Forces in Vietnam "to lose his cool." Marasco earher dinn-,Hlosend. the order to murder Thai Khan. Chu\ en can-le directly frern a hl;i1 Centfal-Inielli-gence .-\::!enc!-_,nffi,Ti:11. --C' 1.-57Ty n was "eliminated" --thrown into the South China Sea � after being shot twice in the head, on er about June - 15, 1969. "I \ had abort two more weeks to serve. in Vietnam," Marasco recalled. "Smith, who was in on tile negotiations and decisions all the time, war.; very friendly with Chuyen. ' "They were bod1ies,4whieh was his , first. mistake. MU never hacome a buddy with 0 yaor vine rd .7.42N-it. 11.4 ).-�,.4, i'Tn,':11i.i!�:-!ric, p:3C;IcP," Ma:�cis �., sai:i Sini:h ar:--o wjs ft le n.fly n int 0-an, en's wife, Pharn NMI ',HI, and her sister. - "He was always going to Sannin with ChuYen for one thing or another,'' Martisco 'But it didn't seem wreng. until ai'terwards." All througn the negotiations ce7nerning. Chuyen 's fate. Marasco said. Smith "was net agreeing that he (Chuyen) should he eliminated. He was not disao:recing, either. He had no alternative, hut be had a special feeling for Chuyen." Marasco said Smith "became very nervous fo'it number of reasons. [-IF; had recently buried his mother in Florida and had become quite neurotic in Vietnam. "He had decided that because he was the only enlisted man, a noncom-missioned officer, involved in the Chuyen thing, that we did not trust hog and that we would kill him. "That was absolutely ridicu-lous," Marasco said. ''The thought never entered our minds." Atnnisi, p4ia _Thirawa_ soich South a cat to. thenci.A -751nti0n chiR at Nha e to a different agent,. not the one who was involved in the thing from the outset," Marasco said, ''This agent did not know anything about the Chin en thing," ,Marasco pointed out that 'everything is celled and compartmentaiized in the intelligence communny. Some-times the right hand doesn't knaw \\ hat ti1e. left is The Nha Trang CIA inAn dna-card Smith to '\.l,.tn_ace... 5-a-rnii�ni,i.-:;-.7.1-7;71-1-it7i-;n11,,f that tor iii mm crio -nt k71:I 1,1 I! told store to the militory," Marasco said. "You 6711 must understand that the Army had no real knowledge of Project Ga�mma. Although we were military, we, in fact, worked for SOG -- Special Operations Group." The Chuyen incident, how-ever. went up Marasco's chain or command to Col. Rohert B. Rheatilt, Green Beret com-mander at the time. "He made the final decision on the assassination, based on our information and that provided by the CIA," Marasco said. "We assumed that Rheault went up his chain of command as we \vent ttp ours. He did not." Smith, Marasco said, told his story to an unidentified Army officer in Saigon who rala ed it. through channels. to Gen. Creighton Atli:alias, commander of the U.S. forces at the time and now Army chief of staff. "Abrams called in an aide, a brigadier general, who was supposed to know all about intelligence operations in viernam." Marasco said. "He was .asked about the Chuyen matter. - "The aide, having been in Vietnam only a month. said 'we don't have any cross� border operations.' said_ there were no CIA agents con-. Tr-ofli�on pnople and _ that the Snecial Forces are i-Tvolved - -advisor; trim Ahrains, .1drasr:o said. then Pheault to Saigon "to !hiags away. 'We had come up with Third of .1 'articles a ('o\ (�1' , hcf(n(�, al)nut 1,,,h it had happened to Chu \ rasco said, ".lip t in c.,ise it t�ds nek.'ded. It was standard procedi (b)(3) � The story was that "we had found out. that Chuyen might have been a had guy, but that we didn't know for sure and that he was sent to Cambodia , on a mission. We had a heli-center log and it showed that a guy went. from Nha Trang at the specified time to the Cam-bodian border where he was dropped off. "Chuyen was chubby and we happened to have a heavy-set Oriental in Project Gamma who looked like him, "In the cover report." 'Marasco explained, "we said. Chuyen went to Cambodia, had one-way radio trans-mission, and that he was sup-posed to contact us arid never did." Marasco. who could not identify Chuyen's double, said "he wasn't really that involved in the operation." "We said in the cover story that Chuyen was a had guy and that he just never came back from Cambodia," Marasco said. One of the military's unwritten rules, Marasco said, is "to always cover your com-mander, no matter what." 'This is why Rheault gave the general the cover story but, according to a CIA 'after action' report, Ahrams "became very upset because one of his senior commanders apparently had lied to him," Marasco said. Abrams. Nlarasco said, was urtjleti_ .=1 m.!err.d _jLjbemacL that civilians, in thisneasenthe_ - 'Charge of Berets. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 THApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 26 Nov i972 (b)(3) (b)(3) Dloodbuths, or allegations? To the Editor: In his zeal to reassure him-self and his readers of the soundness of past literature on North Vietnam, John S. Carroll ("After we get out, will there be a bloodbath in South Vietnam?", Oct. 15) violated the first rule of honest argumentation, which is to represent with reason-able accuracy the text which you wish to refute. Having -chosen my "revisionist" cri-tique of past and present alle-gations ' of a "bloodbath" in North Vietnam as his target, ,Carroll manages nevertheless to avoid. reference � with a single exception--to any of the specific evidence which I have offered in the two publications which he cites. I object, of course, to his taking out .of context my re-mark that I no longer wish to rest my case against Nixon's bloodbath allegations on the International Control Commis-sion reports alone, and using it to conclude that "at least one of the principal assump-tions on which the revisionist history rests is not even be-lieved by its own author." I made the remark in the con-text of a long, fully docu-mented study of the North Vietnamese land reform which I was then completing. As 1 explained to him at that time, in comparison with the evidence I had found of a general distortion of the North Vietnamese land-reform qampaign in both primary and secondary sources available to Americans, the I.C.C. re-ports simply receded in Importance: As a matter of fact, I did not and do not "acknowledge that the original I.C.C. ap-proach is weak." Carroll has completely misrepresented the nature of the evidence to be found in the International Control Commission reports�evidence to which he never specifically refers. It is nec-1 essary, therefore, to repeat it here: From April, 1955, to February, 1961, during which time the Diem Government was actively pressing charges of Vietminh violations of the Geneva Agreement with the I.C.C., the French Government and Diem submitted only 43 complaints of political re-prisals in the North alleging a total of 56 incidents of re-prisal. However, of the first 12 complaints, three were in-vestigated and it was found that there was in fact no damage to life or property to the alleged victims. And of the 18 cases of reprisal by D.R.V.N. alleged to have oc-curred in the December, 1955-y, 1956, period�the height of the land reform campaign �only one involved alleged loss of life. � Even more important, dur-ing this same period of time, the population of the North, which submitted many thou-sands of personal petitions to fixed and mobile teams of the I.C.C. complaining of viola-tions of their freedom of movement, submitted only 41 petitions complaining of po-litical reprisals. This evidence thus has nothing to do with the D.R.V.N. land-reform law or the I.C.C.'s inability to in-vestigate airfields. As much as Mr. Carroll and others would like to believe that mass reprisals were carried out against former French and puppet Government per-sonnel. the evidence indicates that the worst thing to befall the former civil servants, sol-diers and policemen of the French regime in Vietnam was that they were shamed into, accepting the same low salary that Vietminh cadres received. (See Duong Chau, "The Seventeenth Parallel," Saigon, 1958, p. � 147.) The former resistance fighters in South Vietnam did not fare so well during the same period. I am even more disap-pointed that Mr. Carroll did not see fit to deal seriously with my study of the land re-form. lie cites all the usual sources alleging a "blood-bath" in the North (Buttinger, Fall; Tongas, Honey, Mang Van Chi) without even ac-kiiOWAd for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 odology and conclusions of these works do not stand up under careful analysis. An en-tire 'chapter ,of my 60-page study is devoted, for exam-ple, to an analysis of how Bernard Fall systematically misunderstood the socio-economic background of the land reform in arguing that . it was economically unjusti-fied. But Carroll repeats Fall's argument that there were no "real" landlords as though it were unchallenged. I have also documented how Mang Van Chi's sup-posedly "authoritative" ac-count has been the primary source for virtually every secondary .source on the land reform (including Fall), but there is . no mention in Carroll's article of this dependence. . But most important, Carroll ignores the evidence that Hoang Van Chi's account was written for the explicit pur-pose of advancing a propa-ganda campaign against the D.R.V.N. behind which were. the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Governments: the repeated instances in which Chi fabricated evidence where none existed for a policy of massive executions of inno-cent people; Chi's close rela-tionship with the U.S. and Saigon propaganda organs and the C.I.A., all of whom funded and promoted his writings; the significant change between 1958 and 1964 versions of his charge of "landlord quotas"; and his lack of qualifications to write from personal experience about. the party's policy on land reform. Carroll attempts to defend Hoang Van Chi's "loose" translation of Vo Nguyen Giap's statement by citing the opinions of unnamed ex-perts that the Communists normally used the terms in question as euphemisms for terror and execution. But re-gardless of the opinions of such unnamed experts, the fact is that the Communists did not use the word in ques-tion to mean "execution." � And if Carroll had bothered to ask me, I could have cited numerous usages of the word in Communist documents in contexts which � make this clear beyond any doubt. Finally, his flippant dismis-sal of the documentary evi-dence used in 'my study indicates that Mr. Carroll is simply unfamiliar with schole arship on Communist affairs. Most of the documents which I cite, primarily the party newspaper Nhan Dan, were intended to communicate with an audience of party members and general public in. North � Vietnam what the general political line and specific pol-icies of the party were during the land-reform period. These are precisely the documents with which any serious scholar would begin in a study of the land reform cam-paign. Moreover, the D.R.V.N. history of the land reform, which is based on official pol-icy directives and statistical-surveys of the land-reform period, is in no way incon-sistent with these earlier � doctiments. As for the estimate of 800 to 2,500 executions during the land reform, which I have suggested on the basis of the available data, it is entirely consistent, as I point out in the study, with statistics on death sentences in several provinces in the North dur-ing the land reform�statis-9cs published by the South Vietnamese Government. .Readers of The Times Magazine who wish to pur-sue the subject further may order. copies of my study, "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Re-form Reconsidered," from the International Relations of East Asia Project, Cornell University. D. Gareth Porter,. Research Associate I.R.E.A.., Cornell University Ithaca, N. Y. c crit DIATIONA.LJ (.11-1ARDIAN Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 J. LI � � s." � Made in U.S.A. (b)(3) These "Public Safety Advisors," recruited primarily from the FBI, 0 the CIA and military police units, work closely with the National Police Directorate and Internal Security Bureau in Saigon, the u National Police "Special Branch" (political police), and nit Operation Phoenix personnel assigned to the hundreds of provincial and district "interrogation. centers" where political suspects are routinely beaten and tortured before being shipped to Con � Son ka prison island. .. . These ads isory activities are accompanied by lavish subsidies and : grants of police materiel, which have turned the Smith Vietnamese police apparatus into one of the largest and most heavily-armed paramilitary forces in the %% odd. Under Diem, the National Police LI By Michael T. Ware force numbered only 19,000 men�a number which at that time was considered sufficient to justify pinning the label of a "police state" Under the terms of the peace settlement announced by the on the Saigon gos eminent. Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Presidential advisor Henry Since 1962, how es er, the U.S. has financed a sixfold increase in Kissinger on Oct. 26, all U.S. military personnel are to be withdrawn NP strength�to 114,000 men on Jan. 1, 1972. U.S. support of the NP from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the agreernebt, under the AID program amounted to 585 million between /901 and Although many provisions of the treaty require clarification, the 1971 and additional millions of dollars were provided by the impression one gets from reading the published text is that the Department of Defense under Vietnam war appropria n tios. l'Ile entire U.S. warmaking machinery will be rem 0% ed from Indochina. cost of the Phoenix program, estimated at 5732 million, is totally It is for this reason that document re&ently acquired by the borne by the CIA. � , . Guardian on the U.S. "Public Safety" program are cause for special It is clear, from to the Guardian. m the documents made as� concern. that U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus may well increase in These documents, the Agency for International Development's future years, if the battle shifts to a political struggle .between TItieu (AID's) "Program and Project Presentation to the Congress" for and his many opponents. In the preface to the Fiscal Year (I7Y) ., fiscal 1972 and 1973.. ifidicate that 'Washington would like to 1972. AID presentation, it was stated that: ; maintain an elaborate police-support apparatus in Vietnam for: "As one aspect Of Vietnamization, the Vietnamese National some tune to come. - Police are called upon to carry a progressively greater borstaa. I hal. � This apparatus. supers ised by AID's Office of Pablic Safety in the must share with the Vietnamese armed forces the burden oi . State Department, is administered as part of the Foreign aid countering insurgency and provide for daily peace and order�not program and thus is not identified as a military program. Nes er- only in the cities, but throughout the countryside. It is planned to theless, the Public Safety program is directly tied to the war effort, increase police strength from about 100,000 at present to 124.00.0 and is considered, a major part of Operation Phoenix�the CIA's during Fiscal 1972. to allow assumption of a greater burden in the effort to destroy the political structure of the National Liberation future. The U.S. plans to make commensurate assistance as ailable." Front (in Pentagon parlance. the "Viet Cong Infrastructure," or 'VCD. . Specifically, AID listed these "activity targets" for the Public Safety program in FY 1972: � According to the AID documents, which the Vietnamese are no "Provision of commodity and advisory support for a.police force doubt aware of. the purpose of the program is to assist "the Viet-of 122,000 men�by the end of FY 1972, increasing the capability of namese National Police (NI') to maintain law and order and local the police to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure in coordination security in pacified areas. combat smaller VC elements and deny with other Government of Vietnam 'security agencies (under resources to the enemy." An added function is to help Saigon Operation .Phoenix); assisting the National Identity Registration dictator Nguyen Van Thieu consolidate his control of urban areas Program (NIRP) to register more than 12,000,000 persons 15 years " by suppressing dissent and crushing all opposition to the Saigon of age and oVer by the end of 1971; continuing to pros isle basic and regime, specialized training for approximately 20,000 police annually; "The -development of an effective National Police and the. in-pros iding technical assistance to t he police detention system, stitutionalization of law enforcement," AID reports, "ztre importztra including the planning ;Ind supers ision of Ilk construction of 34 jztil - elements in pacification and longaterm national development." facilities during 1971; and helping to achiese a major inc ease in the Launched in 1955 number of police presently working at the sillage les el." The Public Safety program in South Vietnam was launched in The Fiscal 1973 program sets the same �serail objectis es. but 1955,, when 33 American police instructors arrived in Saigon under calls for a vast increase in the number of NP officers assigned to the the cover of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) to train vilive police posts�from 11,000 in 1972 to 31,000 by the end of Ngo Dinh Diem's palace guard and secret police in modern 1973. � . counterinsurgency techniques. � To finance this massise effort during the FY 1971-1973 period, In 1962, the program \\ as expanded under President Kennedy's AID asked congress for an appropriation of $17.9 million. of which orders, and administrative- responsibility shifted to the U.S. 513.0 million would pay the salaries of the nearly 20(1 Public Safety Operations Mission, In 1967, as the pace of the U.S. war effort was Ads isms. 53.3 million would go for commodities Ill) systems. accelerated, Public Safety operations were placed under Pentagon radios, patrol cars, tear gas. etc.), and 5013,000 w mild be used for jurisdiction t hrough the Civil Operations and RCA /flu tionary training several hundred Saigon police officers in the 11.S. and other Development Support program (CORDS). �� . "third countries." The resident U.S. police staff was enlarged with each Of these � administrative changes: beginning with a staff of six men in 1959, the Public Safety mission in Vietnam -increased to 47 in 1903 and to 19b in VP?. Cont, i.ITtled Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 - 6 NOV 1972 (b)(3) 01.: CONSIDINE . r ay That Will Nev6r Come Question: Do you think there'll be a day when the U.S. is not bugged by somebody named Nguyen, or Duong? . . . .. Answwer: Ngo. Retired Maj. Gen. Dtiong Van Minh, the CIA puppet who overthrew the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem nine years ago, has come out against the Kissinger "peace is at hand" plan. He says a ceasefire at this time, when the fighting is spread all over the country in small pockets, would be impoossible to police by neutral forces and the U.N. Better to have the estimated 150,000 North Vietnam invaders retire to large regrouping areas, where they can be more easily watched. �- President Nguyen Van Thieu won't budge until his 'land is completely clear of his enemies from the North. . The rule of Big Minh, as he is called, lasted only from Nov. 1, 1963, to Jan. 30, 1964. He was pushed out by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. He retired to Thailand to raise orchids, but sur-faced again in Saigon several years ago and briefly opposed Thietes election last year! He dropped out before Election Day with an an-nouncement that the election was rigged. Since *hen, Big Minh has been a quiet rallying point lor anti-Thieu former generals, colonels and k.1 fficials. It is a mark of his potential power that he has not been forced into oblivion, as has t. ne-time premier Nguyen Cao Ky. If Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 EMT 1 WU \ Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) tore- of Vietcong Surviving ar � By FOX BUTTERFIELD sinew to The New York 'num ' � SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 4�Despite years of fighting that have largely shattered the Vietcong guerrillas, the Com-munists in South Vietnam have managed to preserve the core of their political apparatus with what many well-Informed Vietnamese and American of-ficiaIS believe to be a dedicated. cadre of 40,000 to 60,000. Those knowledgeable sources feel that the Vietcong political organization will pose a fonnici-able threat to the Saigon Gov-ernment under a cease-fire. The organization is spread through--eut the country and .includes local village operatives, secret agents in Government-control-led areas and political officers Some high-ranking American among the guerrillas, who form military and intelligence of-the-Vietcong's military arm. ficers, however, do not agree that the Vietcong have main-tained political strength: This A '72 Tactic: Restraint One of the clearest indica-tiens of the continued strength of the Communist political ap-paratus is that despite the in-tensive fighting this year, the number of defections from the Conununist ranks is half that of last year. There have been 8,237 defectors so far this year, against nearly 16,000 at this Unit) 1111971. . The continued existence of the Vietcong's political appara-tus appears to be a major rea- view, which is known to have son why President Nguyen Van been transmitted authoritatively Thieu and many other Viet-!to Washington, is that the narnesc are us about the Communists are badly weak-peace settlement worked out by ened militarily and politically Hanoi and Washington. and are practically suing for settlement and turn the mill. tary ,struggle into a political struggle. The analysts say that Hanoi this year carefully preserved its cadre of secret agents in Government-controlled areas by not trying to stir popular up-risings to accompany the of-fensive. During the Communist Tet offensive of 1968, thou-sands of cadremen were killed when they came out in the open to lead what they thought would he mass revolts. As one intelligence officer explained Hanoi's 1972 policy: "The war was a stalemate that neither side could win. They figured that if they could get the United States out, they stood a better chance � of - win-ning the peace." �"The Vietcong have lost peace' many of their best cadre and Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the Vietcong, or they aren't 10 feet tall any National Liberation Front�the more," said an American with Communists never refer to a decade of experience inViet- themselves as Vietcong � are nam. "But their organization". weaker in some ways than they the American went on, "is built. wet." 3965' when they came close to taking over the coon-on the hard bedrock of dis- try without large-scale North cipline and shared sacrifices. Vietnamese help. The North The survivors are tough." Vietnamese invasion this spring indicates that. Militarily, intelligence sources! report, the Vietcong now have to rely on North Vietnamese troops to keep the traditional Vietcong guerrilla units up to strength. In some famous bat-talions with Vietcong names, only the guides and a few of the officers are native south-erners, the intelligence sources say. Moreover, American analysts say, whatever independence the southern Vietcong once had To intelligence analysts, this has been lost over the years auggesta a high level of disci- as IIanoi has taken control. plino among the 'Vietcong and Political Links Strong confidence that they are win-Some American analysts now say, in fact, that Hanoi's ,strategy this year was,designed :to take advantage of the rust party, and reportedly get !Communist political strength, , their orders through the agency With Its vast offensive, employ- known as COSVN. This, nsual-iing North Vietnamese troops, ly 'spelled out as the Central I ', 'Hanoi hoped to force a peace Office for South Vietnam, The Vietcong cadremen are almost all members of the Peo-ple's Revolutionary party, the southern branch of Lao Dong, the North Vietnamese Commu-would be better translated as the Central Committee's Office for South Vietnam, American intelligence sources say. The office is believed to be located in Kratie Province in northeastern Cambodia, a sparsely populated and heavily forested region long --under Communist control. . The top officials, most of whom are-thought to be North Vietna-mese, are the leaders of the People's Revolutionary party I and also members of -Hanoi's' elite Politburo or of the larger Central Committee, according: to American analyst � For example, Phan Hung, who is believed to be the head of the office, is also the ruling secretary of the party and a member of the Hanoi Politburo. He is a North Vietnamese. His second-in-command, who uses the psueclonym of Muoi Cue, Is also a northerner and a mem-ber of the Central Committee. American officials say that the Vietcong's titular leaders ;such as Nguyen IIuu Tho !chairman of the front, or Itiuynh Tan Phat, the Secre-tary General of the front, have ibecome, progressively less pow-� erful. Most experts agree that one reason for the Vietcong's mili-.tary decline is the enormous' 'shift of South Vietnam's pop-ulation away from the country-'side and into safe urban areas to escape the war. At least a .third of South Vietnam's vil-lagers are estimated to have :left their homes, often depriv-ing Vietcong units of bases for recruitment, supplies or taxa-tion. Some allied oficials are con-cerned that this trend may be reversed under a cease-fire and that thousands of villagers may conic home � providing the Vietcong with a renewed source of power.' But no :natter how badly the Vietcong have been hurt mili-tarily, several recent American studies have shown that their political organization remains intact. The organization withstood the vaunted Phoenix program, established by the Central In-11' , ' 1967 cifically to eliminate the Viet-. cong cadre. Though more than. 20,000 were' killed under the Phoenix program and another 40,000 jailed or persuaded to defect, officials connected with it admit frankly that it has been a failure. A recent study for the Rand Corporation found that in Dinntuong Province, in the nem. or Me populous mown& 'delta, the Vietcong have pre-served a core of about five cadremen per village. "Despite I the decline in military capa-I bilities," the study said, in! part, "the N.L.F. in Dinhtuong, has managed to keep the nu-. cleus of its movement intact." The study also found a large measure of "latent support" for the Vietcong among vil-lagers. This continuing sym-pathy for the Communists, the study reported, was not in evi-dence where the Saigon Gov-I ernment forces were strong, but it could easily reappear, should Saigon weaken. For example, the study noted that before the 1968 Tet offen-sive, many Vietnamese and IAmerican officials thought that the Vietcong in Dinhttiong i.were on their way to defeat. l'But, once the Communists gave !their sudden order to attack, lj'almost the entire rural pop-itilation in the province was :mobilized and coordinated in support of the attack," the study concluded. � The highest cadre concentra-tion, according to Vietnamese and United States intelligence estimates, is 25.00 in the Me-kong delta, Militery Region IV. These sources n-port that the second largest renter of Viet-cong, about 15,C0n, are in the Central Highlands and central coast 'known as Military Re-gion II, and most of them are concentrated in Diiihdinh, Prov-ince. , The situation in the north-lernmost region of South Viet-nam. Military Region 1, has ,been complicated this year by Idle invasion across the demili-tarized zone and by the North Vietnamese reportedly taking large numbers of people north for indoctrination. The area around Saigon, Military Region III, has always had the lowest number of Viet-cong cadre, analysts say, be-cause of the numbers and alert-ness of, the Government police in the capital. But while there are fewer than 10,000 Commu-nist party members and cadre-men in the Saigon area, they are said to be the best in the country. Over the last few years, the. Vietcong organization in the city of Saigon has appeared to.; e steadily-losing power. De-spite orders in captured Com-munist documents calling for terrorist acts in Saigon this fail, � in the past month there were only three very minor in-cidents. The Saigon city ap-paratus is also reported to have: been criticized for failing to produce its quota of taxes and: supplies. _ Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO27'92462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 MASS. PATRIOT LEDGER NOV 4l972 E 65,785 NO SECRET WAR -- An Associated Press report yes-terday from Saigon that the United States is planning to keep a mili-tary advisory group of American civilians in South Vietnam after regular military forces are with-drawn is disturbing� The � report quoted military sources as saying that the ad-visers would be employed by ci-vilian firms under contract either _ to the Defense or State Depart-ments. Whether such activities would be covered by a Vietnam peace agreement or e.xcluded froth them remains conjectural. There is as yet no signed peace agreement. The. U.S. is insisting upon reach-ing _certain mutual understandings concerning the basic accord that iS being worked out. - The implication of this report is quite clear � the continuation of American clandestine operations in Vietnam after the uniformed 7egulars are withdrawn, the kind operations being. conducted in the "secret wars" in Laos an Cambodia. Nobody in the U.S. government, of course, is going to confirm that CIA el' taeiL, agents will remain behind to do what they can secret-ly to prevent Communist takeovers in Indochina. Obviously a number , of American civilian officials will stay in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in various capacities. The New York Times reported this week, for example, "In conver-sations in recent days with Prime, Minister Souvanna Pheuma of Laos and others, Nixon has stressed that he would seek to Con-tinue American economic and other assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam because he believed it was important to maintain non-Communist governments in South-east Asia." It would be all too tempting to use "civilian" aid officials, for ex-ample, for _covert operations. It would be naive to suggest that the United 'States have no intelli-gence agents in Indochina after a peace agreement. But the .U.S. should not shift its involvement in Vietnam from an open war to ,.an underground war. waged by :agents under cover. � , Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 LIFE LETTERS - Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 NOV 1972 HEROIN AND THE C by Flora Lewis THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA by Alfred W. McCoy Harper & Row, $10.95 One fact is beyond dispute: heroin .is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Esti-mates about the drug traffic are unre-liable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stimbling through city streets, crime - to the point of civic terror. There are � said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number esti-mated two years. ago and ten times the level of 1960. Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970,- high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more nor-mally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wher-ever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took. the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched. Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shad-owy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics in-volved, if only because the traffic con-tinues to flourish on such a scale de-spite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net. Since the United States suddenly became aware of the sinister dimen-sions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been cus-tomary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the .poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and partic-ularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S'. govern-ment insisted; and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins. Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is con-cerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably in-volved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battle-ground from which President Nixon assured us he was disengaging "with honor." � McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage�for the opium trade is dan-gerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and war can be murderous�to document the facts of the Asian pattern. A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vien-tiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from preCise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had *never come through clearly in the United States. Now, in his book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, McCoy has set it down. To show how it devel-oped, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread oppro-brium, added to growing understand-ing of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, Ameri-can addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out. A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a world-wide octopus of evil almost beyond Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 '7/ DAILY WORLD Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 _ 19/Z r By GENE TOURNOUR and TIM WHEELER ' - NEW YORK. Oct. 31 � Pressure on the Nixon Admin-. ). to sign a Vietnam peace agreement mounted vis-ibly today even as the original Oct. 31 deadline passed in Paris without the initialing of a treaty. In New York and Washington, peace' activists warned of NixOn pre-election trickery and the possible abandonment of the agreement.af ter Election Day. � "The next week is the most im- reached in principle on Oct. 8." portant of the war," Cora Weiss Mrs. Weiss and David Dellinger, told several hundred anti-war a leader of the Peoples Coalition activists who crowded into Hunter for Peace and Justice, called on College Assembly Hall last night. the audience, many of whom were The meeting was held on strategy veteran peace workers, to help .to thwart President Nixon's man- mobilize the city for what they euvers to sabotage accords termed "the supreme test of the reached on Oct. 8 with the repre- peace movement." sentatives � of the Vietnamese Telegram forms circulated people. During the meeting, telegram "If Nixon is not forced to sign forms were circulated that car-the nine-point peace accord in the Tied the message: "If this is not week- before the election, then he an election maneuver, sign the has four more years to sabotage agreement now." For 25 cents the. peace and keep up the killing, Mrs. message will be sent to Nixon im7 Weiss warned: mediately, the audience was told. Seven-day drive � At the- meeting's conclusion at Reporting on her meeting in 10 p.m., 400 participants, despite Paris Friday with representatives near-freezing temperatures, mar-from North and South Vietnam, ched to Nixon campaign head-Mrs. Weiss said, "It is up to the quarters at Madison Ave. arid 53 U.S. peace movement whether or St., and began a vigil in support not Nixon manages to turn this of the immediate signing of the chance for peace into just another peace agreement. election maneuver which can be � 'Trick or treaty?' abandoned after Nov. 7. "Is it a trick or is it a treaty?" "Our job in the next seven days is to put the U.S. on record in sup-port of the peace agreement shouted the marchers to passers-by as they made their way to the vigil site. The vigil was scheduled to con-tinue until 6 p.m. tonight which is midnight Paris time, the end of the day on which the U.S. bad committed itself to signing the nine-point peace accord. In other parts of the country similar demands are being ex-pressed that the American people prevent Nixon from sabotaging the chance for peace. Congressman Parren Mitchell (D-Md.) in a statement to the Baltimore Afro-American, now on the newsstands, declared, "If reports from North Vietnam are correct, then every person in this country ought to be apply-ing pressure on the White house to achieve at long last an end to a futile, wasteful war which we could not win. 'Thies' must go' "If indeed President Thieu stands as the only opposition. to peace in Vietnam then he must go. His administration has been cor-(b)(3) 0- tn.4 e kr" To L., ow_ v Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO279462 Contintle uncm Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 29 OCT 1972 0 77� ci By Nguyen Tien Hung The writer was born in Thanhoa, -North Vietnam, later lived in South Vietnam, and is currently an associate professor of economics at Howard Uni-versit.y. � tisAFFICIALLY, it is clear, a settle-ment of the Vietnam war is about to be reached. But in the minds of Hanol's leaders, the cease-fire and .political accord that now appear im-minent. will not mean the end of . the struggle. Rather, to them such de-velopments will mean only that yet an-other phase in the war between North and South has been opened. . It must be understood that in the Hanoi politburo there are no "doves" on the question of unifying Vietnam under communism; all are "hawks." ' What they differ substantially on is the method of -accomplishing this aim. Thus the main key to iinnoi's increas-ingly accommodating stance at present and to what may happen after a set-tlement is signed can be found largely in the power struggle within the Ha-noi politburo. The struggle is between one faction 'headed by he Dunn, a Southerner and secretary-general of the Communist Party, and another led by Truong Chilli], a Northerner and chairman of the standing committee of the National Assembly. Their rivalry dates back to the 10-10s, when they competed for the ,mind and confidence of the late Presi-dent lio Chi Minh. The rift was greatly intensified in 395G when President Ho effectively replaced Truong Chinh 'with- Le Dunn as secretary-general of the party, a post Chinh had held for lh -years.. . . . � Truong Chinh Emerges �:-y? ECENTLY THEIR CONFLICT 1.0e has extended to three broad is-sues: the economic performance in the North; the ideological direction regard-ing economic policy, and, above all, the conduct of the war in the South. he Duan's faction called for immedi-ate conquest of the South at all cost, and he strongly supported Vo Nguyen Chip's big-battle and total-uprising strategy. Clap, spoiled by the Dien-blenphu victory and obsessed with the thought of becoming a Vietnamese. Na-poleon, provides Le Duan with protec-tion against the powerful police force . Tran Quoc Haan, an ally of Truong, Chinh. . J./ As�in all Communist countries, no leader would dare express himself openly on so sensitive a question as party factions. Nevertheless, based on each politburo member's past record, position, performance, and on the Viet-namese pattern of behavior, one can speculate on the current power align-ment in Yorth Vetnam fc;lows: ' LE DUAN FACTION � 'Vo Nguyen Giap, strongman of the army. Giap is a long-time, bitter enemy of Truong Chinh. Ills hatred for Chinh sterns from two sources�Chinh's favor-able attitude toward Chinese interven-tion in Vietnamese affairs, and Chinh's undermining of Giap's authority by ap-pointing political commissars to share responsibility side by side with mili-tary commanders. � Pham Hung, director of the war in the South. Like Le Duan, Hung is a Southerner. Although he remains director of COSVN, the armed forces in the South, he was removed as first deputy on June 10, 1972,- after the Na-tional Assembly, election. TRUONG CIlII FACTION � Le Due Tito, currently adviser to Hanoi's delegation to the Paris peace talks. Tlio's hatred of Le Duan dates back to 1950 when he was sent by Ho Chi Minh as an inspector to the South. Be became engaged in a bitter dispute with Le Duan on the conduct of the ' war. Duan was summoned to North Vietnam in 1951, while 'rho remained in the South for some time thereafter. � Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign affairs minister, supports Triton; Chinh be-cause of their common agreement with Chinese policies. � Hoangi Van 'loan, Chinh's right-hand man in the standing committee, of the National Assembly. � Le Thanh Nghi, an economist, fa-vors industrialization and is close to Chinh's position on rebuilding North Vietnam. His point of view is sup-ported by important technocrats, such as Vice Premier Do Muoi. � Tran Quoc Hoan, responsible for security and internal order. Ile con-trols all police forces and possesses all secret information on leading figures in .North Vietnam, His lining up with Truong Chinh is explained by his sus-. 'picion of Vo Nguyen Giap's ambition to dominate the internal security, domain, His recent appointment to full membership of the politburo causes alarm to Giap. � Van Tien Dung, chairman of the army's chiefs of staff, appears to be close to Chinh. A hero of Dienbienpim, Dung is said to be displeased with Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Truong Chinh, on the other hand, Wants to pursue a guerrilla strategy; accompanied by political and diplo-matic efforts to help the National Lib-eration Front seize power in the South. For should the South fall under the thumb of the NU% unification of the country under communism would be Inevitable. Chinh's strategy is sup-ported by Giap's lieutenant, Gen. Van Tien Dung. Recent events in North Vietnam sug-gest . that the politburo battle had been greatly intensified and that Truong Chink has begun to emerge as the clear leader, capable of filling the power vacuum left by Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969. The effect of Chinh's emergence and the resulting change in Hanoi's power structure has been a reversal of Hanoi's policy on the war:� from intransigence at the negotiating table to a more concessionary attitude; fronr conventional warfare to guerrilla and terror tactics; from an emphasis OIL decisive military victories to politi-cal and diplomatic offensives. It is consistent with Truong Chinh's policies for Hanoi to agree to a cease-fire in order to recover from the war, and. to prepare for new efforts to achieve final victory. The-Power Alignment TN ANALYZING' the Hanoi rivalry, it I. 'is essential to know the strength of each faction under the existing power structure. According to an un-published study by Saigon educator Nguyen Ngoe Bich on the North Viet-namese assembly election in April, 1971, Truong Chinh skillfully used the occasion to weaken Le Duan's faction by eliminating the 87 Southern depu-ties in the National Assembly. These deputies had been staunch supporters of he Dunn in the legislative branch. The power center in Hanoi, though, Is not the assembly but the politburo. It Consists of ,nine full members and two alternates. Recently (about August or September of this year), the two al-ternates, Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung, were promoted to full membership on the pretext that, they were to fill the seats vacated by IIo Chi Mirth's death in 1969 and by Ngu-yen Chi Thanh's death in 1967. Roan is minister of public security, which is the -equivalent here to the director of the FBI, chief of all local police forces and director of the CIA corn-binedeDung is army chief of staff and a Dienbienphu hero. Apparently their appointments were made as a result of TrtfOng Chinh's influence. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)( 3) SAN FRANC.ISCO, CAT, � EXAMI-I;ER E � 204,749 EXAMINER 8c CHRONICLE � � 640,004 OCT 2 6 1972' Bob Considine Stibsidies For.U.S. rpteges If the. truth were known --- and that's a piety prepos-terous � thought in these times � we may have offered President Nguyen Van Thieu a considerable fortune to: get lost. There is precedent. To clear the ir.)ath. for President Diem. we ,must have underwritten some or all of Bao Dai's departure from Vietnam and his subsequent posh life oil the French Riviera. Before President Kennedy reluctantly okayed the CIA's scheme to unseat Diem, we offered to send Madam NThu and her husband. Diem's, brother, on a long visit to Paris, all expenses paid, to get them offstage. - � (Diem was incensed. In what must have been the laSt interview he 'gave before � his murder, he said to Bill Hearst,, Frank Conniff and this reporter, "How would President Kennedy feel if I suggested that lie send his brother Robert and Robert's wife away?") � The U.S. taxpayer was tapped, without his knowledge, for our buildup of Diem's successor, Big Minh, and money paid to him and the nine other military officers who took over the Saigon government, among them one Col. Nguyen Van Thieu. When Big Minh fled or was pushed to Bang-kok, where he Jived the life of a country gentleman and orchid fancier, we unquestionably supported him, If Thicit gets out alive, good old Sam The Man will be picking up his tabs. Maybe for life. The bills for the Vietnam -war will still be coming in for a long time. As President, LBJ pledged that when the war ended the U.S. would spend a billion dollars rehabili-tating both the North and the South. We'll spend a lot more than that, putting back what we bombed away, and for the relief of victims on both sides of the DMZ. As for the pensions of the men who served there, and the pay- , ments to the families of those Americans who died, they � will last well into the 21st Century. You have to be terribly rich to make war, or engi-neer -coups d'etat, * * * REMEMBER ALL THOSE; nice things the British did for the gang of American tourists who were stranded at Gatwick Airport, London, when their U.S. charter plane company went bust? Happened a couple months ago. The Americans, 122 of them, were a. pathetic group. Most of them were broke at this sorry ending of a nice cheap vacation. 'For three days and -nights they lived in a. cor-ner of the terminal. Their beds were hard seats or the floor. They. were fed by an office of Social Security at near-by Crawley at a cost of about $750. British travelers, touched by their plight, gave them money to make phone calls to their relatives in America, brought drinks, diap-ers and whatnot. A delegation of the strandees called on ' the U.S. Embassy and asked for help but were told that there are no funds earmarked to cope with a situation of . this type. Wimpy International, the firm that introduced the hamburger to Britain, put up the money to fly them � � home. Their fourth and final night in England was a comfortable one, thanks to Grand Metropolitan Hotels, - which Put. them up and picked up all their bills. Many of the Americans were tear-streaked with grat-itude as they boarded their British Caledonian Airways jet for the trip to New York. They swore that they would ' return the money that had been spent on them by the Social Security Department. That was two months ago. So far, the office at Craw-ley has received a total repayment of $27.50. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 WISHINGTON POSI 24 OCT 1972 n the Absence of Facts, Saigonese Intoxicate Selvesmn Rumor By Jacques Leslie According to one, the recent Los Angeles Times ners around the city de-.. � - fighting around Saigon has .. SAIGON, Oct. 23�"Every- ounce the concept of nail-: - not, as commonly thought, 7 one Is intoxicated by ru- involved Vietcong. Rather, x/r. tion government, yet accord-mors," a Vietnamese ob-. commandos of the U.S. Cen- ing to the rumors this may server said a few hours be � tral Intelligence Agency cOme about. At. the .same . , fore Presidential adviser were said to be spearhead- time, warnings of a possible . Henry Kissinger left Saigon ing the attacks, hoping to Vietcong attack on Saigon for Washington Monday. force Thieu into submission � are still being made. Indeed, even if Kissinger's at the negotiating table by Some people have reacted six-day visit to Saigon pro- showing him that his mili-, by buying provisions in ease duced no known outcome, it tary situation is untenable, of attack. Others take seri- . : has generated a remarkable Complexity Breeds Rumors : ously the idea of a cease- ' quantity of rumors, covering every conceivable turn of The complexity of the ne- fire, and depending on their the talks. gotiating points has helped point of view are either- to produce so many rumors. cheered -by the prospect of' Even in quieter times, Sal- Observers, who Include 'goy- an end to the fighting or de-gon is a city which thrives ernment officials, intern- pressed by the possibility on rumors. More often en-joyed than believed, they gence experts, politicians, that Communists will be in provide a balance to the journalists and cab drivers, the next government. Most' had a chance to contemplate go about their business as bland and sometimes too ob-._ - the vagaries of cease-fire, usual. viously facile announce- For people intimately in-ments of the government, tripartite government, con-make up for that, going on. . .. agonizing." . When one journalist sat - On Monday a small �etec-Rumors Spread . down in a Saigon restaurant .. trical fire broke out in the - A few weeks ago, a rumor for a late dinner, he was - . Saigon bureau of a French spread that the wife of apologetically approached . news agency. A reporter-saw South Vietnamese President by the manager, a French- _ -it .and yelled, "Stop the- fire! Nguyen Van 'Mien- had left man, who said, "Excuse me. Stop the fire!" Those words Saigon for Paris with 27 We arc- told nothing. Can -. also mean "cease-fire":',in pieces of luggage. Now, with you tell us what is happen- . French. The 'people around the talks under way and ing?" The journalist passed _- him got very excited, If:or-not on what he had heard and having seen the blaze, they Thieu's hold on the presi- .- thought he had a scoop.: dency in doubt, another 'was rewarded with...a free- ...,.....8.44:4_. rumor circulated: All his glass of cognac. . � ' personal mementoes, such The , only certain -facts as photographs and plaques, .seemed to be who had met � had been removed from his with whom, and for how living quarters. long. This information was Rumors had both Kissin- given out by the U.S. eipo. ger and Thieu "winning" the bossy. Just to make sure, a talks, while just what either few reporters -stood � with had won was another contin- binoculars. on the route ual topic of discussion. his from the embassy to the . singer also was frequently presidential palace to check. suspected of having taken official cars- as they passed Loff for a brief, secret trip to Hanoi. As a result, Amen- - . All this has had an odd im--can embassy officials were pact on Saigon residents. often questioned on the They do not have much ac-exact time they had last cess to news, particularly seen the elusive negotiator, with local newspapers sonic-Rumors ranged from plau- what. muzzled by a stiffened sible to barely imaginable. press code. Government ra-dio and televisiOn and ban-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 slitutional amendments, the volved in. Kissinger's -Vigit But, during the last few, days therumors became ob- makeup of neutralist fac- -to Saigon, the six days vffr tions and predictions by var- e sessional, a psychological re- a tense, exhausting thhe. lease. Here was a time, the ions astrologers. Halfway through his visit, i h d h Near the en of the six-think, seemed to . one journalist who .was think, when the fate of a day period, . journalists country which has been at seemed to have given up - being tempted by juicy vu-war for decades was being asking for the latest rumors. mors but had no hard evi-determined, yet no one Aleanwhile,they found them- deuce of any kind and found knew for sure the substance selves constantly being - himself waiting for any offi-of the talks. They decided to asked to explain what was cial word said, "This is very , .. (b)(3) NATI QNAL GUARDIAN Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 .t IAA Oa (b)(3) 61 r-rf) Fr7 iy11(, �Ito,/ By Richard E. Ward A congressional subcommittee has charged the Pentagon with failure to investigate charges of war crimes carried'out under the U.S.-sponsored Phoenix program in South Vietnam. The criticism of the Pentagon was made in a report by the House of Representatives Foreign Operations and Government Information sub-committee, which noted that many of the so-called "Vietcong" killed under the Phoenix "pacification" program were innocent civilians. The report also expressed reservations about U.S. support for a program that "allegedly included torture, murder and inhumane treatment of South .Vietnamese civilians." The report, not approved for public release by the parent Government Operations Committee, was sum-marized in an Oct. 3 UPI dispatch. According to the news agency, the Department of Defense refused to investigate the charges when they were brought to the attention of high officials. Public release of the cautiously worded subcommittee report has apparently been delayed because members of the full committee are . less than enthusiastic about con-fronting the issue of U.S. war crimes. In July 1971 at the time of hearings that constituted the basis for the report, two subcommittee members, Rep. Ogden R. Reid (0-N.Y.) and Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) charged ' outright that the Phoenix program had. been. responsible for "in-discriminate killings" and the illegal imprisonment of thousands in South -Vietnam. - In September of this year, during a hearing before the Senate Refugee rrcrrir � tmrl ti-ip) �-siLl LJU TJa, �G'')' � subcommittee, a top Defense Department official described the Phoenix. program as an intelligence operation. He was challenged by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in a surprisingly sharp interchange. Kennedy asked how the more than 20,000 "Vietcong" were killed and the witness insisted that the deaths oc-curred during "military" operations. 'Intelligence operation'? During the 1971 'hearings the House subcommittee heard testimony j � from William E. Colby who headed the / "pacification" effort from mid-1968 to mid-1971. Colby stated that under the Phoenix program 20,587 members of the "Vietcong" infrastructure" were killed from 1968 through May 1971. Colby, who had been a top CIA of-ficial before serving in Saigon on assignment from the White House, insisted that the Phoenix program was "entirely a South Vietnamese operation," although he conceded it had been originated by the CIA. Colby tried to portray the U.S. role as primarily an "advisory" one, but he also admitted that U.S. personnel participated in the naming of suspects and the capture of prisoners. Ad-mitting "occasional" abuses�the assassination of civilians�had oc-curred, Colby stated that "we put a stop to this nonsense" in collaboration with the Saigon authorities. With a facade of candor, Colby's testimony actually was riddled with lies about the Phoenix program, which was initiated- under President Johnson and expanded by the Nixon administration. Essentially, ' the Phoenix program attempted to identify and then assassinate cadres of the National Liberation Front, the political leaders on a local level of the Ea. 0 ?") 77117 r7'r � %19 1LIL.1J1iLL anti-U.S. resistance in South Vietnam ,The program had access to secret -CIA :funds as well as large ap propriations from the U.S. military and economic assistance -programs. Assassination teams of mercenaries and U.S. agents who compiled lists of persons to be assassinated were secretly, funded. These aspects of the Phoenix program were revealed in testimony before the same House subcommittee in August 1971 by K. Barton Osborn, who served as an intelligence agent assigned to provide information to the Marines and who also worked for the CIA Phoenix program. Based in Danang, Osborn supervised agent networks for 15 months beginning in 1967. Osborn contradicted Colby's disclaimers of direct U.S. respon-sibility for the Phoenix program and made it clear that U.S. personnel participated in murders and tortures. He said U.S. "advisors" were really directing the program. Osborn also described atrocities he witnessed, including seeing Viet-namese pushed from helicopters, a practice known as "airborne in-terrogations." He also described how Marine intelligence offi:ers held a Vietnamese woman prisoner in a small cage at their headquarters and starved her to death, refusing to give her either food or water. These and other examples given by Osborn provide only a small glimpse of the war crimes committed by the U.S. in South Vietnam. The atrocities were an intrinsic part of the Phoenix program directed by the highest U.S. authorities on White. House orders. Obviously the Defense Department is not going to investigate these war crimes. (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 16 OCT 1972 Why No Peace? The men most responsible for the continuing carnage in Indochina are Nixon, Kissinger and Nguyen Van Thieu, whose role is explored in a just issued 108-page pamphlet, "Aid to Thiel'," by Le Anh Tti and Marilyn McNabb of the American Friends Service Committee, 112 South 16 Street, Philadelphia 19102. Backed by 273 references and notes, the pamphlet is a calm account of tyranny, oppression and mass murder, carried on with vast amounts of American money, military aid and the partici-pation of the CIA. The last paragraph of the text reads: The demand that the U.S. cease its aid to Thieu is reasonable from the point of view of Vietnamese who want peace and national independence. It is im-perative from the point of view of Americans who want to bring this country's expensive and bloody adventure in Indochina to an end. The Nixon Administration locked itself into an alliance with Thieu at a time when that seemed the only alterna-tive to military defeat. With his four "no's," Thieu is now the principal obstacle to a negotiated peace. Getting rid of him is the problem of Nixon and Kissinger. If they persist in keeping Thieu in power no other conclusion can be drawn than that they are determined to win the war militarily, regardless of the moral and material conse-quences,.to the American and Indochinese people. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 DAILY WORLD 14 OCT 1972 orrorrrn � By JOHN PITTMAN If the outlawing of strategic bombing is not on the agenda of forthcoming conferences on disarmament, it should be. The experience of the United States aerial warfare in Indochina con-firms the experience of the Ko-rean War and the Second World War that strategic bombing is essentially a means of terror and genocide, and that its effect on the military outcome of a conflict is minor. During seven and a half years of bombing Indochina, the U.S. Air Force dropped three and a half times more tons of bombs than were dropped by all the Allied Powers in all the thea-ters of the Second World War. Yet.� a military victory for the United States and its Saigon pup-pet regime is not in sight. while Saigon is now threatened with encirclement. In both Korea and Indochina the U.S. Air Force has had full command of the air. Neither the North Koreans nor the Indochi-nese have been able successfully to challenge the U.S. control of their air space. although North Vietnam's defenses have become formidable. In both cases. the U.S. Air Force slaughtered thousands of civilians, mainly children, wo-men and the elderly. In Indo-china the extensive use of na-palm, poisonous chemical defo-liants. and anti-personnel bombs produced biocidal results. that is. the extermination of all living things. Military analysts draw a dis-tinction between strategic bomb-ing and the use of air power as an auxiliary arm of the army and navy. The distinction is pointed up by the contrast be-tween the U.S. and British use of air power and that of the So-viet armed forces in World War Military historians note that the Red Army never employed strategic bombing. but used its (b)(3 � 9..."7 if 6. P-,A andaaaiisj air power for purposes of aerial reconnaissance and as a form of artillery supporting the troops. On the other hand, the English and Americans cold-bloodedly dropped tons of bombs on heavily populated cities, as in the case of Dresden. to terrify the people. drive the workers out of their homes, and hopefully bring about a reduction in the nazi arms production. Yet. except for the distorters of the war's history who falsely claim that the U.S.-British alli-ance NV011 the war in Europe. it is generally known that the nazi war machine was smashed on the Eastern Front. And although the nazis also employed strate-gic bombing with genocidal ef-fects against the Soviet Union. they went down to defeat before the onrushing might of the Red A rmy Strategic bombing fails to dis-criminate between civilian and military personnel and installa-tions. Hospitals, churches, schools and the homes of workers and peasants are wantonly destroy-ed. Civilians who survive are driven in flight to refugee cen-ters. Some eight million or more Indochinese have now been herd-ed into such centers or pacifica-tion zones, where they are sub-jected to CIA supervision and control by Thieu's police. What is more, strategic bomb-ing has been used mainly by highly industrialized imperialist powers against underdeveloped small peoples seeking independ-ence from colonialism and neo-colonialism. Nowadays the Por-tuguese colonialists are using strategic bombing. along with napalm. phosphorous bombs. de-foliants and anti-personnel bombs pcotected in Indochina and pass-ed on via NATO. Their victims are the peoples of Mozambique. Angola and Guinea-Bissau who are seeking to throw off the yoke of colonialism. Who knows what small �Third World" country, striving to strike off chains of imperialism. will be the next victim of an imperialist bombing attack? Will it be South Yemen, Odle, So-malia, Burma. Syria. Peru? Clearly, it is in the interest of the national liberation movements of "Third World" countries that the bombing of strategic bomb-ing should become part of the struggle for disarmament. To claim, as the Maoists do, that '"I� hird World" peoples have no interest in disarmament. is to speak nonsense. In view of, the growing poverty gap between the developing countries and the de-veloped industrial countries. what "Third World" country will be able to construct effective air defenses against bombing raids of which the United States, Bri-tain. France and even South Afri-ca are capable? There should be no illusions concerning the scruples�now or as along as imperialism domi-nates U.S. society�of the gene-rals and politicians responsible for the destruction of life in In-dochina. Typical of Nixon was his hypocritical call tor an in-ternational treaty against terror-ism at the very moment of his escalation of the 13-52 strategic bombing raids against Vietnam. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)( 3) S 17482 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE cendiary," presumably including napalm-type weapons which the U.S. hits defined as being outside the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Then there is $7.3-million for "Miscellaneous De-fensive Equipment," a category that received o�ly $900,000 hi 1970, Obviously, these vague categories can conceal C multitude of mate-rials. (Anyone who doubts the military capa-city for blatant evasion of Presidential di-rectives might refer to all official government history, Science cn:ci. the Air Fc%rce, published in 1966. At one time, the book points out, the Bureau of the Budget decreed that the Air Force ccadd no longer spend money on basic research. 1;e5earch spending wnS continued nonetheless�by charging the costs off to de-velopment of a new bomber. "For all the � Budget Bureau knew," the book gloats, "the f.,4.7-million it approved was for research con-nected with the development of this aircraft, clearly within the realm of applied re- rclr�But In reality, this money was handed over to OSR [Office of Scientific Research] to use,, as originally planned, for basic research.") While Mr. Nixon may well be credited With cautions good intentions concerning CBW, the military apparently is having trouble kicking the habit. It is puzzling that the administration itself chooses to inter-pret the 1925 Geneva Protocol as exempting tear gases and herbicides; in this regard McGeorge Bundy, in the course of his con-tinuing descent from the hawkish role that he occupied as President Johnson's national security adviser, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1971: "Useful as herbicides and tear gas have been In particular situations in Southeast Asia, I know of no senior military commander who would claim that in the wide perspective of the course of the war as a whole their value has been at all critical, In General Westmoreland's authoritative book-length report on his military operations between January 196.1 and June 1968, there is only the briefest reference to herbicides and riot con-trZil agents. Seen in perspective, they are clearly marginal instruments." As far as herbicides are concerned, Bundy's point is supported by a still-unreleased study of herbicide usage in Vietnam, conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers. The three-volume work, one volume of which is classi-fied secret while the others are in the "official use only" category, indicates that com-manders in Vietnam plate little military value on the use of herbicides. Although the battlefield use of tear gas may figure in War College scenarios, experience in Vietnam has demonstrated that the enemy can easily equip his troops with, or train them to improvise, breathing apparatus that renders the gas ineffective. Why, then, does the mili-tary persist fn retaining the option for herbicides and tear gas, continue to rein-force its capability for chemical warfare, and though the matter is uncertain, to dabble further whit biological agents? The answer is twofold: As Soviet-American arms agreements tend toward effective re-t�trietions on the development of ultimate weapons, the military value of other weapons systems rises commensurately, just as the banning of firearms would elevate the mili-tary value of bows and arTOWS. And, as is clear from public. Indifference to the savage air offensive that has replaced American ground operations in Vietnam, the problem is not to avoid war; rather, it is to avoid shedding any great amount of American blood. Hence, in the age of the nuclear stand-off, the Pentagon is looking hard for highly lethal, non-nuclear, low-manpower systems that satisfy both military necessity and pub-lic opinion. And CBW, Presidential protesta-tions notwithstancliv� fits in nicely with t hat quest. Negotiations for arms-control agreements With the Soviets have freque ntly foundered on the issue of inspection, with the U.S. in-ststing that its own inspectors, or perhaps an international group, have the right to con-duct on-the-spot cheeks of compliance. Yet back home, the U.S. government seems un-concerned about verifying whether its army is in fact abiding by Prcendential directives to engage only in "defensive" research. The Executive's disregard fr-r Congress in mili-tary and foreign affairs has been so thor-ouehly demonstrated as to eliminate any realistic prospect for defective Congreenoe.al scrutiny. V.'hen Com.ress has questioned the military use of weather, modification In Southeast Asia, for example, Defense's long-standing reply has been, in effect, that it is none of your business. If there is ever an inspection agreement with the Sot-lets on CBW, it will have an - Ironic benefit: The American public will have rea.son to believe government accounts of wlmt is going on in U.S. military laboratories. .AID TO TRIEU Mr, GRAVEL. Mr. Preident, there has been a great deal of controversy over whether or not the United States should continue its programs of military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese Government of President Nguyen Van Thicu. It is a question of central impor-tance to the peace negotiations in Paris, and the answer finally given will be cru-cial to the direction U.S. foreign policy following in the future. In spite of the great importance the resolution of this issue one way or the other will have, very few Americans are actually aAvare of the extent of this aid or the purposes it serves. Recognizing this lack of information. Le Anh Tu and Marilyn McNabb of National _Action /Re-search on the Military-Industrial Com-plex have prepared a special report, en-titled "Aid to Thieu", which traces the history of U.S. aid to South Vietnam as well as the ongoing day-to-day programs in that country which U.S. dollars fi-nance. I think members of the Senate and their constituents will find this re-port of interest, and I ask unanimous consent that. it he printed in tbe REcoRD at this point. There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: An) TO Tin su DEADLOCIi o.N" MD The Paris peace talks often ridiculed as "propaganda forums," have actually re-vealed many areas of agreement. The United States, the Saigon government, the Provi-sional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam' (called the "Vie�teong" in the American press) and the Democratic Repub-lic of Vietnam ("Hanoi") ell agree in prin-ciple to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the release of war prisoners, internationally supervised free elections, antt even to a coali-tion government. � Yet the talks are deadlocked. One question remains unresolved : should the U.S. continue Its aid to Tilton? The FRG insists that this aid must be stopped. The U.S. is equally stubborn. Both parties fc el that their vital interests are involved on what might appear to be a minor Issue. To clarify the dispute over aid to 'mien, this paper will review U.S. assistance pro-grams in South Vietnam. Special attention will be paid to projects that are considered to be of high priority by the U.S. We will attempt to describe the effects of these pro-Footnotes at end of article. grams on the Vietnamese peopier whom they are designed, and to dtTermine how much the U.S. has spent cm these projects. The U.S.-sponsored programs are well known to Vietnamese but not so familiar to American citizens who pay for them, Our main source of information is the hearings held each year in Congress to ex-amine how American taxpayers' dollars are spent in Vietnam. Supplementary sources Include U.S. government publications and news reports from Saigon and Western news-papers. 2. THE SenING ROUND-UPS Most news reports on the spring 1972 of-fensive told of dramatic military clashes. Less mention was made of certain actions taken by the Thieu government which were made possible only by U.S. aid. While U.S. bombers were pounding the contested and "enemy"-controlled areas of Vietnam, Thieu's police, accompanied by American advisers, = were rounding up thou-sands_ -of suspected "Communist sympa-thizers" in the so-called "secure" areas., The spring offensive increased the regime's fear of trouble from internal dissenters. On May 26, 1.372 the Buddhist Student Aseociation In Saigon announced the arrest and im-prisonment of the entire leadership of many student organizations and civil rights groups in South Vietnam. 4 Relatives of known polit-ical activists have also been taken into CUS-LOCIY, and held as hostages.' A former New York Times Saigon corre-spondent and veteran observer of the war, Tom Fox, describes the far-reaching effects of this crackdown: "Nearly everyone known to have been an outspoken critic- of the Thieu government�and not protected by international recog-nition�has suffered at the hands of the powerful National Police In recent weeks. "In Hue alone, more than 1500 have been arrested and most have been taken to Con Son prison iSland, an island which for dec-ades has confined critics of French and American supported governments. Vs'omen and children have been rounded up among the 'political suspicious'�and taken by police to Con Son. "We've arrested the entire student body of Hue," 'loans, -Duo Nha, President Thieu's press secretary recently stated flatly... "In many cases people have been arrested solely because they have relatives in the ELI' or in North Vietnam "A louver house Deputy front a Delta prov-ince said the police have come into villages and picked up men in their eighties who have not left their home for years, forcing them into small prison cells. 'Even village and hamlet chiefs and officers in the Saigon army are being arrested and interrogated,' Ile added." The ground for these arrests, having "Com-munist sympathies," are broadly interpreted. They extend to all political opponents of the Thieu regime. especially those having credi-bility anti influence with the general pop-ulace. Those arrested include student or-ganizers, religious leaders, and newspaper editors. "In Longxuyen Province, an area dominated by the lies Mao religious sect, seVeral hun-drecl university students held a rally to pro-test a decree tinder which most of them would be drafted. Although anti-American banners were dieplayed�"The students and people will not die for the interests of the imperialists"�the police clict not intervene. Later, however, leaders of the tally were reportedly arrested. "Other arrests of student leaders appear to have had little to do with public demon-strations. "A Roman Catholic priest In Saigon said he conservatively estimated that nine local leaders of the Catholic Labor Youth Move-ment had 'been arrested and that half a (b)(3) ����� Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC EEVIEW Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 r'" (b)(3) Lon Nol's dilemma By Edith Lenart Paris: President Richard Nixon wrote a personal letter to his Cambodian coun-terpart, Lon Nol, shortly after last month's National Assembly elections, asking the Marshal to nominate a vice-president and to include Opposition .members in the new government. What had already disturbed the White House was the fact that Lon Nol had not bothered to take a running mate: the Cambodian Constitution invests much power in the president, and Lon Nol is a .very sick man. The Americans were dis-turbed further when Sink alatak and In Tam � leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties respectively � decid-ed to boycott the poll because they con-sidered the electoral law unconstitu-tional. if President Nixon's demand for a multi-party government upset the Lon Nol-Lon Non duo's plan to consolidate their position, his request for a vice-pre-sident doubtless gave them splitting headaches. Apart from Nixon's need to see a more efficient and representative government in Phnom Penh, his demand for a vice-presidential nominee may in-dicate a desire to prepare Cambodia for the possibility of a negotiated settle-ment to the Indochina War. The choice of a vice-president and im-portant Cabinet figures involves per-sonal, elan and party interests: who can be useful, who can be trusted and who can be manipulated. There would ap-pear to be four candidates for the vice-:presidency: Son Ngoc Thanh, Sink Matak, In Tam and Au ChNoe. If the political scene in fundamental-ly apolitical Cambodia is highly compli-cated, Son Ngoc Thanh's position seems - Sink Matak; In Tam; ailing Lon No!: Letter from Washington. even more so. Born in what is now South Vietnam, he is remembered for his anti-French and pro-Japanese posi-tion; his anti-monarchy stand; his co-operation with the Vietminh; his long exile in Saigon; and his connections with the CIA. Although he is currently Prime Minister, it is not clear whether he is working for the Lon Nol-Lon Non combination Or simply using it for his own ends. Apparently he has the back-ing of a group of Phnom Penh republi-cans and intellectuals who would rather have an accommodation with the Khmer Rouge than see Norodom Sihanouk back in Cambodia; this group has been encouraged by Soviet promises that, in the event of a settlement, Moscow will see to it that North Vietnamese and NLF forces withdraw and that Sihanouk does not return to the country. Sink Matak's position is much clear-er. Considered an agile politician and a capable administrator in Cambodian terms� he has the backing of business in-terests and some sectors of the military as well as that of the Americans, the Japanese and the French. Because he is a member of the Sisowath branch of the royal family, the republicans suspect him of royalist leanings � if not for Sihanouk, then for himself, This leaves In Tam and Au Chitloe. In Tam, a former general, has considerable popular support � especially in the countryside � because he is a simple and honest man who fought side-by-side with the people instead of directiniathe �-��:-�"'ef�-.� war from an armchair in Phnom Penh. But since he has no political or .clan backing, he would have to fall in with one of the other contenders for political power. Au Chhloe has little to recom-mend him; an adviser to Lon Nol, he served Sihanouk in several cabinets. Should he be chosen as vice-president; the post would be deprived of every ves-tige of power. SOUTH VIETNAM Strangling the ICC By Benjamin Cherry - � Saigon: "We are ready for a ceasefire [but] to secure against the communists taking advantage of such a ceasefire, there must be conditions and the most important is the setting up of an inter-national control committee." On the day President Nguyen Van Thieu made this remark in a speech to government officials, professors and students at Sai-gon University's Faculty of Medicine last week, the last members of the In-dian delegation to the existing Interna-tional Control Commission were leaving Saigon for their new headquarters � Hanoi. Friction between the Indian delega-tion and the South Vietnamese Govern-ment came to a head in January when New Delhi raised its diplomatic mission in Hanoi to embassy level, while declin-., Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Continued Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 11 Sept 1912 (b)(3) Union, was about to leave on a similar trip to China. For Kosygin it must have been an intensely uneasy ride. News bad already reached him . of the coup d'etat that had shaken Cambodia the clay before � a coup designed specifically to depose Sihanouk And reverse his politics of neutrality. It was not until they actually reached the airport and the i Russian leader was certain that the Prince would definitely board the plane for Peking that he shared his secret with Sihanouk. The Soviet Chairman must have been well aware that the Right-wing, military in-stigators of the coup, led by General Lon No!, had let out the bath-water and he was determined not to be left holding the baby. Let's see how the Chinese comrades cope with this one, he must have thought. The Chinese have shown a re-markable ability to embrace the glaring contradictions raised by the presence in their midst of the descendant of Cambodia's God-kings � the incomparable, irrepres-sible, unpredictable, laughing and volcanic prince who for nearly three decades ruled his country as an anxious but determinedly individual-istic mother might guard her off-spring. The exile of Sihanouk is not � rince Norodom Sihanouk, the ruler of Cambodiadeposed in 1970, has not followed othor cx-kings into idle and luxurious exile in the south of France. J.ns.teadhe is ea( mg an �eilv-c.. Peking, a Prince among the People, rallying his country behind the guerrilas who are fighting to overthrow the Right-wing regime at prosent controlling Cambodia. Nio Teitelboxz reports on the changed life and times of this descendant of Gad-kings who is now a feted comrade of Chairman Mao Early in the morning of May 19, 1970, a more than usually sombre Alexci Kosygin and Cambodia's jovial Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were in a car heading for Moscow airport. Sihanouk, Who had on Sihanouk's side. He is still young. been on a brief visit to the Soviet In spite of the long and sensational role he has played in political life, October 22 will be only his 50th birthday. Besides which, guided by his stubbornly optimistic nature, he has chosen not to resign himself, but to fight. It looks as if the time is fast approaching when Sihanouk will be able to return to his country. He is convinced of it, and the Chinese tend to regard his stay with them as akin to that of de Gaulle in London during the war. The comparison fits in more ways than one. Sihanouk's relation-ship to Cambodia has always had much of the nationalistic, paternalistic passion which de Gaulle fostered for France � both of them finding it extremely difficult to separate their identity from that of the State. Hardly a month goes by in Peking without some public tribute to the prince. Portraits of the veteran Marxist-Leninist hero, Mao Tse-tung, hang � beside those of the descendant of the Lord of the Universe, Sihanouk. At official banquets, the rather austere Prime Minister of the People, Chou En-lai, is often to be found seated next to the cheerful, Cambodian comrade. The former Khmer king who used to jet around the world now Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 that of a Farouk, not the last desperate pleasure-seeking whirl of night-club life in Western capitals with no hope of return to the mother-country. Time and circumstances are confines himself to journeys between Peking, Hanoi and Pyongyang. He does so, as always, with a smile. His sense of humour has rot deserted him, nor has he abandoned his habitual frankness. The thoughts of Sihanouk, intensely personal and often outrageous, make a striking contrast with the thoughts of Chair-man Mao. He is no Communist and the Chinese know this. He admits to a profound confusion over Marxist ideology, a tendency to lose himself in what he sees as the complex maze of differences between contending schools of thought. His own Socialism is compounded of a mixture of Buddhism, anti-Imperialism and a totally subjective, fierce love of Cambodia. He has, nevertheless, chosen to act as the unifying symbol of the revolutionary guerrilla forces which are, at the moment, literally rocket-ing ahead in their bid to break the present regime in Phnom Penh. So Sihanouk's closest friends and allies now come not from international court circles but from the Marxist International. The combination of royal deter-mination and peasant resistance is wreaking havoc with the already enfeebled government in continued .21 A 0,1,,V.I.e,/,'�� �����"PSISS ' Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 12 SEP 1972 77 ornei _LL r � By George C.� Wilson Washingtonyost Staff Writer A charge by President Nixon; and others that ' the North Vietnamese murdered up to 500,000 of their own people when they took over 'the country in the I950s is a -"myth," according to et study circulated yesterday by Cor-nell Universi1y. The charges are dispatched in a 59-page essay by D. Gareth Porter, a 30-year-old research � associate at Cornell's inter-Jlational�relations of East Asia -project. Corne.11's project of-fice, in sending out the re-port, said, it deserves "home-. widi,spread public at-:IR/Alan' because .of Mr. Nix-on's frequent references to -the alleged bloodbath in North 'Vietnam. , ThINT Iri: �-tl- 77 , . . - 7 ,IL N 0 V tilie Liii Laftne se 'ese after they took over from tively . � "are not the totality" of the _ we a I thy 'landowner "material the White house r the South . . .". , e-Porter claims on the basis of lied upon. Also, said Brewster, . The President added at that: an interview with Chi. Thus, it is the trend that is most im-same news conference that "if he argues, Chi could not be Portant, net specific figures. the united states were to fail expected to give an unbiased in that - sense, he said, the in Vietnam, if the Communists : .i.ktnCrgtrianntl: such as North Vietnamese as-of the land reform ' trend of Communist actm i, were to take over, the blood- s, bath that would. follow woulci,j Western authors like- Pall sassinations in nue, shows , be a blot on this nation's his-! says Porter, suffered a �criii... fears of a bleodhath in South. tory from which we would L cal" shortcoming because they i Vietnam are indeed well fuud it very difficult to return , could not read Vietnamese. founded, just as President � . � , I and. thus could not research Nix" has stated' Asked by Porter to docud the original documents the Porter himself said in an in-ment the President's "half a I North ! Vietnamese used - to terview that he has filed 'for . million" figure, the National : communicate with their own conscientious objector status . Security Council quoted Chi'. cadre. Fall and others, there- and would decline to serve in as writing the following: "The fore, had to rely on Saigon the military in the Vietnam guilt complex which haunted and U.S. government summa- war. He is on a YearlantItI fel-1 - I !the peasants' minds -ift-er the I ries of the North Vietnamese lowship, S5,000 for the acat-i massacre of about 5 per cent; material or on Alt�hors like lea,li(* rar'1�,-I'lirs�;;tI of his I of the! total population , , ," i Chi. (Porter reads Vietnamese, noetorate - e,t Cornet.i's ..c.,ast :. The National Security Council I and said in an interview that ,Asia research center. , edded on its own that te5 per this. enabled him to study (lee-cent of the total population of ! uments that went to North Vi-North Vietnam at that timeIetnalnese cadre from Pm-1Y , "This bloodbath myth is the would be about 700,000." leaders.) I result of a deliberate propa-il "Mr. Chi. offers no justifier- .,. In an attempt: to show the ganda campaign by the South !. non, for tins -allegation" that 5 . danger relying on summaries Vietnamese and U.S. govern-. per cent -of the North Viet- and /Other secondary sources, ments to discredit" North namese population wa.s inm._ Porter charges Chi distorted a (Lao-Vietnam, Porter says in sum- � demi, ass�erts Porter, "but he ' ,North Vileilliamcse PartY the, ' Paper he re-.1 suggests at one point that � "rig marizing Party) .slogan by saying searched. in South Vietnam most of the deaths were those it included the Phrase; "11(P-ti-mid . at �Cornell. 'Porter has of ehildren.who starved 'owing d".le the landlords." There was been a critic of the Vietnam to the isolation policy.' " no such phrase, Porter asserts. Instead, h ' e alleges the slogan Charges Porter: "This is yet ' ' said.: "Abolish the feudal re-another of the many wholly . , r,f is 1 d ; � / ' fl � war. The prime sduree for Presi-dent Nixon, author Bernard /it en c.71 Er7bi '11 . ----unsubstantiated charges Put manner that is discriminating, Fall and others in describing � forth by Mr. .Chi, for there 'the alleged massacre -during methodical and under sound was no such policy of isolating leadership." the North Vietnamese land re- farnilles, even of those land- . form from 1053 to 1966 is a . Ile charges Chi also mistran-lords sentenced for serious crimes - during the land i slated Gen. Vo Nguyen Clap's book guilty. of "g.ross misquo-tation" and "fraudulent docu- speech of Oct. 29, 1956, on reform . � . 1 mentation," Porter alleges. 'land reform. Giap, according "Vet- it is mainly the t on -- --' 1 the Chi's translation, said. the , - The book Porter cites is en- basis of Mr. Chi's totally unre-1 .. ,. titled, "From Colonialism to liable account, the intention of party "executed top many lion-1.;" Communism,". by Illoang Van which was plainly not Ii store 1 es( people" and came to re-Chi. Chi's book--published in ,gard torture as normal prac-cal leCLIn C.' hilt )1- ) "' "I !tiee. 1964� /was financed and pro- . � a , ' - . kruoi.cd by such us. tige_ against North Vietnam, says i tica: Porter, "that the President of as the Central Intelligence the United States himself has Agency, according to Porter. told the American people that Chi, now it course chairman' 'a half a million' " people , in Southeast Asia orientation were exterminated, at the . State Department's � In contrast to CIA's descrip-9 Washingten Training Center, , lin f Chi as a "'former Viet-waso at Et. Bragg, N.C., leetur- : minh cadiT" ' who could %thus [lig and could not be reached be cl'Ill'"10- to have firsthand for 'comment yesterday. knoIwiedge 01 the land reforni The National Securit:y of Couni program, 'Porter asserts � that cil cited Chi' a Chi was never a party member is book s one � President Mixon's sources forI ,_l.i,�2u tnam . ftwe Ileaving the North for � declaring on April 16, 1971, "I, Nixon's bloodbath .figures with i think ef a half a million, by � Mr. (A was himself rela- . ' Porter. Brewster told. The-Comparing the Vietnamese original text Of Giap's.speechi with the Chi and Porter trans.' lations -(which Porter said other scholars and Vietnamese corroborated), Porter alleges that "Mn-. Chi's translation is one of his most flagrant abuses of documentary evi-dence." Donald Brewster is the Na-tional Security Council staffer (on loan there from AID) wl,m discussed the source of Mr. 'Washington Post yesterilay ihat real and literal meanings of. Communist statements are sometimes two different, things, Brewster added that the sources he cited for Porter b).(3) conservative estimates, in i North Vietnam who were mur-dered or otherwise extermi-nated by the North Vietnam-I � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 9 -1-4.,,,cx210 0, .51 k-$71 T Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 4, 5:1'7 r 'T)9 .14 (b)(3)) IFLIEK.) Jr. COON Mr. Cook,. a long-time contributor to The Nation, is the author of many books, including the iecently published The Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy � (Random House). . � The, most damning document to come out of the war in � Vietnam has now struggled into the light in this. election year It Was indeed a struggle: the disclosures were , squelched for years by the highest arms of the American bureaucracy; the pith of the message was ignored by the Senate .subcommittee, headed by Abraham RibicofT, which exposed the PX scandals; the revelations were verified by one of Life's top journalists-7-and pushed iside in favor of the incident on the bridge at.Chappaquiddick; the truth -set forth was too much, for major American .publishing houses, and in the end was published in Great Britain, coming to the American market on the rebound through the David McKay Company. This bombshell is The Greedy War, 'a 278-page book Written by the British journalist James Hamilton-Paterson and detailing the Vietnamese experiences of Cornelius Hawkridge, a dedicated anti-Communist who spent seven and a half horrible years in Russian and Hungarian prison camps before' escaping' to the United States, Hawkridge and Hamilton-Paterson call the war greedy and' the con-tents 'of this book fully justify the epithet. Hawkridge was born in Transylvania, the son of a Hungarian mother ..and a British father, _a . colonel in the Hungarian police force: His passionate hatred of. communism and the Rus-sians led him intoprotests and guerrilla actions�and into those long years in prison. He Came to America believIng all the dogmas of the cold war and eager to aid as a security offiper in What he considered a holy crusade. The Dominican upheaval in 1965, in which Hawkridge could not find the Communists President Lyndon B. John--son assured us we were opposing, was the first disillusion-ment. Then Came Vietnam. Hawkridge's first day in the field there in 1966 was a shocker. Hehad.his nose rubbed immediately in the stinking squalor of the refugee camps of Qui:MI(3n. More than 2,000 refugees were living in pa-Per shacks built largely of discarded American packing cases. Three contaminated wells provided the only drinking � water. There were no -sanitary facilities. "The inmates defecated between the rows of pa-per homes and the sloW seep of ordure crept up the pulp walls." Hawkridge asked ,a -Priest what had; happened to all the USAID. "Stolen," the priest said simply. "It's taken by the ;Vietnamese Gov-ernment.� Hawkridge. soon discovered that virtually everything was being stolen. Only the smallest trickle of supplies and war materiel being shipped to Vietnam in such prodigious, multibillion-dollar amounts ever reached their intended destinations. The Qui Nhon marketplace, an- area .of a good-sized block next to the refugee tamp, was .. stocked with "C-rations, K-rations, drink, clothing, guns, cannons, shells,. cases of grenades, television sets, washing machines . . the mounds seemed limitless." So Hamilton-Paterson writes describing H awkndge s dIscoveria. Won-&ring. what limits there were he asked a Vietnamese stallholder whether he could buy a tank, Tanks are a bit difficult right now,' this man admitted, but how about some armored personnel carriers? Or helicopters, of course. , Or how about a heavy-duty truck?" - 'What the hell goes' on?, Hawkridge thought. And he rushed to' tell American authorities what he had ..found. They were bland, uninterested. Washington, in .its holy-crusade delusion, had concluded agreements with the South Vietnamese that tied the hands of any security agent who tried to put an end to the- national pastime----wholesale looting. Two provisions were critical: trucks could be driven only by South Vietnamese drivers; arid only .South Vietnamese police could make arrests. Even if an Anierican security agent 'like Hawkridge trapped hijackers. in the act, he was forbidden to lay' a finger on them; he had to call in the South Vietnamese police. Arid when they arrived, they-simply collaborated in the looting. Here, in capsule form, are some of the .things Hawk-ridge learned and some of his experiences: liSouth Vietnam all �but. sank into the sea under theof the tons of black-and-white televiSion sets, radios, spin, driers, untaxed diamonds and odier com-modities produced by a society of conspicuous consump-tion and -shipped off to Vietnam to win what must be one of the most curious wars in history. -The port of Qui. Nhon was clogged with shipping, a fleet that spread out to the horizon, Some of the - ships \\railed for.nionths to unload; meanwhile small boats plied out to their) in the night and sometimes in the clay; and so, when they finally reached a pier, some 60 per cent of their cargoes had vanished. SiThe United States shipped enough cement into South Vietnam to pavC the entire nation, but there was a chronic shortage of cement to extend airfield runways and erect facilities.. And the Vietcong always had 'a superabundance with which to build their individual bomb shelters. �On one occasion a truck containing several hundred TV sets was hijacked, tracked down in Tu Due and turned .over to the South Vietnamese police. Rawl:ridge went to reclaim this .U.S. property, but was told he would have to' get a .Vietnamese driver to take the truck away. By the time be had 'found a driver, the truck had been stripped of its contents right in the police compound. SOne night Hawkridge was following a hijacked truck, -mystified because the Vietnamese were ripping open pack-ages in disgust and tossing them into ditche,s at the rout-side. Hawkridge kept stopping and picking up the packages. They were a consignment of aircraft parts for fighter squadrons at Bien Hoa. When Hawkridge arrived at the air base, he was hailed almost as a _savior because .several jets had been grounded for lack of spare parts. �Another time, Hawkridge chased a hijacked truck right into a compound belonging to the South Vietnamese Security Police. The panicked driver sped across the com-pound,'forgetting there was a river on the other side, and braked to a. halt at the last second with the front wheels _ b-ontinuea Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 . Approved for7-1-e-lea;j:-.2018/01/30 CO2792462 SLP (b)(3) T-DE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work � With them inNietnam speak re-spectfully of the "ROK Marines." Technically, ROK indicates their place of origin----the Republic of KO-. rea (South Korea); But the Amer-icans utter the term as if it were "Rock," and as though it referred to their , physical ,.conditioning and the state .of their sensibilities: as soldiers they are brutal, licentious and they get �results. Militarily, they arc trusted by the American high command, which�. in the current fighting�has 'assigned them the responsibility of keeping the vital: An Khe Pass !open and preventing South Vietnam, from being split in half. Some 37,000, of these troops .are presently engaged in South Vietnam. : Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to, arise from ideological commitment to the cause a freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In, fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington for the dtira-'lion. . To be specific, the normal salarY of � a ROK army private i's $1.60 a month. But if, that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or $37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole . month had he remained in his homeland--courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this op-eration is the government of South Koica,� which receives a kickback of well over $300 million per year for t:.a service. ' . Such - "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid'' is to an unprovoked strike and what an "in-cursion" is to � an invasion�namely, the same thing. � For some time now, persistent' re-ports have linked these mercenary Ko-reans to brutalities in Vietnam which - would make Rusty Calley, blush. In 'June, the Alternative Feature. Servicg by James Otis Activities in RAND Interviews," and thereby made public What the Amer-ican government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is re-plete with these stories of barbarity whin Americans have learned how to take in and ignore: O "When they Came to the VC-con-trolled areas ... they raped the women in those areas. There. were times they killed the women after they had raped them. I heard just rec'ently women were raped and killed. The people Were so frightened of the Korean troops, they didn't dare to stay in their hoines but moved away." (from a 'National � .� � ' Liberation Front deserter) * ". . . only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them .were women, children and elderlY people. The Ko-rean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought: that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-con-. trolled areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their gunS at the crowd and opened fire. .Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (from a refugee) ". � when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Ko-rean troops, machine-gunned them." (from an NLF prisoner) O "Everybody agreed that the Ko-reans Were barbarous., They went on operations without interpreters .going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it. was be-cause the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans .couldn't help. making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't J. see why the Koreans children. 'Kids of two, three, or even five or 'seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow-pens and the animals inside too. Cows are cer-tainly not VC!" (from a refugee) . The introduction to the document notes that "no effort has been made to ascertain the. veracity of the statements made by the interviewees." And AFS quotes former RAND analyst Melvin Gurtov as saying that the report was "a draft circulated for comments . as opposed to a published study." It would be. a mistake to surmise, how-ever, that this report outlines the full extent.of the U.S.. government's infor-mation about South Korean murders � in Vietnam. On the contrary, Amer-ican . officials have received at least three other major reports on the sub-ject. Oh January -10, 1970, A. Terry Ram-bo, a graduate student at the. Univer-sity � of. Hawaii, told the New � York Times that he had reported the exten-sive killing of civilians by South Ko-rean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenciir, Were researchers for Hu-man Sciences Research (1-ISR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee inter-view 'project for ' the Pentagon's Ad.:. vanced Research PrOjects Agency. � Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He � briefed a "group of ranking American officers in . Saigon about the report." The 'result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff to cease; investigating the Koreans�and. no mention of it was to be made in our reports." � The Rambo team prepared two re-ports, one without atrocity informa-tion, one with it. This was done, ac-cording to. Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything. about murders it would be classified '''') , 1 I 4 i t I,.tel -I.. J.241.'k,_ should kill the (b)(3) (AFS) of Berkeley, California released. a heretofore secret study by the RAND Corporation, entitled �.innocuously cnough�"Me. ntion of Korean Troop Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 POntinued ts The'pilbt cheol .�up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the-Tibetan .agents who'd be jumping, and .the plane crew who would kick the supplies '.� out "Go" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.- -th ust ae-the last chute opened, the old Aane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm.antiaircraft fire and. the'pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam--ambush! Somebody talked ....._the -bastards.were waiting for us:" � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 MAN' c MAGAZINE September 1972 T Sel-tUSTER 4 - .1r---117 `-- r ---It-..-: ,.�-------- k � -: ; - � ; 1�i ' i ." L ., . 4 LL k r , ! ' ' 9 � ''s, et': ._, ,1/4.,' , [ - A $� .41 THE -OLD WORLD WAR TWO 0-45 bounceo `� But he managed to drop down and and yawed in the violent turbulence as Contour fly the valley floors, below the Its tWin cngines strained to maintain 160 Red radar, and just after dawn they 2- knots. its American pilot gripped the landed back at their base. They climbed-:Controls with every ounce of strength he � .from the plane, their gray uniforms could muster, and his eyes ached from Soaked through vfith sweat,.and.the pilot " the strain of searching the darkness-mu ere d for the thousandth time, "There's gotta -; to avoid the towering Himalayan be an easier way to make a buck."-. � mountains on each side. The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished taken off from a secret base over to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were three hews ago arid were threading small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." Tha � only other identitying marks were the fresh � � � 37mm.holes in the left viing panels. ThroughoOt Asia, people have come to.recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to� spot them wherever you are.-They!re the guys in the grey Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, _cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their ' sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy .Wona-section of Hong Kong or -racing motor their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasajong occupied by the forces of.Red China. Their mission: drop ,agerits and supplies to a band of Tibetan � guerrillas Who were still fighting the'Communists. . 5:The cppilot,.sweating over the air chart ,:.Lirrhis lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American � ,"civilian"- at their 1..).1se had earlier -described. "Hold your course," he--elled:.!'Another two minutes should bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the yputus right on." �-' � girls at the Vieng-Rattay Club in Vientiane. . :They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one.of the world's least known .airlines. Many. are "old .China -hands"_who first began flying for the "outirtabk when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai,shelc.,They're last of that breed-known.as soldiers of fortune,. .and those devil-MaY-care rnerr.,scnarics continued Part 1 HANOI, SOFFIT-I ITTRITIMAN TNT q'TIPITCYZI,T1 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) . the Editor's note. � The Nixon administration has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van Thieu regime as a tool for the " Vietnamization " of the war. But no glossy veheer can hide the hater's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers trading in prostitutes, drags and war means, a band of political speculators, blach-marketeers and endlesztcrs who have been plundering "aid � lands and the salaries and wages of their own civil servants and soldiers -- all this under American. protection. The following inquiry by Thanh Nam exposes part of this corrupt and rotten US-puppet -regime. SAIGO.N, in early 5972. Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki motorbikes and Mercedes- and Dats-tin sedans of every colour and hue rush along, belching clouds of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers 'of the trees lining the streets. The 3.6 milliOn people of Saigon live crowd-d in eleven districts. High-rise US-style buildings of nine, ten, eleven storeys tower insolently in Doug Klianli and Ngayen Hue avenues while along muddy and refuse-strewn odic!) s in workers' quarters at Chtiong Duong, Binh Dung and Cholon. whole fami-lies are crarmned into shanties of thatch, tin and card-board. � .The number of Americans in military uniform has decreased a great deal. More and more snack-bars, �Turkish-bath establishments and massage parlors catering to the. American soldiery are closing down. American military police continue to stalk about, but in dwindling numbers. ' And yet, while the war is being " Vietnamized,." the American presence remains intact, overwhelm-ing, in this city. It seems to have grown even heavier., more stifling:The scream of American jets keeps coming from the Tan Son N hut airfield. Crowds of American civilians and air force officers continue to throng Tu Do boulevard. The ..Ainerican. hand, the tricks oi old Bunker, the desperate moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, zis well as the histlionics of Utica, Ituong, ihiiiss and Co. are still daily topics of discussion for the Saigonese. People talk about the fiasco staring Nixon' in the face, the inevitable departure of Nguyen Van Thieu, the collapse of " Vietnamiza-tion. " For the last seven or eight years, the Saigonese people have had their ears full of the " lofty mission of the Americans" in this country and the " stability " of the " Second 'Republic. " More and more clearly, the truth is appearing to them. � The .fortress in the city Everyone in Saigon knows about the new Amer-ican fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The old embassy at the corner of Ham Nght and Vo Di Nguy streets now serves only for the reception of ordinary visitors and the delivery of passports and visas. The new embassy is white-painted and six storeys high, with a helicopter landing strip on its terrace roof; where a chopper and its pilot -are standing by. -at all hours of the day and. night. The box-shaped building is set back �some distance from the street, surrounded- by a solid ferro-concrete wall, equipped with air-condi-tiOners, electronic computers and a hot telephone line linking it to the White Ifouse in Washington, � and defended by machinegun nest. it is s'erved. by a power-house in .the backyard. Military police stand guard day and night. The Americans boast' that all building materials catim from the United States and that plans were drawn and construction supervised by a renowned American military engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. In early 5975, in an interview with a French journal-ist, Bunker bragged about the solidity of this " White Ifouse " on the eastern shore of the Pacific. The unimpressed Frenchman replied with a wry smile: " Mr Ambassador, in my opinion, the fortress style cf the �embassy building suits . your name rather than ambassadorial. functions. " Bunker's face showed that he was not amused by the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordin-ary ambassador and the unusual style of his residence indeed fits his unusual assignment. Bunker has been in Saigon for six consecutive years. His is the most difficult. and dangerous job ever held by an American diplomat in any period of American history. Political circles in Saigon are rife with stories and rumours about the man and the policies he has been pursuing. in spite of his 76 years, Bunker is very fastidious about his clo-thes, and the expensive caux de Cologne he uses vary according to the season-and the occasion. He has been, before his appointnwnt to Saigon, ambas-sador to Argentina, Italy, India and Nepal. The American press considers him as a skilful trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon politicians nickname him The Old Fridge, while the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proc msul. His business is to pull the strings on which Nvyen Van Thien dances, and he seems to perform it. well. Even when the ping is 'hard, he knows how . to smooth away the obstacles. For instance he would lower his voice and call Thieu by his name � (instead of Mr President) and tell Inth : " ii he United States is a great country, but one of her foibles is to laek patience. So you should realize that there arc. limits to American forbearance. " Or he would say bluntly : " This has been decided in Washington. Once our President has taken a decision, there is no turning back. " Then the only thing Thieu can du is to shut his mouth and stay .quiet. If he doesn't, Bunker will have this clin-, cher : " You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has become � rather restive. They might reduce or even- cancel some of the aid appropriations...'' And that settles it. � The above are part of what the world press calls the tactics of pressure-and blackmail, the main-spring of Anierica a diplomacy. � In fact, " Fridge " Bunker still has one more trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable. He would smile and give- the latter a gentle tap on the shoulder and say softly : " Mr Thieu, we happen to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some person-al financial- affairs to-settle. We should be glad to (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 help." These comforting words arApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 rare circumstances, and,Thien never fails to report them to San, his wife; with joy in his voice. Con-crete details are then worked out between a Bunker aide and General Dang Van Quang, security assist-ant to " President ' Thieu and his financial manager. Paltry sums of a few thousand or even a few score thousand dollars can't be haggled about by a " president " personally, can they ? When agreement has been reached, a money tranfer would be done in favour of one of Thieu's close relatives by some American under the pretence of settling some debt, to one of the bank accounts of the Thieu family in Berne or Rome. In the budget of the American State Department, nearly three hundred million dollars are earmarked each year for such unholy deals. The dollar is a fundamental tool in Afnerican foreign policy. This does not mean that Bunker's generosity can be easily drawn upon. The richer one is, .the more niggardly one is likely to be : such is a feature of his society. Besides, Thien himself can drive a hard bargain. And so, one sometimes sees Bunker's black Cadillac shuttle back and forth between the American embassy and " Independence Palace ", some 700 yards distant. The winner in the end is, of course, Bunker, but Thicu � never considers himself a loser when, after the,. old man's departure, he thrusts a hand into his 'pocket and feels his billfold. (To be continued) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 2 HANOI. SOUTH VIETNAM IN S1EUGGLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 The place is .off limits to all. Vietnamese, includ-2. - THE PENTAGON BY THE lug President Thieu, Defense Minister Nguyen Van CAU BONG CANAL � � � WHEREAS the new US Embassy on Thong Nhut boulevard employs only a few hundred � personnel, the buildings of the American military command in the southeastern part of Tan Son Nhat airfield hum day and night with the activity of over three thousand Americans and Vietnamese of all arms and services. They are the US Pacific Pentagon and serve as headquarters to Westmoreland, then to Abrams and Weyand. The din kicked up by jets and choppers. taking off and landing day and night makes the chronic pandemo-� Mum reigning at MACV even worse. Whenever tipsy Americans lurching along TIT Do � boulevard clamber aboard blue-painted taxis late at night and bark out : "Macvee ! " the driver knows that he is to drive down Cong Ly road, cross the Cau Bong canal and take his passengers to the US Pacific Pentagon. In spi.te of its name,- United States Military Ad-visory Command in Viet Nara (USMACV), everyone knows that it is the supreme headquarters of all military forces under American command in all battlefields in Viet Nam and tndochina. Once a colonel of the Operations Department of the MACV petitioned Defense Secretary Melvin Laird that olficers in the Pentagon by the Potomac river should be sent here by turns, for ".here we arc waging war and living in a war atmosphere and ' . are likely to reap useful experience for the US armed forces. " At their clubs here, American officers talk a great deal about their 'commander, a burly general - of the US armoured corps, with a square face and a black cigar sticking out of a. corner of his mouth, much less talkative and boastful than Westmoreland but certainly not less ambitious. After Westy's e` search and destroy " strategy was shelved, Abrams put forward his own : to launch gimrilla style � P _ small-unit attacks on the adversary's rear areas. along what the GIs have been calling " Drunkards Say '\l \( American c Ti "lie use his forces Alley." 7chey live there under Vietnainese mimes very sparingly and counts every pound of rice seized � take Vietniunese wives (up to three apiece) who from the enemy." Some staff officers make light bear them several children, and make a living of his talents and chiubt his :OA 1 ity �for st b raterdc tha rogh smUggling md hold-up, with a ttenckint command, especially since the ill-fated Lam Son rape and murder. They. are equipped with sub- � 719 operation in Laos. Once an American official machiliegans and pistols and ally themselves with told a Vietnamese friend : "Abrams Call command a local toughies in setting up gangs bearing such tank squadron, or a division, bat net this big war." names as "Skull " and " Zebra, " specializing in . This big war is besides not limited to south assassination and abduction and threatening the Viet Nam. lives and security of people in all eleven districts On the the ground floor of this Asian pentagon, of the city. That is the only, success so far of next to the General Situation room, where the war " Vietnamizat ion " in Saigon. in South Viet Nam is being followed, are the Cain- While the Asian Pentagon hums with frantic. � bodiatt and Lao war rooms, and also the North Viet activity, the Saigon Defence Department building Nam war room under the supervision of an air on Gia. Long boulevard looks deserted. Once, none force colonel of the 7th Air Force. sa there are other than Nguyen Van Vy, thc Minister, admitted : four big wars, which correspond to �vhat. the Amer- " We have no hold on either troops, weapons or ican press has 'been calling the " four big qnag- money. They (meaning the Americans) take charge mires of Washington in Southeast Asia. " of every thing ! When one gets to the first Poor and walks down 'According to a Cao.Van Vim aide, each week, the corridor from Rodin lb to Room 13b, one will the Saigon " chief-of-staff " is invited to come over realize that there arent's just four wars for the to MACV three times, for " exchange of views on the situation." It takes a five-minute drive on Americans. In these rooms painted in light ochre Vien's grey-painted jeep. Abrams would talk to and equipped with air-conditioners, rows of duralu-him about the situation at the fronts and what min-framed chairs, and all kinds of maps with should be done to ''win victory.'' Relationships scales ranging Train 112,000 tO 111,000,000, a multitude of wi-irs are being followed: the war between the two arc quite good. Vien gladly receives by B-52 strategic bombers, the electronic war, the all criticisms, even rebukes, from his " ally " and caemical Wa r, the war on the " pacificttion " front, is ready to act on all the latter 's " suggestions." the intelligence war and the psycholonical These he considers orders, to be transmitted with-The left wing houses the No.i oc�ffi,sers' club, out delay to the various corps and tactical regions. reserved for senior officers, from lieutenant-colonels An Abrams aide once told a friend in the Saigon up to generals. The bulk of members are colonels army : ''Vour chief-of-staff is the very kind of belonging to ill iuns and services : air force, in- man we Americans have always wanted. A true fantry, navy, marine corps, armoured corps, engi_ soldier, with a high sense of discipline and certainly neers' corps, signal corps, etc. Vy and Chief-of-Staff Cao Van Vien. The only ones admitted here on special occasions are either girl-friends of American generals or Saigon strip-tease artists. The conversations overhead in the club amidst the clouds of cigarette smoke and the fumes of whisky supply facts that are at odds with those mentioned in MACV communiques. For instance the following bits could be recorded on a Saturday evening of February 1972: " Those s.o.b.'s (meaning the Saigon troops) at firebases Hotel and Bravo refused to go on patrol outside the camps." � " That general Lam of the First Army Corps doesn't give a damn about military plans. He only seeks to feather his nest in Da Nang." �"Modern weapons entrusted to those loafers who prefer gambling to going to war are wrecked in no time."----"The CLA is purblind and the war is going down the drain in face of an adversary who shows miraculous stamina and resilience before the terrifying fire-power of the American air forces..." In spite of all the nasty words uttered by the Americans concerning the Saigon army, � the Amer-ican troops can't be said to have outshone it. Whenever Abrams gets to the fourth floor and peers. into dossiers kept by the Personnel Depart-ment, he would feel greatly disheartened. Heroin-addiction among American Gis has increased to a horrifying rate. Fragging is rampant, i.e. the kil-ling by GIs, black and white, of officers they don't like by means of fragmentiou grenades. Hundreds of GIs have been disciplined for refusing to go on patrol. Thousands have been jailed for. hold-up, theft, rape... There are also the dossiers of 248 American deserters whom the military police have failed so far to track down in spite of the cooperation of the Saigon city police. Bat some Saigonese know quite a few things about them. They have gone into hiding in slum quarters along the Ben Nghe canal, in teeming Cholon, and even on the northwest fringe of Tan Son Nhut airfield Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 not prone to arguing." In the Fretwh rn1onia-1 days, Vien was a sergeant in the " nzApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 and was later promoted to second lieutenant. He was trained to obey right from his youth. Indeed, he has had no difficulty at all switching from the familiar "Oui, Monsieur " of French, trays to the present "Yes, sir " or "Okay." Once in a meeting with Abrams, he showed himself to be absolutely in t14 dark conurning� the whereabouts of two regiments of the Saigon Fisrt Infantry Division in the. Tri-Thica area. I.3nt Abrams displays great leniency on such occasions. He knows that the Saigon four-star general is primarily concerned with the promotion of Saigon officers, which he and his wife look upon as a lucrative business. Abram doesn't certainly mind. An obedient blockhead at the top of the Saigon army, that's what he wants above everything else. (To be cold hmed) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 3 HANOI. SOLTIH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (cominfied) 3� THE GOVERNMENT: NEWCOMERS to Saigon could hardly imagine that even more feverish activity is reigning elsewhere than at the fortress-embasy and the MACV headquarters. The seat of this tremen-dous bustle is a tall building located at No. Ngo Thoi Nhiem street, next door to the Na Loi pagoda. It is the headquarters of USAID (US Agency /or International Development). Outside stand rows od parked cars � Mercedeses, Triumphs, Datsuns � from which alight ranking American experts, Sat-gem ministers, Vice-ministers and provincial chiefs, " advisers for Saigon ministries and provinces, inp officials ill " pacification " niat eairminality aid " rural construction, agrieultural �tlevelopinent, stir'.',ii Oil sl!mv,�Y TrTigal-re inn etc, To gis.e an iha.l,t" the size of the unjer-ten,.t:a, let us lai�nti,�n in passing tleit there :ire "t':17k. 0:`,` Vietauir itiV5 .111d th.:,3tItIS of acennntants, interpret-ers... ,gthair personnel nate:lin:1- Or2.1,/ A. rank-in the Saigna.Ecnnornies Ministry onee USA �1) is the true government of South Viet Nam, if there is one. .Wnat ,loes our Econom-ics Ministry do ? The only job of the Minister, Mr Pharn Kim Ngne, is to go each year to Wash-ington to beg for nirl aniounting to 500-700 mjiliOn dollars. After that, USAID will take care of every-thing concerning the distribution, utilization, regu-lation, transfer and control of these funds. The USAID headquarters is divided into innume-rable "hoards." the 15 essential ones being staffed with 1,500 ranking American experts. The Ameri-can heads of those boards assume in fact the func-tions of Cabinet ministers in charge of economics, finance, trade, industry, agriculture, communica-tions and transport, security, administration, labour organization, planning, culture and - education, health, information and propaganda, etc. Each board is again divided into sections staffed with " experts " of numerous branches. There are two large documentation departments and a huge library equipped with electronic computers and crammed with maps, diagrams,. models and blueprints, as well as statistics of the most diverse kinds. USAID has its. own printing-office, the biggest. in Saigon, which turns out documents and communiques in English and Vietnamese. A Saigon official said : " It will hardly make any difference whether Vietnamization will be complet-ed or not. This is the American go' ernment-gener-al for South Viet Nam, many times bigger than the former French colonial government-general. Viet-namiza.tion ? One can see that plenty of Americans are around, and more are coming ! " The Saigoneae know that the sharp increase in commodity prices, the cost of living and the rates of unemployment, inflation, and taxation springs from plans worked out by USAID. This super-government, which tops "�Prime Minister " Khiem's in that way, is thus very active.. But how effective is it ? This is a rather big ques-tion mark, Saigon politicians have relished a recent disclosure of their American " friends. �' in Sep-tember to 7t, Colby, deputy � 0101!,issinler in charge of the USA ID or four years returned in the US and revealed that of the two billion dollars ,stribintes-1ttv USAID in Sin:ill Viet Nam in Varrens pi-pair:tins only about aio million. he reached their destination. The Jest, ',Soo million dollars, had vanished like the morning mist under the tropical sun into the pockets of Americans and Vietnamese at various levels in various places. Finally, to gloss over this eie and ugly story, and to " avoid putting weanans in the hands of Americans '\ h' are against the nar in Viet Nam the blame was put on the war and the attendant lack seeurity, a situation for which no one held hinaselt� resp.inaible. There is Still another government in Saigon, one which is invisible yet ubiquitous. It is the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) whose name the Saigonese pronounce in a way wnich makes it sound like the Vietnamese word meaning " excre-ment. " How many are the CIA men, taking into account both professionals and collaborators ? 50,000 ? tooanoo ? No one knows for sure. Accord-ing to some people in the know who become talkative under the influence of alcohol, the American CIA men are quite numerous. They may include ambas-sadors, deputy ambassadors, journalists, tourists, senators on inspection tours, infantry generals, air .force colonels, Green Beret sergeants, businessmen or college professors. .None would' admit to being CIA men, but any American could be one. They work for CIA, either Inn or part time, without ceasing to be members of other military, administrative, �diplomatic, or political services. What about the native CIA men? They may comprise Cabinet -ministers, department heads, parliamentarians, churchmen, business executives, trade union lead-ers, members of locarmaffias... Who are the CIA top men ? They are very :few, and very discreet. They don't live in ostentatious high-rise buildings but in cosy villas along Cong Ly, Had L'a Trung and Truong Ming .Giang boulevards�one - storey Structures with private gardens, tennis courts and swimming - pools. These are the resOrts of such men as Golley American ambassador and the adviser to yang Pao, both of them top CIA men in Laos. Saigon is rife with rumours about CIA deals on drugs and weapons all over Southeast Asia. There are CIA-run channels linking Saigon to Bangkok, Singapore, Vientiane, Long Cheng, Manila, Hong Kong, Tokyo, etc., through which foreign exchange, gold, diamonds, intelligence, pros-titutes and what not are travelling. CIA spending are enormous, and so are its revenues. The CIA men in Saigon spend a great deal of money. Life behind the closed doors 0: their discreet villas is a volup-tuous one. After each series of bloody feats�build-ing "tiger cages" for political prisoners, penning up the civilian population in Concentration camps, making away with Thien's political opponent... � they withdraw to these cosy retreats and relax with specialnpality opium in golden tins engraved with twin dragons. pure heroin. strip - tease . shows performed by belly-dancers brought in from Hong Knee, :lie Philippines ant? 1,ep in, or heetie,garetes of maii.ienn itoh nok�er... �Less,ir CIA men lixe in Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 bigger and more crowded villas wherApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 entertainments which are somewhat more modest but still surpass anything Saigon playboys coUld 'dream of. CIA professionals are proud of their organiza. tion, which encompasses the whole "free world" and has deep roots in aliimst all capitals, anion:, people of all skin colours. They say : "Our country is CIA. CIA is a world-wide government." A mem-ber of the opposition in Saigon scoffs "Their country is rather money, drugs. and costly pros. titutes. " The most noteworthy CIA exploit was the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Of course they later denied any role in it, until the publication of the Pentagon's secret papers made everything plain enough. It was a Colonel, a CIA man, who as early as August 1963 hal been personally entrusted by Kennedy with working out plans for the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem. Even now, men like Nixon and Goldwater still deeply regret the loss of Ngo Dinh Diem and have harsh word for CIA on this score. Rumour has it that ever since he knew the detailed truth about Diem's liquidation, "President"' Thieu often has had to resort to heavy doses of tranquilizers to get some sleep at night. The NFL's' great offensive of Spring r96S gave the CIA a slap in the face. It showed that the latter had been completely in the dark about the preparations and manpower movements for that tremendous undertaking. Another hard blow came in March. this year when Saigon troops suffered terrible setbacks along Highway 9 and in Quang Tn. � These. are two bigs stains on CIA records. Many Americans said at the time that CFA men had been too busy with sex and drugs. Others .ascribed the fiasco to antagonisms between the CIA, MACV and the American embassy on problems of 'policy in Viet Nan. They recalled that CIA men hated Westmoreland's search for military vic-tories over the Viet Cong main force, a dream which never came true. For the CIA would rather stake all on the program for "winning hearts and minds" and "pacification," which they considered the only fighting-front. In the. 1964 - 65, the CIA fully approved of the _bombing of North Viet Nam. But in 1967 it coin-pletelydissociated itself from the policy of war escalation. A top CIA man once said to Admiral Grant Sharp, the commander of US forces in the Pacific, who was passing through Saigon "When You start hitting, pull no punch. Don't you know that, you a militaryman ? Gradual escalation can only be frustrating." THANH NAM (1', be continfeed) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part HANOI, SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (COI tinted) : 'RECENTLY, two special experts of the American, .Congress came to Saigon and set out on an inspection tour of the provinces. After that they withdrew to- USAID headquarters and spent two months assessing the data collected. Finally they came ' out with a quite .candid admission: Tlie President's Vietnamization policy is imprac-ticable, and pacification has reaped but scanty and nominal results. In one single night the Vietcong could upset everything ! " The two experts' -report Caused deep repercussions on Capitol Hill in Wash-ington. Later, ' the two men were identified as CIA collaborators... � . ... � � 4 � THE LAM SON � � . � THEATRICAL COMPANY THE topmost task of-- the proconsul Bunker and of MACV, CSAID and the CIA in Saigon is to promote a "model democracy" there. The "Second Republic," made in the USA, should have its typical representatives. So let us go to Lam Son square which faces Le 1,0i boulevard, and attend a session of the Saigon "Lower -House-of Parliament. " The building is still called by its old name of Municipal Theatre and the Lower House has received the popular nickname of " 159-member Theatrical Company. " Indeed- many sessions of the House can stand comparison with the most hectic scenes ever acted on the stage, with plenty of ''suspense " worthy of the mostc'breath-holding. gangster films or crazy whodunits. The worst abuse keeps streaming from one parliamentarian to another. Here are a few specimens recorded by shorthand during-a. session held in April 1970:-. " Shut up or ,break your jaw ! " " Embezzlement and incompetence are limited to no one individual. Those who denounce others as dung-eaters are swallowing things that are even dirtier. " � . " Go home, Mr Speaker, and wash your wife's panties rather than stay here and rave ! "-However there are things that shorthand records can never adequately describe. On one occasion, one woman parliamentarian rolled up the legs of her silk trousers and, picking op one of her stiletto-heeled shoes, brought it down smack on the head of a male colleague some twenty years older. On another, a representative whipped out a pistol and a gre-nade, which he unpinned and threatened to hurl at his opponent : all his colleagues were seized with understandable panic and quickly made themselves scared. - The - Saigonese people have all heard about their " representative" Tran Kim Thoa, who championed "equality between the sexes. When called to. account by her colleague Ho Huu Tuong about the pocketing of 5 out of the 25 million piastres entrusted to her for the print-ing of documents for a conference of the Asian Parliamentary Union in Saigon, she choked with anger and spat out between clenched teeth : " I'll-tear you scoundrel to pieces and cheek up your bits with salt and pepper for seasoning._ -'-' To the House in uproar she explained : . " knock him dead. - lie is even dirtier than I ever was!" - Saigon democracy, the handiwork of the magi. clan Bunker, also .shines -abroad. One day in early 1971, Dr Nguyen c72uang Luycn, who " represented " Gia- Dinh-province, -went on a mission to Thailand. He neld quite important. functions: deputy Speaker ' of the Saigon Lower -'5.-Iouse of Parliament and , Chairman of the Viet- -Nam- branch of the Asian Parliamentary Union. Yet, at Bangkok airport, cus-toms officers of that "friendly country" determin-edly seized his suitcase and opened it. Their eyes goggled out of their heads : it contained no less than fifteen kilograms (more than thirty pounds) of illegal gold. So, he was whisked off to a police station in spite- of his twofold immunity -- diplo-matic and parliamentarian ! - Another case Representative- Phan --Chi Thien was a priest turned politician. Completely disregard-ing' his dignified demeanour, the police searched his bag and found four kilograms (more than eight pounds) of heroin worth tens of thousands of dollars. Caught red-handed, he tried to get. aWay with it by declaring that it was a business under-taking whose returns were to go to a presidential 'candidate's electoral lunch,� so after all it was no. dirty drug-smuggling but a political act.. This did not prevent the police from carting him off to prison.. Innumerable parliamentarian "missions" have been carried out in the same way. Saigon "representati-ves" went to South Korea, Taiwan, Paris, Rome, etc., nominally for "State affairs" but in fact for fruitful deals in gold, diamonds, heroin- or porno- - graphic materials. . Sonic of the House sessions are rather gloomy affairs. They perfunctorily deal with "the people's life." Not many representatives attend. Their num-ber is even surpassed by that of the "public" look- - jug on froin the upper gallery: police, plainclothes men, secret agents, and American "friends," most of them political advisers to the American-embassy and journalists: The jolliest and most important session ever held was that during which it was decided to increase the parliamentarians' allowances to more than a million piastres a year apiece; so that freed from material cares they could wholeheartedly devote themselves to working for the welfare of the people Following the one-man election of Thien in ate 1971, the relationship between the legislative and executive powers in Saigon has displayed even more histrionics likely to provide entertainment to the Saigonese. For - instance, the Saigonese "senators" were unable to stomach Thieu's one-man race and voted to cancel his election. For his part, Nixon didn't bother to wait for the Saigon "Supreme Court" to decide on the issue, and _immediately se'it a telegram of congratulation to his flunkey. The Saigon press wrote that Thiel) was not elected by the "5,goo,000 ballots east by 9.1.34 per cent of the electorate" as lloasted by official propaganda or-gans (after all the magician Bunker could have . �- - conjured up any numbers of voters he pleased) but by a single ballot sent over from the White House across the Pacific ! The paper -Dart Chit Moi (New Democracy) likened Nixon's message of greeting to an imperial edict bestowing investiture upon a vassal. The new Saigon bower House of Parliament held its first session in early 1972. The new faces are no � cleaner than the old ones. Immediately after his election, Representative Diep Van Hung was caught in the act of smuggling prohibited goods into the country by Tan Son N'hut airport police. But no one any longer . paid any attention to such. trifles which had become routine business. The new thing ' c; 4 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 tnat nappenect with the Lam Son Theatrical Company was the heightened tension between the socalled "opposition" and the valets of the regime. New scophants replaced Trail thi Kim Thoa and her ilk in the unending task of "expressing gratitude to our great ally the USA". , In the eyes of. the Saigon People, both the Sai-gon Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament are but cheap gewgaws for a new kind of "democracy": one-man rule, Thieu's rule ! Relations between the legislative and executive � powers in the Saigon regime are not in the hands of the Speaker, old Nguyen Ba Luong formerly, Old Nguyen Ha Can at present. They arc the preserve of Nguyen Cao Thang, -a � former druggist who has become political assistant to "President" Thieu and is considered to be in charge of the President's secret funds, stuffed with -American greenbacks. Political observers in Saigon hold that in major votings the parliament-arians always keep an eye on the ballot box and the other on Mr Thang's billfold. None other than Nguyen Cao Timm; himself has admitted that Law _10-70 was passed at the cost of 15 million piastres in "gifts" to Messrs Representatives. The rewards were brought to the homes of the co-operative voters in fat envelope's accompanici by a letter of thanks from the Presidential Assistant, signing for the President. But money is not the only string linking the leg-islative to the executive powers in the Saigon regime. Beware, Messrs Representatives of the "Opposition" ! Remember the fates of such oppositicmists as Truong :Dinh Zu and Au Truong Thanh. The former is still in prison. The latter after a few months in police custody was forced into self-exile abroad. Each time they look out into the Lam Som square, the "oppo-sitionists" cannot help feeling uneasy. A monu-mental sculpture featuring gun-toting "Republican Combatants" with their weapons trained on the Parliament building reminds them that the any law prevailing in their "Republic" is that of the jungle I (to .be continued) :MANN NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � Part 5 (Continued) Approved for 11 5. THE PIMP MAYOR THE Saigon regime which nestles in the shadow of the American Embassy is worthily repre-sented not only by the Lam Son theatrical troupe but also by the 39,372 officially registered prostitutes aged 16-45. Indeed the professional whores number more than 70,000. If one adds to them the semi-pros�most of them masquerading as " waitresses " in the more than 300 " snack-bars " '� the figure will surpass the zoo,000 mark I A thriving industry of the regime I A figure all the more eloquent if one recalls that the total number of college and school teachers, medical doctors, engineers and pharmacists in Saigon is less than .one-tenth of it. US culture has also brought Saigon more than � one hundred Turkish baths, to which Formosan culture has contributed 370 young women special-izing in " scientific " massage. Along Nguyen Van Thoai and Vo Tanh streets as well as Tran Hung Dao and Tran Quoc Toati boulevards there have mushroomed mot.ley signboards carrying suggestive drawings and inscriptions in English advertising steam-baths and cabarets with such names as "Lovely Bath," "Queen Bar," "Moon Bar," etc. The army of harlots is the product of the war imposed by foreigners. Its numbers have skyroc-keted since 1965-66. Following each "sweep, " each 'plan for setting up " strategic hamlets, " each operation for " special pacification, " " accelerated pacification " or " complementary pacification, " each � displacement of civilians, each spraying of toxic chemicals, population figures in the towns and cities would shoot up. Carrying their belong-ings on their backs, the refugees would stream on foot, or in crowded buses and sampans, into the towns, where, failing assistance from relatives or friends, they . would pitch camps on sidewalks, waterfronts or in bus stations and public squares. The girls would fall preys to pimps and brothel. owners, who would give them some money for cos-metics and dresses and entertain them with special films and novels aimed at arousing base passions and desires. Country girls with pure hearts and simple minds would soon be acquainted with I.ewd scenes on the streets of Saigon and pressed by material enticements and soaring prices into selling their bodies. A lawyer with some concern for social morals has observed: "In this city of Saigon teem-ing with Americans, the fact that the men have become cannon-fodder and the girls have been compelled to offer the use of their bodies in order to eke out a living, is only a matter of course. " But the leaders of the regime look at things from a quite different angle. Minister for Social Affairs Tran Ngoc Lien has gleefully declared : " In this country, prostitution has developed into one of the best - organized trades ever ! " A representative blurted out in the Lower House of " Parliament" : " The Americans need girls ; we need dollars. Why should we refrain from the exchange? It's an inex-haustible source of US dollars for the State. " And so important personages have set up big organiza-tions dealing in human flesh covering whole districts and ranging from cheap brothels to the supply of deluxe .courtesans of various nationalities � Viet-namese, Japanese, Thai, Formosan � to wealthy customers : American ambassadors and deputy .ambassadors, CIA chieftains, as well as Saigon presidents, vice presidents and Cabinet ministers. In the 1969-70, Saigon was shaken by anguishing news: girls of 13 or 14 were kidnapped and taken to .sinister dens. So-called Okinawa V.D. microbes, resistant to ordinary anti-biotics, were on the rampage after being introduced into the country by Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Sept 1972 American soldiery. The city was rife with all sorts of rumours about the wives of such and such Saigon civil servants, officers, professors or representatives catering for the lusts of the Americans and being paid by the day or by the hour.' Unbelievable things happened : mothers and sons, brothers and sisters ran into each other in brothels ! Who stands at the top of this prosperous and shameful industry? The Saigonese have come to know the answer to this intriguing question : he is none other than the Mayor of their city, Do Kien Nhieu. Nhicu is a native of Long An province. In French times, he was a constable and later became 'a cor-poral in the native auxiliary troops. He was known as a drunkard and a debauchee. Under Diem, he made a profitable career for himself by " extermi-nating Communists" and massacring innocent people. Later he was promoted chief of Long Xuyen then An Giang provinces. When Diem and his brother Nhu were made away With through CIA ma-chinations, Nhieu bitterly grieved at the bad news. In June 1968, Thieu appointed Nhieu Mayor in replacement of Van Van Cua and promoted him to be a full colonel. He is Thieu's right-hand man and reigns despotically over the 16o square kilometres of the city's area. All the pimps and brothel-owners of the eleven city districts have been put under the unified control of his own aunt and elder sister. Other 'relatives of his have been entrusted with other busincs ses in human flesh. For instance pro-viding " wives " to GIs; transfering " wives " from departing GIs to newly-arrived ones, supplying wom-en seduced by American officers with marriage certificates and helping ' them acquire American citizenships, etc. Nhieu also holds indirect sway over such "cul-tural activities as cabaret singing, strip-tease danc-ing, at such " cultural . centres " as Kilby Dance Hall in Nguyen Hue boulevard, Ritz Restaurant on Tran Hung Dao street, Maxim's Theatre in Tu Do avenue, or Melody Dance Hall in Cho Lon. The owners of these profitable businesses have to pay him fat kickbacks. With lioang Thi Tho, who has brought the " art of presenting decadent, psywar-oriented music and singing to the level of a profitable industry respon-sible for the moral ruin of a whole generation of city youth, Nhieu entertains special relationship, that between two professional panders.. Owing to the Mayor's solicitude and the effective assistance of American advisers, Saigon has witnessed the coming into existence Oi a host of strange characters calling themselves " local hippies " and numbering over ro,000 early this year. They are playing a very efficient role in diffusing the "culture" of the "free world" in this enslaved part of our country. Most of them are children of VIPs � ministers or generals... � or wealthy families who by fits grow tired of life only to become crazily pleasure-seeking at the next moment. The boys grow long hair while the girls wear it very short ; both sexes wear drain-pipe trousers and gaudy shirts, make love in the streets, quarrel noisily in public, dash along crowded streets on their Honda or Yamaha motorbikes at breakneck speed, linger in cabarets and nightclubs where they perform wailing and syncopated outlandish music, are inveterate mari-juana and heroin addicts, and indulge in looting and riots. They set up garbn7S carrying such evoca-tive names as " Dust of Life, " " Black Star, " "Bloody Hand, " " Human Skull, " etc. Indeed they greatly contribute to the moral pollution of the already heavily-polluted atmosphere of Saigon. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Recently, owing to the departure of sizeable num-bers of Gls, the prostitution industry has been on the downgrade. The massage parlors and opium dens are facing a dwindling clientele. Nevertheless, Do Kien Nhieu, the Mayor, after four years in business, has amassed a great fortune. Once during a drinking bout, he noisily boasted : " I am richer than any brigadier or major general in this coun-try ! I am a millionaire in... US dollars ! " As a matter of facts, Nhieu holds fat accounts in Hong Kong banks. He has readjusted his business activi-ties to fit new nine urgent economic measures decreed by Thieu. Score of new taxes have been promulgated aimed at sucking dry the cityfolk. Do Kien Nhieu, a major public figure in Saigon, is also a typical representative of the Thieu regime. This pander-cum-black marketeer is still doing a thriving business. He will no doubt be promoted general by his " President " very soon. But together with the latter, he is heading for inevitable ruin. (to be continued) THANH NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 - Part 6 Approv-eciTOTReleWs-e7.26-1-87Riiii d0-21-9"27EGLE sept L9( (Cont. ilti,ed.) VICE-PRESIDENT IILJONG'G. " INTEGRITY" � � To get a job as a longshoreman on the wharves at Chuang Duong .or Thuong Cang, one. must offer the superintendent a bribe ee..uivalent to two months' wages. A highschool gradui.te who wants to be a clerk in a government del)artinent will have to cough up between 100,000 and 500,000 piastres, depending on what kind of job he is after. lf he wishes to enter an American agency, he will have to offer money to a multitude of people.: from the district police to the personnel chief of the agency concerned. � . . . . � � A father who wishes his Son Or daughter to enter a general-education school must offer presents to the head-master and to officials of the City educa-tional service. man who falls ill and needs some kind of 'treatment at the- hospital will have to give the doctor in, charge a shot of Vitamin /It (A/ for money) before he could hope to get some care and medicine in return. The military hospi-tals are so crowded that wounded soldiers who arc fortunate enough to be brought back to Saigon from, Say, An LOc, lie on the cement floor in the verandas. Whether one such soldier wants a glass of water to quensh his thirst after an operation, or a pill to soothe his pain, or a new bandage to replace the .stinking old one, he will have to pay fen. it. If he .can't afford it, he will. lust lie there and moan out vain pleas for help. . �� � � A bus ticket to Central Trung Bo for instance generally costs three times its normal price. A trip to France will cost it stowaway about r,000 US dollars for a hiding-place on a ship. A regular exit visa costs 5,000 US dollars : everything can be bought provided you have the money. Children of wealthy parents never bether to study hard for their exams. They spend their time at seaside resorts with their sweethearts, or go for pleasure rides on their Honda motorbikes. About a week before the exams, they can buy the subject of the tests for between loo,ocio and 200,000 pias-tres. The only condition, besides the money, is that they should burn the incriminating papers after using them. That racket about test papers is in the hands of Education Minister Ngo Khac Tinh and his associates. For his talents he has been dubbed Minister of lin-Education. � . Now about the draft. If you want to evade it, you must of course find a hiding-place, whether it be a cellar, a cupbcaid, or a dark corner in your own kitchen. But the point is that you must have a wad of banknotes in your hand, between 20,000 and 5o,000 piastres just in case military police find you out. If you want to take a walk in the streets, you'd better have some money with you, for at each check-point you'll have to offer some dough to the officers on duty : in 1966, about 3,000 pias-tres, now more than io,00b ! As you can see, prices have skyrocketed, ever since. the proconsul Bunker rei4ealed his intention to charge the colour of the corpses on the battlefields. �-Suppose they get you somehow and you are im-pressed inti) the " Republican . Army. " If you don't want to be sent to fanaWay places up in . Central Trueg Bo or in Cambodia or Laos, if in-stead of goi.ig to "hot" battlefields you prefer safer jobs like st,hcling guard before government offices, your parents will have to pay up to 300,000 piastres for the favehr, just ask the sentries on duty before T�HE worries and miseries that beset the people the City Eall or the Saigon Special Command, of Saigon are multifarious. Many spring fi'om you'll lean. that most of them are sons of wealthy the necessity to offer bribes, which inVo'lves Chinese me-chants in Cho Lou who in order to get many hardships .and much h - them these soft jobs have paid astronomical sums .�to high-ranking officers: 50o,000 piastres down, and then 20,00, piastres each month. � � From f97 I onwards, because of galbring inflation, the bribe-takers, instead. �of fat env, lopes stuffed with 5o0�piastre bills, would prefer presents in � kind : a few ounces of heroin in plasti-: phials, or a Japanese television set, or a big refr �;erator, or a Honda motorbike, or a dozen wrist-w,Aches... - - � Even those who are not. seek-in e any special favour must sometimes offer bribes, to district chiefs or to security officers, if they just .wish to be left alone to mind their peaceful Ind law�abid-mg businesses. Otherwise they would e .summoned from time to time to police head, uarters to be questioned about distant relatives or childhood friends who, so they are told, have '')ined the Viet (long ! 'After greasing the palms of y.rious officials, they would be allowed to return hopie, only to be summoned back a few Months later, .'or more ques-tions and more... palm-greasing ! To be fair, we roust say that the Saigon admin-istration has promulgated quite Jew Iecrees against " corruption." Discussions have )een held in Parliament and the lawcourts. V ritable " cam-paigns " have been launched with C a 'participation of police, customs officers, militi ry gendarmes, etc., and the whole court-and-pr ton machinery put in motion. Tens of thousand , r arrests were made, in January 1972 alone. Bu as a Saigon judge candidly said : " These cam:�tigns only hit at the small lry. Nobody ever clans to touch the' big fish !" The small traders com:ilain: " Whom are the authorities striking at in their drive against corruption ? They only sinai,h the rice bowl of the poor people by confiscating smuggled goods from petty peddlers." The only ins1-.ance of punish-ment meted out to " big fish" was the execution of the rich Chinese merchant Ta Vinh. But this served .only as a smokescreen to cover thousands of much bigger fish. Sonic people also hold that the shots that felled Ta Vinh in fact ushered in a new stage in the history of wealthy circles in Saigon : the decline of the "old millionaires" and the rise of new ones, who wear military unifotin and hold absolute and exclusive control over the country's economic resources. The Saigonese know -that the anti-corruption drives are in fact golden- opportunities for more corruption : police, customs officers, military gendarmes, judges, etc., seize upon these occasions to get fat bribes and kickbacks. Indeed, one can say that in Saigon, the law-makers, law. enforcers and lawbreakers are just the. same people, and that the watchword : ".Fight corruption ! " . in fact in.eans,: " Long liVe corruption " c � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 However, it would be. unjust if we were to include in that rapacious gang the ordinary rank-and-file of the Saigon army. Iry the " free world," they are indeed the lowest-paid mercenaries. The salary of a ITC is 3,800 Saigon piastres ; that of a non-corn ,ranges from 5,00o to.�8,000 piastres. In comparison, let us ohkerve that a glass of beer costs 8o piastres ; a bowl of soup, roo ; a kilogram of pork, 600 ; an egg, 22; and a packet of cigaret-tes, 80. How could they ever hope to make ends meet True, the Saigon atlininistration has on a few rare occasions raised teteir salaries, but while prices ride away at a gall p, wages and salaries creep along at a snail's pace. A paratroop NCO with some education uses this mathematical parallel: "While prices in-crease by geometrical progression, salaries are raised only by arithmetical progression." It is routine practice for a PFC or NCO back home after service hours to hastily swallow his bowl -of ,rice, don civilian clothes and drive a mo-tor-cycle taxi for some extra earnings to supplement the family income. The case has been reported of a sergeant living at Bay Hien crossroads who had been compelled by financial oecessity to let his wife provide entertainment to sex-hungry GIs. She caught VD, the family was ruined by the costs of medical care, and the neighbours got wind of the matter. Finally the wife committed suicide by drowning and the sergeant, left with 6 young children to look after, was driven to near insanity. Soldiers arl'd non-corns with some special skill�signalmen, engineers, mechanics... � try to earn some extra money by working on evenings and Sundays repairing typewriters, radio and television sets, calculators, cars and motorcycles, etc. All have work very hard indeed if they are to feed their wives and children. Among the junior officers, sonic succeed in getting rich through using their influence and power as battalion or regiment commanders. They grow up into wealthy big shots too. For them, their sala: ries only serve as pocket money. Their main income is drawn from .elsewhere. Let's listen to what Major he Van Ng4i, the commander of a 6cio-man battalion of the Fifth Infantry Division stationed at Lai Kim, has to say about his extra earnings : In annual times, when no operations are under way, the quarter-mas-ters give him kickbacks of up to loo,000 Saigon piastres every month, from funds earmarked for �supplies and maintenance. Theso earninge really shoot up when things get hotter on the battlefields. Soldiers die or desert, but their names remain on the company lists, and their salaries go to their company commanders, who send half of -that wind-fall to Major Ngai. The latter's cornucopia also in-cludes a fat percentage of the operational funs (combat rations, special expenses, etc.) and the war booty : pigs and chickens, articles of clothing, gold and jewels mercilessly stolen from the civilians. Meanwhile the battalion's rear-base hums with. prol-Rabic activities :-under the supervision of the Ma-jor's trusted lieutenants, military lorries are hired to private traders for the transport of goods, most often smuggled ones, or are used to ferry "surplus supplies" : firewood, oil and lubricants, etc., to confidential middlemen. And so, after a mere two years as battalion commander, from a penniless captain, he has risen to be a millionaire-major, a faithful member of the Khaki Party, His colleague, Major IInynli Cong Do, v chief of the 3rd district of Saigon city, has fi hal his pockets at a still greater speed, thanks to I iree. ident Thieu's favour. Major Do's bonanza sprinei from-many sources : one is the damageS paid by tee American embassy to Vietnamese civilians killed "by mistake Or accident" by American borito, shells, bullets, or military trucks. These dam:1-4.�-: amount to 31. dollars per viethin the prie,. ef 20 kilograms of pork; as bitterly observed by the Sel-gonese. Forty per cent of that miim-V i it keted by Sir deputy district-chief for the simple reason that "were it not for his interveotion the Americans wouldn't have paid a cent !" Another Pactolus is the kickback from gambling-den gl�k who will ipso facto benefit from police proleetion. Another mint of money : the jUlok ,t ii at Long Binh, the great Ameriean 11,gisticat base. its the biggest military refuse dump in Asia, sperwlieg over tens of hectares, a huge motititruit 1 1i- carded jeeps, scontoears and trucks, typewiiiers, air-condi-tioners, reftigerators, radio and guns. tie sheets, iron and corper wire, articles of eiotl,ing, blankets, shoes, belts, canteens, and AVIIM- Ilt,l ! Tens, hundreds of tons of them. On orders from the .% tnerican bri-gadier commanding the Long Binh base, that enor-mous mass of junk is handed over to Major Do, to be sold to the "district people, with prioi-ity to'fam-ilies with orphans and widows it ho are es,pecially sympathetic to American and alb( dintuit- " at prices as low as one-tentli of ii -c on .the Saigonlilaelf market. But as soon as the goods are out of the stockade, Sir deputy dieiriet-a hie( hastens to put the "district people and fainiln-s otth widows and orphans" out of his miad. The merchandise is quickly sold out at the most profinilde � prices thanks to the efficient cooperation of the Major's henchmen.. Major Do's "extra earnings" Livo �ta-,aight him several apartment buildings and btxuri,nts villas, for rent and for use by his attractive yonag concu-bines, as well as big cars -- Anne-te.m, French and Jeptinese � for ferrying :Mt children to seaside resorts on holidays... In the reign of President Thiele ill(' great friend of the Americans, a princely liCe is Cie happy lot of the members of his party, the Party. TI4ANH NAM (To be contirmed) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 7 HANOT _ SalTPH ITTRTNAM TN qm-prroxrr.7 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 L-� -7/ I 7.7 THE KHAKI PARTY THANKS to solicitous care from the fortress-embassy, political parties have mushroomed in Saigon, like fungi on decaying wood. No less than 123 political parties and organizations are reg-istered with the Ministry of the Interior and the City administration. Proconsul Bunker can Mcleod, take pride in the fact that, quantitatively at least, Saigon " democracy " has outstripped American democracy, which can boast only two contending parties. The Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dung has split into three factions, with three headquarters. One under the thumb of Vu Hong Khanh, who had moved south after 1954 ; one controlled by Nguve:i Hoa Hiep, and one, calling itself the " unified VNQaDD " and having Nguyen Dinh Luong as its bellwether. Each faction claims to be the genuine VNODD and of course disclaims all American subsidies and. string�pulling. The Dai Net has also burst asunder : the Bac Ky (Nort.Vrn) faction is under the sway of Bang Van Sung, the Trung Ky (Central) faction is led by Ha Thuc Ky,. and the Nam Ky (Southern) coterie by Nguyen Ton Tloang. The Saigonese give the party as a whole the sobriquet of Dai Fit, which means, Great Hoax. The Dan Xa is an avatar of the " Labour and Personalism " organization set up by Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu. Its aim is to restore tl:c Ngo dynasty, and it maintains close relations, pc litical and financial, with Thieu and other Saigon generals, -and also with CIA chieftains responsible fer the murder Of Diem and Nhu. The list could be indefinitely prolonged : Phuo Viet, Cach Mang Nhan Dan, Vitt Nam Ilitng ()two Bang, Cong Flea Dui Chung, Doan ket, etc., not counting the Mat Fran CUU Ng u y Dan Toc (Front for Na-tional Salvation) hastily rigged up by the Amer-icans in an effort to rally all anti-Communist parties. behind Thieu. 'Many of those " parties " can boast only a few dozen- members. - Some are possessed only of an " Executive Committee " of ten members or less, a headquarters and an emblem, all serving the sole aim of getting hand-outs from the Americans. Before attempting to recruit any follower at all, a "party leader ' . should first get himself a fashionable " suit " from Adam, the tailor in vogue in Saigon, a black Mercedes sedan, and an attach case which he would stuff with... old 'newspapers. These accoutrements will allow him to knock at Bunker's door, hat in hand. , �: - � One party stands out among all those American-financed organizations. It has neither rules, program, headquarters, emblem nor any other paraphernalia normally connected with a political party, yet is especially pampered by the Americans. The Saigon -ese dub it the Khaki Party. Tt is made up of the generals and colonels promoted on the recommenda-tion of the proconsul Bunker and has had a meteoric career which is Ei cause of bitter envy and deep re-- sentment.on the part of the other parties. .. 'IOnce Phan Huy Quat, who served as Prime Minister under Nguyen Khanh's -military rule, said with a shrug 01 the shoulders : " Their job is to fight at the front. Yet they intrude into every field and grab every post : president, vice-president, prime minister, ministers, province chiefs, etc. Here in the South, there is one. only political party left, the - Khaki Party." For the last four or five years, the Khaki Party, the pampered child of the Americans, has driven all other parties into the background. "Senator" Dang Van Sung, a Dai Viet chieftain, who has close ties with the CIA and was once General Taylor's favourite, is quite spiteful about the Khaki Party. At a dinner in company with his close collaborators on the terrace-roof of the Con-tinental Hotel, he shook his head and complained with bitterness in his voice: "We are at the end of our tether. What's the use of founding a party ? The Army Party is ruling the roost." On the. Saigon political stage, gun-toting armymen. play all parts. All power is in their hands. Streets are controlled by sergeants, precincts by lieute-nants, districts by majors and the city itself is headed by a colonel mayor. At the National Cultural Congress, the tune was also called by men in khaki uniform : Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, whose main cultural interest is cock-fight-ing, gave his " instructions, 7 and psywar officers delivered lengthy speeches in paaise of "literacy" works by S. Paratroops Captain Nguyen Vu, and so on and so forth. Things are even more obvious in the economic field. The Khali Party controls all national resources. Everything is in the hands of generals, ex-generals, and their wives, concubines, relatives and friends : chemical' industry (Dosuki and C" in Bong Klianh boulevard, owned by Generals (ret.) Don, .Kuan, Kim, Tinian) ; i'mport-export trade (with yearly imports worth over 500 million US dollars), banking. (Ex-Defeace Minister Nguyen Hun Co is now the owner of a big bank)... Every .source of wealth and profit's is controlled by them : wood and forest products in the Central Highlands, cinnamon bark and pine resin in Quang Nam and Lam Bong, fish, brine and other sea products in Phan Thiet and Phu Quoc, even thc frozen-shrimp trade at Vung Tau. The real-estate business is also quite firmly in the hands of khaki-clad liigwigs: high-rise buildings in Saigen, Nha Traug, eam Ranh, . Da Nang, luxurious hotels and villas, complete with tennis-courts and swimming-pools, in Cong Ly and Hai Ba Trung boulevards, etc. Lesser figures in the Khaki Party control such profitable businesses as snack-bars, brothels, Turkish-baths, massage parlors, and laundry shops catering for American Gls. Time and again, Parliamentarians attempting to safeguard the interests of civilian traders and businessmen have vociferously condemned the brazen - faced encroachments . of the military, but in vain. The men in uniform rejoin that " free enterprise " is the supreme, rule of the ,and and that anyone with enough money and drive can engage in profit-bringing -activities. It's all very well, but. how can anyone , compete with the generals when they wield such power and influence, have access to military and economic secrets, hold control over US-aid goods, and, supreme argument, over the guns ! Many wealthy businessmen who had gone south after r954. have been driven to bankruptcy by competition from the khaki-clad entrepreneurs. One of them,. a notoriously pros-perous dealer in gold, jewelry and textiles in Hanoi h st k nlii our f d , a a en is ov e� u o espa r an impotent anger. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 There are top-ranking people who lApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 defence of corruption.. Among them is former president Tran Van Huong, who is now nearly So and has been connected with the regime for, decades. In one parliamentary rebate, he had this clincher : " If we should eliminate all corrupt elements, no one would be left to work for the States! " In the electioneering campaign of October ro7r, when Iluong was Thieu's running mate for the vice-presidency, he w.Ls praised by his sycephants for his " integrity Lnd honesty." According to them, he was "a rigl.teous man who lives close to the people and stays .way from all temptations." Then in early 1972, a pretty kettle of fish was uncovered. It was p-oved by political opponents that Huong was no irore honest than any other big fish of the Saigon regime. Immediately after he agreed to be Thieu's running mate, the American Embassy presented 'rim with a gift of io,000 US dollars. Thieu himseli: offered him a luxurious villa on f'han Thanh Gipri boulevard, and Bang Van c.juang, Thieu's financial manager, brought him two million in cash for " the furniture. " Later, Iluong also pocketed a check for 20,000 US dollars. But what made him most happy was the " special fund " of the vice-presidency, put at his disposal by the Saigon Finance Ministry after approval by Hunker personally and by USA1D headquarters: from five million, the fund was increased to thirteen million piastres ! Huong� was indee(1 wholly correct when he said that a truly effective anti-corruption drive would drive all Saigon officials from office', and that no one would be left to work for the "State," neither civil servants,. police, gendarmes, parliamentarians, soldiers, senators, nor president, vice-president and premier : Corruption is the miraculous twee which keeps the State machinery in motion. It is the cement that holds together all components of the � Saigon regime. No one should worry about the lack of industrial development in thE US-occupied part of South Viet Nam. Corruption and prostitution, thanks to the solicitude of the Americans and their fluiikeN,' Thieu, have reached a level of development equal to that of any industry in the world and could indeed supply the ''free world" with top-notch experts. (To be continued) THANH NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 8 H ANnT _ R(11 VT-FITN AM TN RTRIThisar Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (Co tinned) 8.-SEA TIGERS AND BLACK VULTURES THE "get-rich-quick" methods of the Saigon generals have brought them new records. The legendary wealthy figures of French colonial times fiave now been relegated to the background the latifundist Tran Trinh Trach, who had enough rice in his granaries to food hundreds of thousands of people ; Nguyen Hun Hao, the father-in-law of ex-Emperor Bao Dai, the doe phic su who owned immense areas of ricefields in My Tho and ]lac Lieu ; the rich Chinese merchants of the 1 lui I3on lion type, who had rows of tenement houses. Even in their heyday, they could in no way stand in com-parison with present-day generals. Because, in the .words of a wealthy Bac Lieu landowner, their for-tunes are to the generals' what a little knob is to a whole TV set ! � � In these years of r970-71, for the first time in history, there have appeared Vietnamese millionaires (if their wealth is counted in US dollars) or bil-lionaires Of it is reckoned in terms of Saigon pias-tres). International bankers now show a healthy repect for Vietnamese moneybags and put them on an equal footing with American, British, French and Japanese nabobs. Of course President Nguyen Van 'Dieu and General ('no Van Vien are counted by Saigon and international business circles among � those Croesuses. These Men have invented very effective ways for . filling their pockets. Take for instance the case of Admiral Trait Van Chon, the. Commander of the Saigon Navy. He and ��his predecessor, Admiral Chung Tan Cang, now military governor of Saigon, together with their subordinates of the Saigon naval forces, have all got rich " at the speed of PT boats " according to the colourful simile of their rank-and-file. Every three months or so, the admiral would � send groups of officers and men to the United States to take over warships handed over by the US Navy to its Saigon ally. These- are golden opportunities both for those entrusted with the job and their bosses at home. While living in posh hotels in 'various port cities along the Californian coast, they have plenty of occasions to familiarize themselves with American " culture " and market conditions. Their cargoes of heroin, opium and marijuana quickly change hands, bringing them wads of green-backs. Trips to the Philippines and Okinawa (japan) to fetch military hardware and get their ships checked are also highly lucrative and entertaining. No .wonder it happens that ship collisions are sometimes deliberately provoked by Saigon naval ofiicers to. provide them with opportunities for sailing .over to Manila for " repair. ' The coasts of South Viet Nam are uncter close surveillance by the Navy, whose ships, can cast anchor � wherever they see fit and' have besides " special security zones " put at their exclusive dis-posal. It also owns the multitude of rivercraf t which ply South Vietnamese canals and rivers. Vice-admiral Lam Nguon Tank has many friends and relatives .among the wealthy Chinese merchants of Cho Lon. And so the trade of sea-products is of course in the hands of Messrs senior officers of the Saigon Navy and their clans : fish, lobsters, mine main (fish brine) of top quality, and swallow's nests, which fetch high prices on the Hongkong market. �The holds of Navy vessels are crammed not only with such valuable merchandNe as cinnamon bark from the forests of Trung Bo or fresh .fruit and vegetables from the delta- kitchen gardens .and orchards, but also with all kinds of drugs and narcotis for GI customers stationed in Cam Ranh, Da Nang, Cua Viet and other ports. One must add of course the " war booty" that has been mercilessly stolen from the coastal population .and fishing-folk in frequent raids, incursions and round-ups : gold and jewelry, clothing and. furniture, watches, radio sets, motorbikes, even fishing boats and gear. After each such raid, the lesser items are distributed to the sniall fry, while the more valuable ones or the proceeds from their sale are moved up the ladder, each level of the hierarchy taking its re-deter�minect p share. All senior commanders of the Saigon Navy, vice-admirals and admirals, are millionaires ; the ship captains and commanders of rivercraft groups are also very wealthy men. The land-lubbers, green with envy, call the sailors " corsairs who not only rob the population but also steal from the State', Indeed in the open-air markets of Saigon, at Th.oi Binh and Cau Ong Lanh, one can find every item of Navy equipment put up for sale on the pavement : buoys, compasses, blankets, hammocks, electric generators and what not ! � The airmen, for their part, do business in their own way, with the speed and efficiency worthy of the jet era, under the leadership of such men as " Air Vice Marshal " Nguyen Cao Ky formerly and General Tran Van Minh at present. They deal in light-weight, h igh- value merchandise : gold, either in foil or bars, diamonds, heroin... Missions to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Manila or Taipei are highly �profitable occasions in which base, wing and flight, commanders operate in close co-operation with Southeast Asia-based international dealers. The goods travel under the protection of air-force military police and leave the airports in special air-force vans or even helicopters, which completely stymie customs officers and economic police. Air-force officers at the big Tan Son Nina base also run a transit business catering for private traders with especially valuable goods to ferry to various places of the speed and security with which the precious cargoes travel : 200,000 Saigon piastres for the transport of a kilogram of heroin from Saigon to Nha Trang ; 300,000 to Da Nang; and 350,000 to Phu Bai,further north. The money is given in advance and no receipt is of course given. The sender gives the address at which the goods are to be delivered, usually a public square or a posh restaurant, and also the sign at which the receiver is to be recognized. Big money also comes to the airmen from the sale of US-supplied equipment : spark-plugs (z,000 piastres apiece), special pilot's watches (40,000), plane wreckages (50,000 piastres a ton)... The Marines' worship of Mammon cannot be so discreet. The Saigon press is replete with unpleas-ant news and tumours which greatly anger Major-General Le Nguyen Khang, the burly, green-beret-ed Marine commander whose headquarters is at No. 15 Le Tininh Tong Street on the Saigon water-front. Marine officers, who wear the black-vulture badge, still speak with nostalgia of the great 1970 bonana. ; the invasion of Cambodia in the Neak-lueng region. It costs the Marines nearly a thou-sand lives, but the survivors had a jolly time � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 plundering the food and textile depots 4�;...ei � ally Fa 11VCI1 11.M;l1 CLu valice and paid on deliv-no haggling. The Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Lon Nol and stripping the local population, "refu-gees " included, of all their property : gold, jewels, Vespa scooters, Honda motorbikes... which were piled up on military lorries and whisked to open-air markets which had mushroomed along the frontier. A Marine brigade commander, on the advice of no less a figure than General Le Nguyen Khang himself, sent his own wife to Neakluong where she quickly organized, jointly with the spouse of the Cambodian local commander, Colonel Tasayat, an efficient channel linking Saigon to Phi mom Penli t iron gh N eakl uong for prof ii aide trade in opium and diamonds. Thus was " friend-ship " built up and consolidated, under the Ameri-cans' benevolent eyes, between the " States " and " armies " headed by Nguyen Van Thieu and Lon Nol. The year [970, in retrospect, proved to be the apex of the fortune of Le Nguyen Khang, and of his Black Vultures as well. For according to wags at the Saigon General Staff, the pitiful show the Marines performed in Southern Laos in 1971 was due among other things to the absence of such stinni Ii as gold and opium, which were hard to come by in the thick jungle of that theatre of operat ions. However, in this rat race, the men in the Com-missariat of the Saigon army are the fastest of them all. The name of this department in Viet-namese is Quao Tiep vu (Military Supply Depart-ment), ()TV for short. It takes care of all the stores and supplies of the Saigon army, and the whole. of US military and economic aid to this army passes through QTV services. The OTV men have grown sei presperous that the acronym has been read by Saigon wags to mean Own tim yang, or Gold Rushers. Indeed they have learnt quite a few tricks from their American counterparts, who run the PX stores and engage in thriving black-market activities. Let us pay a visit to the PA' on Nguyen Tri Phuong street, the biggest of them all. In spite of all the official announcements of American " troop withdrawals, " it is still crammed with GIs. The shop assistants, with painted lips and rouged cheeks and suggestive miniskirts, cast sheep's eyes at their American customers in the hope of getting generous tips. The rooms are filled with all kinds ,of goods : motorbikes, refrigerators, television sets, tape-recorders, cameras, fabrics, the newest gadgets from the US, Japan, France, Canada.-- soldat specially low prices. IN principle the PX's are off limits to the Viet-' namese. Yet black-marketeers wait in throngs at the door with wads of 500-piastre bills in their Pockets, for the kind-hearted GIs arc ready to help them get any commodities they want, against hard cash of course. Getting a 9-inch TV set for them will bring the GI 15,000 piastres' net profit ; a Honda moped will fetch them ro,000. The whole deal takes five minutes and twenty steps down the street. No wonder that many GIs have sung the praise of Saigon as a new Eldorado. US commissaries, however, look down on such paltry deals. Theirs are of a quite different magni-tnee. Let us follow for instance an American eonvOy (usually from 5 to zo trucks) carrying military supplies along one of the main highways leading from Saigon to Vong Tau, Tay Ninh or even nearby Bien lloa. At a given place, the convoy would screech to a sudden stop and some lorries would be quickly unloaded. The crates are dumped onto the roadside and quickly taken by waiting men to con-venient hiding-places, and the convoy would start rolling again. The whole operation lasts only a few ery : 10,000 piastres for a big crate, 6,000 for a smaller one. Their contents are not known in ad-vance, and that is the spice of the deal, which is as fascinating as a roulette game. When the crates are opened, the Vietnamese- _buyers, civilians or QTV men, hold their breath : if the boxes are fitteu with blankets of articles of clothing, they will give a contended nod, for the profits will be quite sizable. But they are really mad with joy if the goods then out to be watches, electronic radio valves, or lighter flints. On the other hand, they will put on a long face if confronted with heaps of Cl training man-uals, MP white helmets, rolls of toilet paper, or some metal or plastic machine parts of uncanny shapes. These will have to be quickly disposed of. But don't feel soiry for the gambler-buyers, they will make up for the losses later, and Nvith a vengeance. This original way of doing business lets begun to be practised by QTV men along such routes as the Saigon�BariaeSaigon�Lai Khe and Da Nang�Chu Lai highways. Recently a big scandal erupted in Saigon about the theft of 420 tons of copper hardware and elec-tronic equipment from the giant Long Binh US logistical base. The stolen goods were loaded on the cargoOtip Bong Nai bound for Singapore, at a time when the price of copper was shooting up on the world market. The deal involved big shots in many services, both American and Vietnamese: the Econom-ics Ministry, the port administration, tl.e customs service, American senior officers, etc. Palingreasing, as it was later revealed, took as much as 30 million piastres, but it apparently foiled to satisfy every-. body, for the beans were eventually spilled by some malcontent. The goo* according to time exposme, had been taken to the wharves by American militaey lorries during fifteen consecutive nights, in curlew hours of course ! They consisted of brand-new altil-lery shell-cases (the warheads had been unscrew,d and sold out to junk-yard dealers in Cholon) and costly military signal equipment. Outstanding among the Vietnamese names men-tioned in connection with this big deal are thmse of General Bong Van Khuyen, head of the Commis-sariat, and other ()TV senior officers. Their tort nes rival those of other top brass of the Saigon army : Admirals Chung Tan Cang and Tran Van Chou, Air-force Generals Tran Van Minh and Vu XUall Lanh, Marine General i.e Nguyen Khang, Paratroop General Du Quoc Bong, and other hie-rarchs of the IChahi Party. Small wonder that they are bemused by the prospect of American withdrawal and the wobbling posture of their ringleader Nguyen Van Thieu. (To be continue d) THANH NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 Part 9 TT 01\TnT SnTrTrff ITTPITIVAM TAT qr111RTTagLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2 s."�. J-2 (Continued) 7.� THE NUMBER ONE MAN - AND HIS PROFESSION OF FAITH WHEN, in late 1.97o, a number of parliamen-tarians met in the Dien Hong Conference hail which stood among the bank buildings near the -Chuong Duong docks, and kicked up a row about � corrupt ion among the bigwigs in the government, the name of Major-general DO Cao Tri was the subject. of vehement debate. In the coffee houses . along Tu Do (Freedom) Boulevard and the posh refreshment stalls along the Saigon-Bien Iloa. expressway, the name of Do Cat) Tri, President Thieu's right hand man, became a byword of plunder and embezzlement. At the joint General Staff Headquarters, junior officers doing clerical work amidst the. ,scream of jets from the Tan Son Nhut airfield agreed that the major- general was indeed the number one embezzler and bribe-taker of the Saigon army. Behind him stood three other�generals in this order : Bang Van Quo ng, I,n Lan and Dam Van Quang. Who was Do Can Tri ? His name was a household word among the paratroopers. He joined the French cohmial army at the age of 17, was sent to France for training and made his first parachute jump at . the age of is, whereupon he was promoted second lieutenant. It was in 1946. Later Tri liked to remi-nisce about his French superiors at. the time, Co-lonels Gilles, Ducourneau, Konal and others, and about his participation in operations of the French Soon,, on the highway leading from Chup to the frontier and on to Saigon, long convoys of Amer-ican-made military trucks. with QC (Quan Canh : Military Police) escorts started rolling. Under the tarpaulins they carried ro-12 fat oxen or buffaloes apiece. About 4,000 head of cattle ,thus passed the frontier in one week. But what particularly enraged the French plantation-owners was the looting of their rubber stocks. Nearly a thousand tons Of raw rubber were thus taken away by 20o truck convoys, this operation being given priority even over the evacuation of Tr i's wounded soldiers. The bales bore inscriptions in French "Plantation Chup," or "Plan-tation Mimot." After the warehouses were nearly emptied, aircraft were called in to drop incendiary and napalm bombs. Called to account by angry Cambodian senior offi-'curs, 'Fri answered with a shrug of the shoulders : " The latex is so inflammable ! A few Viet Cong shells were enough to set it �ablaze. As for the cattle, well, they just stampeded away when the battle started and we couldn't do a thing about it, could wt" Cao Tri truly deserves the name his parents gave him, which means The Wily One. A captain of the 18th infantry Division later supplied some details about the operation, in the course of a carousal: " Everything went like clockwork. The convoys were welcomed at the frontier by no less a figure than Brigadier Lam Quang Tho, commander of the rSth ID. Under his troops' protection, the goods were taken to points plotted beforehand on the map, from which they were later directed to secret warehouses or confidential middlemen. The security expeditionary corps along the Sino-Vietnamese men couldn't lift a finger for the escort officers were . border and, in the North . west, in the years 1950- all their senior in rank, majors or lieutenant-1952. Ile never forgot to boast that he had been -'colonels, and moreover covered by mission orders awarded the Legion d'Honneur in 1951. " 1 wzor signed either by General Do Can Tri himself or his only 23, " he would proudly stress, " yes sir, only chief-of-staff Brigadier An. Such mission orders, as 23. " He never tired 'of repeating to his subord- you can guess, are worth ID i 1 I io n s of piastres apiece. ', inates : " I made my first jump before General At the peak of the Cambodian operation, Chinese' ' Nguyen Chanh Thi, and General Cau Van Vien, the the Chief-of-Staff, did theirs. "_ _ merchants with a great flair for profitable deals Who was Do Cao Tri ? His name was a household went by night to the open-air markets in Go Dan ha word among the paratroopers. He joined the French on the frontier and brought back truckloads of the colonial army at the age of 17, was sent to France plunder seized by General Tits troops : woollen and for training and Made his first parachute .jump at silk fabrics, medicines, tobacco, watches, radio sets, the age of 18, whereupon lie was promoted second bicycles, motorbikes, not to mention the innumerable lieutenant. .It was in 1946. Later Tri liked to remi- household items taken by force from the population, nisce about his French superiors at the time, Co- down to the poorest strata. On General Tri's orders, lonels Gilles, Dueourneau, Konal and others, and electric generators were brought in to provide these about his participation in operations of the French thriving centres of business with all favourable expeditiontiry corps tilong the Sino-Vietntonese conditions for carrying on their activities at night. border and in the North. west, in the years 195o. And so, while the soldiers of the Third Paratroop 1952. lie never forgot to boast that he had been Brigade and the 2.58th Marine Brigade were dying by awarded. the� .Legion d'Honneur in 1.95 r...-." I was the thousand at the foot of rubber trees, hundreds Only 23, " he would proudly stress, " yes sir, only of thousands of US dollars; in greenbacks as well as 23. " lie never tired of repeating to his subord- in red (military-issue) dollars, kept streaming into mates : " I made my first jump before General the coffers of their commanding general. Nguyen Chant' Thi, and General Can Van Vien, ic tl t that was not all. There were even bigger . . . B Ll the Chief-of-Staff, did theirs. " windfalls, For instance two suitcases stuffed with ,In 1966, in the course of a ceremony held by the bundles of bank-notes � US dollars, Saigon piastres, Paratroops Division, Tri was dubbed King of Para- Cambodian riels, Lao hips � taken from the safes of troopers. But he was better known under the less 'the French rubber plantations and the pockets of flattering sobriquet of King of Embezzlers, Gam- .the local population, and totalling, according to blurs and Whore-hoppers. . estimates by intelligence officers of the Third Corps How did he go about his business ? In 1970, when Area, over four thousand million Saigon piastres. It be. was commander of the Third Coips Area and - was a great kandal and Saigon parliamentarians Military Governor of Saigon, he was appointed kicked up a shindy about it. But barely three day,s commander of the Saigon forces invading Cambodia. later, General Tri sharply upbraided them : " it's When his in fan try and paratroop unit entered the an unforgivable insult to generals- in the field, and rubber area of Chimp and Mimot (-0,000 hectares a slanthT aimed at staining .the national prestige. " �each) Tri lost no time appointing a special Task The rebuke was accompanied by a challenge to Se-Face for requisitioning all property of the French nator Pliant Nam Sach to come to his headquarters plantation-owners and Cambodian local population. in Bien Hon to thrash omit the.matter by discussion While the rest of his forces were being crushed and, if need be, by a pistol duel ! Needless to say, under the artillery barrages and decimated by the ambushes of the Liberation forces, Tri's buccaneers efficiently fulfilled their assignment. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 the Senator quickly drew in his hoApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 not such a fool as to risk his life by going to the tiger's den. It was publiC knowledge that Tri enjoyed "President " Thieu's Complete confidence and pro-tection, and his truculence naturally knew no bounds. Indeed, the mere sight of him would fright-en the ordinary citizen out of his wits : t burly figure with fierce features, jumbo-sized dark glasses, a black beret tipped at a sharp angle, and enormous pipe pugnaciously sticking out of a corner of his mouth from which came an unending flow of foul language, one hand waving a silver-tipped ebony swagger-stick, the other ready to whip out a caliber Colt Colt pistol at the least displeasure. Tri's career had been meteoric. His climb from ordinary paratrooper in the French colonial army to major-general in Thieu's army had been all smooth sailing. Made commander of the most important of the four Corps Areas of the Thieu regime, then commander-in-chief of the 50,000 Saigon troops invading Cambodia, he had good reasons to believe that his star would keep rising. Financially speak-ing he had made quite a few lucky strikes. In 1955 he had pocketed heaps of money in the operations ordered by Ngo Dinh Diem, his then in titer, against the Binh Xuyen. In late 1903, he Was serving in the First Corps Arc-a when Diem and his brother Nhu were liquidated at CIA instigation. Tri received orders from his new masters to arrest Diem's bro-ther Ngo Dinh Can, the satrap of Central Trung Bo, whom he used to respectfully address as " Elder " Among the latter's confiscated property was a box of diamonds, the most precious item in the immense fortune of the `` Tiger of Trung Be." A Tri aide who was present when the box was seized From r965 onwards, as the war expanded, Tri's fortune also knew a fantastic rise. One of his younger brothers was appointed commander of the Bien Floa sector, the family's native region. Another was given a lucrative job in le forestry adminis-tration while a third worked ill the army's security forces, a good position from which to "protect " the business deals of the Do Cao clan. The Saigon press talked a great deal about the Do Cao " war-lords " who, under the wings of General Tr, planned to become financial magnates as well. � In March 1972 General Tri's career came to an abrupt end when his helicopter, in which had also taken place his closest American advisers, was shot down by Tay Ninh guerillas soon after taking off from the Trang Lon airstrip. It was reported that 'Chien wept bitterly when accompanying Tri's remains to the military ceme-tery at Bien Ifoa. The dollar-scented relationship between the two was well-known : a sizable part of the Thieu family's income came from Tri's contribution, through the channel of the " sisterly " rapport between San, Thieu's wife, and .Kim Chi, Tri's third spouse, who incidentally was the daughter of Nguyen Hue Tri, the governor of Tonkin in French times. Soon before his death, Tri had uttered what could lae considered the profession of faith of the lihrki Party anti the Saigon generals' guideline for action. The French journalist Jean Larteguy, who interview-ed Tri in Tay Ninh town, recounts that after remi-niscing about his past services to the French and his former saperiors in the French colonial army --Colonels Gilles and Vanuxem among. others � Tri recalls that his eyes goggled out of his head when talked about his philosophy of life. After drawing Tri emptied it to count his booty no less than 2.12 -la long puff at the French cigarette Larteguy had diamonds in all, of which 30 were of the first water offered him (the Frenchman gave him four more at and worth tens of thousands of dollars apiece.. - his request to satisfy his nostalgic yearn for things � French) Tri confided: " In war there are usually two kinds of people : Those who make it, and those who 'get .rich from it. I do both. Yes sir, I make war and at the same (I inc take fat profits from it." Ile burst out laughing and added sententiously: "Life is so short one should make the most of it !" Four days later, Tay Ninli guerillas put an end to his life. (To be contintced) THAW, NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 10 H.ANOI , SOUTH VIETMAN IN STRUGGLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (Continued) The- content of the letter somehow leaked out. Major-general Ngo Dzu was greatly shocked or 10. The Highlands Satrap rather. feigned great shock, and hastily came to Saigon for an 'explanation' campaign in which he D OCan Tr died before he could fulfil his dream went so far as to challenge to a pistol duel anyone i of commanding the big operation involving Republic and sully national prestige." Y'� "dared to drag in the mud the generals of the 40,000 troops in to Illghway 9 and Southern Laos, in replacement of Major-general Mang Xuan But no one was fooled. Anyone who set foot in Lam who Was ill-fitted for the job (the Saigon Da Lat, the fashionable resort in the Central press considered Lam to be at best suited for a Highlands, knew in what kind of business the regimental command). Almost at the same time a general had been engaging. You could hear it openly big scandal erupted around the name of General discussed in the lounges of the posh hotels, such as Ngo Dzu. � the I'alace and the Lang Biang. In Da Lat you can No Diu was called the highlands Satrap. A easily get things that are rather hard to come by in Saigon : such costly drugs as "yellow" LSD major-general since (968, he was :Appointed corn-pills could be had at to,00ta pjastres a bottle ; mander of the Second Corps Area, the largest, an green ones at much lower prices. Tablets that are immense region stret citing from the mountains to the sea and containing tremendous wealth. It was a mixture of mescaline and LSD, much sought populated by many ethnic minorities and :Coked after by wealthy revellers of both sexes, could be upon as of great strategic value. A Saigon paper obtained in any amount. Prosperous American. business executives and globetrotters are unani-.n 1970 : " President Thieu's right hzind, observed mous in their praise of Da lat. The air is cool. General. Tri, holds Saigon, while his left hand, General Dzu, takes a firm grip of the llighlands." (never more than 16" C. day or night), the streams and pine groves beautiful. What is more, you can-NV1137 then did Ngo Dzu fall into disfavour ? The get things that are hard to obtain even in such story, as circulated in the posh restaurants of places as Marseilles (France) and Los Angeles Cholon, is as follows : all began with an out-(USA), and at such low prices you couldn't believe burst of anger from President Nixon in May ro7r. your ears : Red Rock heroin (95% pure). costs two Drug-addiction had reached an alarming rate in the dollars a bottle (moo in the US) ; a packet of 20 US exPpditionary. corps. A special report by the federal narcotics administration on drug-addict filter-tipped marijuana cigarettes, 50 cents. among returned GIs as well as among the US expe- All the channels, big and small, were controlled . -ditionary corps in South Viet Nam struck Nixon by Ngo Dzu and his underlings. Thousands of ton-and his advisers with understandable anguish. The rists�America.n, French, West German, Japanese, addiction rate was not a mere 15% as anticipated, Filipino, Indonesian, -- were freely spending their but as high as 32%, and even to% in the America' dollars in Da Lat. They could drink and dance all Division. Other reports from American Congress- night, go boating, play tennis, and for their orgies, men, doctors and lawyers who visited South Viet rent luxurious villas or repair to plush night-clubs. Nam. in jnne and July contained descriptions of a The lion's share of the dividends from those wretched state of affairs: depravation and indis- business naturally found its way into Ngo Dzu's cipline were rampant among the GIs, who pockets. In May 197r; the liberation forces attacked . refused to go to battle, murdered their mates Da Lat. The Saigon army's military academy and and even killed their commanders. The rea- staff college fell into their hands. The pleasure-son for this was their disillusionment with the seeking tourists hastily disbanded. They cursed war, a murderous and meaningless \var. This moral Ngo Dzu who barely a month before had boasted decay was spreading to American troops in Western that: " never could the Viet C'ong penetrate into Europe and the. US itself. Panic-stricken members. Da Lat !" of Congress suspected a devilish trick of the adver- However busy he was massacring local minority sary, whose "secret weapon consisted in having the people (I3.2 Na and E De tribespeople especially) drugs sold at dirt-cheap prices to the GIs through and herding Burn into "strategic hamlets, " Ngo a network of ubiquitous pushers." Saigon newspa-Dzu always found time to come to Da Lat at least pers also sounded the alarm : "A heroin war has once a week to supervise the work of his subordi-surged in Viet Nam !" nates and to immerse himself in revelry. A colonel . Soon, however, a top-secret CIA report, which' OA. r the 22nd Infantry Division, who had occasion had been compiled by special agents and brought to to accompany the general to his " headquarters, " Nixon by CIA chieftain Richard Helms personally, was quite impressed.. The building was a luxurious leaked hut. The CIA men had come to the region villa which had belonged to Nguyen Hun Hao, the dubbed Golden Triangle, which lies at the father-in-law of " Emperor " Ban Dai. Built on top meeting-point- of the frontiers of Viet Nam, Laos of a hill with a fine view on neighbouring land.-and Burma, where 1,200 tons of opium were being. scapes, it had changed masters several times produced annually. They took a close look at the Did and his consort, French Governor General channels of .distribution of the drug (including. Decoux, the Japanese commander-in-chief in Endo-those run by the CIA itself, which link the place. china, French Marshal De Lattre de Tassigny and to Long Cheng, Vientiane and Bangkok) and con- most recently, Ngo Dinh Nhu (brother and adviser eluded "Heroin has been supplied to the GIs to Ngo Dinh Diem) and his wife. Ngo Dinh Nhu, through the business undertakings of the Viet- .an opium-addict, had hail a room on the second narnese (Saigon) generals." An. appended list cited floor specially fitted out for his drug-taking sessions, 42 names with functions and ranks, all pillars . of during which he was able to enjoy a splendid view Thieu's regime. Ngo Dzu's name topped the list. .,-of pine-covered hills. After a full debate by the National Security Along the Saigon�Da Lat highway, 'n such towns Council of the mortal danger .facing the American .as Blao and Tung Linh, Ngo Dzu's men had set up troops,. President.Nixon wrote a personal letter to -whorehouses and opium and gambling dens, the Thieu in which he curtly demanded that an end be resorts of playboys, most of them children of VIPs, put to that systematic poisoning of the GIs and -scions of. wealthy families, smugglers, and prosper. punishment be meted out to those who for the sake .ous wholesale dealers in vegetables, one of the of bast material interests were luring hundreds of main products of Da Lat. All benefited from thousands of their American "allies', to slow but Ceoeral Ngo Dzu's generous, -but by no means disin--certain destruction.. . �terested, protection. International smugglers also �maintained fruitful partnership with the satrap. � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Scores of quintals of processed opium vere ferried matter. " Of course both of Ngo Dzu's superiors by helicopter from a remote region in Burma to were in the know but their mouths were kept tight-Pleiku, Kontum, Da Lat, Pakse, Long Cheng, ly shut by means of enormous bribes, amounting to from which they were distributed to the American millions of piastres. Colby, the head of LISA ID, .clientele through the general's network .of military asked "Premier " Khiem to put an end to that transport. . . " sabotage " and got this polite, but firm, rejoinder : In early 1971, while the Lam SOD 719 operation " Once handed over to the Vietnamese side, the into Southern Laos was rnrming into deep trouble, bases become Vietnamese property and the Viet-Ngo Dzu, on Abrams's order, twice went by chopper namese know best. what to do with them. " The to Pakse on the bank of the Mekong, the headquar_ only resort left to the infuriated Colby was to ters of the Fourth Military Region of the Vientiane curse the " incompetent and venal generals " of .army. There he met General Phasouk, commander Saigon. of the Military Region and satrap of Bassac, a rich . It was the only case in which the Saigon top area of the Country of the Million Elephants, the brass, who as a rule are at the Americans' beck colourful name by which Laos is often designated. and call, dared to defy them. The two parties discussed prospects for incursions After the � disaster at Tan Canh and Dak to in into the Saravan�Attopen highlands in order to late 4, prn :i L n [972, Ngo Dzu was recalled to Saigon, hamper the liberation forces' strategic supplies. � , pc.nding investigation. " lie was often seen in But the plan was eventually abandoned for lack of company with General I bang X uan La in, the troops and fear of annihilation. Vet, Ngo Dzu's general cashiered after the fall of twang Tri, at time was by no means wasted. fie concluded a the city sportS club. Clad in immaculately white fruitful deal with Phasouk whereby an opium�andsports clothes, they were playing a lively game of heroin�ferrying line was set up between l'akse awl tennis and enjoying it enormously. Pleiku, and business progressed apace until the fall Let military disaster follow nrilitary disaster. Let of Dakto and Tan Canh cost Ngo Dzu his post. Saigon troops get their noses bloodied ill one place It was public knowledge that Dzu's father was � after another. This in no way interfered with the the owner of an import-export under la king \vita generals' comfort. The only difference was that they. branches in many -cities of Trung Bo : Quang Ngai, now had plenty of time to enjoy the tremendous Da � Nang, Qui Nhon... and of course had a linger w6alth they had amassed over the past decade or so in the heroin pie. thanks to the blood shed by their soldiers. The Ngo Dzu's greed knew no bounds. In this, be threatened " investigation and trial " did not worry was a typical representative of the top brass of the them in the least. They knew it was a put-up job Saigon regime. In 1970, he had thought out a aimed at soothing. public opinion and allaying the scheme which fitted Very nicely into Mr Nixon's despair and bewilderment in the Saigon .army. The plan for " Vietnamization." After the transfer by , worst that could happen to them would be their the American Fourth Infantry Division of a base appointment to some ambassadorship abroad. A at Due Co to the Second Corps A rea Command, (2 : ..a[ngon lawyer observed : " In this country the Ngo Dzu ordered that the base be auctioned Off,. administration of justice 'follows a very .strange and the proceeds incorporated into the Corps Area's course indeed. It's just beyond the ordinary man's special fund. Anyone who has had occasion to pass 'grasp. The sentences meted out sometimes cause the by an American base knows that it is. worth a accused to jump for joy, for they mean no punish-great deal of money : hundreds of rows of mili� ment at all; but actual reward. " Iloang Xuan Lam tary huts with pinewood beams and walls and tin and Ngo Dzu could thus wait for their trials with . roofs, air-conditioners, electric generators, radio tranquil hearts. New favour would no doubt be and 'television sets, electric fans, safes, filing bestowed upon them by their boss, the leader of cabinets, costly plumbing, bath-tubs, duralumin- the Khaki Party: Nguyen Van Thieu. framed furniture, typewriters, mimeograph ma-The replacement of Ngo Dzu ;is head of the Second chines, etc. The American troops have lost the war, Corps Area was also carried 4)ut in typical Saigon all right, but they remain none the less a modern fashion. The new appointed was Brigadier Nguyen and wealthy army. And the Americans are always Van Toan who, as commander of the Second Infan-very " generous " - towards their " allies. " On try Division in Quang Ngai, had been brought to Washington's orders, all American bases in South book on several occasions for such offenses as the Viet Nam, together with all their equipment and rape of a 12-year-old girl, looting civilian property installalionS, are to be transferred to the Saigon in broad daylight, accepting several million piastres army to help it " grow as strong as its big broth- in bribe from a subordinate against the promise, er. " But Ngo Dzu had his own conception of never fulfilled, to promote him to higher rank, "Vietnamization. " Within two weeks, everything plundering tons of cinnamon bark, marketing them at Due Co had disappeared, sold off lock, stock with the complicity of I foang Xuan Lam's wife and and barrel. To whom ? To the generals of course, sharing the proceeds with her, etc. It was clear their relatives, and their underlings. At about that he was made Ngo Dza's successor solely by one-tenth of market prices. The litur's share natu- virtue of his proven ability to run the profitable rally came to Ngo Dzu, whose million-dollar business set up by the latter on behalf of Thiel], account in a Hong Kong bank grew noticeably Khiem, Vien and Co. fatter. The subsequent " Victnamization " of other (To be continued) American bases greatly benefited from the e.xpe-Hence thus acquired. .It no longer took as much as two weeks, but a mere two days to dismantle each THANH NAM of the American bases at Dae To, Le Thant), .Iney Mrong�1.n Khe... Long columns of military lorries had been assembled, outlets found, prices fixed. The Americans complained to General Cao Van Vien and " President " Thieu, but all they got was a-polite, " Thank you, we'll have a look into the . Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Pa* 11 HANQT_ Reimm VTPTWAM TM mPiTGGLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 prime. mover, fuel and lubricant of the State ma-chinery,'' as admitted by one of its stalwarts, the four major-generals play indeed a major role.. They maintain close and effective liaison between the' satraps in the four Corps Areas, the Presidency and �the General Staff. 'laving themselves worked in the various Corps Areas, they are quite conversant' with . all available opportunities for profitable businesses there. how rich are they ? It's difficult tos say. An indi-cator is Dang Van Quang's boast in the eours.-:-of drinking bout that his own fortune had grown even larger than that of Nguyen Hull Co, the :fOrmer Defence Minister and now a big bank; owner, whose known wealth is believed to have passed the 6 million US dollars' mark. Each month Co and his wife draw two -million Saigon piastres' rent' from .-Diiring their time in power, � Diem, his. brother. Nhu, �and Nhu's - wife, Le .Xuan,- had their hand in .. (Continued) just every profitable business in the land. They held_ the Monopoly of the rice.trade in Trung Bo and the.. 11. �. The four pillars of -export:of such products as cinnamon bark, white' � the corrupt regime sand. Vox. glass making); scrap iron, rubber, frozen - shrimp, duck feathers, .etc. to Japan, Singapore,� Hongkong', France, .the USA; West Germany.... THE four pillars of the corrupt regime in Saigon stood in this order : Do Cao 'I'd, Dang Van year in profit. The general manager was Diem's which- brought them several billion piastres each 'Outing, Lu Lan and Dam Van Quang. All four elder sister, Ca Le. At present this PactoluS flows Were major-generals (Tri was posthumously promo- into the pockets of Ngo Dzu, Huang Xuan Lam, - ted to be a ' four-star full general). i Dang Van Quang, and company. The higher your rank, and the bigger your power, One of Diem's achievements in " industrial deve-the more mercilessly you rob the people�such is 'opulent " was the setting up of the Tan Mai firm the law governing the Saigon administration and in Bien Hoa., which hehl the monopoly of timber. army. Let us take a quick look at the careers of exploitation and wood processing. A government " President " Thieu's four cronies. decree forbade all trade in. wood in order to " pro-Dang Van Quang used to be the commander of teet national wealth ", i.e. this monopoly. Now the the Fourth Corps Area (the Mekong Delta) where an Mai undertaking has been entrusted to a retired he had had plenty of opportunity to plunder its general, one of Dang Van Quang's cronies. rice Lu Lan, formerly head of Quang Ngai province Diem possessed great interests in the textile then commander of the Second Corps Area, was industry. He held large shares in such undertakings also notorious for his venality and especially im" as Intertexco, Dofitex, Vinatexco, and Vimitex. � his looting of relief rice for flood victims. Ile His brother, Bishop Ngo- Dinh Thuc, 'owned the is now inspector general at the Ministry of .Defence. Cogido paper-mill in. Bien Boa, where he gave his Darn Van Quang, formerly a staff sergeant in blessings to 300 workers to compensate. them � for, the I'''rencli colonial iirmy, was later promoted. their .starvtltion .wages,. the lowest in the trade The .to be " Emperor " Bao Dai's aide-de-camps mill has been developed into a large plant entrusted then commander of his personal guard. In the- with "supplying paper for, national defence " and American-financed regime in Saigon, he was put in� is now firnliy-totittolled �by GeCtierals Ctio,Vail.'Vleii: comthand of the Special. Forccs a.nd earned a solid and Lu Lan. � reputation as a dollar trafficker, American aid, embezzler, and inveterate ga.mbler.. He is now Lu. In the food industry, Madame. Nhu in her tin had set up the Intraco Company, which owned a 1...an's. deputy. In the Saigon regime, where " cordiptioni is the' Meat-packing factory in Gia Dinh, a fish-canning one in Phan Thiet, a zoo-hectare breeding area for lobsters in Vung ,Tan, a freezing plant for shrimps in Van Don (Saigon). The major shareholders in these undertakings are now senior officers in the Saigon General Staff. Diem in his time was surrounded by such faithful servant-managers as ' Nguyen Van Bun, his own nephew, who ran the M11110.111011 and shrimp businesses in Trung Bo, or Nguyen Him Khai, who supervised the vegetable-growing " cooperatives " in Lain Dong and the marketing of their products in Saigon or even as far as Singapore. The Saigon generals' retinue is much more numerous. It is made up of their brothers, nephews, cousins and of course their . parents and wives. Not to mention their subor-dinates --- staff � officers and commissaries � who will do their utmost to please their bosses and their real estate alone: a three-storeyed apartment get promoted to higher rttnks. . house in Da Lat, Go bungalows rented to Aniericans. The official title of Dang Van Quang: security at the Nita Trang seaside resort, a luxurious villa. adviser to the President, should not be taken too in Vying- Tau, two modern hotels in Saigon.. etc.. seriously. His job is rather to look -: after the ng The real estate. accordi, to the estimate of expc- security of the President's.., purse, and to ensure a rienced building contractors, is worth billions or' steady flow of income from his opium and political piastres. But the cash and bank. accounts-remain, traffic, lie works most of the time with Thieu's a well-guarded mystery. There are only a few eloquent' wife and manages the Thien family's bank accounts pointers. For instance this story- about Mrs Co, -iii Rome and Herne. " A real Kissinger," quipped a whose great passion is gambling. Once, having struck journalist to a parliamentarian, wild quickly replied : a bad 'streak,. she lost 300,000 piastres in one single " Kissinger can't hold a candle to Quang as far as evening. Lighting .a cigarette, she saidl casually, financial management for the boss is concerned.'" With a ...-shrug ,of .� thi,. -:shoulders.:T7: ''� WS .,nota,hinF�, The generals' spouses are at letist as notorious as nothing- at all. The price of three soldiers: ! - �their husbands. The press often carries reports What is certain is that the fortunes of the Saigon :about visits paid by the First Lady of the Second generals far surpass that of - the Ngo, Dinh Diem 'Republic of Saigon (Thieu's wife), accompanied by family, which in fact had been incorporated into such social luminaries- as the wives of Generals theirs alter Diem's fall in 1963. The so-called Dang Van Quang and Lu Lan, to wounded soldiers it. c.onfis;Cation� � of the ' N go clan's property for. the � at the Republican- Hospital. " Charity " activities �biliefit Of the State "was just eyewash�the throwing are a convenient screen for less. innocent under.-ulway .Of '.a -Sprat to -Catch a is ii . Some : of ' the 5f iff � -Of the Saigow Supreme ' Conrk:" 'knOW2every, nook and cranny of the affair; the files., rifs�Whith-lie in their.:Safes, but they priulently.keep, their,' Mouths shut. They rarely...talk about- this;,�1 ticklishs Subject, only in private' conversations- with. truSta,friends.- � . -- .- � s��� ...�.� - -cYbrit1:3"*.E.A. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 takings. Thus Mrs Thieu is president of the Women the hundreds cri thousands or GIs who had laid Serve Society associatimi, while Mesdames (pang,' down their lives would not have died in vain. A Lan and Quang are members of its central coin- luxurious Esso headquarters rose on Thong Nhat mittee. The. Saigonese are quick to point out that boulevard opposite the " Independence Palace ". In 'in fact they only serve their own private coffers by late 197o, Thieu had promulgated Decree 11-70 corrupting society. For their 'numerous financial which laid down rules and conditions, very liberal deals they have an army- of efficient aides and can ones indeed, for foreign companies to conduct sur-devote most of their" time to American-style orgies. veys and open up oil wells on an area totalling :...T1u:y arc: numerous enough to form a .special. too,000 square kilometres. " An outright gift to !privileged .stratum. For although there are only foreign investors,'' estimated a Lybian oil expert. 13'z; :generals: (from brigadier .up).� the, number- of The Saigon press quickly pointed out : " President their consorts is much larger, perhaps a thousand Thieu is ready to sell out the whole of the country's .or so. Once a brigadier-general was killed in- battni; wealth for just a few score million dollars in anti-'No less than eight widows came to his funeral cipation of the day when he will leave the country was the first time they ever met), from places as for a comfortable exile in Switzerland. " distant as Da Nang, Hue, Da Lat, Can Tho and one However, in spite of all efforts by Thieu to cajole from -each of three Saigon districts. Each tried to and entice foreign investors, USAID and the Saigon express her grief louder than the others, hoping Economics Ministry were unanimous in recognizing thereby to justify claim to a larger share of the that the undertaking, far from progressing at a tJoo-mi Ilion -pias tre heritage. " cosmic " speed, was proceeding at a snail's pace. As said about, charity" is the favourite occiiPai In the early part of 1972, an elderlty .'. - seen taking .tion. of the generals' wives.. Victims of natural: wearing 0d-rimmed speetacleS could b Calamities, war refugees widows and orphans a-re; a. walk every aft!rnoon along the tree-lined Thong the object . of their watchful solicitude. Indeed: Nhat boulevard, He looked tired and worried. He they are watching for the least typhoon that may' was a top-ranking expert of the American Bristol Oil swoop down on their unfortunate compatriots. Not company:, who had been. in Saigon for s, velal years that. they are much 'concerned about their fate. But: and had kept in close touch with Thieu and Quane. they are terribly interested in the share that they Once .he confided-- to a. Vietnamese friend in the never fail to get from the relief funds collected:: Saigon Economics Ministry usually no less than 60 per cent. ' 'Safety, absolute safety, that's what we need. These last few years, Dam Van Quang has been You know what has been happening in the Middle entrusted by Thieu with the problem of the oilfields;' and Near East. Let trouble erupt and the oil wells With a -bulging brown leather briefcase under ho ill 'go. up an flarries. Oil 'and bombs stiould be arm, Quang often conies to meet the American oil: widely separated. Both are inflammable !" He experts at USAID headquarters. Indeed he is the added with a wry smile : ." There May be an oil liaison man between Thieu and the big- American' war, but in actual life oil shouldn't be too close to oil companies. Together with Mien and some of the war!'' A pause,' then he continued : 'r Absolute Saigon top brass, he dreams of becoming an oil political stability, that's the second thing we need. magnate in Soutkeast Asia, Oilmen come to Saigon. The nationalizations effected by those new govern-from all corners of the world. From the Boeing ments in South America have been hard blows to 7175 which land at Tan Son Nhut airport there us. Unfortunately both the things we require, safety alight prosperous-looking businessmen - from the_ and stability, can't be found here. " He looked at USA, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, his friend who seemed lost in thought, and explain-Japan, Australia and even Indonesia. This has cd : " Trading in oil is not like trading in heroin. become a veritable rush, in contrast to the relative; We have to build big storage tanks and long pipe-discretion of a. few years ago, when American oil lines. No amount of armed guards could ensure their executives passed themselves off as mere touristsr absolute safety. ktwo-pound explosive charge could and went home after a period of three to six months, � cause billions of dollars' worth of oil to 1p-) up in During their stay, they lived in hotels, in rented smoke. Mr Bunker's bunker itself has been proved villas or at the headquarters of Shell. Caltex or not to be immune from attack. What about oil tanks ? Standard Oil Saigon branches. How could we think of setting up business here ? " A special . department at USAID studies the He looked discouragingly to the north, where natural-wealth of South Viet Nam, oil in particular. .according to a recent MACV communiqu�he fuel In early 1971, sensational news was unofficially and ammunition depots at Cam Ranh had been " leaked, " from that, department: South Viet Nam burning for several days, then to the west, where r.'04,U4,-IiterallY -floating on an ;ocear . of oil ...Wherever several million litres of gasoline at an Esso storage you drill, se it was rumoured, in the Central High- depot near Phnom Penh had vanished into thick black smoke. lands, in Trung Bo, in the Mekong Delta, oil gas The dream harboured by Thieu and his cronies would gush forth. What is more, the oil was said to become oil magnates has also vanished. Perhaps to be of the low-sulphure kind, highly valued in tins is the reason why they are more than ever per-the industrially developed countries, which are par- � suaded that the most fruitful trade they could ticulatly sensitive to the menace of pollution. in engage in remains the banter of the cannonfodder the posh restaurants and cabarets, American, Dutch constituted by their soldiers against American and Japanese politicians and businessmen whispered greenbacks. With " Vietnamization " being pursued into each other's ears thrilling hints of the fabulous by the Americans, the Saigon � .soldiers' dead bodies importance of the prospective oilfields : the reserves r . emai n the principal source of dollar' dividends for were estimated to be a hundred, nay, a thousand the leaders of the Khaki Pare)). times bigger than those of the Middle East. A strik-ing simile was circulated : the Middle East oil I, .i.!.(To be continued), deposits when compared with the South Vietnamese ones would look like a stamp stuck on the rump of THANH NAM an elephant. These rumours were in fact discreet calls by Bunker and Thieu addressed to American - business circles, who were urged to invest' in a field where . nothing concrete had really been found. In the latter part of 1971, more " men of good will " came by the hundred, people ready to " help " the country move away from its economic backwardness. Their briefcases were stuffed with maps and blueprints about the sites of future wells, pipe-lines, storage tanks, refineries and plants pro-ducing all kinds of goods from oil. For these men Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 12 HANOI, SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (Cutaintred) 12. �Inside the Dragon's Head Palace - The Khaki Party- had. no officially proclaimed leader. But tlw Saigonese know very well who is at - the top, In fact. they know all ;Llama his past and present. Bunker has been warmly praised by Nixon for the acumen he displayed when he put that man in the Dragon's I lead Palace. When in late 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem was made way with at CIA instigation, the Americans found themselves in a quandary, Coup followed coup at such a tempo that, as saifi an English newspaper, " no one knows on waking up each morning what government has come to pokvor." It was then that Bunker made his judicious choice of a man worthy of the confidence of the " free- world. " lie was the " statesman " Nguyen Van 'Mien. Of course there were a few snags. For instance the tact that Thieu had been staff . sergeant in the French colonial army. It was rattier awkward to put an understrap-per of the French colonialists at the top of the government 6f an " independent nation. " But Thieu knew how to make up for his shortcomings. Before becoming the bell wet her of t he khaki Part y' Then had fed on corn from every bin. Ile had been a member of the Dai Viet Party, then had joined � the Lab(nir and Personalism Party of Ngo Dinh Nhu, and called himself a Buddhist before becoming a fervent Catholic, in order to please the then Pre-sident Diem as well as his own ( atholic wife. A .complete and succinct description of Nguyen Van Thiel] could be found in this conversation he might have with an imaginary interlocutor: " Are you a Did V ret ? Su re� :" A rid a Ille,Inher of the' Labour and Personalism Paily as well ? " " Of course." ; " A follower of Ngo Dinh Diem ? " " Yes. ." Didn't you oppose Diem ? " � " Why shouldn't I ? "; " Are you a Catholic ? " � " You lot. " ; " And a Buddhist too ? "� " Correct. " And so on and so forth... . Saigon � politicians have dubbed Thieu " The - Master Turncoat, �' for his skill in forsaking the French for the Americans, Diem for Minh,. Minh for Khanh, etc. and in taking care of number one. Once he made common cause with Lam Tan Phat and Duong Ngoc Lain but left them in the .lurch when the going got- touch. The depaty Ngo..Cong Due calls him the " Six-faced Die. " Then has just turned 49. News leaked out from the " DragOn's I lead Palace " said that as prepara� tions were under way for a tremendous birthday party for the " President, " everything was spoilt by the gloomy reports from Highway 9 where all the strong points built by the Saigon army had collapsed. And so, when the festivities were held on the night of April 5, 1972, to mark the entry of the " President " into the 5oth year of his life full of intrigues and plots, the whisky drunk for the toasts tasted like gall and wormwood. And no wonder, Said a soothsayer with a political turn of mind living on Confucius Memel, for this year will .prove to be one of hoodoo for the " President. " ,�Thien attracted the Americans' attention as. early as the days when he was attending military training courses at -Fort Leavenworth in the USA. Ile was interviewed by .General Taylor persimallY. Ever since then he has tried hard to groom himself for a career as a " statesman. " For instance, he avoids drinking and revelling in public; But his political machinations are far from innocent-. � . What Nixon and his proconsul Bunker have been 'seeking has been a Diem government without Diem, a Diem line without Diem. There are many point. ers. The role played by 'Fran Kim 'Dwell for instance. After Diem and his brother Nhu met their death in an American-made armoured car, people say that their evil spirits jointly appeared in -human form in the person of their former aide Tran Kim Tuyen. Tuyen had built and con trolled the whole �network of secret agents of the Ngo dynasty and was notorious for his machiavellian schemes. In late 1967, after his entry into the " Dragon's Ilead Palace, " 1I.iicii got TuYen out .of prison and had hint installed in a luxurious villa linked to the Presidential office by a direct tele-phone line. Tuyen thus became a major, albeit hidden, Presidential adviser. People see his hand in c;uch murky affairs as the murder of Professor Nguyen Van Bong and the ouster of such right-hand men of Nguyen Cao My as Lt. Nguyen Khang, governor of Saigon, and Linh Quang Vieni Minister of the Interior, at a time when Ky himself, as Vice-President, was having his office in the same palace as Thiel]. More recently, when Ky and Big Minh were prevented from competing with Thiel' in the one-man " presidential " race � that brazen act of dictatorship in the midst of a show of democracy " the credit for that cunning scheme also went partly to Tran Kim Tuyen. Thiel] lives in the " independence Palace, " also dubbed by the Saigonese " Dragon's I lead Palace, " protected by stringent security measures. The iron fence which had been partly knocked down in the Spring of 1968 has been replaced and reinforced. Two heavy M.48 tanks stand by in a corner of the grounds in the shade of mango trees, as yell as three grey.painted I helicopters further to the left. In the backyard, two � M.I13 armoured personnel carriers point their heavy - machine guns outward. Both vehicles and pedestrians are banned from fluyen Tran street, which runs along the back side of the palace. The nearby Ong Timing stadium and Tao Dan park have been turned into a huge camp, where 2 oo paratroopers in camouflaged uniform and armed with quick-firing M.16 submachineguns have pitched tents, together with clusters of jeeps and military lorries. Policemen, clad ill Nvhite in the daytime and olive -drab at night, patrol the surrounding streets: They are armed cap-aTie and number at least two batta-lions, for surveillance over an area of less than one square kilometre'. Behind each tree, lurk two or three uniformed policemen. As for the plainclothes men, their number is difficult to ascertain. Quite � memorable were the security measures taken at Thieu's inauguration on October .3r, r97r. In front of the " Independence Palace, " along Thong Nhut boulevard stood no less than 42,000 troops and police .under the direct command of Brigadier Cao Ilao lion, aSsistant to the I nterior Minister. They ;were there to ensure safety for the Less than 10,000 people who attended the ceremony : high-ranking functionaries, foreign guests and American officials. As for the 3.5 million Saigonese, they were ordered to stay behind close doors, the Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 best way for them to celebrate the investiture of the man whom Nixon had just pritistd as " one of the major leaders in Asia. " After crossing the lawn and the flower-beds,. where "Longevity" chrysanthemums are grown, we enter the main hall. Behind immense doors of polished wood is the ceremonial room where big receptions are usually held, attended by such pillars of the regime as Ambassador Bunker, Gene-r:ds Abrams and Weyand, the director of USA ID, Saigon generals with their la-jewelled spouses and senior officers of " allied " armies: South Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand... sporting Saigon medals awarded them for their " exploits " in massacring South Vietnamese civil-ians. In short, the cream of Saigonese society, viewed from the angle of Thieu and Co. But intelligent and honest people hold quite different views. A Saigon lawyer, for instance, has called the habitues of such gatherings " a refuse heap that the people �vill sweep away. " At the far end of the ceremonial room stand a pair of elephant tusks in a glassease. Next to it is a.door of polished wood which leads into Thieu's office. The floor is covered by a red carpet. Thieu sits behind an immense desk of bulky shape, in an armchair upholstered in flowered silk, with a cush-ion to support his aching back. Here Thien discusses " State affairs " with his close advisers. Topping the list is Hoang Due Mut, his press secretary and number-one counsellor. Others are Nguyenl'hu Due, his-mentor on foreign affairs, Dang Van Onang, adviser, and Nguyen Ngoc Linh, former of Viet Tan Xa, the Saigon official news now a millionaire whose wily schemes are greatly appreciated. Thieu's son-in-law, Trang Si Tan, has recently been admitted to those meetings, where the most notorious frame-ups of the "Second Rtpublic " have been thought out. They have resulted in the arrests of Trait Ngoc Chau, secre-tary general of the Lower house ; Truong Dinh Dzu, Thieu's runner-up in the presidential race of 1967 ; Au Truong Than lx ; and the bonze Thich Thien Minh, later sentenced .to ten years of hard labour and five of solitary confinement...,all for t hie r anti-war attitudes. Also in this room have been devised such cunning schemes as the law winch compellecl all presidential candidates to produce evidence of sup-� port by at least .jo members of the "National Assembly " or too members of provincial councils -- a hurdle which tripped Nguyen Can Ky evert before the race began. Ky was so embittered that even now, in his Nha Trang retreat, he often clenches his teeth in the midst of a tennis game and gives the ball a whacking bl(ny accompanied by a curse addressed to that " s.o.b. Thieu! " Other decisions, adopted on direct instructions from the Americans, are taken in another room, on the second floor of the left wing. It is a big draw-ing-room with furniture upholstered iii purple velvet and light-yellow carpeting. Every time he comes, Brinker would stalk straight down the. cor.ridor, up the stairs and into the room, followed by his host, who walks with a bad limp due to sciatica. Iloang Due Nha �alone s allowed to be present at such meetings. Political circles in Saigon have been wondering whether Homing Due Nha is the roan of Thiel], or Bunker, or both, While Thiel' puts up a show of filial respect for Bunker, he is often annoyed at the latter's peevishness. Thieu is linang Due Nha's maternal uncle. Nha received thorough training it' the United States from the age of 25 to 28 (he is ,now 32) at Stanford and Pittsburgh universities, majoring in history apd economics. A taciturn man with eyes hidden behind thick -lenses, he is a repu-tedly ambitious and wily politician. Ile and Thieu completely agree on this guideline for action : The end justifies the means. This highly practical motto perfectly suits the taste of the Americans, but contributes to time accusation brought against Tibet] by his political opponents, who consider him a treacherous and unscrupulous inch% idua/. " After shaking hands with Thku, " they say, " you'd better make sure you still have all your fingers left. " Even now Thieu's participation in the November robri coup, which overthrew Ngt� Dinh Diem, remains �a complete mystery. It is true that at dawn on November 2, 1963, two battalions of the 5th Infantry Division under Thieu's command did launch an assault on the " Independence Palace, " but by that time DitIll and his brother Nhu had escaped to Cho Lon. At 7 in the morning, when Big 11linh made a triumphant entry into the palaco grounds, on the spur of the moment he hugged Thien and pinned two stars on the collar of his uniform. Thieu thus became the only Saigon colonel ever promoted major-general without pasin, through the rank of brigadier. !however, officers ( the 5th II.) gave another version of what had happened. When 'I hien ordered his troops to move to Saigon front Bien lloa on the afternoon of Noventher. according to these officers, he had told them : " Duong Van Minh has staged a rebellion. We nmst come to Saigon to save the President (i.e. Diem). Recen'tly, on the occasion of the Sth anniversary of the death of Diem and Nhir (November 1, 1971), Thiel.' himself gave this account : " On the morning of November 2, when I opened the door of .that M.1 r3 armoured . personnel carrier and saw the bodies of His Excellencies Diem and NItu lying in a pool of blood, I stood at attention, took off my. cap, and clad tears of sorrow. " Could it be that for once he was telling the truth ? Ir hr had switched his loyalty from Diem to the putschists only vhen the former's fate appeared to be sealed. In December 104, barely a year later, he received his third star from the hands of Nguyen Iihanh as a reward for his betrayal of Duong Van Miuili. lint just at the time when he was fawning upon Nguyen Khanh, lie was already plott big with General Lain Van Phat and his friends Doc, Ton and Thao to overthrow his boss. \\ lien the scheme was discover-ed, Thieu quickly ctsengaged himself. In answer to Mat's' revelation about his participation in the conspiracy, Tibet' flatly said that it was only a ruse which had allowed him to penetrate the chat: designs of the " rebels." lie even became a member of the court-matial whim !omit his former " comra-des" to face the firing squad. (7'o lie connoted) 11-1ANH NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 13 VT ri ,T1r1.777 trrflm,vr it I i rtt nm,-,r'rr,rr Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462' Nov L3( (Cu oh Thien's financial deals go hand in band with his political machinations. He is the leader of a new 'Class of men in military uniform who hold sway over the country's economic and finoncial resources. The size of bank accounts is of course a %yell-guarded " State seciet, " But indiscretions from his entourage give us some rough idea of his Nvealth. When he was the colonel commanding the 5th lirfantr' Division stationed north of Saigon in the years I962-63, Thieu once boasted to. his chief-of-staff that he had a nest-egg of some zo,000 US dollars tucked away in a 'Hongkong bank, the equi-valtnt of eight million Saigon piastres. By the time he became chairman of the "National Leadership Committee, " that, hank account had swollen to at least fifty times that amount, and his wife, in one of her trips abroad, went to Rome, ostensibly to visit the Vatican, in fact for financial operations, .which involved important deposits in Italian banks and the purchase of a large villa in the western suburbs of that capital city. In 1066, some, repre� sentatives back from a foreign tour supplied hints of the princely life led by Nguyen Von Ilion, Saigon ambassador to A.ustialia and linen's elder brother-. In French and Japanese colonial Limes, 1-lieu was a notoriously cruel and corrupt mandarin in Yen Dinh, Thieu Floa and Ninh Tinian. Now besides his " diplomatic " functions, he ma�kes trips by PanAm jets to Paris, Rome, Geneva, etc. to look after the oVersea.s financial interests of the Thieu clan, dropping casual remarks about " my brother the President " at diplomatic cocktail parties. Nguyen Van Kieu, Thieu's younger brother, was at one time bead of the " Relief Funds to Flood. Victims in Trung, Bo " and is now widely travelling abroad to prepare for the comfortable " withdrawal " of the whole Thieu tribe to Taiwan or Switzerland. A relative newcomer to the "Independence Palace" (Dila; Doc Lap in Vietnamese, and often read by Saigon wags as Dinh Co Lap; or Isolation Palace) is � Trang Si Tan, the lieutenant-colonel commanding the city police and the right-hand man of the pimp mayor Do Kien Nhieu (see supra). He is Thien's son-in-law and has been dubbed " Prince Consort of the Nguyen Court. " He is a �swarthy, burly fellow, with slant eyes and a breath reeking of alcohol. His special skill resides in torturing, which he does with cold-blooded ingenuity. Besides such routine business as the ,electricity or water torture, he relishes such sadistic practices as sticking US-made needles into the nipples. of girl students suspected of anti-Thicu feelings. It is due to such beastly " innovations " that from a police u � Approvea for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 risen to his pr(ssent position and can look forward to being promoted a full police colonel pretty soon. OF all the schemes hatched in the "Dragon's E � le ;id Palace " the most hemous is incontes- ach l�lonthiy, Wcdnesdziy, iind Friday morning' the sentries at " isolation Palace ". would see a en � � tablv the invitation extended to the US to ' tbillietck maraedes and a dark-blue Mercury drive past sd a 00 5,,lo o�str ong expeditionary corps to South Viet Nam. It accounts for the nickname of "L gate into the grounds of the palace. Theree �, Chien Thong of the Second Republic " given to,, N(1)1'ild alight from them Pang Van Quang, Do Kien uslill.eu Thieu by the Saigonese. he Chien Thong, let and Tiring Si Tan. At these regular meetings, us ally chaired by lio:Ing Duc Nha, Thicu's press recall, is Unit felonious prince ho towitrds the end . . secretory and closest adviser, they would discuss of the 18th century called in Tsing troops to help tie security situation in the city, with special ldm save his regime in decomposition, and whose , reference to the stability, or rather instability, of name has become a byword for cowardice and � treason. the Presidimtial posture, and how to reined): it. The agenda is a crowded one, for new headaches crop up Still alive in the people's memory is that picture every day. Anti-American feeling has run so high � of Thieu and his crony Nguyen Hun Co standing on lately that Bunker ha-s ordered the 30,000 or so the flight-deck of the aircraft-carrier bidePendente Americans still in the city " to avoid all contacts in mid-t066. Thieu was putting his signature to a and clashes with the Vietnamese, to beware of 50o-pound bomb which was to be dropped on North linguistic misunderstandings, and to make them-Viet Nam by . merican aircraft. The American selves scarce whenever some ugly incident involving generals present nodded approval but eye-witnesses Americans occur. Also on the rise has been open recount that many of the sailors honied or spat. opposition to Thiel' ever since he scored that walk-That signature put on an engine of death can never over in the infamous one-roan presidential race. be forgotten by the Saigonese, and especially by The number of ''recalcitrant and uncooperative " those who had collie from the North and still "have deputies has shot up while " insolent " editorials relatives and friends there. 'have been appearing regularly on over 40 daily publications. Thien's advisers are also preoccupied with the attitude of the intellectuals -- lawyers,' doctors, professors... In their retreats in Hoc Mon, Thu ')uc, or Go Vap, they have suddenly ceased to devote their time to raising song-birds and wild orchids, as they have -been doing in recent months to show their coldness to the regime. Now they start engaging in heated political debates, in which such explosive remarks as the following have been heard " impossible to live with the present regime I " " This regime is a challenge to human dignity I " � " To sit with folded arms is to con-done crime ! " etc. A priest, Truong Ba. Can, writes in the Dien Tin �: " Mr Thieu is the only obstacle on the road to peace. " A bonze, the Venerable Clap � Duc : " Thiel' is the. war president. " Others, like the Catholic priests Chan Tin, Nguyen Dinh .Tin and Nguyen Viet Khai, denounce the Saigon regime as " rootless, "anti-national, " while praising the achievements of the North. Small wonder that on orders from Thieu, a veritable war has been started against the press. Small wonder too that, following each of the above-mentioned meetings of his tight-hand men, more people are flung into jail or sent to the penal island of Con Son (Poulo Condor). The Khaki Party is fast becoming the 'Cudgel Party, whose very survival depends solely on apression � naked, unscrupulous, brazen 'faced repression. In this veritable war, Thieu has attained new records: in May alone, he ordered the confiscation of no less than 165 newspaper issues, the highest peak in his crackdown on the press so far. Indeed he had no choice, for the press has been publishing highly " subversive " stuff. For instance, this item in �Dcoi Chic Moi (New Democracy) which follows a scathingly ironical essay on " The GI Problem " " The children in the North dig their own air-raid shelters, wear plaited-straw protective helmets, feed on cassava, and successfully stand up to American aircraft. They truly spring from a heroic people I " In .the " war against students," the Thieu administration has ordered the arrest of such student leaders as Bnu Chi, secretary general of the Association of Creative Students, in Hue, and Nguyen Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Duy Hien, head of the students' Social �Vork Team in the same city, together with over 300 ,other students. Still another lvar, that " against the Third Force " has been waged against those tylp, stand for peace, neutrality, and national concord, -whose numbers have been increasing among intellectuiliS and at er strata, including deputies and�religious leaders. But the. most fiercely waged of them all has been theewar against the over three trillion Saigonese with a view to press-ganging ever more people and grabbing ever more alt Ii for the war against the patriotic forces, which threatens to bring about the collapse of the whole regime. More than 200,000 civilians have been pressed into the army and inflation has passed the 'zoo hit I ion piastres mark. These staggering figures are the topics of heated discussions among the Sai,..:one-ie for the policies worked out in the " Dragon's !lead Palace " are depleting their already very lean pocketbooks, and threatening not only their liveli-hood but their very lives and those of their dear ones. This is the thing that is likely to toll the knell of the Nguyen Van Thiel] dynasty. While alarming reports have been streaming into the " Independence Palace '' from every quarter, rumour has it that the relationship between the American proconsul and " Pres!dent " Thieu has become heavily tinged with bitterness. Thien and his aides, Quang and Nha, have been perusing the newly-disclosed secret papers of the l'entagon, particularly the chapters on the decisions taken by President Kennedy in the wurse of those five fateful meetings of the National Security Council held in the period front August to November 1963, which resulted in a plan to overthrow Diem and Nhu, an operation which was to be headed by a CIA chieftain and to involve many generals of the Diem army itself. In the light of those documents, the praise recently bestowed upon Thieu by President Nixon : " You are a talented leader, equal to your respon-sibility, etc." took on a sinister meaning when one recalls a similar c9mmendation given bi Diem by President Kennedy. Over the past few years, Thieu has never failed to order fairly sumptuous commemorative ceremonies on the occasion of the anniversary of Diem's death. Requiem masses are as a rule held at the Church of the Virgin Mary. On October 1, 1971., when a 400-strong procession marched out from the Church along Hai Trung boulevard to the cemetery on Mac Dinh Chi street for a wreath-laying ceremony at Diem's grave, Thieu's wife distinguished herself by the particular loudness xvith which she vented her grief. The Saigonese were not surprised, for they knew that the tears were in fact being shed over the impending doom of the Thieu regime itself. The Saigon press has made this observation about three outstanding sites in the city : the " Inde-pendence Palace," the American Embassy, and the Mac Dinh Chi cemetery. These three symbolic places are all situated in the same district and are separated by equal distances (about one kilometre), which causes them to stand at the apexes of an equilateral triangle. Incidentally, the Mac Dinh Chi cemetery used to be called the " Cemetery of the French Ghost." � (to be continued) THANH NAM Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Part 1.4 (Concluded) 13.�TWILIGHT OF A ,REGIME SAIGON,May 1972:. � Long convoys of military trucks are bring-ing wounded soldiers hack from An Loc through Lai Kile. They are heading for the Republican Hospital. Highway 4, which leads to the provinces, is block-ed for long hours at a time. On the morning of the loth, the whole city is astir. Martial law has been clamped down on the whole of the territory of South Viet Nam, a mea-sure without precedent over the past 25 years. Even in Diem's time, only a state of emergency was sometimes decreed. At nightfall, the streets are all deserted. � The. draft, which hits men from the age of 17 to 43, set the town agog. The press remarks : " It takes everyone, from striplings to hoary heads." US Vice-President Spiro Agnew sent to Viet Nam on an 'inspection tour, thought he could not stay in Saigon overnight for security reasons. On hand at the airport to greet a worried and irritable Agnew .was Thieu, who had suddenly grown old. In late 1070, he had had to dye a mass of his hair at the back of his head a dignified grey so as to make him look more like the venerable "father of the Repub-lic " .he had been trying to set himself up as. But since then, no dye had- any longer been necessary to turn part of his head white. � One FriclaV morning, the Proconsul Bunker flew by helicopter from his fortress-embassy to the Tan Son Nhut airfield to welcome General Alexander. Haig, the security assistant of President Nixon, who had come on a fact-finding mission. Bunker's back was hunched up and his cheeks were sagging. -He didn't even bother to wave a greeting to the American officials present. Ile is too old, people 'say, nearly So, and too much depressed by the impending doom of Ids President's policy of ' Viet-namiza.tion. " it is rumoured that he is about to retire. His greatest grief has been his failure to build a viable political party in Saigon, one which has a broad popular base and might serve as a " Labour and Personalism " party without its bell-wether Diem. The Khaki Party, his pampered child. has been a big flop. Talking to a friend in a small villa in Thu Due, a college professor said : " The Old Fridge can't sleep because of the deterioration in the military situation, and he has been crying over the political decomposition that has taken place." The profes-sor was of course right. The Americans want the Saigon generals to, fight the patriots, but all they :care for is their coffers. 01 the four Corps Area .corrimanders, one, Tri, has been burnt to ashes in his downed helicopter ; two, Lam and Dzu, have been dismissed and are awaiting trial. The fourth arid only one remaining, Truong, has been hastily sent from the Mekong Delta .to the northernmost provinces of Tri-Thien. But Truong is only an in-competent swashbuckler. An American officer at MACV says : " Truong is a hot-headed bully, whose only way to get himself obeyed by his men is to ' bawl insults at them, and threaten them with pris-on and firing squad." Things are even worse on the political front. Ever since his " triumph " in the one-man presi-dential race, Mien has turned practically every man against him. Most of the 1' Senators" oppose him and his valets. The press clamours : " The regime is dying. It has reached the lowest depth of infamy. We are witnessing the twilight of the Thiel] regime." And a doctor who has kept abreast of the situation asserts: " For Thieu the situation is beyond retrieve. He is but a political corpse which has started rotting." Approved for Release: 2018./01./30 c.02792462TRUGGLE 13 Nov 1972 During a Senate session at the Dien Ilong Stmetor shouted.: " The Americans have brought Thieu to power. It is DOW Up to them to remove him frem office. When the roar Of American 13.52s and the millions of tons of American bombs stops, then the Vietnamese will be able to hear the. voices of each other." But in his Isolation Palace; Thicu is not resign-ed to his fate. More and more pewls.�,ttalo.,ttwyaz arrested by his police. In the old imperial city of Hue, nearly 300 students were rounded up in one single night and taken Heaven knows where. In Saigon, a stifling atmosphere prevails in all eleven districts. Police Chief Tra.ng Si Tan is flinging himself about. At police headquarters, all detention rooms are filled to capacity and in the torture chambers near the Zoo, the lights are 'on all night. The Saigon government needs zoo billion piastres to rebuild its badly-battered army. Little is left of American aid, and so slogans are put out for " self-reliance " and " Vietnarnization. A hundred new taxes are decreed. Business slumps. It becomes ever harder to earn one's bowl of rice. The nights are still. The streets are empty. A storm is brewing. In the workers' quarters at Khanh Hoi and Lo Sieu, the children are singing : � To stand on our 07011 feet And have enough to eat Let's topple Thieu And knock down his whole gang. Saigon under Thieu in 1972 is just like Saigon under Diem in 1963, sa.y many- people. The same chaos and tension, the same stifling, unbearable atmosphere. There is one difference, though : anti-Americanism, i.e. the disgust at, scorn for, hatred of and opposi-tion to the Americans, has become even more open and widespread. Over the last five or six years of contact with " GI civilization, " the Saigonese have come to realize more fully than ever that nothing can be more precious than the spiritual values of one's own nation. Material wealth unaccompanied by a spirit of independence and self-respect only leads to moral ruin. Many school and college students, who formerly liked, believed in, and admired the Amer-icans, now turn against them and enthusiastically join movements with such slogans as : " Let's go back to our nation's roots " and " Let's speak to our compatriots' and listen to them." They want to cause the stream of the people's strength to gush forth even more strongly and to immerse themselves in it. Hero is what a patriotic woman teacher said in the course of a recent meeting : "How fortunate that after such a long occupation by US troops our fellow-countrymen still stick to their national baba silk garments, relish their milk-apples and mangoes, love their fragrant rice and sweet folk melodies... How fortunate that neither American miniskirts, Californian rice, nor GI music have succeeded in catching their fancy." continued Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2762462 When, following the fall of Qua.ng lApproved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462ng, announcing the cs ation troops, Thieu had to go there to try ro 1-mister curfew. Only military vehicles and troops remain t� 4 'up his troops' morale, the conversations in Saigon in the streets. Military and civilian police stalk tea-houses naturally turned to this topic. People said about. The US embassy is a windoWless fortre. to each other : " Nixon is asking for more can- The MACV headquarteis is in a bustle. The USAID nonfodder, and 'Mien has of course to comply. Now building is astir. The " Independence Palace " looks is the time for him to repay his debt to the Amer- strangely isolated, as the night descends on Saigon. lean President. Over the past few years, the .G.Is The men livinr, in those headquarters, build ing have died by the hundred of thousands for Thieu to and palace are lumped together by the Se igonese remain in the Independence Palace. Now, it is the under one designation : " that gang: " As �the 3 mil-turn of Thieu's soldiers to die for Nixon to remain lion Saigeinese go to bed, they wish with all their in the White House." What a penetrating remark ! hearts that in the morning, when they wake up, It hits the nail on the head : many American and they will find their city swept clean of " that Saigon soldiers have indeed paid with their lives gang " which. have been proliferating in the shadow for the consolidation of two wobbly presidential of the American embassy. Saigon�pure, clean and seats on either side of the Pacific ! happy�will again be a shining Pearl of the Orient. SOS calls keep coming from Saigon generals in " That gang are shaking with fear, " the Saigon-Tr Thien, in the Central Highlands, in An Lee, ese think, " for they arc now resorting to martial Binh Dinh and other places. They are so busy fight-law, round-ups and frantic massacres. They are Mg for their lives that they have to put a tempo-heading right for the abyss. " rary halt to their wheeling and dealing. The whole � of that social stratum, which we shall call the Dawn will soon be breaking for the people of military-compl'ador, bureaucratic clique and which Saigon�rosy, pure and fresh. Ittsjes all.r.,the infamous members of the Khaki May 1974 Party, has been thrown into confusion and bewitd- .THANH NAM erment: For years, they have drawn coin fort and support from American money and troops. Now, dollars are coming only- in driblets and many GIs have left. The backbone of that clique is now made up of the 13 plippet regular divisions. But seven or eight vertebrae of that backbone have already been smashed. The pillars of the Khaki Party turn 'their anxious look to the Independence Palace, Thieu's residence. They know that if Thieu goes, nothing can save the. Khaki Party, which has neither popular roots nor following, from immediate collapse. ln the sweltering days of this summer, neither Thieu nor his henchmen seem to have much confi-dence left in each other and in their American and Vietnamese friends. In early May, Thieu's wife again set out on trips to Italy and Switzerland and the generals began accelerating the flow of their money transfers to Hongkong and France. At the booking office of Air Viet Nam at No. rib, Nguyen llue strict,- wives and children of VIPs are i peuing up, lugging heavy suitcases. The Boeings and Cara-velles flying to Hongkong, Paris and Rome are lull to capacity. In the Lower House of Parliament, deputy Do Sinh Tu shouted ' While appealing to all of us to fight to the bitter end, why should Mr Thiel' be sending his wife and his money abroad? Let him stop doing it ! " It is very difficult indeed for Then and other members of the Khaki Party to comply. Every morning, at 4:30 sharp, the people in the whole of District One of Saigon city can hear the engine of a chopper revving up : it is the special 1111.i helicop-ter on standby duty on the grounds of the presi-dential palace. It is piloted by a captain who is a nephew of Mrs Thieu's. And here is the message that the noise of its engine is carrying to all Sai-gonese : " I, President Thee, am still here. So beware. And let me tell you this : If it comes to pinch, I won't rush headlong into a tunnel, like that fool Diem, and die like a rat. I will just hop off in that American helicopter ! " There is enough room in the helicopter for Thien, his wife, his financial manager Dang Van Quan,,, his police chief and son-in-law Trang Si Tan, and his close adviser 1-bang Due Nha, who has sworn to swhn or sink with him. On the navigation charts these routes have been carefully plotted : Saigon-Bangkok (from which PanAm flights could be taken to Paris, Geneva, etc.) and Saigon-Yankee Station (where American aircraft carriers are standing by). Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 AUG 1972 e'f; -e,/e-c�\ C �,.;,�,./ 1Y) A Mennar c A., BOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST Of CIA head-quarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the ----\\ BaJtimore-Washington expressway overlooking 1/,, ' IN-- the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie fac-tory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, head-quarters of the National Security Agency. Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span-ning' the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri-descent 1. 1). badges � green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret cry'rpto" Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all -along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA. budding (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the. headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies --it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Ojwa-lions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, amilyze the de-aypted mes-sages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. in-telligence community. Far less widely known than the CIA; whose. Director (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 COnt. .1,1V�14. ..1,1"C T.r.1�".,� � re,,,,�� Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 JULY 1(if? (b)(3) irpr to Show CIA Proof s of mu Book on Asilan La' n--ez it tfl 6. fr" 1111 c'ri 1.11.11a-11:0[3,4�41.1,17�LigS.103161.1wer-.94.01..18.1�Bilf0.���:..J.../ Marchetti Book on CIA Still Under Suit Harper & Row has decided, after much consideration, to honor a request from the Central Intelligence Agency to see page proofs of Alfred 'W. McCoy's controversial September 13 book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," and to consider "factual" corrections that the CIA may offer. The publisher, however, has made no advance com-mitment to accept any requested changes. In his book, written with Cathleen B. Read, Mr. McCoy, a 26-year-old student in .Yale's Ph.D. program in history, al-leges that French, Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have used the traffic in opium � and _heroin in Southeast Asia for their own ends, and that the CIA and other U.S. agencies have either accepted or have responded inadequately to the sit-uation.. Mr. McCoy told Congressional committees early in June (including the foreign olierations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire, D., Wis., of the Senate Appropriations Committee), that he had had more than 250 intervic)As �� , about the drug traffic, including talks with CIA and South Vietnamese offi-cials, and that President Thieu and Premier Khiem were involved: he gave details of many allegations which appear also in the book. 13. Brooks Thomas, Harper vice-president and general coun-sel, tells PW he and the editors have worked closely with Mr. McCoy on the manuscript, have insisted on documen-tation of all material points, and have had outside experts read it. As a result, Harper & Row is convinced that the book is well-documented, scholarly and deserves to be published. A chapter from the book, adapted, appears in the July Harper's magazine. The magazine has. received a letter from the CIA's .executive director, W. E. V Colby, denying allegations involving the CIA. Ikrper's reportedly plans to pub-lish the letter soon. Mr. Colby and an of-ficer of Air. America (a contract airline which does Work for CIA in Southeast Asia) also wrote to the Washington Star, disputing allegations picked up by a Star columnist from Mr. McCoy's findings. In these protests, and in its approach to �� Harper & Row, the CIA is said to be departing sharply from its usual policy of silence concerning criticism. Harper & Row was approached early in June, when a representative called upon Cass Canfield, Sr., former chief executive, now a senior editor for the firm, and said the agency understood the McCoy manuscript contained serious al-legations about CIA and other agen-cies�allegations that 1te said might be libelous to individuals or severely dam-aging to the national interest. The repre-sentative spoke also to Ni. S. Wyeth, Jr., executive editor of the trade department. The Harper officials said the manuscript was not yet ready to be read, but that the request would be considered. in weighing their decision, I larper & Row officials and editors talked among themselves and with respected publishing colleagues, including experts in the field of the freedom to read. On June 30, Mr. Thomas wrote to the CIA asking the agency to state its request, with reasons for it, in writing. The reply, dated July 5, / came from Lawrence R. Houston,'gen-t/ eral counsel of the CIA. Ile wrote that the CIA was ip no way questioning Harper & Row's right. to '.publish the "book, but said, "We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims" about the CIA were "totally false" or "dis-torted" or �"based on 'unconvincing evi-dence." � Harper & Row then decided to let the CIA see the book�subject to the au-thor's approval, without which, Harper & Row president Winthrop Knowlton told PH', the CIA's request would not be accepted. The author finally accepted the decision, to let the CIA look at page proofs only, and to give a quick repiy, with Harper -& Row reserving all its op-tions and reaffirming its right to publish. � "As head of the house of Harper & Row," Mr. Knowlton told PW, "I am sensitive,. like' all my colleagues in pub-lishing, to the problem of censorship, and if I felt this request involved censor-ship we would not be agreeing to it. In view of the gravity of the allegations, we simply think this is the most responsible way we can publish this book. Ironically, in view of CIA efforts to refute the charges by Mr. McCoy and others; personnel of CIA, State and the Department of Defense completed in February a report to the Cabinet Com-mittee on Narcotics Control which but-tressed many-of the charges, according to Seymour Hersh in a � front page New York Times story, July 24. Mr. Hersh reviewed the I larper-CIA discussions in the Times of J uly 22. The CIA's procedure with respect to Mr. McCoy's book is in sharp contrast to government action on an as-yet-unwritten book, a nOnfiction work about the CIA, which Victor L. Marchetti is tinder contract to prepare for Knopf. iii that case, the Justice Department ob-tained in April 'a restraining order to Prevent Mr. Marchetti from .publishing the proposed book, on the ground that it would be likely to divulge currently clas-sified information in violation of a sc-crecy agreement that N4 r. Nlarchetti had t/ made as a CIA employee. Mr. NI archetti worked for the CIA for 14 years and resigned in 1969. 1 le then wrote a novel, "The Rope Dancer.' (Grosset), based on his observations. Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., U.S. Dis-trict Court, Alexandria, Va., in issuing the restraining order, ruled that Mr. Marchetti's agreement with the CIA "takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment." The American Civil Liberties- Union, representing Mr. Marchetti, denies this and argues that the author cannot in fact sign away his First. Amendment rights. The Association of American Publishers and the Authors League have filed an:jells- curiae briefs supporting Mr. Marchetti in further. Court proceedings. �(See PHI, April 24, June 5, June 12.) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for 21D0r118701/30 602792462 3 0 JUL 1972 (b)(3) 7Thq iv115. in this seemingly endless war--1 million, 2 million, 3 million? More important yet, how many Americans truly care? � 'That question was asked of Intelligence Report .recently by a North Viet-� namose representative in Moscow. The North Vietnamese, at least many of them, if this ' official is to be believed, are convinced that if President Nixon cannot end the war by negotiation, he will end it by extermi-nation. ' With seven U.S. aircraft carriers discharging fighter-bombers daily, with more than 200 B-52's drop-ping-tons of bombs, with the new "smart" laser bombs in action and the even smarter "Maverick" TV bombs forthcoming, U.S. air and naval forces can extermi-nate most of the North Vietnamese population within 60 days. It is a long-held Kissin-ger belief that extermi-nation will not be neces-sary, that the North Vietnamese can stand only so much destruction and devastation before they accede to ending the war by negotiation. The North Vietnamese told US that they prefer ex-termination to negotiatibn under duress. Many of them are con-vinced that they will soon die by drowning. They point out that U.S. planes have been systematically bombing . the areas around the Red River dikes which protect the Plain of Tonkin from flooding. By weakening the dike foundations, they contend, the Americans are making certain that the monsoon rains will collar's-No one knows how many:Viet-namese lives have been lost _ the dikes, causing the death by drowning of a large portion of the 14 million North Vietnamese who livo on the Plain of Tonkin. President Nixon was asked on April 30th, this year, at the John Connally bar-beque in Floresville, Tex., if he intended to order the bombing of the Red River dikes. "That is something," he answered, "that we want to avoid. It is also something ..we believe is not needed." He also Said that "with regard to dams or dikes... while it is a strategic target and indirectly a military target, it would result in an enormous number of civilian casualties." Nixon, however, did not foreclose on his option to bomb the dikes, which the North Vietnamese claim our Air Forca.is already doing That the American public will support a continued air war so long as it results in relatively few American deaths is a Nixon tenet which has been proved correct. Nixon and Kissinger, as well as countless military men, are convinced that under continued bombing, the Communists must eventu-ally cry "uncle." The North Vietnamese maintain that their ulti-mate pain threshold isdeath. The Soviets, on the other hand, believe that the war could end tomorrow if only we would order the C.I.A. to assassinate Nguyen Van Thieu, President of South Vietnam. : Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 "You people arranged to have Diem assassinated in 1963," one Soviet journal-ist explained. "Why can' the C.I.A. do the same thing with Thieu? Or at least arrange his abdica-tion to Singapore where we understand he has already bought a home? Once Thieu is out of the picture, really out of the picture, a coalition government can be formed in South Vietnam, a cease-fire can take place, the war is over, and you can get your prisoners back. It is all really quite simple." The Soviets, of course, are cynical. 3 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 0AbhiNUTUB. YUbT 26 JUL 1972 (b)(3) Herobi, and tke Tar � Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student who inter-lyiewed 250 people, charges that the Central Intelli-gence Agency has known of Thai and South Viet-namese official involvement in heroin traffic, has � covered up their involvement and has participated -In aspects of the traffic itself. The CIA has publicly � denied these charges, in the process even per-suading Mr. McCoy's publisher, Harper gr. Row, to ,.Jet it review his book manuscript before publication. .But now � there comes an internal government re-:port�done by the CIA and other . agencies�on the difficulties of controlling the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia. The report states: "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, s the corruption, collusion, and indif-ference at sOme places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that preclUdes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place." -That is to say, a private report by agencies in-eluding the CIA confirms the thrust of charges. :which the CIA publicly denies. The White House � contends the report, completed in February, is "out of date." Now, we are aware that the Nixon administration _ has worked with great vigor and much effective-, � pox,itwercer-- � 0. 4--I Mkit I 01111 - ness to curb the international narcotics trade. Thel fact remains that the largest supplies of .the filthiest poison of them all apparently come from or through Thailand and South Vietnam, if one is to take the CIA's private word�as against its public word�on the matter. Nor should it stretch any reasonable man's credulity to understand that the United States has had to accept certain limitations on its efforts to get those governments to stop drug deal-ing because it has wanted to ensure their coopera-tion in the mar against North Vietnam. In the final human analysis there is simply no place in the pur-suit of honor and a just peace in Southeast Asia for an all-out lionest effort to control traffic in heroin. This is the infinitely tragic fact flowing from con-tinued American involvement in the war. Would heroin addiction among Americans have swollen to its current dimensions and would the amount of heroin reaching the United States from South Vietnam and Thailand have reached its cur-rent levels if the war�and power politics�had not gotten in the way of effective American pressure upon the governments in Saigon .and Bangkok? If President Nixon needs any further reason to make good his pledge to . end the war, this is almost reason enough by itself for what it says about the character of regimes this ,country has gotten into the habit of supporting�lavishly and indiscrim-inately�in the name of our "national .security" and "world peace." Rear Guard � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) July 24, 1972 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD � SENAT � � reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report, In two parts, concerning, the illegal interna-tional narcotic traffic. "(c) The first part of such report shall in- ' elude a survey of (1) the cultivation and processing of narcotic drugs (which are il-legal in the United States) in each country where these operations are known to, or be-lieved by, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-gerous Drugs to occur; (2) the routes of transport of such drugs to the United States; (3) tho means by which such drugs are brought into the United States; (4) the fi-nancial and banking arrangements which support such illegal international narcotics traffic; (5) changes in the international pat-terns of cultivation, processing, and shipping of such drugs for the United States markets which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Nar-cotics and Dangerous Drugs, have occurred since calendar year 1969, and an evaluation of those changes. "(d) The second part of such report shall Include�"(1.) a list of the countries which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-gerous Drugs, are currently major centers in Illegal international narcotic traffic; "(2) a summary of the programs rind other actions undertaken by such countries for the -suppression of such traffic; and "(3) an evaluation by the Bureau of Nar-cotics and Dangerous Drugs of the effective-ness of such programs and actions, including reasons for their effectiveness or ineffective-ness. "(c) Each Federal department or agency having the responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States, or for programs rind other actions related to the suppression of the illegal international narcotic traffic, shall, upon the request c,1 the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, make available to the Bureau such Information and other assistance RS may be requested." Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President., will the Senator Yield? - Mr. MONDALE. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a 10-minute time, limitation on the pending, amendment, the time to' be equally di-vided between the manager of the bill, or whomever he may designate. and the author of the amendment. I understand it has to. do with: a report on interna-tional drug traffic through the Narcotics Bureau. Mn GOLDWATER. I did not hear the Senator. Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand it has to .do with a report on international drug traffic through the Narcotics Bureau. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there .objection to the unanimous-consent re-quest? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. .The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, this amendment is, I think important, and yet uncomplicated: It would require. the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to submit to Congress within 6 months a comprehensive survey and analysis of the illegal international nar. co tics traffic. I shall not go into details of all the reasons why this amendment is needed. I think the Senate is quite aware of the growing seriousness of the inter-national narcotics traffic. This amend-ment would require the Bureau of Nar-. cotics and Dangerous Drugs to submit a report to Congress which would contain information, which would then be avail-able to the Congress and to the public in' two general categories; The first, it would report a survey of the cultivation and processing of narcotics drugs in' each country where these operations are known to, or believed by, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to occur; the routes of transport of such drugs to the United States; the financial and banking arrangements which support such illegal international nareotie.s traffic; changes in the international pat-terns of cultivation, processing, and shipping of such drugs for the United ,States markets which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-ous Drugs, have occurred since 1060, and other information in this general area, The second part of the report would include a list of the countries which, in the opinion of the Bureau of. Narcotics and Dangerous Drug's, are Currently major centers in illegal international narcotic traffic; a summary of the pro-grams and other actions undertaken by such countries for the suppression of such traffic; and an evaluation by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous�Drugs of the effectiveness of such programs and actions, including; reasons for their effec-tiveness or ineffectiveness. Last year we adopted an amendment which I offered, which, among other things, authorized this Government to terminate foreign aid to any country which 'vas known to be willfully in-volved in the production of sale of illegal drugs and which ultimately ended up in the United States. It is estimated that the amount of illegal heroin entering this country will be nearly 40 percent greater than that brought into this .country .a year ago. A front-page story in the New York Times describes a secret Cabinet level renort that concludes "There is no pros-pect" of eliminating the smuggling of narcotics in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can. realistically be projected." . I ask unanimous consent that the article appearing in the New York Times appear at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. MONDALE. This amendment will help the public and the Congress better understand the essential elements of this vicious problem so that we know better what to do. I am hopeful that the distinguished floor manager will accept this amend-ment. EXHIBIT 1 MI:PORT TO UNITED. STATES SEES No Hoc's OF - HALTING ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC . (By Seymour M. Hersh) WASIIINCTON, July 23,�A Cabinet-level re-port has concluded that., contrary to the Nixon Administration's public optimism, :'there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea hi Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected." "This is so," the report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, 'because the governments In the region are unable and, In some cases, un-do those things that would have done by them if a truly effective effort twoill be it were to be made." The report, prepared by officials of the - Central Intelligence Agency, the State De-partment and the Defense Department, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corrup-tion, collusion and indifference at some places in sonic governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place." � The report sharply contradicted the official Administration position and qovernment in-telligence sources say its conclusions are still valid today. In May, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a Senate subcom-mittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satis-fied with that cooperation." Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinatoie for International Narcotics Matters, testified be-fore Congress in june on the subject of nae-coties smuggling that "the gOvernments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have airesciy joined us in the fight and, while we have a long way to [o, we feel that during the past year some real progress lies been achieved." � All officials concerned with the drug 'prob-lem acknowledge that the United States 55elle13, under personal prodding from Pres-ident Nixon, have begun an intensive effort to stem the international narcotics traff,e. But critics contend that the effort is far less effective today than Administration officials say it is. C'RITICS. CHARGES BACIZ-ED Two leading critics 'of what they allege to be the Government's Is Xne3S In stoppingHie flow of narcotics are Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut. and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale gisidu-ate student who has written a book on nar-cotics in Seattheest Aetc.. The IcCW York Times reported Saturday .that Mr. McCoy's allegations concerning the C.I.A. and the drug traffic had been the snblect of all in-tense and unusually inne)lic rebuttal by the r'ge`filacey.Cabinet-level report, made available to The Times, buttressed many of the charges made by tlae two critics, particularly about the pivotal importance of Thailand to the International drug smugglers. Thailand is also a major Air Force staging area for the United States.. III a report on the world heroin problem last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the American viewpoint, Thailand is as impor. tant to the control of the illegal interna-tional traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast A5iia, Is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smug--gled through the country." Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that many American citizens had established res-idence in Bangkok, and had Inured into the narcotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the, teen were paying Thai officials for protection. Mr. McCoy said In testimony before Con-gressional committees last month that hun-dreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to International markets in Europe and the TJnited Stales and that 80 to CO per cent of the opium was carried by Chinese Nationalist peramilitere teams that were at one time paid by tbe C.I.A. There 'are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai horsier, he said, and much or the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 NXIV 1..ORK T 1 ES Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 V L. la I L. (b)(3) Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting , Asian Drug Traffic � S By SEYMOUR M. IIERSH Special to The 'New York Times .s� WASHINGTON, July 23�A Cabinet-level report has con-cluded that, contrary to the Nixon Administration's public .Optimism, "there is no pros-pect"- of stemming the smug-gling of narcotics by air and .Sea in Southeast Asia "under any condition � that can realisti-cally be projected." "This is. so," the report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "be-cause the governments in the region are unable and, in some Cases, unwilling to do those things that wont(' haVe to be done by them. if a truly ef-fective- -effort � were to be, made." - The �report, prepared by of-.e/ficials of the Central 'Mai-� gence Agency, the. State De- . partrnent :and the Defense De-partment, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least -likely of any early solution, is the' corrtiption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective Supression -of traffic by the is,9ssoisunerils on whose territory Ye :vacv The report sharply contra-mu official Administra-tion position and Government intelligence sources ,say its conclusions are still valid today. In �May, Secretary of State Wil-hiam P. Rogers told a Senate subcommittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satsi-lied with that cooperation." Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, testified before Congress in June on the subject of narcotics smuggling that "the govern-meats of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight and, while we have a long way to b go, we feel that during the past year some real progress has been achieved." All officials concerned with the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding from President Nixon, have begun an intensive effort to stem the in-ternational narcotics traffic. Tut critics contend' that th-e ef-fort is far less effective today than Administration officials .say it is. Critics' Charges Backed Two leading critics of what they allege to be the Govern-ment's laxness in stopping the flow of narcotics are Represent-ative Robert IL Steele, Repub-lican of Connecticut, and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yalg graduate student who has writ-ten a book on narcotics in Southeast Asia. The New York Times reported Saturday that Mr. McCoy's allegations con-cerning the C.I.A.. and the drug traffic had been the subject of an intense and unusually pub-lic rebuttal by the agency. The Cabinet-level report, made available to The Times, buttressed many of the charges made, by the two critics, par-ticularly about the pivotal im-portance of Thailand to the in-ternational drug smugglers. Thailand is also a major Air 'Force staging area for the Unit-ed States. In a report on the world heroin problem last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the American viewpoint, Thailand is , as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium pro-duced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that coun-try." Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on For-eign Affairs, noted that many American 'citizens had estab-lished residence in Bangkok, and had moved into the nar-cotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the men were pay-ing Thai officials for protec-tion. Mr. McCoy said in testimony before Congressional commit-tees last month that hundreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to international markets in Europe and the United States and that SO to 90 per cent of the opium was carried by Chi-nese Nationalist paramilitary teams that were at one time paid by the C.I.A. There are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai border, he said, and much of the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong. "Even though they are heav-ily involved in the narcotics traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, "these Nationalist Chinese ir-regulars units are closely -allied with the Thai Government." He said that Thai Government po-lice units patrol the northern traffm of heroin. Their measure border are, and collect an "ilm!eleared the House Foreign Af-port duts Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO279-246221 pound of raw Opium entering: Thailand. All this activity, he said, is monitored by United States intelligence agencies. Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited Mr. Gross, the State Depart-ment's adViser on international narcotics, said in his Congres-sional testimony that "during the past year the Thais have increased their efforts in the drug field with United States and United Nations assistance." He cited two agreements, signed in late 1971, calling for more cooperation and more long-range planning between Thai and United States officials .to stamp out the trade. "Based on all intelligence in-formation available," Mr. Gross testified, "the leaders of the Thai Government are not en-gaged in the opium or heroin traffic, nor are they extending protection to traffickers." He added that the top police of-1 ficial in Thailand had publicly stated that he would punish any corrupt official. The cabinet-level report, sub-mitted to the Cabinet Commit-tee on International Narcotics Control, asked "highest prior-ity" for suppression of the traf-fic by Thai trawlers, noting that each trawler "would rep-resent something like 6 per cent of annual United States consumption of heroin." The report said that the trawler�traffic should have pri-ority because "it is possible to attack the Thai trawler traffic. without seeking the coopera-tion of Thai authorities and running the attendant risks of leaks, tip-offs and betrayals." After such a seizure, the re-port said, the United States Embassy in Bangkok could "re-peat with still greater force and insistence the representa-tions it has already often made to the Government of Thai-land" for more effective efforts "to interdict traffic from the north of Thailand to Bangkok and also the loading of nar-cotics on ships in Thai har-bors." L At another point in the re-port, a general complaint was Nailed Press International voiced. "It should surely be Robert II. Steele charged possible to convey to the right the Government is lax in Thai or Vietnamese officials, the mood of the Congress and - halting flow of drugs he Administration on the sub- C t9 ject of drugs," the report said. "No real progress can be made On the problem of illicit traffic' until and unless the local gov-ernments concerned make it a matter of highest priority." Representatives Steele, Les-ter L. Wolff, Democrat of Nas-sau County, and Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, have sponsored legislation that would cut off more than $100-million in foreign aid to Thai-and unless she took more ac-ion to halt the production and and is included in the Foreign Assistance Act, now pend'ng. During a Congressional hear-ing into drug traffic last month, Representative Wolff disputed the Administration's contention that it was making "real prog-ress" in stemming the narcotics flow and said, "we think the trade has got so much protec-tion in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air basses out if .we put too much pressure on them." The New York Times Nelson G. Gross asserted that there has been prog-ress against smuggling. � CIA. AIDES ASSAIL 'ASIA D41 CHARGE Agency, Fights Reports That !gnored Heroin Traffic - Among Allies of U.S.. � By SEY1ViOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 21 � The Central Intelligence Agency has begun a public battle ;against accusations that it knew - of but failed to stern the � heroin traffic of United .Stdtes allies in Southeast Asia. � In recent weeks, high-ranking ;officials of the C.I.A. have Signed letters for publication to a newspaper and magazine, granted a rare � on-the-record interview at the agency's head-quarters in McLean, Va., and -.� most significantly �. per-suaded the publishers of a forthcoming expose on the C.I.A. . and the drug traffic to permit it to review the manuscript prior to publica-tion. � The target of all these meas-ures has been the recent writ-ings and Congressional testi-mony of Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate stu-dent who spent 18 months in-vestigating the narcotics opera-tions in Southeast Asia. His dbook, "The -Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is sched-uled to be published by Harper & Row in mid-September�bar-ring delays caused by the in-telligence agency's review. In his �book, Mr. McCoy al-leged that both C.I.A. and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indo-chinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic, have con-sciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved them-selves in narcotic trade. C.I.A. officials said they had reason to believe that Mr. Mc-Coy's book contained many un-warranted, unproven and falla-cious accusations. They ac-knowledged that the public stance in opposition to such allegations was a departure from the usual "low profile" of the agency, but they in-sisted that there was no evi-dence linking the C.I.A. to the drug traffic in Southeast Asia. One well-informed Government official directly responsible for HEW 'LUX T I kES Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 '4 4 JUL IW4. monitoring the Illegal flow of narcotics complained in an in-terview that many of Mr. Mc-Coy's charges "are out of date." "Go back three or four years," he said, "and no one was con-cerned about this. It wasn't until our own troops started to get addicted, unal 1968 or '69, that anyone was aware" of the narcotics problems in South-east Asia. This official said that In the eyes of the C.I.A., the charges were "unfair." He said of the C.I.A., "they think they're tak-ing the heat for being un-aware and not doing anything about so/net:MI.1g that was go-ing on two or three years ago." Based on 250 Interviews During two Congressional ap-pearances last month, Mr. Mc-Coy testified that his accusa-tions were based on more than 250 interviews, some of them with past and present officials of the C.I.A. He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials, including _President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Iran Van Ithient, were specifically involved. In July, 1971, Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, said during a House Foreign Affairs subcom-mittee hearing that the United States Government possessed "hard intelligence" linking a number of high-ranking South-east Asian officials. including� Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then corn-! mander of the South Viet-namese II Corps, with involve-ment in the narcotics trade. Mr. Steele's accusations were denied and mostly ignored. Mr. McCoy also alleged that Corsican and American syndi-cate gangsters had become in-volved in the narcotics trade. He said that such information' was known to the C.I.A. In a chapter of his book published in this month's Harper's Maga-zine, Mr. McCoy further charged that in 1967 the in-. famous "Golden Triangle" � an opium-producing area etn-bracing parts of northeastern ,Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos�was producing about 1,000 tons of raw opium annually, then about 70 per cent of the word's supply. The bulk of Mr. McCoy's accusations�both in the maga-zine and during the Congres-sional hearings--failed to gain much national attention. None-theless, the C.I.A. began its unusual public defense after a Washington Star reporter cited some of Mr. McCoy's allegations in a column. Letter Sent to Paper Two letters were sent to the newspaper for publication. One was signed by W. Er Colby, the executive director of the (ILA _ artrl did not agree; he added, Harper & Row would not publish the book. In a subsequent interview, � Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House and president of the Association of American Publishers, Inc., said that his concern had twice refused of-ficial C.I.A. requests for per-mission to revise manuscripts. "In general," Mr. Bernstein said, 'our opinion would be that we would not ,publish a book endangering the life of anybody working for the C.I.A. or an other Government agency. Short of that, we would pub-lish any valid criticism." In a series of interviews with The New York Times, a number of present and former officials of the C.I.A. acknowledged that smuggling and "looking the oth-er way" was common through-for a copy of the manuscript out Southeast Asia during the for review prior to publication. nineteen-sixties. But many noted On July 5, a formal letter that the agency had since taken making the request, signed by Atr.ong steps to curb such prac-Lawrence R. Houston, general Vtices. counsel of the C.I.A. was sent ! One official, who spent many to Harper & Row. years in Southeast Asia, said, Mr. Houston's request was "I don't believe that agency not based on national security, staff personnel were dealing but on the thesis that "allega- in opium. But if you're talking/ Vitals concerning involvement of about Air America haulnig the the U.S. Government [in drug traffic) or the participation of American citizens should be 'made only if based on hard evidence." The letter continued: "It -is, our belief that ,no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations with-out being assured that the sup-porting evidence was valid." If the manuscript were handed over, the letter said, "we be-lieve we could demonstrate to you that a considerable num-ber of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged in-volvement are totally false and iithout foundation, a number re distorted beyond recogni-tion, and none is based on convincing evidence." A copy of the letter was made avail-able to The New York Times. Mr.McCoy, in an interview, said that the book had been commissioned by Harper & Row and carefully and totally reviewed by its attorneys with no complaint until the C.I.A. !request was made. 1 B. Brooks Thomas, vice presi-dent and general counsel of .the publishing house, said in . an interview in No York, 1"We don't have nay doubts !about the book at all. We've ,had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and schol-arly." "We're not submitting to censorship or anything like that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're aking a responsible middle po-sition. I just believe that the C.I.A. should have the chance to review it.", If Mr., McCoy by Paul Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 higton-based official wi ir America, a charter airline that flies missions for the C.I.A. in Southeast Asia. Both categoric-ally denied the allegations link-ing C.I.A. personnel to any knowledge of or activity in the drug traffic. . A similar letter of disavowal, signed by Mr. Colby, was sent for publication to the publisher of Harper's Magazine within the last week. Robert Schnayer-son, the magazine's editor, said that the letter would be pub-lished as soon as possible. The C.I.A. began its approach to Harper & Row in early June, apparently after learning of Mr. McCoy's appearance be-fore the Senate subcommittee. Cord Meyer Jr., described as a senior agency official, met with Officials of the publishing concern and informally asked stuff around, then I'll bet my, bottom dollar that they were n Another former C.I.A. agent described Mr. McCoy's pub-lished writings as "1 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the Most vain able contribution I can think of." , (b)(3)-1 Approved for Release:, 2018/01/30 CO2792462 b)(3) LEVITToWN, DA. COURIER-TIMES r 449842 1 13721 . i/1-to's the ra,c,s?,, itutiear nig n zn:, all o 177 17 t "" � � . � ' � , ' 4+ ' '' ' ei ' ' The American SAIGON (NEA) � There is a monument in this city � appropriately next to a Chase Manhattan Bank advertisement � which reads: "The noble sacrifice of allied soldiers will never be forgotten." Ah, these Vietnamese. Already they tend to forget. Nearly three million soldiers from a half-dozen nations have suffered 60,000 dead and 350,090 casualties in the last decade of the Vietnamese war. But the man in the street, if he acknowledges it at alp, may just shrug and say, "Yes, butswhat have you done for us lately?" Some here who are aware that several neighbors, such as Thailand and the Philip-'pines, have contributed troops, dismiss it as insignificant. The Australians, they say, never, did much. And the Koreans, have just strutted about feeling superior. As for the Americans � who did the most, who fought the most, who in effect pur-chased, the 'entire allied commitment � as � for them, well, "Americans No. 10," say imany of the children of Saigon. - Vietnamese officials deny it, U.S. diplo-mats try desperately to explain it away, but the icy fact is that after all this time and all this blood the United States is unloved in this country. Women fear us, merchants cheat us, peasants ignore us, students deplore us. The $10 billion a year ton average) Americans have spent in this land has bought some co-operation,.but neither respect nor apprecia-tion. "The only people who smile at me here are the beggars," says an Air Force colonel. "On the streets I feel like my forehead is marked." - The situation � call it anti-Americanism, was perhaps inevitable. Two and a half mil-lion GIs have been in and out of Vietnam since 1961, plus thousands of sundry diplo-mats, civilian workers, newsmen and seekers of erotica. Few of them; with the occasional' exception of diplomats, have strengthened any international bonds. It's not that the Yanks are so bad, just that they are different. Vietnamese women have never gotten use to being pinched on the boulevard and Viet-19 Of COurse namese men have never gotten use to seeing it happen. The troops, perhaps, because of sheer numbers, have done the most to wrinkle the Oriental brow. A drunk GI is hard to take in Galveston, much less Gia Dinh. Not long ago in Da Nang, a trooper from the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, tipsy of course, ran down a Vietnamese child with a truck. It was the last straw for the nationals of the area. Hundreds of angry locals stormed the truck, threatened the driver and hinted of open war. Indeed, it was war of a sort, and the. 196th had to seal off the area, helicopter reinforcements in and finally agree to pay retribution to the victim's father. The same sort of thing is happening from the Delta to the DMZ. A newsman in Hue was recently set upon by three Vietnamese soldiers who stole his pack, his camera and his sunglasses U.S. troops traveling through the off-limits town of Bien Iloa do so with guns loaded, cocked and pointing 'at anybody who comes near. A military policeman with the bIlilth recently lost a color, television when he stopped his vehicle to avoid hitting a boy, then could not get going before a swarm of alerted nationals relieved him of his -cargo. Fights. Shootings. Name it. The Nams are at the Yankees' throats. Even the North Vietnamese spring offen-sive has not sobered the citizens sentiments. Vernacular newspapers have hinted � good grief! � that the invasion was a .ClA.splot to "coldly test" South Vietnam's military met-tle. And a young legislator, who knows bet-ter, says privately: "It-wouldn't surprise me if Nixon and Mao (Tse-tung) have plotted out a coalition government for Saigon. The hth-ajon could be the ploy to convince us that we can't stand by ourselves. Therefore we should hasten to aceept any generous Hanoi offer of peace." So it goes here. The walls of Hue Universi-ty are covered with anti-American slogaris ("American GIs eat water buffalo drop-. By Torn Tiede . . - pings"). An airline clerk in Pleiku tells a Yank traveler to "buy a ticket to My Lai." There are several urban slums where U.S. types walk at their own peril. "Not every-body here hates us," says an executive of a U.S. engineering firm "Some just don't care one way or the otter.'' The situation is sad. And maddening. And the forecast is the United. States may spend the next decade here spending money trying to buy the friendship it lost spending money in the last. lint, say the cynics, there is at least one hope to 'Vietnamese anti-Ameni, canism: "Maybe it's a sign. Maybe these people aren't passive after all. Maybe one day they'll hate their enemies as much as they hate their friends." . - Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 646 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 20 July 1972 r F.1 r4c4 kr4; I Cti r4 SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who .-re-butted the charges made by some American newspa-permen that the CIA was involved in opium traf-ficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and old history." I also know what I am talking about becausel was inVolved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day, the President told me to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report di-rectly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, 'CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves." I found out the corruption of two. chiefs, and the President took very drastic measures against Them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the coun-ter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely im-portant when they are compared. to operations of the same agency in other countries, In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial Beet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For , good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of these operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is un-limited�they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders�no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambo-dian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a de facto power. affects some of these CIA operatives. The traffic of opium involves a relatively large num-ber of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since these persons have their clans, families and friends who live from INS traffic, the total number of persons con-cerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations. also do not question the good faith of CIA Director,/ Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution;�we know we are not contributing to the prob-lem . . However, as I said previously, a line must. � be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circum-stances are not the same�there is not the vaguest re-semblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries. � In conclusion CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss j. Randal, and Mcdoy said the truth and did not contra- . diet one another; they perhaps did not talk about' the same country. Chevy Chase, Md. � Tran Van Mimi, 'Attorney, Former Deputy, Vietnamese National Assembly, . . I Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Alleg.ea - � PROVIDENCE, R.I. JOURNAL M � 66,673 S 209,501 � JUL 1_9_1972 IN p I .4. Pro/be. ...,peared in. the Providence-Sun. , i, oil to . ., day .Journal on Juneporfed that cloud. seeding operations were begun in the mid-19130s to create rains to wash'Yout portions- of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In t tfectilter - The 'New "York Times ran .a . story a,week later saying that Sett Claiborne Pell' an- 'rainfall was .first begun over nouriced yesterday that .a sub- Hue in 1963 to prevent Bud-committee he heads will hold dhist demonstrations in that hearings next week on allega- against the South Viet-tons that the Defense Depart- namese government.' The meat' has changed the :striry...quoted unnaMed agents / Weather over Southeast. Asia of the �CentraLAtpiligPnea. for Military reasons. The senator said his Senate Senator Pell said witnesses .! relations subcommittee on ..froM the State Department, oceans and international envil. 'the Pentagon, the Arms am_ ronment will bold .hearings trol and.Disarmament next 'Wednesday- and Thurs., day. . � "There have appeared .in the press recently very _dis-turbing reports that the Unit-ed States .has used weather , modification extensively in Southeast Asia," Senator Pell said. The hearings will focus on a resolution introduced by Sena-. tor Pell in March with 14 co-sponsors which urges negotia-tion of a treaty prohibiting the " use of environmental or weather changing techniques Nas weapons of war. - . A story which first ap-Agency, the Council on Envi-ronmental. Quality, end 'the National Oceanic and Atmo-spheric' Administration have , been invited to testify. - Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1_5 JUL 1972. ^-,1 el1! � f 1/l I' I 11 11 I (T`. la' 1 � 9 Tc II cli 0);i l.j C) By Sanford J. Ungar pace of jury selection jeoprus ;chief prosecutor -Nissen who aml should let the. Pliblic wk. intiiiiraoa Post MO( WI !ter diZeS the appearance of a I complained that. the judge ' }OS ANCE1 Fc.- July 14 ...... "necessary witness" for the was putting too lunch em- That is exactly the.pre'rition The 6efense in the trial of ijiverhnieht who is avr'riltible plursis on the presumption of Oben by Ellsberg nind :Russo. . Daniel El berg and Anthony all next. wee); but then must 'innocence in his jury exam- Mrs. Sirois, a 24-year-old )-.0 cc todzry au:tell-ed. uisi pis., enter , a hospital for scriouslimitioni . student beautician n.rid that trio., Judge wi -.\i,itt Byrne Jr. surgery lie declined, how � "Tire presumption of innoe- she would not be afit'eted by , for t.dhiltettiv failinit to t ,, I: e eV CT, to name the witness. ('I1Ce Is lot a 1) 11' Of partial- the. fad ill:14,. hf:r 1'01i-it-IL was necessary steps to assure the In a comment that ire has itv to he worn bY either side," a career miltintry o Meer and 'defendants an impartial jury. characteristically- employed Nissen. exclaimed. When the i that her brother served with Leoliord B. Boudin, who rep- during the l'Ist� IiVeetl, BYrne defense pre S.SC:d for: an explan- the CIA.. iin Vietnam ,if she� resents nisnergi complained reacted to the defense corn- ;tiler. dr that remark, Byrne in. should se..ve on the eventual: that . piyrne,s totestioninei of 01111115 by saying, "I'll deem terjactial, "Never mind whaUjury. - I prospective Jun ors \vas eharae..- that a motion and deny it." the pi osecutor says." terized by a "lack of Itrohing." i The indnze sPeecailY re- )na is interhettatinn today,. and was a .'pro forma exaint_ fuseel once again to permit the mniiiii 01. the .new pi osnectiye nation" which met the techni- hiwYers " both -sides c'r the ',intro, s exipressed their views cal requiremenls hut, did not case to (0 (lid u the dettiild 1 on ine American involvement 0.)ieit u se fob i n f orm a ti on f or ! exarni I ration of each potential i in viettiam. ch" _ ioosit ig a inc. juror. lie aiso turned down a re-. hic,:\viird IL Knapp, a retired 1 . iicrit\l\d'ii.4tihol.;1;t idziniii;nzio-alctinoitti,N1'iiiii Ile vi, ed de rense demand onto nicc:rameal inspector for Los plea before the itni2,e. this all prospective jurors sib t-). An'."'ir. ti unit sliel, "line morning, all Miner precn-intions luive sec-many clearances or l oll]it ' ',hunt I object to is the zbmit keeping the trial fair ot hen connections with South. i t:triinin.ntirly;(,rospeytulhinutirglstotioie lici..)(t(n,cirlIn, . 1 r .i , � ci . . 1 , , . " ern Calitornia defense imius- ii` 0111y." . . � Ile ii.dso- comppdned tint tries be automatically ex� Byrne, who Originally esti. chided from service, mated that A jury mom be se. The defense contends that. Iceted to try the espionage s,.uch jurors cannot be objec. conSpitacy and theft etise or live . in judging, Ellsberg anCti three days, is motivated more bliss�, who si ,uie chargedwith b.,: a desire for speed than hy criminal viorations n connec-:ressed and the- governmeni of evenhandedness. tion with disclosure. of the top; South Vietnam scented mist a-With jury selection now in secret Pc"ta-i". papers, a ll'.s- 1 bie, I began to realize that it its fifth clay, the judge has tory of U.S. involvement in ! \vas a mistake," i A nother potential juror, lengthened daily court ses. Southeast Asia. sions ini.d suggested 'that he Although openly annoyed Ilichard '\t tot whose step-may hold .Saturday sessions as whh the Oscainileil detchsc at l brother was killed in Vietnam well. Boudin and Leonard L Weinglass, qief counsel for Buss�, contend that this is be-cause of. "undue pressure" from the ptosecutors handling the case, who have repeatedly asserted that some of their witnesses � government offi-cials in Washington � have had to postpone their vaca-tions because of delays here. Late today, chief prosecutor iDavid II. Nissen- said that the Douglas W. Silver, who had held a string of. civilian) jobs � with the military, said that, ."Orlt.tinally I believed in tlicn invoivement,' Lut as it prog-Incl:s on Ins coronet of Juri Inst. year, told the judge, "1 selection, Byrne (lid expano ring we're Ping to give the the scope of his questioning as vietnaniese people sernethinvi the day went on. they don't want. IT think we As he began interrogation.of stimild�rt be there." " new P")111) of IG Prespect'v� Maseher also indicated his jurors c; iled on Thursday, the skepticim s about the security judge began asking., for exam: � classification system, which pie, what kinds of "briefings :will be a major issue in the they had had about security_ case, While in the Navy, he matter n s in the defense-o-said, he saw "a lot of things" coiled jobs. stamped secret which he felt But at the same time, I \ 3-Tile 'should not have been. began to incur the wrath of I The day's biggest surprise in court came when Jan Sirois, \vho' is from an almost total., ly military family, proclaimed: during examination hy lies judge that, "a person \vim has access (to secret documents), if theY find something wrong, has a moral oblii_nition and Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 of opposing points of view on the Vietnam war and one in which the future of Vietnam will Lc decided. The asstuopt on by most Viet-nainese seems to be that Presi dent Nixon will pursue his pros (Alt 0�01 se w , hich, in cyes, Means � f the Commit. nists, cot-no what may. Senator McGovern is sect) as 1111 crierilv of Presicient hieu kind. military ule, tmd, 10(1)0 importantly, as someone who would hring peace to Vietnam .by \Vii:1-!, the (01'00i515 10 p! t.:\ 1:der. � Consequently, the. attitudes Of any South Vietnamese to-ward the two c;:redidates can he predicted exactly if it is Itnown how be feels abottt the war, connumilsm and Presi-dent Pignycn Van Thiel]. . Mistinst Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 77,42,1 c 1 0 c) 2V" a iTy* SO titJ � r,y MALCOLM WilOiVNE n, `17 SAIGON, South Vietnain, July 1 Nixon Victory Etepetted 1.3---"Never has an American- 01.. C lection see:ned in1p01-1.ant: 1 -�r el prob-to � politically int:rained South ti.hh, mtjortt.,,, of the yontl:,,tc�.. Vic tn3MCs.,?. than ilhe COmiog ml.CJiccloa.0; V,'0111(1 111,0. 10 :�('C' race betwc'en Savi"ter Gec'r!ter Senator McGovern in the White MeGi"a111 and h'resdent Njxon.House. Marry South Vietnamese sco . Nhunn, an OppOsi-thc ejection S a dear contest con Dopiny s3id: Cooarn Nvirs in Not, einhcr then I think he \-,111 be the one. l_lniteci States l'icsident who can bring 0hout nn honorable atm most s:ttisirictory solution ,. .1 win re-election, The 1.4Kly gossMing politi-cians, joarnalitds, lav,�yers and otlairs who make up the Sai-flil COffe;�11C,11Se Set fdrea;iy 105 Senator MCGOVertl'S "Nixon will have him inur-ddied., yoU'll SO,'' a prominent lav,tver said, "that's' how poli-tics in America wioilz those days. The microphones tia? Re-ptinlictins tried to plant 01 Veinocralie heinicuarters show what's going 00. Some mysteri-ous killer, litte the one 5n0 almost. got 'Wallace, will gclt , "There is another factor I ,\JCuOVC.1 r The C.I.A.' I mention if ) Z.:111 10 lie navel' It a dove itito the completely frank'," fpirly White 'arouse." � high�raniting South Victmonese. Most South Viathamese civil servant said. "Theca has H ove that. the Uniled lao-nesjer been ritime Vjliell trarii-ike Vie'.nam, moves poiiticE:lly nloso Of all political .1.1 iDes m.Enly a context. of con-they Americans more than 1,T.,iracies and counterconspira-s they do now. That is to say, tie . There is doubt that the we dislike and mistrust both ittiteetoral process in America is Nixon and I,IcGovern, for the , more than sham that irrational reason they are both num Americans. cor.ceals a hchind-the-scencs President-making proces, � "But for me, and perhaps Those few South Vietnamese just for that reason, I prefer McGovern. lie has pledged to v,,ho have visited or lived in get America out of Vietnam, tnUnited Slates view the and that's all I need to know coming election more lealisti-about him." (tally, and some confess they ,Prespite the speaker's high .'.zr0 in a quandary about it. !position hi the Government, his "If we Vietnamese could views me clearly not typical vote in your election,' a weal-of 'supporters of Piesidentl thy and well-educated Saigon Thieu. doctor said, "this would he a Over the years Mr. Nixon' difficult one for me." has repeatedly visited south: 'A Time To Ife.Countu1' Vietnam, and a succession of Ile added: military governments has made him feel welcomla. 13y compari- "The. issues are perfectly son, � senator McGovern was Flear, a vote for McGovern � greeted with. tear gas and offi- is, 0 vote agaihst my supposed , class and. for the Communists. et.13,1 der,isic,41,...�y1,1ah, ha visited the Communists lakc. over, onigon September. it will mean the destruction of Ngo Mule. Tinh, Minister of me. / will lose, everythint-f.. Education and a cousin of Pre. " But fin going to surprise dent Thiell' st"id cn. the Me- VOU and tell you I would vote Govern candidacy: "As Viet-'or McGovern anyway. The namese we all WiSll to See an time lias come for .nationalists American President who can to stmd up and be counted, deal strongly with the Commu-and if Nixon stays in office, nists. I think President Nit.:on ''1 -11,10) dodrnvo(1 prn. lOIS bc'en' teugh- "-G05'01"Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 crIft N.., (b)(3) "One- of the reasons for the great anti-American feeling here now is Neon's� support for a very unpopular president in Vietnam," he continued. "Nixon will win, of course, but I would Ulna to 1.0e a Mc-Govern victory followed by a gradttal transition her T e. he Communists viii run all of vtetmtin., lint the au tin thing is that ihay should assume control not s.uddeitly, but gradually, and let us ail et used .to each other r little to the Vietnam war." at a time." '1 he general ossin�rplion here ' Ahhot,gm Inc,st smith �,27,,dt � �� � " 0(1)11)50 11)1(1 foreigners livinf here !":13Y they how the, people of this country think on any given issue, nothim!, saerns 1.;:sccr to gauge than Scuth Victriamese pulaie opinion. South Vie.tnain never had a free elect"')), and the few port efforts to 1: Ice polls have been largely thwarted by the war and the pievailing fear that truthful rnswers can lead to trouble Still the, police on ohe side or the Communists on � the other. There seems little question that `Multi Viet IlanleSe, 1:Olt continued armed Pe-siStrnee to the Communists arc hoping for a Nixon victr.�ty iii ;November; those who war.t.1111 and to the Way lozik to Senttlor. l',".:ctGovern. 6: Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 L5 JUL .IVZ (b)(3) 'What McGovern Has Said on Some of the Issics . � Following are excerpts .from statements by Senator George McGovern on a num-ber of issues: - Vietnam � � � Let us not talk about Nixon's war or Johnson's war or the Pentagon's war or the C.I.A.'s war. Let us take hold ' of this war as citizens and as elected representatives, and let us vote to end it. , Many years ago, the an;�� cleat Biblical prophet wrote: "I have set before you life or death, blessing or cursing; , therefore choose life that ' thou and thy seed may live." � Let us choose not cursing fait blessing, not death but life. (Senate Speech, May. 7, � 1970.) Future Commitments . In cases similar to what .we�have *seen in Vietnam, we should examine any request' for American involvement in the light of these points: � cAre those asking our help the appropriate elements for us to be supporting, both in terms of what they stand for and in terms of our national interest? , (]1.1 so, are they unable to bear the responsibility them-selves for the protection of their position? cilf they are not, we should. try to determine if the inter-national community, through the United Nations, can pro--vide there the aid they need. If such a U.N. role is not possible, then we should in-vestigate the possibility of multilateral action. cif that approach is un-workable, then we should be prepared to consider a com-mitment by the United States..(Response to Congres-sional Quarterly questions.) Welfare . There is a fundamental al-ternative to the President's Family Assistance proposal--an alternative whose poten-tial as an antipoverty strategy far exceeds the poor people's approach of the President � a Human Security Plan which looks toward insuring each of our citizens against the risk of poverty and doing so simply because we believe that this kind of minimal fi-nancial_ security should be a right of citizenship in our country. I will offer an amendment [comprising] four major corn- - ponents�components which would protect each of us against the four major causes of poverty in Amer-ica. First, it would include a children's allowance to se-cure the future of our. chil-dren. Second, it would guar-antee a job at a decent wage for every able-bodied working-age citizen. Third, it would improve Social Securi-ty for the elderly and disabled. Finally, it would provide a small, federally administered special Public Assistance plan to protect the few who would remin in need for additional incoMe maintenance. (Speech to Citizen's Com-mittee for Children, New York City, Jun. 20, 1970.) CrimQ and Justk' All these apparently hard-nosed proposals, winch would actually result in making re-duction of crime harder to accomplish, are part of a great illusion that has been fostered ever since Richard Nixon began to campaign for the Presidency in I It is the illusion that. crime is ray-aging the nation because the. police, the prosecutors and the judges are too soft on the criminals The Ad-ministration hopes to blame-Congress and the courts for striking down an alleeTd at-tempt to stop crime. This will be the Administration's re-sponse to the inevitable demonstration that the Nixon promise to end the crime crisis is to he unfulfilled. The promise- will be uniulfillcd because the harder construc-tive task has been largely avoided. (Senate speech, July 21, 1970) � � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) LOUISVILLE, KY. TIMES E - 173,180 rdUL 1 11972 ill it rain on your protest? Every war, no matter how unpleas-ant, produces benefits for some of those who survive it. Outdoorsmen, for instance, can thank World War II for jeeps and lightweight sleeping bags. Korea speeded up the develop-ment of helicopters and jet airplanes. And now Vietnam has given us a re-markable new crowd. control tech-nique known as "weather modifica-tion." On various occasions during the war, according to the New York Times, the CIA_ arranged for rain to fall on civil lTdrders in Saigon and Hue. Torrential downpours, the CIA discovered, were useful in persuading uppity Buddhist monks and other pro-testers to go home and quit embar-rassing South Vietnam's democratic government. All it took to maintain order in the streets was a little cloud seeding on the day of a demon-stration. The question now is whether the government will use similar methods here in the United States. Miami Beach, the scene of both national political party conventions this sum-mer, would be an ideal testing ground. is that the Miami Beach City Council Instead of calling up the National and Police Chief Rocky Pomerance Guard to quell a riot and risking a are trying something quite radical: bloodbath, the President could simply ,they are being nice to the protest send up a CIA cloud-seeding team,/ groups. Demonstrators have been Even the most militant yippies, gay libbers and poor people would be forced to retreat when hit by Miami's first monsoon. Politics being what it is, we rather doubt Mr. Nixon will modify the weather to help the Democrats. Any-thing that embarrasses them helps him, so he will surely be content to sit back and watch heads get bashed on nationwide TV. Sudden cloudbursts are much more likely if demonstrators get out of hand when the GOP meets in Miami late in August. At the moment, however, it appears that peace will prevail in the streets of Miami this week. The authorities have taken the security measures needed to preserve order in an open society. Concertina barbed wire has been rolled out, troops are on alert, and tear gas has been stockpiled. What's really, significant, however, allowed to camp in Flamingo Park, and, policemen assigned to crowd con-trol won't carry guns or clubs. When a problem develops, negotiations will be tried first, force second. In other words, every effort is being made to avoid the violence of 1968. All bets are off, of course, if Sen. George McGovern should somehow be 'denied the nomination. But it. now appears that while the candidates shed each other's blood inside Con. vention Hall, cops and pot-heads will smile at each other outside in the Florida sunshine. Law and order Republicans, on ,the other hand, may not tolerate this per-missive coddling of effete intellec-. tuals. So if you are planning to demon-strate at the Republican convention for transvestite liberation or govern-ment aid to middle-aged adults, better take .along a ceuple of raincoats and a water-repellent sign. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 GARDEN CITY, N.Y. NE DAY E jut,. 2,7 rfi)12 GOP Attractions: Vietnam, Beer, By Bruce Lambert Jr. Roslyn�When the several hundred youths at a Republi-can conference here broke Ub into seminar groups, only half a dozen or so showed up for the one on reelection of Pres-ident Nixon. Despite that disappointing turnout, the President got virtually unanimous support at the day's most popular sem-inar, on Vietnam. Thirty youngsters gathered for it, and, unlike the other groups, their number grew. In fact, the Vietnam seminar nearly tripled in size and lasted close to two hours, long after the other seminars ended their discussions on women, colleges, ecology, off-shore oil, transportation, .busing, the courts, narcotics, and the State Legislature. The Vietnam seminar had not even been scheduled, but the Nassau County Republican organization running the all-day youth meeting accepted a speaking offer from a young man who identified himself as Daniel Teodoru, a Romanian refugee and former correspondent in Vietnam. He did, not say what news organization he had represented. Teodoru said the effectiveness of Nixon's war policies had been confirmed by unpublicized Communist documents captured by the. Central Intelligence Agency and the mili-tary. "When you've got. ifie-PFAident and the enemy telling you the same thing, you've got to believe it," he said. Teodoru described Sen. GeOrge McGovern as "an out-and-out liar" who "coordinates his political campaign with Hanoi's military campaign." Referring to his own youth, Teodoru also claimed that McGovern "bombed inc and other innocent civilians" while serving as a pilot in World War II. And he said that the media have been "vicious and vile" in distorting news from Vietnam. His remarks drew several rounds of applause from the youths: One objected that the war was based in U.S. eco-nomic interests and another spesifiled oil. Teodoru challenged them for details and got none. - "I ended up being a defense of Nixon," .one 19-year-old girl said. "But he [Teodoru] was able to back himself up with facts while they weren't. They had no facts. Generally, I think the Republicans are making an effort for youth." Another girl. said the seminars were "really excellent." More popular than any of the seminars, however; were the free attractions: several swimming pools, a- trampoline, a pond, shady trees, fried chicken box lunches, Leer on, tap and a dinner of hot dogs and hamburgers. One teenage girl said to another, "Oh, let's stay. There's nothing else to do." Nearly 1,000 of the 1846-25-year-olds registered during Sakirday morning and afternoon, but a late afternoon rain til6atened to end the program, and the crowd dwindled to 40. With an ice cold can in his hand, one youth said, "Well, we've still got the free. beer." Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 A 1111 ifyr) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 vve (A) si k 5 (b)(3) Pentagon: Weather Asa Weapon Of War :.::. -WASHINGTON---Dr. Gordon J. F. -MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist ,who had just completed a tour as 'vice -president of the Defense Department's -.Institute' of Defense Analysis, pub-lished in 1968 a little-noted Init chilling .study on the military potential of .rneterological warfare. He listed a num-ber of options available to those who would choose to tamper with nature. �Among them: �,,, * Altering the world's temperature ,hy rocketing materials into the earth's :upper atmosphere to either absorb light (thereby cooling the surface below) or �absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating' i ..the surface below). This technique 'could be targeted at a specific area. . o Triggering tidal waves by set--ting off a series of underground PX-'plosions along the edge of the Conti-nental Shelf, or by producing a natural :earthquake. A guided tidal wave could achieved by correctly shaping the tfiergy-release source. �....1 r . ; 0 Changing the physical makeup .d the atmosphere by creating, with . it rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between .1C1' and 30 miles up that is responsible 'for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun. Without the e.� . protective layer of ozone, a molecular 'form of oxygen, the radiation would -be fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the liffected area below. .'''Dr. MacDonald (who is now a member of the White House Council on )nvironmental Quality) made it clear 71.11at" his essay was based only on spec--tilation. Last week, however, it became Ithown that at least part of his maca-bre weather arsenal had been secretly 4n use by the United States since the 1960's. t: 7;�Air Force planes, supported by the se ntral Intelligence Agency, have beers waging a systematic war of rain on the infiltration trails of Laos, Cam-bodia, North Vietnam and South Viet-nam. The intent: suppress enemy anti-missile fire, provide cover for South Vietnamese commando teams pene-trating the North and hinder the movement of men and materiel from North Vietnam into the South. The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not until 1965 that a' group of Air Force scientists officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a' military tool. "We all sat down in a big brain-storming session," said one of the sciehtists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora-tories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the trafficability in all of Southeast Asia." Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-mak-ing project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, known as "Operation' Pbp-Eye." There were heated protests from the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of De-fense Robert S. McNamara ordering a halt to the project. Instead, well-qualified sources � said last week, "it went underground�into the dark." From 1969, through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House acquiescence. The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in, The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or whether it was-still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that fol-lowed the enemy offensive last April. Making rain has long been techni-cally feasible. Scientists have learned that rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seed-ing clouds by aircraft with silver-io-dide particles. Other chemicals, includ-ing dry ice, also have been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia. Military and Government specialists acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practi-cally none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall. Some scientists have . � . � . � .published data suggesting that weather .modification, in combination with ,� other ecological stresses such as air pollution and pesticides, may have a synergistic effect�that is, result in collective changes far greater than either abuse would have- caused by . itself. In Indochina, where heavy bombing already has robbed much of the land-snipe of its natural water-holding ca-pability by destroying foliage and trees, artifically induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expected, along with heavier soil erosion. Technically, there are no interna-tional agreements outlawing such war-fare. But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-mak-ing activity of tile Air Foree was shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-informed official said, was one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national-security adviser, took.a personal hand, "This kind of thing was a bomb," the official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had. to know." �SEYMOUR M. HERSH' Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 LIAO Ill Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) e JUL 1972 John P; Roche War Command chaos DEN. JOHN D. La-velle' s private War with North Vietnam has justifia-bly touched off quite a stir. Lavelle, it will be recalled, was commanding general of the 7th Mr Force and appar-ently decided to use the am-- biguity of "protective reac-tion" as a justification for some preemptive strikes against North Vietnamese military installations. He had the records of these strikes doctored up in such a fashion that they indicated compli-.� nee with the rules of en-gagement. However, because the President subsequently Authorized wider bombing, the chances are that many -people will write off the La-velle incident on the ground that he was premature but � sensible. Actually the Lavelle initia-tive is symptomatic of a far more basic problem than sim-ple battlefield improvisation.. Leaving aside the Strange-love scenarios which have � local commanders joyously ,firing off Minutemen, what -occurred was a complete fail-ure of, the command struc-ture that should concern all .of us. It was far more than a 'breakdown in civilian control over the military; it was a breakdown in military con-trol over the military. Not 'since Abraham Lincoln put .U.. S. Grant in command of the Union armies have we � seen such a shambles as the command structure a the Vi-etnamese war. WHO IS theoretically the top American official in South Vietnam? The chief of mission, Ambassador. Ells-worth Bunker. What was the official function of Gen. Wil-liam Westmoreland and, later, Gen.- Cr e ig ht on Abrams? They were the am-bassador's subordinates in charge of the Military Assist-ance Command (MACV). That is, in theory, these four-star generals had exactly the same status as, say, the colo-nel, who is in charge of an American military assistance group in some Latin Ameri-can nation. For openers, then, the. commanding general, MACV, worked for the ambassador, just like the local director of the Agency for Interna-tional Development or the local head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Then came the war and half a mil-lion American troops�Army; Air Force and Marines, plus the assets of the Seventh Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. Now who was in charge? Well, if you can believe it, the ambassador. ' At this point General of the Army George C. Marshall must have been spinning in his grave. Vietnam was never made into a military theater of command with the highly structured lines of control that existed in World War II (and even then there were problems; George Patton, for Instance, had a do-it-yourself view of strategy). Nor were our ambassadors, either by character or conviction, will-ing to take on the job of pro-consul. Which brings us to Gen. ' Lavelle and the 7th Air Force. Who was Lavelle's boss? In one capacity, he worked for Abrams; in an-other, for the commander in chief, U.S. Forces in the Pa-cific (CINCPAC)---an admiral In Hawaii; in still a third, for the chief of staff of the Air Force in Washington. THE SAME sort of com-mand chaos permeated all the services. Indeed, if one looked at the chart, he some-, times wondered how any-thing ever got accomplished. But conversely, such a laby-rinth is perfectly designed for a general who wants to go Into business for himself. In political terms, it is a ' classic case of hardening of the categories. Even though he character of the war rad'. 1t hechanged between 1963- 66, the fiction was main-tained that we were merely providing "military assist-ance." Thus we fell between two stools: there was no thea-ter commander to run the show; there was no ambassa-dor willing or able to exer-cise his theoretical responsi-bilities. I have often thought in this context that perhaps Presi-dent Johnson's greatest error was in not accepting Robert F. Kennedy's offer to go to Saigon as ambassador. With Bobby at the head of the table there would have been no ambiguities in the com-mand structure. Sing Features Sync teat� Joseph Kraft is in Hanoi. His column will be resumed this week. � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 4vc-Lazat Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) ANNALS OF \VAR_ VIETNAM . II--SOVEREIGN OF DISCORD , NGO DINH DIEM�the name meant a great deal at one time, in Washington as well as Sai-gon. On a trip to Vietnam in 1961, Lyndon Johnson called Diem "the Winston Churchill of Asia." What-ever the other points of resemblance between him and that British states-man, the man who undertook the American project of barricading the southern against the northern half of Vietnam certainly provoked hyperbole �from Americans. For a period in the mid-nineteen-fifties, Diem was the .hero of the American press. According to an article in Life, he was a "tough miracle man," who . had "saved his 'people from [the] agonizing prospect" of a national plebiscite; and he was widely given credit for halting "the red tide. of Communism in Asia." The word "miracle" affixed itself to Diem's name with the adhesion of a Homeric. �epithet. Diem had performed the "po-litical miracle" of creating . a strong government, the "economic miracle" of rebuilding the economy of South Vietnam from the ruins of war. In 1957, Diem travelled to the United States on the American Presidential air-plane. Welcomed by President Eisen-hower at the airport, he addressed a joint session of Congress and visited New York, where Mayor Robert Wagner called him "a man history may yet adjudge as one of the great figures of the twentieth century." Six years later; Diem was to die in a dark alley of Saigon, denounced as the petty tyrant who had destroyed South Viet-namese society and prejudiced the cause of the free world in Asia.' Any history of the Diem regime would have to be written in vivid, novelesqu.e colors. To start with, there was Ngo Dinh Diem himself�a shy, self-righteous Catholic mandarin who had �taken a vow of chastity and re-vealed an ambition to serve as a moral example to his people. He wished, in ef-fect, to be the emperor of an enlight-ened Confucian state, in the classic pat-tern of Vietnamese history. Four of Diem's brothers played important roles, especially the lean, fierce Ngo Dinh 'Nhu, wfloSe life. Was a succession of plots, ruses, and metaphysical dogmas. And there was Mine. Nhu, the beauti-ful, outspoken, and wholly outrageous woman whom the American journalists called "the Dragon Lady." For nearly a decade, the Ngos dominated all con-versation in Saigon; Americans and Vietnamese alike spent hours discussing the latest court intrigue or scandal, hours speculating on the intricacies of the family philosophy. The 'Ngos never disappointed them�not even in dying. Played out under the gaze of the tele-vision cameras, the fall of the Ngos was, in its way, pure theatre, the de-nouement of a baroque tragedy. The private psychological drama of Diem and his family was as nothing be-side the grand strategies and global concerns of the United States in Viet-nam, but, as the French historian Phi-lippe Devillers once wrote, "in our age of mass society, where all liitory seems to be determined by forces so powerful as to negate the individual,, the Viet-namese problem has the originality to remain dominated by questions of indi-viduals. Indeed, the problem becomes almost incomprehensible if *one trans-forms men into. abstractions." "f he no-tion .may sound romantic, but it is not. In the first place, Vietnam in the days. of Diem possessed a very small edu-cated society; most of the prominent men knew each other as well as if they had been the inhabitants of one village. In the second place, the Vietnamese traditionally understood politics not in terms of programs or large social forces but in terms of the individual. And their perception was not unscientifically based, for, given the size and .uniform-ity of the old society, the life of one man might stand as a model for the life of the society as a whole. If that one man was. Ngo Dinh Diem, then. the personal drama of the Ngo family, with its mysterious and violent ending, de-scribed the difficulty of. the American project in Vietnam better than would a history of all the counter-insurgency programs or an analysis of all the larg-er social forces. mencan decision to back Ngo Dinh Diem was not of it-self a major policy decision. The policy of supporting a non-Communist Viet-nam had been 'formulated sonic years earlier, and Diem himself was but one element of the fallback position hastily devised following the French debacle in 1954. By that time, the United States was paying eighty per ,cent of the costs of the French war, and it was not until June of 1954 that Secretary of State Dulles told the French definitely that the United States would not commit its own troops and planes to Indo-China. Even after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Administration, officials did not accept the Vietminh victory or the principle of a divided Vietnam. During the Geneva Confer-ence, their ambition was not only to build up a government in Saigon but to undermine Ho Chi Nlinh's govern-ment in Hanoi as well. In June, 1954, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale was sent out as chief of a Saigon military mission with orders to "beat tile Geneva time-table of ComMunist takeover in the .North." By August, during the period of negotiated truce that had been agreed upon to precede the �holding of national elections, Lansdale's teams were scattered about the country from Hanoi to the Ca Mau peninsula con-ducting agitprop work and sabotage operations, in direct violation of the United States government's promise at Geneva to "refrain from the threat or the use of force." These teams had small success in the Vietminh-held. areas. Their main' achievement in the North was to lay the groundwork for the 'subsequent "flight" of the Catholics to the South. Their tactics were prom-ises and "black propaganda," or the falsification of enemy reports. Many of the rest of their activities were little more than terrorist acts. One team, for instance, managed to contaminate the oil supply in the bus depot of Hanoi in order to wreck the engines of all the city's public transport. The fact is that high United States officials could have had very little con-fidence in the success of Lansdale's mis-sion in either the South or the North. In Saigon, the French-sponsored gov-enunent was in a state of near-collapse. Shortly after the. Emperor 13ao Dai ap-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 COntinuea Caok Luracia Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 ,v,JUL.1�.1 Rainmaking Is As Weapon- by U.S. Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed�Chemical Also Employed to Foil Radar � By SEYMOUR M. IlEASH St.'eelat to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 2�The "What's worse," one official United States has been secretly asked, "dropping bombs or seeding clouds over North Vi- rain?" , etham, Laos and South Viet- All of the officials inter-nam to increase and control the viewed said that the United rainfall for mititary purposes. Government sources, both ci-vilian and -military, said during .an 'extensive series of inter-views that the Air Force cloud-seeding program has been aimed most recently at hinder- - Mg movement of. North Viet-. . namese troops .and equipment and suppressing enemy antiair-craft missile fire. The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Con-gressional and scientific circles about the use .of weather mod-ification in Southeast Asia. De-spite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they .understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region. Some Opposed rrogram The weather manipulation in Indochina, 'which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, two main rbonsoon affect Laos and Vietnam. "it was just trying to. add on to smoothing that you already got," one officer said. - Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the .;seven inches Of rain- in two 'hours on one of our Special' 'Forces camps." Despite the professed skepti-cism on the part Of some nun-duration of the southwest mon- her of the Johnson Administra-soon, which spawns high-rising tion, military nun apparently cumulus clouds � those most took the weather modification susceptible to cloud seeding-- Program much more seriously. �over the panhandle areas of According to a document Laos and North Vietnam from contained in the Pentaadn May to early October. The long- papers, the Defense Depai t-er rainy season thus would give I merit's-secret history of the war, the Air Force more opportun- weather modification was one ity to trigger rainstorms, of seven basic options for stop. "We wore trying to arrange ping up the war that were pre-the weather pattern to suit our scented on request by the Joint convenience," said one former Chiefs of Staff to the White Government official who had House in late February, 196-7. detailed knowledge of the �per- The document described the atior. � States did not have the capabil-t v,ather program over Laos�ity to cause heavy flooding duri ; According to interviews, the tidally known as Operation ing the summer in the northern! Central Intelligence Agency in- Pop-Eye�as an attempt "to parts of North Vietnam, where: itiated the use of cloud-seeding !reduce trafficability along infil serious flooding occurred last over .Hue, in thethe northern part tration routes." year. of South Vetnam. "We I irst Authorization Needed used that stuff in about August Officially, the White House of 1933," one former C.I.A. it said that � Presidential and State Department declined agent said,.. "when the Diem authorization was "required to comment on the use of mete- regime was having all that implement operational phase of i-01-0-logical warfare. "This Is one trouble with the BuddhistsY -weather modification p ocesa of those things where no one previously successfully tested: "They would just - stand and evaluated in same arca." around during demonstrations is going to say anything," one The. brief stunmary concluded when the police threw tear gas official said. by stating that "risk of coin-Most officialt, s ,iaitervi at' them, but we noticed that ewed mise is minimal.' when the, rains came they pro agreed that the seeding had wouldn't stay on," the former .A similar option was cited accomplished one of its main'"ge.litti v got an A' n another 1:167 working docu-tnent published in the Pentagon objectives -- muddying roads ":ae America Beechcraft and - had' Papers. Neither attracted nitY and flooding lines of colnmulli- it rigaed up with silver iodide," immediate public attCtIltiOn, cation. But there were also he said, "There was another The Laos cloud-seeding op-many military and Government' demonstration and we seeded emotions Mt provoke, however, P officials who en-pressed the area. It rained." a lengthy and hitter, liKir � ' A similar cloud-seeding was secatet, dispute inside the John-that the prbject hzul caused any son Administration in 1967. A carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in dramatic results. Saigon at least once during the team of State Department at-The sources, without provid- summer of 1964, the former torneys and officials protested ing details, . also said that a agent said, that the use of cloud-seeding was a dans method had been developed for Expanded to Trail�the� Ur gerou iited States precedent for. treating clouds with a chemical i. is the first confirmed use of ; The Intelligence Agency exa "I felt that the military and that eventually � produced an4,panded its cloud-seeding activi- agency hadn't analyzed it to meteorological .1,varlar l- , e. A acidic rainfall capable of foul-. , ;ties to the Ho Chi Minh supply letermine if it was in our though it is not prohibited by ing the operation of North VIet-ltrail in I,aos sometime in th interest," one official who was any international conventions namese radar ecatipment used' middle nineteen-sixties, a ntnn- involved in the dispute said: for directing surface-to-air mis- her of Government sources he also . was concerned over sues., said. By 1967,. the Air Force the rigid' secrecy of the project, In addition to hampering 'had become involved although, he .said, "although. it might -SAM missiles . -and delaYing .as one former Government of- have been all right. to keep it . . . . secret:1f you did it once and didn't want the precedent to become known." The general feeling was sum-marized by one -former State Department official- who said he was concerned that the � rainmaking "might violate what we considered the general rule of the . thumb for an illegal weapon of war�something - Il:Altering 'or tailoring the The state or the art had not that would 'calla'. unusual suf-rain patterns over Noth Viet- advanced to the Point where fering or disproprlate damage."; nam and Laos to ant United! it was possible to predict the There also was concern. he( . States bombing: missions. 'results of a seeding operation added, because of the unknown ecological risks. A Nixon Administration or-roads and other lines of com-a"We used to go out flying flail! sal 1 tliat. he believed the around and looking for a cer- fir' of weather modifi-munication in opeiadion. . tarn cloud format.ion," the offi- cation over North Vietnam Keyed To Monsoon � ,cial said. "And we made a lot of took place in late 1968 or early The cloud-seeding operations 'mistakes. Once we dumped 1960 when rain was increased necessarily were keyed to the 1 on warfare, artifical rainmak-ing has been strenuously op-posed-. by some State Depart-ment officials. ort Vietnamese infiltration, ficial said, ag,ency was lit could' not be determinall the �rainmaking program had calling- all the shots." whether �the operations wereI the.follOwing pu.rposef: , "I 'always assumed the agen-being conducted in connection (t:Provicling ram and ciono cy had a mandate from the cover for infiltration of Sauth White HOMO to do it," he with the current North Viet- Vietnamese commando and in-=nese offensive or the telligance teams into North.added, . - A number of former CIA, and renewed American bombing of Vietnam. � lhigh,ranking Johnson Adminis-the North. (:Serving as a "spoiler .'or!titation officials depicted . the Ef fectiveness Doubted , North Vietnamese attacks aNcL operations along the In as raids in South Vietnam. experimenta Beginning in 1967, some State Departnient officials pro-tested that the United States, by deliberately altering the nat-ural rainfall in parts of Indo-china, was taking environmen-tal risks of unknown propor-tions, But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather mod-ification as a military weapon. CDiverting North Vietnameir men and material from military operations to keep muddied with any degree of confidence, one Government official said. cont iuuod Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) _ PRuvivc.NCE, R.I 'Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 JOURNT0 L 3t972 m - 66,673 S 209,501 4.0ee-Qui ou CAS .4s � By BRUCE DeSIINA , Quoting unnamed Central � : Intelligorwe,AgeRay.,and State .- Department sources, The New. '. York Times News Service yes-terday reported new evidence that the Pentagon is changing ( the weather over Southeast Asia for military reasons. . In a �story by Seymour M. , Hersh, the reporter who first . . broke the story of the My Lai ' Massacre, the Times said the United , States first began �seeding clouds to increase rainfall over Hue in the north-ern, part of South Vietnam in 1963. . According to a former CIA , � official, the action was taken ' to prevent Buddhist demon-ms In addition to impeding infil-tration, the Times reported that the Pentagon rain-making program has the following par. poses: O To provide rain and cloud cover for. infiltration of South Vietnamese comman-dos and intelligence teams into North Vietnam. O To serve as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Viet-nam. O To divert North Vietnam-ese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads arid other lines of communication open. strations in that city against The Times quotes a � the South Vietnamese govern- "former high-ranking -of-: ment, the Times reported. ficial" as saying that by the "They would just Stand end of 1971, the Program was � around during demonstrations under the direct control of the when the police threw tear White House. ! gas at them, but we noticed ! that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the . former agent is quoted as gram was politically sensitive .:saying. and ordered it kept a secret The story repeats, as first from all but a handful of ad-reported in the June 25.Provi-- ministration officials, the of-. dence Sunday Journal, that ficial is quoted as saying. seeding operations were me Times quoted a "well : begun in the mid 1960's to informed source" as saying create heavy rains which Navy scientists developed a !: washed out portions of the Ho new chemical agent effective Chi Minh Trail and impeded in warm stratus clouds that , infiltration of supplies and produces an acidic rain capa-,1 !- Men to the South. ble of fouling "mechanical � Sen. Claiborne Pell said late equipment --- like radars, � last Month he strongly be- trucks, and tanks.", Heves the United States is The story implies, Seeding clouds in Southeast not . say, that the ,�� Asia for�military reasons, was actually used . Reached at his home last North. :..night and informed of the The Times reports that of-Times story, the Senator said: ficials interviewed said the "This provides additional United States did not have the '-, foundation for my own belief, capability to cause heavy . a belief that I have advanced 'flooding during the summer in for several months, that these the Northern parts of North activities have been conduct- Vietnam last year. The flood-c1 by the United States." big. destroyed crops � and re-The Senator is planning portedly killed' thousands. _ Senate hearings for later this summer on his proposed ' treaty to ban the use of : : weather modification as a I: weapon of war.. � . � � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Henry Kissinger, the Pres-ident's special adviser for na-tional security, felt the pr but does chemical over the �� However,-, Sen. 'Pell and David Heaney, a member of the Senate foreign relations committee's professional staff, told the Journal they believe the United States does have that capability and was responsible for the floods. In a letter to Senator Pell last year, Pady Johnson, the assistant secretary of defense for legislati've affairs, said the Pentagon has the power to increase rainfall by up to 50 per cent. A 50 per cent increase in the torrential monsoon rains - 'of the region could obviously have a considerable effect. 1 "JUN Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 By MIRIAM OTTENBEI RG Star Staff Writer U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and�:despite reports to the contrary � America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it. "We have seriously dam-aged the program of the nar-cotics traffickers," reported c/ John Warner, chief of the Bu-reau of Narcotics and Dan-gerous Drugs' strategic intel�ligence office. "It's becoming increasingly more difficult for them to operate, even though their profits are tremendous." Warner countered testi-mony given recently by Al-fred W. McCoy, a Ph.D stu-dent, before a Senate Appro-priations subcommittee to .the effect that the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are actively en-gaged in the heroin traffic - and that the U.S. government� � .; has not moved to stop it. "Corruption," Warner ac-knowledged, "is a way of life - in Southeast Asia. It reaches to all levels. But the United States government has made it perfectly clear to all gov-ernments in the area that we Will not compromise on the ,narcotics issue." He cited as an example of increasing cooperation on in-stance earlier this year when 1.26 tons of opium were turned .over to the government of Thailand by one of the in-surgent forces along its bor-der�presumably for reasons of its own. Until recently, the opium 'would have found its way back into the traffic. But this were taken and analyzed by American chemists. Even more significant are recent successes of Laos and � Thai narcotics investigative units set up with U.S. aid. Warner explained how they came into being and, in doing so, replied to the charges made by McCoy in his Con-gressional appearance. .. McCoy had chaliged that the U.S. ambassador to Laos, G. Malurtrie Godley, "did his best to prevent the as-signment" of U.S. narcotics agents to Laos. Actually, Warner said, God--ley has been one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-narcotics program in Laos, and requested U.S. nar-cotics agents as advisers long before they could be sent there. He was instrumental in persuading Laos to outlaw the opium traffic, Warner said. Godley also persuaded the Laotian government to ap-point an honest and compe-tent general to head the new narcotics investigative unit which the U.S. Bureau of Nar-cotics and Dangerous Drugs established and, 'trained, War-ner added. In the short time the unit has been operational, Warner reported, it has made tre-mendous progress in arrest-ing traffickers and seizing laboratory equipment and the chemicals used to make heroin. The unit's latest score came on June 7 when it arrested a Meo deputy of the Laotian parliament and seized 10 kilos of No. 4 heroin (the injectable kind), 26 kilos of opium and a number of U.S. Army car-bines. Another special investiga-tive force tr a i ned and equipped by BNDD agents, has just gotten under way at Chingmai in northern Thai-land. Chingmai is a road junc-tion in the network of roads leading south to Bangkok. . It's particularly important Second of 2 Articles to U.S. narcotics agents be-cause they hope there to halt time, it was burned in the the movement of heroin out presence of American nar- of the "Golden Triangle," the cotics agents and samples opium growing area border-ing Laos, Burma and Thai-land. The new Thai unit has just scored its first success. On June 10, a joint BNDD and Thai task force raided a com-pound and seized 1,600 kilos of raw opium and processing equipment, he said. . Warner also reported that .he Royal Hong Kong police also have stepped up their anti-narcotics program, 'flak-ing large seizures of nar-cotics, arresting traffickers and seizing two laboratories this year. At the time, both labs had quantities of heroin, opium and morphine base. Burma, the other govern-ment touched by the opium traffic, has expressed its will-ingness to cooperate, \Varner reported, but Burmese offi-cials frankly admit their con-trol over the border areas are very tenuous. It would require an army to make any impact on the border areas where .insurgent forces protect the opium traffickers. Warner said. In Laos an acknowledged impartant trafficker has been knocked out of business not by an army but by American diplomacy, Warner said. Gen. Ouane Rattikone, for-mer chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, had con-solidated several opium refin-eries into one, and with his army, controlled and protect-ed the Laotian narcotics traf-fic for years, Warner said. "He was forced to retire in July, 1971. We have political clout in the area and Ambas-sador Godley exerted it." Warner said similar action would be taken against Viet-namese figures if charges of narcotics trafficking were proven. "Politics means nothing to us in BNDD," he said. If we had the evidence . . . the President would be informed and I know something would be done about it. McCoy had said in is con-gressional testimony that the. political apparatus of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (the former president of South Vietnam) "demonstrates the importance of official corruption in South-east Asia's drug traffic." Mc-Coy also said Ky's sister is tied in with heroin smuggling. _ Warner, however, said there is no evidence that Ky is in volved. McCoy, in his Senate testi mony, said he had briefed BNDD on his findings and they corrobated much of his evi-dence. Asked about that, War-ner said he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from McCoy "other than gossip, rumors, conjecture and old history." - McCoy had accused the CIA of providing substantial mili-tary support to mercenaries, rebels and warlords actively engaged in the narcotics traf-fic and of letting aircraft it chartered be used tO transport opium harvested by the mer-cenaries. Of those charges, Warner said the American-chartered aircraft now have security forces guarding against the against the transport of any. narcotics. Since President Nixon asked the CIA to assist in dealing with the Southeast Asian nar-cortics problem, Warner said, the CIA has been one of the most cooperative government agencies working with BNDD to' develop the information on which BNDD and its foreign counterparts can act to inter-dict the traffic and make cases. The weeding out of Asian of-ficials heavily involved in the dope traffic, as well as the strikes against the traffickers themselves, are all fairly re-cent. And so is the BNDD in-volvement in the Pacific. e It's .only in the last twO years that American narcotics agents have come into the Orient in force. Since BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll pushed for more agents to fight the Pacific traffic in drugs, regional offices .have. been set up in Bangkok, Sia, gon and Tokyo, and district offices in Chingmai, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Okinawa and Manila,. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 3 JUN 1972 Charge CIA and Thieu � push heroin to .U.S. GIs Daily World Washington Bureau WASHINGTON. June 2�Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student. working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcom-mittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Sai-gon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the ship; meat of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S. McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against heroin imported from Turkey." . He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee. headed,by Sen. . William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally �recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast Asia sources. In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic Is divided among. the nation's three dominant military factions: Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political organization, and Gen: Ky's political apparatus. "Throughout the mountainous Golden: Triangle region, the � CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries,: - right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and 'in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and man-ufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market," McCoy testified. � "Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of he." roin to Americans GI's fighting in Indochina." 1 �.� ' "Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in. certain � aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air Ame-rica aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been trans-porting opium." 7� � �� Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 -2/ Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1 JUN 1972 � (b)(3) Perspective lectoral olitics: The Candidates eply IN THE ED1TORTAL ESSAY "Vietnam and the Elections" which opened the April issue of RAMPARTS WC observed that the call for U.S. with-drawal from Vietnam, once dismissed as extremist or naive, had at last be-come politically respectable. Withdraw-al- had in fact become the dominant ' theme of Vietnam policy among this .. year's..Presidential candidates. At the same time, we noted, the clear prin-ciple of this demand was being clouded and distorted in the turgid mainstream of American electoral debate. And we . . . called upon the anti-war movement in the coming months "to sharpen the demand for withdrawal and establish the clearest possible mandate for it." � In an attempt to' follow our own ad-vice, RAMPARTS wrote, to each of the Presidential candidates, presenting to them a list of seven questions on their plans for peace in Vietnam. We re-ceived replies from Rep. Chisholm, .Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Jackson, Sen. Mc-Govern and Sen. Muskie. The letters from Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern and Muskie essentially consisted of the candidates' point-by-point responses to our questions over their signatures. In the following commentary we have taken these questions one or two at a time, and grouped together the answers of these four candidates' for compari-son and analysis. Sen. Jackson's letter did not direct itself to the specific ques-tions in a parallel way, so we are print-ing it in its entirety in a box on page 10.0f the Democratic candidates who remained in the aftermath of the Wis-consin primary only Wallace and Mc-Carthy did not respond to our questions. Since Rep. McClosky had dropped out of the race in March, and Richard Nixon didn't answer, we drew a blank on the Republican hopefuls. . We posed seVen 'questions:. while the original numbering is maintained, the results are discussed here in a different order. This alloWs us to set out first the common thrust of the four candidates' policies and in a sense proceed from the easy questions to the hard, from the shared assumptions to the problematic implications. . I. Shall the United States permanent-ly withdraw all its armed forces (161-,diers, sailors and airmen) from Viet-nam on the sole condition of an agree-ment for the repatriation of prisoners of war, timed to coincide with our � withdrawal? 2. Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw its armed forces front all of Indochina on the same single. condition? What about U.S. bases in Thailand? . CHISHOLM: . . . 1. I firmly believe and stand for an immediate total withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam:. with the sole londition being an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of. war. � 2. I also believe that it is imperative � that we.. withdraw our armed forces from all of Indochina. I must further support a withdrawal of U.S. influence on the lives of those who seek a .pres-ervation of their culture. HUMPHREY: 1. Yes.. 2. Yes, although in regard to Thai-land the critical point is that these bases not be used for strikes in Indochina. The question of leaving these bases al-together is a longer term proposition, involving issues that go beyond the Vietnam war; this calls for further study at the Presidential level. McGOVERN: 1. Yes. It is important to note, how-ever, that leaving U.S. forces in South Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is a circuitous method of achieving re-lease of our prisoners. I am convinced that they will be returned within the framework of Article 118 of the Gen-eva Convention on prisoners of war, which provides that prisoners will be released without delay "after the cessa-tion of hostilities." This requires a com-plete American disengagement from hostilities. against all parties in Indo-I china. want to point out, too, that I Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � do not regard this U.S. withdrawal as a negotiating position�it is instead a course of action which I. fully intend to implement. The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment did not urge the President to 'negotiate our withdrawal; rather it required withdrawal by cutting off funds for the war. 2. Yes. The bases in Thailand have no justification other than to attempt to dert U.S. influence over the internal politics of Southeast Asian countries. The withdrawal must, of course, mean an end to all military operations, in-cluding bombing, anywhere in Indo-china. MUSKIE: . I. Yes. I have consistently supported this position in the last few years. On February 2, I urged that "We muSt set a date when we will withdraw every soldier, sailor, and air-man, and ,stop all bombing and other American mil-itary .activity, dependent only on an agreement for the return of our pis-oners and the safety of our troops as 'they leave." I do not believe that an agreement for the safety of our troops as they leave would be in any way a problem; the basic exchange would be a complete end to American. military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners. 2. My proposal includes our military aCtivity and personnel in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. would there-fore not make use of our bases in Thai-land and elsewhere in Southeast Asia for activities related to the Indochina war. I would otherwise approach the issue .of bases in Thailand and else-where in Southeast Asia in the context of efforts not only to promote detente between the U.S. and China but also with regard to the effect that either maintaining or removing our various bases would have on the possibilities for accommodation among Asian na-tions' themselves. Clearly, we do not need to maintain anything like the number and size of bases we have now in Southeast Asia. 6. Shall the U.S. set a date by which it will carry out its withdrawal (as spe-cified in the preceding answers) on the same single condition of an agreement on repatriation of POWs? 7.. What date? "13 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 . � 211 MAY 1972 (b)(3) � Exclusive in terview Jr-1i By Wilfred Burehett ' Guardian Stall Correspondent Paris President Nixon's advisor Henry Kissinger has visited Moscow, Peking and Paris in. search of�as Nixon always puts itr-a peaceful settlement to the war in South Vietnam and bearing "generous" offers of peace. 'He has had 13 private sessions with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation in Paris, but he has never deigned to talk with those primarily'concerned with the struggle in the South�rePresented in Paris by Nguyen Thi Binh: Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and head of its delegation in Paris. There ar,e unclaubtedly elements of Male chauvinism in this, but it is primarily the arrogance of the super-power. psychology at the White House. An arrangement between "equals" with the other super-power, the Soviet Union could be tolerated. Next best would be a deal with People's 'China�at least a major power. But it was too humiliating to talk even with. the DRV. Each of Nixon's negotiators in Paris, from Henry Cabot Lodge to William Porter, have exhausted the language of contempt to make this clear. As for the PRO, it was seen as far, beneath the contempt of the U.S. It was with this in mind and due to the deliberate distortions of the PRO's views by Nixon and Kissinger that I put some questions to Nguyen Thi Binh: � Are you prepared to meet with Kissinger or some other competent U.S. 'negotiator and within the framework of the PRG's 7-point peace plan discuss the following con-crete points: (1) The question of the safe withdrawal of the remaining 60,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam? (2) The question of the release of U.S. POWs in South Vietnam as well as the captured pilots held in the DRV? (3) Questions relating to President Nixon's concern about the "imposition of a Communist regime in Saigon?" (4) Assure that there will not be a "long night of terror" in South Vietnam as Nixon expressed it on May 8 or a ;bloodbath" as he expressed it in his April 28 speech? Nguyen Thi Binh. answered with the following: "In order to deceive American and Niior Id public � opinion, Nixon persists in repeating his lies and slanders, trying to justify his new extremely grave acts of war. We have many. times declared and we repeat once again that as evidence of cur good will and our sincere desire to arrive at a peaceful solution to the problem of South Vietnam, we are ready to engage in private conversation with U.S. representatives so they may still better un-derstand our peace proposals. We are ready to discuss alt matters concerning a solution. .The PRG proposals "It, seems to me that the American government' is presently well informed regarding ourApprove'd for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 continued. "However, I would like to clarify for American public opinion some of the points you have raised: "Regarding the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in complete security. On Sept. 17, 1970, in .our 8-point peace plan, as on July1,1971 in our 7-point peace plan, we clearly rated that after the U.S.-fixes a definite date for the total vithdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, he parties concerned could agree- on necessary. measures .o guarantee the security of U.S. troops during their with-Irawal. "Thus, if the, list of soldiers and pilots captured, killed Ind wounded gets continually longer this is precisely because Nixon has refused to fix a concrete date for total withdrawal, refuses to negotiate responsibility on the basis of our reasonable proposal and continues to utilize U.S.. troops and pilots in acts of war against our people. "Regarding the freeing of U.S. POWs. This problem has also been dealt with exhaustively in our peace initiative. If until this day captured U.S. military personnel have not been able to return to their homes and their number in-creases all the time, this is also because Nixon refuses to fix a definite ..late for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops, refuses to discontinue his support for dictator Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and continues to wage -war against our, people. These captured military personriel are in fact prisoners of the policy of Wietnamization.' They are prisoners of Nixon and Thieu. If the U.S. had replied seriously to our, 7-point peace plan, the POWs would long ago have returned to their families. . "Regarding the political regime of South Vietnam. There. never has been a question for us of imposing on. South Vietnam any sort of regime whatsoever other than one chosen by the South Vietnamese people. Still less do we wish to impose a communist regime as the Nixon administration continues to maintain.' On the contrary, it is the U.S. that stubbornly continues to impose on the South Vietnamese people the pro-American, anti-communist, belligerant, dictatorial and fascist regime of Thieu. . _ Elections�with Thieu machinery Nixon's proposals about 'new presidential elections' in South Vietnam, while Thieu's machinery of dictatorship remains means nothing-other than a repetition of the one-man electoral farce of October last year. The National Liberation Front and the PRG have consistently ad-vocated the formation of a truly representative govern-ment in South Vietnam, which would be mandated to organize really free general elections in South Vietnam to commit a free choice of representatives of a political regime. In the light of the present realities in South Vietnam, such a government cannot be any other than one of national concord, comprising three elements as we have proposed." (That ..is, representatives. of the PRG; of the present regime in Saigon as long as Thieu is no longer at continued (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 f 10 MAY 1972 (b)(3) grenam ccascience � 0 ri 0 N�1-.1.1 et A delegation of American Communists arrived in Hanoi last month as American bombers roared overhead with their weapons of death and destruction. The delegation consisting of Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United "States and CP candidate for U.S. Pres-ident; Jarvis Tyner, chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League and CP Vice Presidential candidate; Rasheed Storey, chairman of the - New York State CP; and Joseph North, author and editor of the Daily World Magazine, was in Hanoi as invited guests of the Vietnam Workers Party. Hurried into air raid shelters by their North Vietnamese hosts, the four Communists recorded their observations and issued, on April 19, "An appeal to the conscience of the U.S. people." ' "We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls and the bodies of small boys ... the shattered hands of workers who will never again be able to provide for their families... (and) some who were blinded by � the flying debris," the appeal, printed in full in the April.20 Daily World said. Substantial portions of the appeal folloW: , . . . . We saw with our own eyes that the main targets of the U.S. bombers were the heavily populated working class centers of Hanoi and Haiphong. We saw the newly constructed working class apart-ment houses in Haiphong that were destroyed by the criminal pilots sent by the arch criminals of the Nixon Administration. � We saw the hospital and spoke to the women and children whose blood was smeared on the steps as we entered. We saw the workers' quarters where the planes re-turned three times to complete their destruction. < This is no accident. Civilian targets are the Main objective of the government. We saw market places bombed, restaurants bombed, factories bombed, water-front warehouses bombed, vital water mains bombed. � We saw British, Soviet and German Democratic Re-public ships attacked in the harbor. As we crossed a bridge entering Haiphong, crowded with families of mo-thers, fathers and their children, a U.S. plane streaked above us and people scrambled for their lives. We saw the same in the beautiful capital of Hanoi where we experienced two waves of bombers. It was the same in peaceful country villages by the rice pad-dies where we met a. farmer whose friends, a family of seven, had been killed in that morning's raid: We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls who only 'moments before played peacefully with their dolls, and the bodies. of small boys whose friendly games of marbles were disrupted forever by the mas-3ive tonnage of U.S. bombs. We saw the shattered hands )f workers who will never again be able to provide for Approved for (.�.�n ktep Ues� their families. We saw some who were blinded by the flying debris. In the name of our own children we appeal to all Americdns to- save the children of Vietnam, Cambodia. and Laos. We appeal to your humanity, common sense and reason. ' . We know these murder. policies of aggression are dictated not by the will of the people, or even of the U.S. Congress, but by the giant monopoly corporations�the Rockefeller, Morgan, I.T.T. interests, etc., who main-tain and extend their riches through the destruction and suffering of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the world. ' � We must see, though, that we bear a responsibility as long as these acts of barbarism are perpetrated in our name. The bombings are the work of desperate tnen gone insane, Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, these Dr. Strange-.loves of Washingtm. 0 The victories of the Vietnamese National Liberation forces have created a totally new situation. They have virtually destroyed the best of the puppet troops. They have shattered once and for all Nixon's hoax of Vietnami-zition. As the Pentagon-trained Thieu mercenaries turn their guns and tanks on U.S. puppet troops, the arrogant .predictions of General Creighton Abrams and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird go un in smoke. � But we in the United States have the main. respon-sibility. In meeting this challenge we will be fulfilling our responsibility to ourselves and to all the people of the world. Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 0 sontitihitiot Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � We appeal to all Americans: to every shop worker, to all members of the trade union movement, to all peace and dethocratic-minded Americans,. to all Black Americans, .to all Chieano, Puerto Rican, Indian and 0 . � � ; -,;;, - Asian Americang,' to, the youth, to the 'students, to the women, to the veterans, to the unemployed, to the in-tellectuals, to all who feel the impact of the war in a thousand different ways�on our living standards, on our taxes, on the decline of our cities, on the escalation of ;racism, and the destruction of democratic rights. We appeal to all whose sheer humanity is violated by this war. This moment in history cries out for'unity in action! This is a moment when we must unite and concentrate our total efforts to end this criminal war, to end this mass murder, to end this imperialist aggression. . An absolute precondition for the right of the Vietna-mese people to determine their destiny is the total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina. These actions must continue on every level and in all localities. These actions must be intensified in depth and scope, until the U.S. Government returns tci the Paris negotiations in good faith, until it accepts the just seven-point program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. - These actions must continue until the U.S. govern-ment sets the date for the withdrawal of all forces from Southeast Asia�the ground troops, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Airforce, the C.I.A. and all supportive personnel! � � There have been. many important actions in the U.S. on behalf of peace since this .war began. The moment cries out now for the greatest united actions of us all�to achieve the end of this war on behalf of our people and the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, on behalf of human progress, on behalf of our children and all children of the world. ' / � . We make this appeal from the air-raid shelters of � - Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 DAILIr WORLD� Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1 MAY BM Halt the assassins!. The "language of naked power": that is the "kind of language the President is now speaking." The words are those of Agriculture Secretary Earl - Butz, defending Nixon's latest violence in North Vietnam. � The words describe the regime that Nixon would impose on the world, the regime he would instal at home. Those words'-- the "language of naked power" � de-scribe also the attempt to assassinate Governor George Wallace. They express the violence of Nixon and Spiro Agnew and the late J. Edgar Hoover. the violence which they repeatedly incited against the advocates of peace and democracy during the 1968 campaign. That violence is of a piece with the scarcely-cloaked charges of treason which the White House hoodlum bri-gade has flung at those political leaders who do not support Nixon's new violence against Vietnam. It is the violence which the Pentagon and the mer-chants of death have incorporated into the most profitable business in America � at whatever cost to the nation and _the world. 0 ) � � � The "language of naked power" is the language that. U.S. imperialism introduced into Indochina a quarter cen-tury ago. the language which it has spoken more and more harshly since then. It is the language in which the death sentence on Ngo Diem was spoken during the Kennedy administration, by killer generals and their patron. the CIA. � It is the language of napalm and bombs and torture and defoliant chemicals and bacteriological agents and rigged elections and chain-store brothels and "tiger cages." It is U.S. imperialism in Indochina. The "irrational murderous" attack on Governor Wallace occurs. as Gus Hall. Communist presidential candidate said. "in an atmosphere produced by the es-calated. genocidal war of aggression against the people of Vietnam." Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 111,12.0 114 MAY 1972 Nine years after a fateird assassina dyon Eze i'vdan . Dfi'ami , SAIGON. deaths in 1970, between 1,000 and /7MONG the ever-increasing scores 2,000 people, including the wife of A of graves in Mac Dinh Chi cem- President Nguyen Van Thieu � etery, the oldest and most pres- Thieu's father is buried alongside�tigious one in Saigon, now spread appeared at the graves in what an be said across several blocks near the Amer- to� have marked the formal jean Embassy in the downtown area, beginningsl of a revival of Diemism in are two unmarked slabs of marble South Vietnam. Last Nov. 2, more around which miscellaneous mourn- than 5,000 mourners visited the ers occasionally place wreaths or graves and attended a requiem mass scatter a few flowers. Each week at the Saigon cathedral that was pre-fresh pots of blooming plants are set viously announced in the newspapers on the tombstones by the gravekeep- by a conun'ltte e f Diem's admirers. ers, who are paid by members of the Several thousands more who were family of President Ngo Dinh Diem of simply curious passers-by, and a South Vietnam and his Rasputinlike sprinkling of anti-Diemists as well, helped cause a huge traffic jam. ROBERT SHAPLEN is Far East cor- These reverential demonstrations in . � respondent for The New Yorker. behalf of Diem are a manifestation of the psychological and political brother and closest advisor, Ngo changes that have taken � place in Dinh Nhu, both of .whom were .�mur-dered in midmorning of Nov. 2, 1963, Vietnam in the decade since !his approximately 20 hours after the death. But in seriously re-evaluating Diem's historic role and analyzing start of the military coup that over-',his complicated personality, the cere-.threw them. monial and nostalgic tributes, in . Following the assassination of the themselves, can be easily miscon-- two brothers, which'took place in an strued. They are symbolic and symp-� armored car after they were captured tomatic performances, typically Viet-in. a Catholic church where they had namesc in their hidden meanings, sought refuge, the 'two shot and bay-flagellative and purgative, and their � oneted bodies were originally buried message is one a both longing and in a corner of the military headquar-admonishment. On the surface, they .ters compound on the northern edge represent the natural -and human in-of the city close to Tan Son Nhut air-chliation to look upon the past more port. They were placed there as a favorably than the present. Under the precaution to avoid further mutila-circumstances of the long and de-tion by anti-Diemist fanatics. At 3 structive war the Vietnamese have o'alock one morning two years later, suffered since 1963, and especially the remains were said to have been since the large-scale American in-secretly brought to the Mac Dinh Chi volvement after 1965, the days of cemetery. It was believed that the Diem now seem peaceful and golden generals who planned and executed to many people who feel themselves the coup did not want the embarrass-/ worse off today than they were be-ment of having the ghosts of their fore. However, that is not true of all two victims permanently haunting Vietnamese, and if one stands back them at headquarters; particularly and regards the image of Diem in a since Saigon at the time was full of larger historical light, the picture is rumors of new coups and counter-� considerably more complicated. coups. Until two years ago, the two DISCUSSIONS about Diem nowa-graves, originally just small mounds � light are particularly haunting in the without any marble topping, were aght of the new Communist offensive scarcely. noticed.. A handful of rela-in South Vietnam, which may well tives and friends of the two men paid be a climactic one. Many experienced ;homage to them each Nov. 2 and observers believe that had Diem sometimes on Sundays during the lived the "big war" would never year. But on the anniversary of their have materialized and the South Viet-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 By ROBEIIT SEMPLE! namese would not have suffered any-where near 120,000 dead hnd 500,000 wounded-100,000 of them perma-nently incapacitated�or that today there would be 350,000 war orphans. These figures date back to 1961, when the American involvement that has cost us 55,000 lives began on a small but gradually increasing scale, with advisers and funds. By the time of the coup, there were 12,000 ad-visers in Vietnam, but those who knew Diem best feel that neither he nor Nhu would ever have invited or allowed 550,000 American soldiers to fight in thefr country, and to permit the devastation caused by air at-tacks, including bombing and defolia-tion. There is evidence that shortly �before the coup took place�and for several months after, ward�the first tentative ef-forts were initiated both by the Saigon Government and the National Liberation Front to come to some sort of ac-commodation. These- efforts might well have led to noth-ing, as so many subsequent ones involving Hanoi and Washington as, well as the Front and Saigon have, and the war might have continued ,anyway, although on a much smaller scale than came to be the case in the post-Diem era. If there had been a smaller war, or if a political- agree-ment had been reached in the days before Hanoi completely dominated the N.L.F., South Vietnam might well have come under some form of Communist domination one way or another within two or three years. This remains a political possibility today, and if that happens, despite Viet-namization and despite con-tinued American air and other logistical support, it will be due primarily to the inability of the many governments that succeeded Diem's to create a �nation capable of withstand-ing the more united, patient, dedicated, and better-led Com-munists. Still and all, looking back in 1963 with all the imponderables of the past and present in . mind, almost all ''dontinue6, RISH11.10I014 STAR . Approved. for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 d. Han nd of Pe By RICHARD CRITCHFIELD ., . . . Star Staff Writers d"What fascinates me," former Viet-Dam pacification. chief Robert W. Korner observed last week, "is that the war is ending with a conventional bang." . Komer'S feeling that the old Viet-cong insurgency has been completely overtaken by the overt North Viet-namese inv asion and President. Nixon's military moves against the North seems to be generally shared by a number of Americans who had most to do with shaping U.S. counter-, . insurgency doctrine and strategy in Vietnam over the past 20 years. � Among those interviewed . were Henry Cabot Lodge, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and Frederick E. Nailing, all former ambassadors to Saigon; Walt W. Restow, a chief foreign policy ad-viser to Presidents John P. Kennedy and Lyndon 13. -Johnson; Maj. Gen. . Edward G. Lansdale, Ngo Dinh Diem's first American adviser; and Barry Zorthian, former U.S. infor-mation chief in Saigon. As most of them see it, the war has now become a .straight old-fash-ioned� military contest between two geographically distinct states in which the better army,, conventionally or-ganized 'and equipped with tanks, rocks and heavy artillery., Will defeat the weaker one.. . Solar American tactical air power has failed to provide the necessary margin of assistance to the South Vietnamese, and the military effect�iveness of the Northern sea blockade remains to be proven. Nor have those of the Southern Vietcong guer-rillas.who survived the defeat of 1963 as yet shown they can play anything but a supporting role. THE IMPORTANCE of so complete a transformation of the war, it is felt, is that Hanoi has destroyed its own propaganda. � It can no longer claim 'a victory will validate the doctrine of "people's revolutionary war." The importance to the North Vietnamese of still doing so is evidenced by the title and con-tent of General Vo Nguyen Giap's recent essay setting down the ideol-ogical basis for the current offensive, "People's War, People's Victory." In it, Giap predicts the war will end In a climactic military victory. The collapse of South Vetnam's 3rd di-vision at Quang Tri, followed by smashing blows against Hue, Kontum and An Loc, may put that victory In his grasp.. .. _ �1 But it will be done contrary to all North Vietnam's declared strategic doctrine, with its credos that the vic-torious soldiers must be drawn from the supporting masses of people around them or native-born South Vietnamese. � Following the Chinese Communist model, North Vietnamese doctrine as declared by Giap and others has al-ways held that the revolution must pass through three phases: first, the defensive, when the population is tak-en in hand while leaving the enemy to control the main centers; second, offensive guerrilla warfare, which obliges the enemy to split up his forces while the organization of Com-munist regular and local units is ac-tively. continued on a battalion and regimental scale; finally, the third phase, Giap's climactic military vic-tory, whose object is to crush the enemy's main forces in preparation for seizure of the cities. North Vietnam's major departure from this doctrine by sending its regu-lar divisions into the South provided the argument for the original U.S. intervention in '1965. It also provoked bitter Chinese disapproval, since the more .conventional the .war became, the more Hanoi became dependent .on modern Russian arms and the less its victory would vindicate Mao Tsp.-twig's revolutionary idea. Today, North Vietnam may be close to winning, but it has had to send almost its whole army into the South and by sending its army it has destroyed its own pretensions about the nature of the war.� IN THE VIEW of some of the Americans most deeply involved in Vietnam in the past, it is even pos-sible this may have some effect on what happens next, especially should the North Vietnamese forces mount an offensive directly against Saigon, the provinces around it and the Me-kong Delta. More than 70 percent of the country's population, mosiy native-born Southerners with a distinctly different dialect and culture from the North, live in this rice-rich region. Regionalism among these Southern rice-growing peasants, it is felt, is as strong as Austrian resentment against the Prussians, or southerners against Yankees in the American civil war, and Hanoi cannot predict accurately how much they might resist .wholly Northern troops. T. s - AMONG THE AMERICAN old hands, Gen. Lansdale, who today lives in retirement in Alexandria. said he believed Hanoi could not collapse the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu without mounting an offen-sive against the capital itself. "Hue's falling would be tremen-diously traumatic," Landsdale said, "but that wouldn't be enough to topple the government. I think we'll see Saigon threatened. That will be the real climactic moment." Lansdale, who first went to Viet-nam in 1953 and was Ngo Dinh Diem's American adviser in 1954-56 after help. ing Ramon Magsaysay defeat the Huk guerrillas in the Philippines, has ajways held the view that the growth of Communist power in Vietnam fed on peasant grievances. His recom- � mended counter-insurgency strategy was a mixture of charismatic leader-' ship, land reform and agricultural modernization, restraint on military power � and restoration of traditional Confucian ethics. Today, Lansdale said, the overt North Vi e lira mese invasion has changed the nature of the ideological struggle, since victory now will only prove the Communists had a superior army not necessarily that they had a. superior political idea. In the American search for a � counterinsurgency doctrine to combat "people's war" over the years, one school of thought was to put primary emphasis on civil government. This was most closely associated with the British and such authorities as Sir Robert Thompson, who agreed that top priority must be put on establish-ing law and order through a central government with a strong public pos-ture of morality, decency and legality, a large, competent police force and an effective civil administration. An American who shared This view was former ambassador Notting, who resigned his post in August 1963 to protest the Kennedy administration's withdrawal of its support for Diem. Like all of those interviewed, Noll-ing felt the lack of respected leader-ship in Saigon was perhaps the most potentially fatal weakness in the pre-sent situation. Lansdale said, "I think Thieu is trying but there's little charisma or respect there. Corrup-tion's been such and so commonly known and his people have been in on the take so obviously, I doubt if he can rally the population as a war leader." ooniinued Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 3 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 NEW 6L-F.ANS, LA. STATES ITEM E - 134,707 'MAY 4 1972 � ntiwar De . About 100 anti-war demon-.strators marched from Beattr-�egard .Square to Lafayette Square today where they � gathered under an oak tree and listened to speeches con-demning President Nixon's re-cent "re-escalation" of the air war in Vietnam. The procession bristled with signs that said things like "S mash Imperialism, Not Women and Children," or "WhoProfits.From This War?" The marchers chanted slo-gans such as "Stop the War ' Now," and "Prices up, Wages own, Why war?" Willie Gunther, a Vietnam .veteran, led the list of speak-ers recounting that when he onstrators March worker as cryptographer in :Vietnam he discovered some "truths" about the war "that the people of the United States are not being told about the war." He said the government "is telling a lie," when it says North Vietnam is invading South Vietnam. He said the North Vietnamese troops com-ing south are merely advisers and support troops to the Viet Cong. Gunther said the President's attempt to suppress the Pen-tagon Papers indicates that Nixon does not want the American people to knew the truth. "13ecause if the Ameri-can people knew the truth, Nixon would have the same problent with them as with his own troops." � Ile said that since he. ar-rived in Vietnam hard .drug use has escalated and that the C -ntral Intelligenee ALency, working with poppy growers in Cambodia who are friendly to the U.S., is running "junk" in Vietnam. He said studies by the Army have shown that troops on hard dope don't resist the army and that one general has recommended that hard drugs be allowed into dorrtes-tic and foreign posts to keep GI's from pretesting the war. State R e p .-e lect Johnny Jackson told the group the continuing Vietnam war is symptomatic of the U.S. con-tinuing to hold the wrorig priorities, particularly in, jc: gards to the black and poor c munities. Steve Cohen, who said he is with a group called "Air War," spoke .of the anti-per-sonnel \bombs he said are being used in. Vietnam. . . He said the U.S. has used a progression of more and more. destructive anti-personnel bombs. He said that recently the Flechettes, which are tiny nails with fins on the back,' which could be dispersed from a bomb, strike' humans . and cause gaping wounds, have been replaced by plastic pel-lets which Cohen said are "even more nefarious." 0 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � . . May. 3, .1972 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.� HOUSE . of our GIs around the world. I am hopeful . that U.S.O. will continue to serve them in the future. But I am afraid that from what I have been told, that there has been a seri-ous scandal within U.S.O. that may possibly reach the very highest levels of administra-tion officers in the organization. If I can be of any further assistance to you or to anyone else in U.S.O. in conducting this investigation, please do not hesitate to call upon me. Sincerely, LES Asmar, Member of Congress. CONGRESS OF TIIE UNITED STATES, liOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C., May 3, The Honorable MaavIN R. LAIRD, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS you may know, I have been investigating the current scandal in the United Services Organization. I share your concern that some individuals within 13.5.0. have been responsible for al-legedly illegal acts. U.S.O. has been of great service over the years to many of our GIs around the world, but it is becoming increas-ingly apparent If these allegations are true, that a major scandal, possibly reaching the highest administration levels of .U.S.O., has occurred. I am enclosing the testimony which I have released recently, which I hope may be of assistance to you in pursuing the investi-gation.' Thank you very much for your attention to this matter. . Sincerely, LES ASPIN, Member of .Congress. MR. HARRINGTON IN VIETNAM The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle-Irian from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) Is recognized for 15 minutes. Mr. O'NEILL, Mr. Speaker, our �col-league (Mr. HARRINGTON) recently re-turned from an official inspection trip to South Vietnanrand Thailand. He was ac-companied on his trip by William Was-serman, his former administrative as-sistant, who is a newspapernmn by pro-fession. On their return, Mr. Wasserman wrote an interesting and thoughtful re-view of their activities which was printed in the North Shore newspapers, which-vfl publishes. Because of their compelling interest on a subject of critical importance to all of us, I insert these articles by Mr. Wasser-Man intoThe REcom) at this time: AIR WAR SECRECY IS MOST FRIGHTENING (By BM Wasserman) . You can be frightened after a week in Southeast Asia that U.S. policy is not suc-cessful. You can be even more frightened when you see that we are rigidly pursuing that same policy of failure, and perhaps widening it to include Thailand. But you can be most frightened by the ef-fort of the U.S. government to conceal the whole business from the U.S. public, and even from a Congressman who votes the authori-zation for all U.S. military programs. After three days of intensive briefings and tours of the five U.S. air bases in Thailand, Congressman Harrington learned from a newsman that several shifts in squadrons and aircraft Were shortly anticipated which would increase the fighter squadrons in the area. "That newsman's information is remark-ably good," we were told by an Air Force officer. ''Why wasn't I fold about itr asked Cong. Harrington. "You didn't ask," said the Air Force officer. At Udorn Air Base in Thailand, a civilian pilot staying in the civilian hotel where I was billeted told me very openly that all Air America helicopter 'flights oven Laos origi-nated from Udorn Air Base. Air America is a contract airline paid by the American gov-ernment, and presumed to he a CIA oper-ation. When Congressman Harrington asked the base commander at Uclorn, "What is that squadron of helicopters over there?". pointing to the lined up aircraft. "I don't know, sir," said the base com-mander. "Those are contract flights and I don't know anything about them." A press association reporter who has spent five years in Thailand and has consistently sought to report on American air bases there, as reporters freely do in Vietnam, said that he has been unable to obtain permission to go on the bases. "The U.S. officials say 'Ask the Thais.' The Thais say" 'Ask the U.S.' " Craig Whitney, chief of the N.Y. Times bureau; Peter Osnos, Washington Post; Kim Wifienson, United Press International; Don Sutherland, Christian Science Monitor�they have all tried and so far been refused per-mission to report first hand on the 'U.S. air war being waged out of Thailand. Yet the U.S. has about 26,000 airmen in Thailand end its five bases account for about 5 million dollars a day. We have invested billions of dollars in Thailand, and from these bases we are 'boinbing Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and now North Vietnam. We have nearly twice as many airmen in Thailand tls in Vietnam. It is a gigantic 'effort, but it is � Concealed from the U.S. public. One reason given for concealing the air-war from the U.S. is "security' But momasans, Thai women, come on the U.S. bases in droves every day to do the house chores of the U.S. airmen. They clean the barracks. They wash airmen's clothes. With their children, and their washtubs, and their picnic lunches, they make a colorful sight squatting between the GI barracks at lunch hour. Along with Thai men who work on the base, they can easily be the cover for any hostile agent seeking general information about the airbase. To suggest that what they know as common knowledge cannot be avail-able to the American public just doesn't make sense. SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHERE THE UNITED STATES j PR ',J PRACTICES A POLICY OF AMB -ELIEVE (By Bill Wisserman) (North Shore 'Weeklies' publisher Bill Wasserman traveled with Cong. Michael J. Harrington to Vietnam and Thailand for 10 days from March 29 to April 8. In Vietnam they visited Saigon and DaNang. In Thai-land, they were in Bangkok and Udorn, and Mr. Harrington visited four other air bases. Harrington spent his days being briefed on the military operations which he, as a mem-ber of the Armed Services Committee, over-seas. Wasserman interviewed airmen, civilians and newsmen.) Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, tall, patri-cian and gracious, leaned forward, his hands folded, and said, "You must look at the whole picture, not just the military. You must see the economic side too. The military, however, is now working." - That was less than three weeks ago. Ambassador Bunker had received me be-fore Congressman Harrington's arrival in Saigon because he was leaving for a week's trip over Easter to visit his wife, the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal. It was a calm, sunny day in Saigon. We sat in comfortable chairs at one end of the Ambaslarge, air conoitloncci occ11/1,, the embassy. The Ambassador's youngest sonku)k x/3) had been my roommate in school for two years, and now, after catching up on family histories, he told Me about Vietnam. The. U.S. initially had failed, said Mr. Bunker, to appreciate the need to provide the wherewithal for the South Vietnamese. "It was a new experience for the U.S. to he involved in a civil war and a war from without at the same time." The Tet offensive In 1968, psychologically a blow to the U.S., had been the source of fresh determination by the Vietnamese, con-tinued Bunker. They .saw the need to be bet-ter armed, and, the A mbassadorobserved, the U.S. supplied M-16's. The ARVN (Army of the Itepublic of Vietnam) was modernized and expanded and now 'numbered 1.1 million. "fhe -Ambassador dwelt on the economic development in the south. "I drove recently with President Thieu through the country-side. The farmers used to have bicycles. Now they have Hondas and tractors, radios and tv's, outboard motors for their sampans." He urged me to arrange an air trip for Cong. Harrington over the delta to see the prosperity and to see, also, to the north to-wards An Loc�now the scene of desperate fighting�how air interdiction had not meant total destruction but selected destruc-tion. What Bunker was clearly saying was that Vietnamization was working, that we should on this trip pay attention to the broad, civil-ian achievements under President Thiem He mentioned land reform, specifically. As the interview drew to a close, tile erect septogenarian who had completed a success-ful business career before joining the govern-ment, noted that he had served five Presi-dents. "Of course, I expected to stay here a much shorter time." He smiled and described how President Nixon had arranged for him to visit his wife In Nepal regularly. "But that was impossible. It was so busy here�seven days a week, It used to be. It's better now," and he made a little joke about how he had to make this particular trip because his wife surely would not permit him to be absent over Easter. Forty-eight hours later, the North Viet-namese offensive was underway. And within those few hours, Quang 'Fri and Hue, major bastions irf the north, were threatened. . The American public at home was also calm as our trip to Vietnam took shape. One local newspaper even queried, "Why go?" Cong. Harrington, their editorial suggested, would do better to stay home and tend to his dis-trict. Going to Vietnam now, they said, was a junket. In general it seemed the American public felt that the war was almost over. Caeualties lead almost disappeared�U.S. casualties, at least. Our troops were leaving. The air war? What was that? A distant war, Cong. Har-rington said it needed seeing, it neediest ex-posure. He suspected, but could not get firm figures that it was costing $10 to $20 billion dollars a year, and devastating three coun-tries. A gentle breeze swayed the palm trees over the ornate Buddhist temple while saffron robed young men, monks in training, strolled by. This was Thailand, where the people, commented the Air Force captain escorting ine, were "very easy going and gentle," and where the U.S. now maintains its major Southeast Asian air bases. Down the dirt road in front of the pagoda walked a young couple hand in hand. He was obviously American in his khaki trousers and sport shirt. She was obviously Thai. "Who would that be?" I asked. "One of the guys from the base, and. his girl," was the reply. I was in Udorn, 30 miles from the Laotian border and the location of our largest fighter base in Thailand. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462' TITCc-mirn Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 .LL16 -Ly I C. (b)(3) 0 Lc-Ilow V\7-e Scnk Ent.o Jos,eph Buttinger IDne of the most puzzling questions future historians will have to deal with is why the United States ever got involved in the con-temporary struggle for Indochina that has been going on since 1945. Did the consid-erations that determined the course of American foreign policy after World War II ' make this involvement inevitable or could it have been avoided in spite of the tensions that arose after 1945 between the West and .the so-called Communist bloc? On this point, opinions will probably always remain di-vided, but those who believe that no other course could have been chosen without dam-age to the West or the United States would do well, to consider the following: (1) no Indochina war would have taken :place if France had not insisted on reestab-)l.ishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos after these countries had gained in-dependence following the Japanese surrender in 1945; (2) it is questionable that the United � State S would ever have reached the point of even considering intervention in Vietnamese �� affairs. if it had refused from the beginning to support the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina. � It is indeed one of the important conclu-sions of the Pentagon Papers "that the Tru-man Administration's decision to give mili-tary aid to France in her colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly in-� volved' the United States in Vietnam and 'set' the course of American policy."' Yet this deci4on was made only in 1950, after the victory of Communism in China and the recognition of Ho Chi Mirth's regime by the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would never have come about had it not been preceded by the decision made by the � victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave 0 the French not only a free hand but also Allied support for the reconquest of � Indo-china. This Potsdam decision, supported only � by the British under both Churchill and At-tlee, might not have been taken if President Ca. Q.rq11,1 Roosevelt had still been alive. It was op-posed by Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin. Vigorous American .opposition to it would probably have led to the acceptance of Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first step toward full independence. Surprisingly on this crucial point the con-clusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roose-velt "never made up his mind whether to support the French desire to reclaim their � Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at the end of the war." 2 In view of the forceful statements Roosevelt made against the re-turn of the French to Indochina to his Secre-tary of State Cordell Hull and to his 'son Elliot, as reported in their memoirs,8 this . conclusion must be regarded as erroneous. There has been much speculation about the question whether American massive mili-tary intervention in Vietnam might not have bean avoided if President Kennedy had been alive. It is .unlikely that this question will � ever be answered with any degree of cer-tainty. But it is probable' that Vietnam after - 1945 would have experienced a period of peaceful evolution toward independence, un-der a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugo-slavia, if Roosevelt had lived and succeeded in imposing his anticolonial solution for In- . dochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that Roosevelt would not have disregarded the appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United States and United Nations intervention against French colonialism.4 "There is no record . . . that any of these appeals were answered." 5 Not until publication of the Pentagon Papers did the American public hear of the existence of these letters. Yet the Truman administration's policy toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at least the first three years of the Indochina war. On the one hand, the -U.S. "fully rec-ognized France's sovereign position," as Sec-retary of State George Marshall said in a still secret State Department cablegram sent to the U.S. Embassy in Paris; on the other hand, , (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b )(3) BOSTON, MASS. GLOBE M - 237,967 S -AW23671a72 We have no right or reason to I had thought that there was no longer any need to set forth the na-ture and� causes of American failure in Vietnam or the case for complete � withdrawal, but the renewed bomb-ing attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong demonstrate that there are still those � who have the delusion that it will be possible to sustain a viable non-com-munist government in the South. The notions of "Vietnamization" and an "honorable negotiated settle-ment" in Paris implied the delusion, but one could question how seriously , they should be taken. When, how-ever, we renew massive bombing � . raids with their indiscriminate � slaughter, it seems clear that Presi-dent Nixon and his top advisers either� think that the South can survive as an independent entity, Or they are � committed to postponing its collapse until after the election. If it is the former, they are fools: if the latter, the most callous sort of political op-portunists. As a member of the infamous Michigan State University project in . Vietnam from 1955-1957, I partici-� pated in that attempt to create an � anti-communist regime in the South� . By 1957 it was already clear that the �Diem government was moving towards , a police state to offset its declining popularity, and that the massive presence of the US was un-� dermining Diem's legitimacy and en-couraging his authoritarian tenden-cies., That was 15 years, 5 govern-ments and how many dead and maimed Vietnamese ago? Everything we have done over the past 15 years has .contributed to destroying the in-tegrity, the rationality and the will of the people in South Vietnam while building up the commitment to na-.. tional. reunification in the North. We have trained a few people at the top of the South how to con us into great concern over the consequences of their defeat and therefore con-tinuing support of their survival. Our leaders for 15 years have operated out of fear of being held responsible for � a debacle (e.g. "who lo China"), and the false hope that the could create a regime that could stir� . vive., � . continue' The The con artists in South Vietnam are not all venal. Some are; but. many are just trying to exist in a terribly confused setting. What would happen to them if the North :Vietnamese take over? The more corrupt, who have already made their fortunes, would probably flee, and wisely so. The rest would stay and try to make their peace with the new regime. I am sure that some of them would be killed and some impris-oned, but probably not many. There was no mass slaughter in the North in 1955 and 1956. Most Vietnamese with strong feelings about political freedom have already left the coun-try and those who remain have learned how to compromise. We have no right or reason to continue, much less to expand a com-pletely corrupt and corrupting war either to save a few of our "friends" or to postpone an inevitable failure. We should recognize that there is ab-solutely-no hope for an independent, anti-communist regime in the South. Given that fact, the only way we can help the Vietnamese people is to get �out of the country completely � mil-itary, aid, X,,J,406.,the whole works. �j - � ._ and let the Vietnamese Work. out their own accommodations and solu-tions. , The US Government, by its recent actions has demonstrated that it nei-ther accepts these propositions nor is it following a consistent policy of withdrawal. So long as this is true ,and the government remains unre-sponsive to the normal expressions of public opinion, there must be mass demonstrations as the only way of showing the degree of dissatisfaction with current policies. If such demon-strations can be kept non-violent and non-destruetive they can help to build popular support for stopping the war. It is unfortunate that uni-versity buildings and research facili-ties become the lightning rods for absorbing the frustrations over tragic government policies. A more fruitful line of action is to assure that the person elected President next No-vember is unalterably committed to stopping our involvement in the war. � DAVID C. COLE Center for International Affairs Harvard University Cambridge Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2016/01/30 CO2792462 2_9 APR 1972 (b)(3) Washington Merry.Go-Round Navy F By Jack Anderson � , The sewage that ships dump into the open sea often washes up on the shore. � President Nixon, for one, has had personal experience 'with this problem at his Flor-ida beach house where mari-time wastes have fouled his swimming area. s To fight beach and harbor 'pollution, he assigned the Navy aa the "lead agency" to set an example of maritime sanitation to the world's ships. ; A .1978 deadline 'was set for the Navy to stop the discharge 'of sewage; garbage, oil and other debris into the sea. Locked in the Navy's confiden-tial files, however, is sad evi-dence that this billion-dollar program is failing. ' The Navy had counted heav-ily upon a complicated sewage 'system manufactured by Fair-banks-Morse. But Rear Admi-ral Nathan Sonenshein, the ships commander, has com-plained in a "Point Paper" to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy chief, that the new sew-age equipment is "unreliable" and "not operating" in the test ship U.S. Conopus. Indeed, the failure of the sewage disposal units could cause a smelly incident at lioly Loch, Scotland, where the Canopus has been berthed. � Navy Odor "In the interests of con-genial relations with the tilt-. ule Up in Sew ish," Sonenshein warned the Navy's top admiral, "it is vital that these units be put back into operation as early as fea-sible." On top of the "unacceptable reliability" of the new sewage units, they also take up too much room. This will have "significant impact on military performance . . . in the smaller, high population dens-ity ships," warn's the docu-ments. Old sea dogs are also sputtering over a plan to pull out guns to make room for sewage units on some destroy-ers. All the trouble with the Fairbanks-Morse equipment has forced the Navy to fall back, at least temporarily, upon a system of "holding tanks." The tanks are sup-posed to retain all sewage while the ships are within 50 miles of the shore. Then, in theory, the sewage is supposed to be dumped at the pier when the ships dock. But-- unfortunately, most piers aren't equipped to han-dle the sewage or, for that matter, the bigger naval ves-sels. To get around this, the Navy plans to spend millions to build special ."lighter! barges for each 'naval port." The Navy's sea-sewage ex-perts explain delicately that the lighters will "collect and transfer shipboard wastes" to shore. But the shipboard salts, less delicately, are al-ready referring to the lighters as "honey barges" and "dough-nuts." Summing up, the Navy docu-ments concede that, on the one hand, their sewage units are a flop and, on the other, there are persistent "political pressures to demonstrate ac-complishments." Refugee Deaths We reported on February 6 that U.S. officials in Vietnam had covered up rampant mal-nutrition, exposure, tuberculo-sis and pneumonia in three refugee camps. As a� result, 350 displaced Montagnard tribesmen, mostly the old and the young, per-ished while U.S. officials. shuf-fled papers. When word of the refugee conditions reached the head-quarters of U.S. pacification chief William Colby. the fact were swePt under the plush rugs of the U.S. offices in Sai-gon. The number of deaths, ironi-cally, were close to, casualty totals in the infamous Mylai massacre. Yet only Rep. Les A spin (D-Wis.) showed any concern. In an outraged letter to AID Adminsistrator John Hannah, the congressman demanded to know what had been done to punish those "directly respon-tsposal' sible for the tragic deaths of 350 innocent people." A few days ago, Hannah sent back an evasive, self-serv-ing memo prepared by ails Vietnam specialist Robert II. Nooter. The memo reports that the Montagnards were transferred from their homes to the camps about January, 1971, by Vietnamese military. commanders over the objec-tions of American pacification Officials. "Montagnarcls exist at a marginal subsistence level, and with any loss in nutri-tional level, the prevalent diseases of diarrhea, malaria, pneumonia, and tuberculosis can prevail," explains the memo. The deaths began to occur shortly after the relocation, the memo adds. "Some 330 of the very old and very young" had died by the time higher American officials discovered the problem, it is contended. Once discovered, "prompt and remedial actions were taken," the memo claims. The' AID officials admit, however, that it was April before "the situation was in hand." The officials tried to pass the buck to military authori-ties for hushing up the facts. Any suppression of reports, declares the memo, "would in-volve reporting by militarY. personnel in Pleiku Province through military channels." 1972. 'United Feature Syndicate Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 ST. Laurs POST-DISPATCH 25 April 1972 nough If Covert Actio � While the Administration has obtained a tern the financing of Radio Free Europe which, whe porary order against publication of a book on disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. of freedom or credibility. And there was the Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful Bay of Pigs. to the author. He has already provided outside Then there was the CIA militafy operation to of book covers some valuable insights and corn- save the Dominican Republic from a :rebellion Inents on an agency that, deliberately hides to return a democratically-elected president. from the public and Congress. � There was armed support for the overturn of Without revealing any really hidden secrets, a government in The Congo. Of course, there the author uses published repoits to note that " was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dol. Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening lars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency the way for another dictatorship more satisfac-. has 18,000 employes, and that 6000 of these tory to Washington. And there is presently 'are working in clandestine services, as opposed war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered ,to intelligence collection. without any visible success for the American position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace As it is, however, the CIA is the President's and order. ' baby. ,Congress has proposed various control Aside from the fact that so many of these measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, clandestine activities were inefficient and in-or requirements for clearer information about � effective, even aside from the fact that they It, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for were bound to be failures for America's long-'the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Con- range pi�ospects and reputation even if they did gross as well as the White House. Congress, after all, foots the bill, but it does not know for what. CIA officials occasionally surface frOm se-crecY to complain that critics concentrate on CIA failures. If so, that is because the public only hears �about the failures, and they have to be, big ones at that. They always seem to Involve those covert or "paramilitary" opera-tions, which range from a most qualified suc-cess in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I don't think we've had a successful paramilitary operation yet." The clandestine operations are worth review: There was the U-2 spy plane incident that tor-pedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to im-prove relations with the Soviet Union. There was the CIA's proud armed intervention to "save" Guatemala from. leftists, leaving the country to, oppression apd terrorism. There was power to, make war. succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in paramilitary functions represents a continuing ability to start hostilities without the knowledge of the people or Congress, and certainly with-out< any declaration of war. Author Marchetti is fair enough to say .that� so far various presidents have kept a measure of control over such activities. That is no guar-antee for the future, however, and it is Con-gress, not the President, that is supposed to make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Mar-chetti recommends confining intelligence ac-tivities to a small and highly professional group, and eliminating the covert actions entirely. Intelligence simply cannot work well when governed by an agency equally interested in activities ranging from propaganda to military action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation does need successful intelligence. It does not need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 . 2.4 'APR 1972 (b)(3) "17 etters Controlling Foreign Policy Senators 'Aiken and Fulbright have pro-mulgated a long overdue and crucial proposal. In the amendment to the bill authorizing State and USIA funds, one which seeks in effect to determine why or how everybody and his half-brother is involved in foreign policy decisions. Nothing should punctuate this desperate need more, forcefully than the latest pe-remptory, policy-by-shock decision to mass. bomb Haiphong for the first time in the war. Even as two .other senators are en route to Peking, as the President jogs between Red China and Red Russia, as we demand our prisoners returned unharmed, as we "Wind down the war," and parrot the rubricated claptrap 'that "it's Saigon's show now!",. we Intensify our role as if it were D-Day minus one.'Or is it? � Worst of all is the continuous dropping of 'surprise policy bombs in the American midst. as. if we are all imbeciles, unfit to be Informed or 'warned of anything so trivial as getting out or going back in. The Aiken-Ful-bright- proposal to probe the myriad agen-cies- ginning up policy blastoffs such as this should be implemented fast, and with strong support_ from millions of American citizens in whose names, Vietnam is being bombed into a senseless mass of cratered moon-scapes and mangled bodies. Can we not at least stop�our contributions to the continuing massacre of peoPle year after year after 'year? Anyone who has served responsibly in Nietnam knows that State, AID, USIA, CIA, � DOD, the White House, and a few others all . have "their" own foreign nolicy, as the Aiken proposition suggests. The chief of. mission is . often the last person to know what in hell is going on, and others who have met with them in mid-Pacific confer-ences have shown even less knowledge. Viet-nam is horrendous enough. Another classic ' of 'hack policy handling is still stuck in our :fthroats and that was the Bengali lunacy. `',Our rush to destroy Bengladesh is only :matched by our current passion to recognize 'the place and provide aid! If ever a country needed someone at the helm, the United States does today. � . - ,LAWRENCE HARKNESS. , �. Washington.... (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for-Re-lea'sei61-8/01/30 CO2792462 20 APR 1972 (b)(3) VC!. ("r t liti kc\i0 o 0 Special to the Daily World HANOI, April 19�A delegation of four U.S. Communists here who witnessed U.S. air raids upon Hanoi and Haiphong today is-sued an "appeal to the conscience of the peo-ple of the United States" to force the Nixon Administration to end the "mass murder" bombing. The appeal was signed by Gus Hall, gene-ral secretary and Presidential candidate; Jar-vis Tyner, Vice Presidential candidate; Ras-heed Storey, N.Y. State Communist Party chairman, and Joseph North, author and edi-tor, World Magazine. � The text of the appeal follows: We who have now experienced the brutal bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong make this ap-peal to the conscience of the people of the United States. reirnr, We saw with our own eyes that the main targets of the U.S. bombers were the heavily populated working class centers of Hanoi and Haiphong. We saw the newly constructed working class apart-ment houses in Haiphong that were destroyed by the criminal pilots sent by the arch criminals of the Nixon Administration. We saw the hospital and spoke to ,the women and children whose blood was smeared on the steps as we entered. We saw the workers' quarters where the planes re-turned three times to complete their destruction. - This is no accident. Civilian targets are the main objective of the government. We saw market places bombed, restaurants bombed, factories bombed, � water-front warehouses bombed, vital water mains bombed. We saw British, Soviet and German Democratic Re-public ships attacked in the harbor. As we crossed a bridge entering Haiphong, crowded with families of mo-thers,- fathers and their children, a U.S. plane streaked above us and people scrambled for their lives. We saw the same in the beautiful capital of Hanoi where we experienced two, waves of bombers. It was the same in peaceful country villages by the rice pad-dies where we met a farmer whose friends, a family of seven, had been killed in that morning's raid. We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls who only moments before played peacefully with their dolls, and the bodies of small boys whose friendly games of marbles were disrupted forever by the mas-sive tonnage of U.S. bombs. We saw the shattered hands of workers who will never again be able to provide for their families. We saw some who were blinded by the flying debris. In the name of our own children we appeal to all Americans to save the children of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. We appeal to your humanity, common sense and reason. rr, et* �zi rn Li i;a44.4 i=1 Li . . . We who have seen the iron will, the unprecedented courage, the unbreakable determination, the united, un-flinching commitment of the Vietnamese people in their struggle for national salvation against U.S. imperialism appeal to all Americans who value human life and dig-nity. We appeal to you to see the Vietnamese love of life as your own, to see the Vietnamese people's struggle for social progress as your own, to act now to save human-ity from disaster. Those who thought that the withdrawal of troops was intended to end the aggression in Indochina now see that it was Nixon's camouflaged way of escalating the war via criminal air power�the new IVIylais of the B-52's�that are designed to undertake an impossible task to break the unshatterable will and determination of the Vietnamese people. This is why the targets are heavily populated cen-ters and not the so-called military objectives. This we saw with our own eyes�the genocidal policies of the Nixon Administration. Now that we know this, we must act now or accept the verdict of humanity of complicity by complacency in mass murder, in genocide. As long as the aggression continues we cannot, as Americans, escape the stigma of what is a national shame. As long as the bombing goes on. we can never wash off the" blood of the millions of victims of U.S. imperialist aggressors. We know these murder policies of aggression are dictated not by the will of the people, or even of the U.S. Congress, but by the giant monopoly corporations�the Rockefeller, Morgan, I.T.T. interests, etc., who main-tain and extend their riches through the destruction and suffering of the Vietnamese and- other peoples of the world. We must see, though, that we bear a responsibility as long as these acts of barbarism are perpetrated in our name. The bombings are the work of desperate men gone insane, Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, these Dr. Strange-loves of Washington. The victories of the Vietnamese National Liberation forces have created a totally new situation. They have virtually destroyed the best of the puppet troops. They have shattered once and for all Nixon's hoax of Vietnami-zation. As the Pentagon-trained Thieu mercenaries turn their guns and tanks on U.S. puppet troops, the artogant predictions of General Creighton Abrams and Defense Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Secretary Melvin Laird go up in smoke. The retaliation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong has smdshed to smithereens Nixon's phony �'peace for gene-rations" fraud. This insane act destroyed the illusion that Nixon's troop withdrawals were ever intended to lead to the end of the aggression in Indochina. This is a moment of great danger. NixOn's irrespon-sible acts of desperation are those of a mad butcher and can lead to a .world confrontation. But above all else. the very acts of desperation have opened up momentous possibilities of putting an end to the aggression now. The escalation of the bombing has set into motion an escalation of the world's struggle against U.S. im-perialism. It has created a new stage in that struggle. It will let loose the greatest waves of anti-imperialist movements to date. But we in the United States have the main respon-sibility. In meeting this challenge we will be fulfilling our responsibility to ourselves and to all the people of the world. We appeal to all Americans: to every shop worker, to all members of the trade union movement, to all peace and democratic-minded Americans. to all Black Americans. .to all Chicano, Puerto Rican. Indian and Asian Americans, to the youth, to the students, to the women, to the veterans, to the unemployed, to the in-tellectuals. to all who feel the impact of the war in a thousand different ways�on our living standards, on our .taxes; on the decline of our cities, on the escalation of racism, and the destruction of democratic rights. � We appeal to all whose sheer humanity is violated by this war. This moment in history cries out for unity in action! This is a moment when we must unite and concentrate our total efforts to end this criminal war, to end this mass murder, to end this imperialist aggression. ' An absolute precondition for the right of the Vietna-mese .people to determine their destiny is the total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina. These actions must continue on every level and in all localities. These actions must be intensified in depth and scope, until the U.S. Government returns to the Paris negotiations in good faith, until it accepts the just seven-point program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. These actions must continue until the U.S. govern-ment sets the date for the withdrawal of all forces from Southeast Asia�the ground troops, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Airforce, the C.I.A. and all supportive personnel! There have been many important actions in the U.S. on behalf of peace since this war began. The moment cries out now for the greatest united actions of us all�to achieve the end of this war on behalf of our people and the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, on behalf of human progress, on behalf of our children and all children of the world. We make this appeal from the air-raid shelters of Hanoi. Signed, Gus-Hall, Jarvis Tyner, Rasheed Storey, Jo-seph North. Delegation, Communist Party, U.S.A. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 April 19, 1972 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD � SENAT (b)(3) 0 041.)1 Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a minute? I use the time of the Senator from Arkansas for this purpose. Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to ,yield to my friend from California. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the dis-tinguished' Senator for a very forceful and effective presentation. I think it is a particularly significant contribution to this discussion because of the Senator's background in military matters in the executive branch with high responsi-bilities. His service now on all key com-mittees in the Senate also provides him with the opportunity to be better in-formed than almost all Members of this body on military and foreign relations matters. � I would like to make an observation � and then to ask a question. I have noted this morning that in some of the debate we see what almost amounts to a "win the war" attitude again rearing its head in this Chamber. The distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), whose forthrightness and frankness I respect tremendously, stated he feels this is perhaps the worst managed war in history. He said that when you go into a war you go in to win., not in 10 years, but in 10 minutes. I wonder what that means. The Senator from Colorado spoke of the other side as a "losing horse." . The Senator from Missouri, and every other Senator, and every citizen in the country, know that we could�at least In a tiarrow military sense�if we went all out. The reason we have not done that under a Democratic President, Lyn-don Johnson, and under a Republican President, Richard Nixon, is that we know we do not just face small North Vietriam with its limited population and hmited resources; we face North Viet- � .nam backed up by the Soviet Union and China. If we choose to escalate our aid to the South, they may very well feel that they must escalate their aid to the North. I wish to ask the Senator this ques-tion in light of the circumstances now prevailing. Greater risks are being taken now than at any time in this war in terms of the escalation and possible re-ciprocal moves by the other side: Where can this end? What risks do we face if we decide once again not to lose, not to negotiate, but to break the backs of the other side? What are the risks in that policy? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes under the same con-ditions. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ator is recognized. Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to the able Senator that, regardless of what the risks were, I would take them if I felt they were in the interest of the se-curity of the United States. When I first went to Vietnam, back in 1961, with Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Mr. Walt Rostow, I felt this war was neces-sary. After further examination over the years, however, I changed my mind, and so told ray colleagues in the Senate in the fall of 1967. _ It is interesting to note in General Taylor's recent book, "Swords and Plow-shares," that he makes a statement which supports what I am told the dis-tinguished Senator from Arizona said this morning on this floor. General Tay-lor's statement best illustrates how badly this war has been managed from a mili-tary standpoint by those who made the decisions. He said that no one, not even the President, has the moral right to send a man into combat without giving him the best chance to do the job he is as-signed, with least danger to his life. His exact quote reads as follows: Our pilots were required to return through increasingly heavy enemy defenses to repeat attacks on targets deliberately hit previous-ly by aircraft insufficient in number to as-sure their destruction in a single attack. This was a misguided attempt to translate the principle of gradualism and limited violence from the strategic to the tactical realm�a fallacy which ignored the fact that for the soldier or pilot in the presence of an armed enemy any war is total since his survival is at stake. No one, not even the President, has the moral right to put a man on the battlefield or in hostile air space and re-strict him from taking all the measures need-ed for his survival and the execution of his mission. So in a variety of Ways, gradualism contributed to a prolongation of the war and gave time not only for more men to lose their lives but also for the national patience to wear thin, the antiwar movement to gain momentum, and hostile propaganda to make inroads at home and abroad. Military men constantly protested to me that they were being forced to attack useless targets. One who did was shortly killed; another, even though a major general, quietly resigned in protest. This all helped me to change my view about this war. It is now clear said war is being escalated as a result of the President's decision to continue it even though in his campaign�and I have now placed it all .in the REcoaa�often he said,' "If elected, I will stop it." He has had nearly three and a half years, but instead of stopping it, he has expanded it. There is now fighting in Cambodia where there was not fighting until he came to office. He has maintained the struggle in Laos, even though he switched it from being run by the Defense Department, if they ever ran it, to the Central Intelligence Agency, and now he is further escalating the war in Vietnam. One. of the ironies of what is going on brings us back to what I said in 1956, namely, that our policies are to be weak against the strong and strong against the weak. The recent visit to China and the planned visit to Moscow would ap-pear incredible efforts to demonstrate our peace loving intentions at the same time we continue to destroy these little countries in Southeast Asia. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, if the Senator would remain on his feet, I wish to say I regret that, under the time re-straints, I was unable to yield to Senators who have asked for time. We have had difficulty when. they have asked us to yield because of the time limitation. I would like to ask if Senators who have contrary views would like to address questions to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, we have Senators who would like to get the floor In their own right. . Mr. CRANSTON. As the Senator knows, they will get the floor in their own right. Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I will begin by making reference to the Senator from Missouri's statement about the dev-astations which have been visited--Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on whose time is the Senator speaking? Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, is there time to Senators on this side? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Yes. - Mr. GRIF.O'IN. Mr. President, I have been authorized by the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) to yield to the Sen-ator from New York (Mr� BUCKLEY) such time as he may need. Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I will start by commenting on the statement by the Senator from Missouri about the devastation visited on Vietnam. The history of the Vietnam war has been one of complexities and confusion, a history on which men of good will have differed and shall continue to differ. Yet with the redent massive invasion by North Vietnam of South Vietnam, a new phase of this war has been created. The facts are unambiguous; one sov-ereign nation has invaded another with conventional forces for no other purpose but the traditional one of all invading forces: to conquer the people and the territory of the invaded nation. This savage and sudden end to cer-tain fashionable myths which have hitherto masked the role of North Viet-nam in this war has had certain salu-tary effects on world opinion. With the exception of North Vietnam's ideological allies; no nation has supported this at-tempt at conquest. The idea that what we are witnessing is a Civil war has become a linguistic as well. as historical absurd-ity. While it would be worthwhile to ex-amine in great detail those curious at-tempts we have heard during the past few weeks to switch the burden of blame for these latest developments from the North Vietnamese invaders to President Nixon whose decisive action has helped to halt the invasion, because of the brief time allowed me I will limit myself to an examination of some of the basic facts of the matter. First, the facts of the invasion along the DMZ and of the bombing of the military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area: The northern sector of South Vietnam has been invaded by a force of 45,000 to 50,000 seasoned NVA troops equipped with modern Soviet and Chinese Com-munist artillery and armor including three varieties of conventional and am-phibious tanks. With the exception of minor Vietcong units operating along the Cambodian border north of Saigon, the entire Com-munist effort within South Vietnam is being conducted by the North Vietnam-ese. Not less than nine NVA divisions are now employed in South Vietnam, sus-tamed by huge quantities of weapons and trucks and fuel provided 85 percent by the Soviet Union. . � The fact that the NVA is now employ-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1-1,Yrf:7 . Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 18 APR- 1972 Stop the mad bomber! President Nixon's order to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong has opened the door to an international crisis, and involves a challenge to our Constitutional structure. Democracy and world peace are imperilled. The message is� unmistakable. North Vietnam has been under U.S. bomber attack for the first time since 1968, now for the 12th day. Four Soviet merchant ships and one from the German Democratic Republic have been hit in Haiphong harbor. Another squadron of F-4 Phantom jets has been deployed to Vietnam, this one from South Korea. The Soviet Union has stated clearly that it will continue to support, as it has, the liberation struggle of the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against imperialist aggression. - - These developments reflect an unprecedented aggra-vation of U.S. aggression abroad. The implications for democracy at home are inescapable, for imperialist ag-� � gression abroad and fascistic steps at home complement each other. The situation demands a people's response of unpre-cedented proportions, for'peace and democracy. The demonstrations scheduled for New York, San Francisco and other cities Saturday, April 22, should be ex-panded far beyond their original scope in auspices and par-ticipation. They should become outpourings of hundreds of thousands united in the determination to turn Nixon from his mad course. - But the situation created by the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong demands even wider action. The hour demands demonstrative action of all peace forces; in Seattle and At-lanta, in Chicago and Houston, in Albuquerque and Boston, in Cleveland and Minneapolis, in every city and town. Nixon has put world peace in peril; he is prepared to bomb U.S. democracy as he is bombing Hanoi. If confirma-tion were needed of the world menace that Nixon's course represents, it was provided by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's declaration that the Nixon Administration is plan-ning to expand the U.S. s:-.ockpile of tactical nuclear wea-pons in Europe, already in excess of 7,00. The aggravated peril to peace, the desperate need to mobilize the majority of the American people for action against the war demands the maximum of unity for peace and democracy. In the face of this peril, the provocation of disunity � however "revolutionary" the gabble that may aceempany it -- is the side of the bombers, not of the people: The certain fact that the Central Intelligence Agen-_ _ _ 4ontinued Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 cy is determined to provoke such disunity as part of Nix-on's more-war program, should alert everyone to the need for the utmost discipline. The President's order to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong represents another step toward Presidential dictatorship, for further aggression abroad and at home. The funds that should be used to sustain our public schools and hospitals, for example, are being used to de-stroy the women and children, the schools and hospitals of North Vietnam. Every public official, in executive or legislative post, must be faced with the people's demand to speak out against this incitement of a greater war, this ruthless mis-use of the nation's wealth in devastating Vietnam, the new steps toward dictatorial White House rule. Eery public official should be required to answer: What are you doing to block the road to a bigger war? The resolution on which the Gary, Indiana, City Coun-cil is scheduled to act tonight deserves emulation in every. city. It calls upon Congress to "demand an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam, and an immediate end to American air anti other logistic support for carrying on the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," and it demands that the White House set a "definite date for... complete withdrawal" from Southeast Asia. ' Such demands should be introduced into every muni-cipal and state legislative body, to save the peace and our democracy. Mass demonstrations for peace this Saturday will strengthen the prospects for people's victory -- here and abroad'. ' Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 NORFOLK, VA. PILOT APR 1 6 1972 - 127,079 S � 174,257 � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 soa..ss. grows Iun By S. L. A. Marshall, !referring to them as "barbecues." :Brig. Gen (ret.) :Thus, in the summer of -1963, several of-� Times/Post News Service IN HIS WELL-POI,ISH7r) MEMOIR, "Swords. and Plowshares," Gen. Max-:well a Taylor sees the murder of for-mer South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh � Nhu, as a monstrous blunder in the :Vietnam War, bringing about political :c on f usi on that vastly prolonged the Struggle. Though one might answer such a theo-ry in the words of the French diplomat who said that it is an idle exercise in history to spedulate on what might have _ happened had that which happened not happened, the Taylor opinion stays no less weighty in the aftermath of the mil-� itary coup and the killings. Taylor be-came ambassador to Saigon and had to 'cope with the consequent chaos. As he cOrrectly puts it, the inexcusa-ble mistake of all who cons pi r e�ci to � ;.0 v or throw Diem was that they had � ;planned nothing better to replace him. ' The passions and attitudes of that summer nine years ago almost inevita-bly generated a violent climax. Diem was under heavy fire. He was being vi-ciously assailed by the American press in Saigon, who waged their vendetta be-:cause Diem scorned them and they were. being starved of news: - ' Publici opinion in the United States, ;seeing Diem as a lesser evil, vented its .rage against Nhu because of his oppresL. sion of the Buddhists led by Tri Quang, :who was just another Vietnamese rack-eteer in a saffron robe. The self-immo-. lation� of several Buddhist monks in pro-test against Nhu's measures also served to fire American emotion. Though Tay-� lor indicates that Tri Quang had con-'Arived these sacrifices to topple Diem, 'Madame Nhu, already an object of par-ticular loathing to the American press, :intensified the get-Diem movement by ficial statements came out of Washing-ton that seemed clearly to signal that the U.S. government would welcome the ruination of Diem. Gen. Taylor's freshly minted memoir lifts the lid on that subject more than a little. On Aug. 24, when he was chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there came to his desk a U.S. State Depart-ment action paper already cleared and cabled to the embassy in Saigon. What he read alarmed Taylor as it did other defense principals. - The authors of the already cabled in-struction were Undersecretary of State W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secre-tary of State Roger Hilsm an and a White House staffer, Michael Forrestal. They had cleared their paper with Un-dersecretary of State George Ball while he was playing golf and with the late President Kennedy via telephone, which signifies mainly that the clearers gave only passing attention to a major and convulsive change in American policy. Significantly, the paper had not been cleared with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was not anti-Diem, or the Central Intelliaence Agency or the De-partment of Detenn5: The sense of the paper sent to the new. ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, was that the United States would no longer tolerate the presence of brother Nhu in the Saigon government. Diem, however, 'must be given a chance to get rid of Nhu. At the same time, Lodge was to in-form key South Vietnamese generals about this change in the U.S. position.. Not only that, but if at any point the generals decided to get rid of President Diem, they were told the United States would directly support their action. So what was in essence this instruc-tion to the ambassador? Only a twisted mind would see it other .than as a li-cense for the South Vietnamese military . I (b)(3) , . . to form a cabal to gun down Diem and Nhu with the approval of the United, States. � Inside official U.S. circles there *as : no protest against the course so definite-ly set forth. Some of those directly con-cerned such as Taylor might in their own minds question the wisdom of the instruction or policy shift. But none said clearly: "What we propose to do is im-moral. It is beneath the dignity of the United States that we as a government would conspire to political assassina-tion. My conscience won't take it. So I will turn in my suit." One by one the principals fell in line with what had be-come, if by default, White House polity. In the end, the deed was done. Be it said in favor of the Vietnamese in brass that they were more loath to becom e the executioners of Diem. and Nhu than were U.S. generals and diplomats. Taylor, however, in noting the inci-dent, writes: "I know of no evidence of dir ect American participation in the coup and certainly of none in the assas-sination." Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 9 April 1972 (b)(3) An old Asia hand doesn't tell it all In the Midst of Wars An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. 13y Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale. Illustrated. 386 pp. New York: � Harper & Row. $12.50. ismosmiemexamsmcgaraar.....mramayemaseorzmar.....assommaxwasia I3'y PETER ARNETT Before the Vietnam war turned sour and Americans could still be-lieve in legends, there was an idealized cold-war warrior whose .bravery, boldness and common sense were carrying the American Way to victory over Communism in South-east Asia. His legendary exploits and style became the model for the scores of young American operatives dis-patched by various departments -and agencies to that arena of big-power political intrigue. Like the idealized cold warrior himself, those operatives were armed with a moral certitude about their mission. It sustained them through the long hot nights in backwaters like Luang Prabang and Pakse cultivating minor princelings. And it justified their support of the shoddy political accommodations that passed for democracy in Bang-kok, Saigon and Vientiane. - Then it all started to go bad. Deeds 'once thought bold and daring now seem to have been blundering acts of miscalculation that sucked the United States into an unforgiveable bloodletting in Vietnam. Those who had a hand in shaping the recent history of Southeast Asia, however, feel differently from the average._ American about that his-tory. One such man is the model cold-war warrior of them all, Ed-ward Geary Lansdale. Novelists .have tried to put him between. cov-ers: Graham Greene made a kindred idealist the antihero of "The Quiet 'American," and he was later featured as the hero of "The Ugly American" by William Lederer and Eugene Bur-dick. - Now, the 64-year-old Lansdale, for-mer San Francisco advertising man, oriental kingmaker, frustrated, coun-terinsurgency expert, speaks for himself with, "In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia." But he remains as elusive as the legends, even after 378 pages, and the reason seems to be that his memoirs are strangely abbreviated; the narrative concluded with Presi-dent Ngo Dinh Diem firmly in power in Saigon in 1956, the second Asian monarch helped .to the throne by Lansdale. The first was Ramon Mag-saysay of the Philippines. But with all we know of the later dramatic developments of the war, and with all Lansdale knows; his memoirs are like reading a history of the Ameri-can Civil War that ends with the first election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. The record states plainly that in 1960 Lansdale wrote a bitterly nega-tive report on the way the war was going in Vietnam, and later dis-cussed .his finding with President Kennedy who wanted to send him back to Saigon in a high position. But -top Kennedy aides intervened because of his bureaucratic crock-ery breaking and. independence. This same reputation apparently forced his retirement from the United States Air Force with the rank of major general at the age of 55. But none of this appears in his memoirs. But if Lansdale is reluctant to eval-uate his life's work or discuss his personal reverses, he has plenty more to say. His pages ring with the evangelistic anti-Communist rhetoric of the 1950's. Lansdale, an O.S.S. officer in World War II, remains an idealist who believes that the United States can prevail in distant, un-derdeveloped lands if she exports "the American way," a composite of "winning the hearts and the minds of the. people" and expert leverage of American economic aid. The former operative made plenty of enemies in his freewheeling days as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's personal emissary in Indo-china, but he names none in his memoirs, preferring to rail against the "back rooms of Washington pol-icy makers," which are "too full of articulate and persuasive practi-tioners of the expedient solution to daily problems, of the hoary art of power politics, and of the brute usages of our physical and material means." I ,ott Co A e c, Lansdale's belief is probably sus--tamed because of his first and last-ing counterinsurgency success, the crushing of the Huh rebellion in the Philippines. He teamed with the then unknown Ramon Magsaysay, secre-tary of national defense, and mount-ed a drive against the Communist Huks that demonstrated superb co-ordination of political, military and social-psychology strategy and tac-tics. This dramatic campaign, which he details .minutely in his memoirs, destroyed the Huks and led Mag-saysay to the Presidency in 1953, with Lansdale's help. By then Lansdale had become America's Number One counter-insurgency expert, and John Foster Dulles sent him to Vietnam to do the same there. In the Philippines Lans-dale had a favorite maxim, "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," and in Viet-nam he was given every opportunity to put his skills to use; his mission, among other things, was to launch paramilitary operations and poitticak psychological warfare against North Vietnam a few days after the Geneva accords gave that country to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's operatives were the first American fighting ram in Vietnam, a fact not hitherto known until the Pentagon Pa-pers last year revealed minute details of sabotage in Hanoi by Americans in 1954, including the pouring of contaminants into Hanoi buses to eventually destroy them. Lansdale men-tions the teams in his memoirs, but he fails to include the con-taminants, or his association with the .Central Intelligence Agency revealed by the Penta-gon Papers. Lansdale's main contribution to the history of Vietnam was his success in propping up Ngo Dinh Diem, the obdurate Viet-namese nationalist appointed Prime Minister by the French in a power play in 1954 and saved from political extinction by Lansdale who save in him the makings of another magsay-say. Dulles, in April, 195, had already agreed to a demand by his special envoy -in Saigon, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, that Diem be dumped in favor of a coalition of Saigon politicians and sect leaders, when a dra-matic cable arrived from Lans-dale stating that Diem was suc-cessfully surviving a military Peter Arnett is an Associated Press C _A n\e. t n,"1 S reporter who spent eight years In - � Vietnam. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO27924621 e1.i Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 WASHINGTON POST -6 APR 1972, Letters To - A South "Vietnamese Soldier Writes I have just received a letter from a South Vietnamese soldier in Vietnam (a former constituent) who retreated from the DMZ. His language is very straightforward, but I will not change anything because it will help the American people who are saturated with ,cliches and hypocritical euphemisms to know the other side of the story. Here are a few excerpts (when my correspondent says "we" he refers to himself and his South Vi-.etnamese comrades in arms): " "Enemy fire was not so terrible really, I � have known much worse; we were not afraid at all, we could have stayed, but we did not want to fight the Reds . .. What for ? Why � should we fight them? They have never harmed us. But the corrupted Vietnamese 'leaders in Saigon and the Americans who live in luxury and debauchery in Saigon have harmed us. These Americans and these Vietnamese traffic in heroin and opium; they share the proceeds with one another; the Vietnamese are the high officials; the Americans are U.S. officials which include military, civilian and CIA personnel; they live lavishly with villas, cars, mistresses; each of them spend in one night what we soldiers, with one wife and three or four children take one year to earn. That is why 'we all agree: (1) it is too stupid to die for nothing; (2) it is even criminal to kill the guys in front because they do not deserve to die, they are unfortunate fellows like us; we should kill instead the corrupted leaders in Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American friends .. . [note: he makes a distinction be-tween the Americans who live in the U.S. and who are not involved and the despised' Saigon-Americans who are war profiteers] who have made shambles of our country. Since the Americans killed [sic] President Ngo Dinh Diem and installed a new regime of yes-yes men, corruption stinks to the sky. We want to tear down the corrupted. Since the Communists want to do the same job, we leave it to them. What we want before all is independence, then we shall freely choose the leaders we respect. With the Americans sitting right on our head we are anything but free. That is why we are more and more mad at President Nixon. His withdrawal is interminable, hence we have no independ-ence. His Vietnamization shall never work: because he is fighting not only the Commu-nists but also the whole Vietnamese popula-tion which are mad at the corrupted Ameri-cans.; and Vietnamese who rule them. "There is a brave U.S. major, who acted as adviser and who probably meant well, who saw us packing and leaving and who asked me�probably because I have many ribbons for gallantry on my chest�why we did not make the slightest effort to resist and save our country from communism, etc., etc. . I looked at him silently for a long moment, shrugged my shoulders, and went away with-out answering, because I cannot tell him what I tell you in this letter. Some of us, in other units, fight by sheer reflex, like ro-bots, but they will quit too, because they also feel the same way as we do. For the time being we 'just quit the battlefield, but in our next step we shall join the Commu-nist forces. "We hate the corrupted. Why don't you come back to lead us?" I concur, but I also advocate reunification and neutrality for the entire Vietnam. TRAN VAN KIIIEM, Former Deputy. Vietnam National Assembly. Chevy Chase. bp) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � -n-T .evo, Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 5 JAM It1/4 Hanoi improves Its Air Defenses .S. Pilots Sa Washington Post Staif Writer DANANG�The Soviet Union C-123 crew downed earlier in has improved North Vietnam-ese aircraft defenses, accord-ing to U.S. pilots here. the same area. � Hanoi on Sunday claimed, that a high altitude 13-52 was They said the relatively safe shot down over Vinhlinh in :layer between the low-altitude the eastern portion of the De-i.57-mm. antiaircraft guns, militarized Zone. The U.S. Air which are radar-directed, and Force denied the claim. the high-altitude SAM-2 mis- If the- pilots are right in sues is now harder to find.- crediting North Vietnam with Pilots interviewed did not better air_ defenses, and there know what technical improve- is no reason to doubt them, ments were made in the So- this will -complicate their job viet air defenses but listed the of assisting South Vietnamese following as among the possi- troops under attack in the bilities: an improved radar-, northern portion of the cOun-. aiming system for the 57-mm, try. antiaircraft guns, Soviet tech- Just suppressing the antiair-nicians making adjustments craft fire to clear the way for on the ground in North Viet- bombing runs could cost the 'Atm to improve both range United States and South Viet-and accuracy. namese an unusually high A further complication, the number of planes if the air de-� pilots said, is that the North fenses indeed are more effec-Vietnarriese have moved SAM- live.' 2 rockets and antiaircraft guns southward to protect more effectively their troops ad-vancing in Military Region I. One tragic bit of evidence of the improved air defenses / came several weeks ago when the chief pilot of Air Ameri-can had his leg shot off while sitting in the rear of an air-craft, flying at about 13,500 feet over northern Laos where the Chinese have been build-ing a road. James Ryan, the chief pilot / for the CIA-financed airline, was , dropping pamphlets out of a small plane when he was hit by what fellow pilots be-lieve was a 57-mm. shell., The pamphlets Ryan was dropping offered a reward for any infor-mation about the whereabouts of the -crew of an Air America _ � " Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 71 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 JAL. 1 .6 %I APR 1972 (b)(3) cz21: eirraTid monazazarr9E3 worort rvincnETTI Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & .Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign af-fairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its au-thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be�the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations. In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper-ational plans accord with the aims of the 'administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead-ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen-tial individuals and institutions outside government is also sopght.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care-ful than are administrators in other areas of the bureau-cracy to inform the White Hous,e of their activities and to : seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress. The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe-less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere. After the Bay of feel the sting of Pre; the agency had its because it failed in overthrow Castro. C the top of the agenc committee, which ti tration, the agency . tices. Throughout th tine operations again the same time, and agency deeply involv ing regimes in Laos When the Natiom the CIA in 1967, s exposed the agency' labor and cultural funding conduits, ne tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's a trol over the CIA lit was simply told by P and get on with its lat formed to look into Secretary of State, th of the CIA. Some because they had be longer thought worth continued under improvea cover. e arger operations went ,on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a $500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/ assassination programs in Vietnam. tew o The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu-nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan-cial management of the community, especially in the mili-tary intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin-istration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should con-centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 *a.t. r "st -5 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 nawsa.a.al %JAN J. J. J...3%J.L). 11,1114.1J, (b)(3) y Lall9 four years afterward � 2 APRIL 1972 --� a-, � 'Cover-Up By Seymour M. Hersh. *Random House. 320 pp. $6.9 Reviewed by ROBERT SHERRILL But that brings us to the even the question of why officers of the highest rank failed t investigate and prosecute the guilty immediately after th offenses occurred, at which time even the creaking court martial system might have been expected to produce reasonable quantum of justice. Cover-Up, another of Hersh's awesome reporting achievements, is the best answer we are likely to get. It may be futile to argue about whether the murders at My Lai and My Khe prove that most young soldiers in moments . of convulsive emotions can become war criminals; but cer-/.; tainly little doubt can remain, after reading the evidence here, that in moments of stress�as when they feel their careers imperiled�high field officers in the United States Army are quite willing to boil their code of honor down to � the old practical barracks motto, "Cover Your Ass."--- : � By the evening of the day it happened, nasty jokes about the My Lai "battle" were being made at division headquarters. It was the chief topic at the cocktail hour. in Colonel Oran fiend Lest We forget, March 16 was the fourth anniversary of the Most highly publicized and perhaps the worst war ,cOrne ever committed by U.S. troops, that being the day .in 1968 when elenients of the Americal Division descended .on cluster of hamlets in the Sorigmy area of South Viet-�nain and, without provocation, butchered several hundred .unarmed civilians. � - IP'� The army still refuses to say how many Vietnamese were killed that day by Company C, First Battalion, 20th in-fantry, 1 lth Brigade when it destroyed the hamlet of My -Lai :4. Seymour Hersh says the secret documents from which. he developed this book show that at least 347 ,women, children, and old men died there. This is twice' as many as the highest previous estimate, -and it is very .close to. the death count made at the time :by the Viet Cong and circulated in propaganda leaflets, which, of course, our officials. gave no credence to. Since the Viet Cong have been more a4urate than the Pentagon � about the whole matter, there is no reason not to take their word also that "there-were twenty-six families killed :completely�no survivors." Their work done, the men of Charlie Company sat down :among the bodies and ate lunch. Meanwhile, in another hamlet nearby, this one known as My Khe 4, Bravo Company was getting in some prac-tice. "We were out there having a good time," one of the participating GIs told Hersh. "It was sort of like being in .a shooting gallery." Estimates of the dead at My Khe 4: range up to 155. Hersh's account of this episode is the first that has been made public, just as he was the first to report the My Lai 4 murders in 1969. �:For the slaughter at My Lai 4, the army (after intense public pressures) eventually brought charges of murder or � assault with intent to murder against 12 officers and men; � but charges were dismissed against six, and of the others only Lieutenant William Calley was convicted. i For the murders at My -Kite 4, nobody has been court-martialed, and apparently nobody ever will be. So the evidence is, all in now, and already becoming vintage history, that even where there are many witnesses, the military's system of justice is incapable of coping with war crimes.: , Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 erson s mess nail. lienclerson corn-(b)(3) manded the brigade. Many helicopter pilots in the 123rd Aviation Battalion knew about the killings. South Viet-namese district officials knew about the mass murder . within three days. So did Lieutenant Colonel William D. Guinn, the deputy province adviser, but he dismissed the report passed on to him by the native officials as invalid becaUse�now get this�because "it was so poorly trans-lated and the handwriting was so poor I could hardly read it." Official reports of the assault stated that � 128 "Viet "Their work done, the men of Charlie Company sat down among the bodies and ate their lunch." Cong" had been killed after a heavy fight. But only three weapons were taken in the village and. no Americana were injured by rifle fire. There were no requests .for gunship support. For these reasons no alert officer would have let the battle report go unchallenged. Some of the gossip quickly reached the ears of Major General Samuel W. Koster, commanding general of tia.: America.' Division, and although he preferred that nothing create 'shock waves that might disturb his style of life (Koster's mess was noted for steak, lobster, engraved china, the best of hard liquors and wines, GI waiters dressed in white flunky coats, and the pleasant company of Red Cross nurses), still, he did tell Colonel Henderson that maybe he ought to investigate. Henderson's idea of getting to the bottom of things was to stop a group of the soldiers who had been at My Lai 4-- _ Robert Sherrill's most recent book is Military Justice Is to Justice as Military Music Is to Music. � (b)(3) COMMUNICATIONS Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 DVOiM4.01., mr.L.Lam 1 April 1972 _ ITT's public relations fiasco Despite the welter of testimony and newspaper stories implying question-able relations between International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and the Justice Dept., the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House, there has been no concrete evidence yet pro-duced of any illegal conduct. Still, the publicity has damaged ITT's public im-age. Even sophisticated businessmen and investors are talking of the dam-age done to the reputation of business in general, describing ITT's recent con-duct as arrogant and conscienceless. At midweek, the common stock hit a low for the year. ITT is caught up in a full-fledged pub-lic relations fiasco, with an unaccus-tomed spotlight beaming on the office of Edward J. Gerrity, Jr., senior vice-president for public relations. Gerrity, 48, a onetime Scranton (Pa.) news-paperman, oversees ITT's far-flung cor-porate relations staff, including public relations, advertising, and dealings with government agencies. Dita Beard, the lobbyist whose alleged memo about the company's contributions to the San Diego Convention Bureau started the brouhaha, works for Gerrity. The credibility. Gerrity's operation, which has a staff of 51 worldwide, has had a reputation for being effective but heavy-handed. In 1967, for instance, three Washing-ton reporters .covering the Federal Communications Commission hearings into ITT's proposed acquisition of American Broadcasting Co. testified that ITT public relations staffers pres-sured them for better treatment. Ei-leen Shanahan, a New York Times re-porter, said that Gerrity "badgered" her, and she later claimed that ITT asked a former employer about her character. Now, shredded documents, discrediting medical testimony, and ill-advised memoranda have all combined to make things look very bad for ITT. When columnist Jack Anderson pub-lished alleged ITT internal memos im-plicating ITT in a scheme to block the election of Chilean president Salvador Allende, ITT public relations issued a statement describing as "without foun-dation in fact" Anderson's claim that the conglomerate "had participated in planning any plots or coup against him [Allende]." Yet former CIA director John A. McCone, a member of the ITT board of directors since 1966 and a member of company told the U. S. government, "If you have a plan, we'll help with it." Far from disavowing the authenticity of the memos published by Anderson, McCone says "those were staff." And. he adds that suggestions of "economic repression" measures were "prudently, properly, and firmly rejected by Gen-een and his operating people." McCone adds that ITT Chairman Harold S. Gen-een and he are filled with "regret at the way that the memos were written and the way they have been read by the press so that our true policy has been distorted." The Image. The .way they are 'being in-terpreted by the press is, of course, a problem for globally ambitious ITT, as well as for 'Ned" Gerrity. What he and ITT's statuette: A manneken pis for members of The Brussels Boys Club. his staff think of it all is unknown, for Gerrity is refusing interviews "on the advice of our lawyers." ITT is not a corporation known for hiding its light. Each year several hun-dred journalists, ranging from finan-cial writers to police-beat hacks, gather at Manhattan's St. Regis Roof for a bash that ITT's public relations depart-ment calls "The Brussels Boys Club." The tone of the evening is set by a replica of Brussels' famed manneken pis, which directs a potable stream into the glasses of thirsty guests. "Members" get statuettes of the manneken. its executive committee, this week con- The emphasis on Brussels is crude firmed that moves against Allende had but apt. The giant ITT always has one indeed been discussed at ITT. McCon 1 _ Approvedfor'Release. 2018/01/30 CO2792 � Of IT counted for $3.1-billion of ITT's total. corporate sales of $7.3-billion. Just last week, the 11-man executive committee of the ITT board flew to Brussels for a. special presentation by ITT-Europe. Notably absent were Chairman Geneen and Gerrity, both preoccupied with the hearings in Washington. Hanging over the meeting was the big question: Will the publicity tar the company with the image of a string-pulling, cloak-and-dagger operation? Foreign affairs. If ITT's image is hurt in Europe, it could not come at a worse time. The now-famous deal it struck with the Justice Dept., which allowed it to retain Hartford Fire Insurance Co., set a limit of $100-million on the size of a company it could acquire domes-tically. In effect, this means that ITT will have to look abroad�especially to Europe�for large acquisitions, and in Europe a favorable government atti-tude is a prerequisite. A former ITT manager overseas con-cedes that marketing and politics go hand in hand in. Europe. There is in-tense expense-account wooing of postal, telephone, and telegraph offi-cials. And the same tender, loving care is devoted to selected French deputies and Spanish ileputados as ITT lavishes on U. S. congressmen. ITT also recruits influential allies. The board of Bell Telephone Mfg. Co., ITT's big Antwerp unit, includes former NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak, while the late UN Secretary General Trygve Lie was a director of ITT-Norway. Such tactics apparently work: In the last 15 months, ITT has ac-quired six companies in four countries. Foreign troubles. In Latin American op-erations, administered from New York, the experience has not been so happy. Foreign ownership of telecommuni-cations systems there is out of style. Peru and Ecuador nationalized ITT sub-sidiaries in 1970, and even friendly Brazil declined to renew the franchise of ITT World Communications. For all its overseas interests, ITT is not averse to waving Old Glory. For ex-ample, when Charles de Gaulle forbade an ITT subsidiary to ship highly secret radar installations to Vietnam, a for-mer executive recalls, "We just slipped the blueprints to the CIA." Public relations is a management problem, and the current image crisis at ITT is a serious blow to Harold Gen-een's reputation for tight controls. An ITT public relations handout quotes a magazine evaluation of Geneen as "the greatest businessman," yet ITT's public relations operations somehow slipped from his grasp. Now, Geneen faces hearings this fall by the Senate For-eign Relations Committee, looking into 4'6-2 influence of multinational corpora-4 � ..... . ......... Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 k 'rummy�, uRvavA) APRIL 1972 ti 0 SAN FRANCISCO-Earth Magazine has announced the preparation of a law suit against a CIA-controll-ed airline it accused in its March issue of flying heroin out of 'Southeast Asia with the knowledge of that clandestine government agency. San F rancisco attorney Ron Lea-chrnan says the suit.will charge Air America, a corporation set up by the Central Intelligence Agency, with allowing its facilities to be used for the traf-ficing of opium from the "fertile triangle" of poppy fields in Laos, Burma and Thailand. The current issue of Earth documents in a feature article by University of �Calfornia Prof. Peter � Scott, the connection be-tween� the CIA, Air America and the heroin trade, Scott charges that "the opium-based economy of Laos is being protected by a coalition of opium growing CIA mercenaries, �Air America planes and Thailand troops." The article charged that much of the heroin wound up being used in Vietnam by U.S. troops or went to the streets of America. At a press conference announ-cing the publication of the article, Earth editor James Goode ang-rily pointed out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home: "The CIA helped put our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack." he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA $6 billion a year for these services." The impact of this trafficking on American youth cannot be underestimated. In the article, Scott quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate in the New Republic . that 25% of all berOin in the U.S. comes from the fertile triangle region of South-east Asia A further amplification of the problem came from research done by Mike Benner of WR IF news in a recent broadcast about the Earth magazine exposures. He said, "Studies on the heroin problem in the United States have indicated that up to five billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by an estimated five� hued red thousand addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin two and one-half billion dollars � is U.S. Government studies have indicated that as much as 50% of the crime in metropolitan areas is caused by addicts and medical officials report that heroin pre-sently causes more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than war, cancer or car accidents." . Most observors feel that the CIA involvement in the heroin trade has not come about through a desire of the U.S. government to poison its troops and young people. But rather through a trap of political alliances with the dealers and marketers of opium, who were often the only forces in Southeast Asia willing to support the U.S. political and military adventures in that region, an area contro led by remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army. Several recent calls for attacks on the trade by the gov-ernment are not being taken too seriously and Hubert Humphrey even suggested having the CIA itself hunt down the smugglers. Don Strachen writting in the Staff newspaper in Los Angle suggested that this was like askin the Nazi S.S. force to investigat atrocities at the Auschwitz con centration camp. Earth Magazine and atforne Leachman want GI's vets or othe, persons with personal knowlecigi of the drug trade and who vvouli be willing to help them in the sui against Air America, to .contac .Earth Magazine, The Agricultura Bldg. The Embarcadero at Miss ion, San Francisco CA 94115 o phone (415) 989-4300. Copies o the above mentioned article oft also be gotten from that address Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 0\ 0.11�1101NOMMOIMMIN�11, Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 April 1972 numamomaamm���=lawsmia (b)(3 Cl Nixon's Peace Offer IIE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake in the Indochina war has always been a relatively simple one; is the United States (or the French be-fore it) to have a predominant voice in determining the political and social structure of Indochina, or will this question be settled by the Indochinese peoples themselves, relatively free from outside intervention? It has been fairly clear from the outset that, if external force were withdrawn, Vietnam would ultimately be unified under commun-ist leadership, since the Viet Minh and its successors had "captured" the na-tionalist movement, as U.S. govern-ment analysts express it. In Laos, the Pathet Lao have been unmatched in their ability to construct a popular na-tionalist political movement, in this case, too, with revolutionary social con-tent. U.S. intervention from the late 1950s. has drawn North Vietnam in-creasingly into Laotian affairs, much as in South Vietnam and more recently Cambodia, where the March 1970 coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and the US-ARVN invasion that followed, shattered a fragile though conceivably stable neutralism and increased the probability that Cambodia too will be brought ultimately into a communist-led federation of. some sort if outside force is withdrawn. For reasons that need not detain us here, the United States has never been willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indo-china, and remains unwilling today. The conditions of U.S. intervention have changed over the years, but not the essential goals. Furthermore, the basic problem facing the Western in-vaders has also changed little during the past quarter century. Several years ago, an American military spokesman formulated the problem clearly: the U.S. has enormous military force but littlo. political power and must defeat an adversary with enormous political power but only modest military force. To this problem the U.S. must find the "proper response"�in Vietnam and elsewhere in the third world as well. (Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, 1966). This ,problem dictates American strategy. The basic strategy has been, necessarily, to demolish the social and � political structures in which the.. indig-enous resistance is rooted, what is called "nation-building" by some of the more contemptible hypocrites spawned �in the course of this endeavor, for ex-ample, Robert Komer, chief Presiden-tial advisor on "pacification" in the Johnson Administration. Five years ago, he held out the hope that "ero-sion of southern VC strength" may be feasible because, though none of the American programs are very efficient, "we are grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass" (Pentagon Papers, Beacon, volume IV). After the Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear that the American public would not long tolerate the costs of a continuing military occupation in South Vietnam, coupled with a costly air war against the North. Consequently, the direct U.S. troop commitment was leveled off and then gradually lowered through "Vietnamization"�a policy suggested by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967 �while a sharply expanded techno-logical war reached its peak in the early months of the Nixon Administration. Nixon and Kissinger are gambling that the massive destruction and forced population concentration in the South, with its devastating impact on the rural society, may create conditions under which the U.S.-imposed regime can survive. To use Robert Komer's terms, "thanks to massive U.S. military in-tervention at horrendous cost," a "fa-vorable military environment" has been created "in which the largely political competition for control and support of the key rural population could begin again" in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" of International Affairs, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add that contiol of the "key rural popu-lation" may be facilitated by the fact, that at least half the population, 85 percent rural in 1960, now lives in urban ghettoes (J-C Pomonti, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1972), part of the "hor-rendous cost" of "massive U.S. mil-itary intervention." Much the same is true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and Kissinger appear to be moving towards an effective partition of Indochina: the heavily settled areas of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is hoped, be separated from the resist-ance forces by a ring of fire and de-struction, controlled by an elaborate Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � military and police apparatus, an-C1 gradually absorbed within the U.S.-Japan Pacific system. The vast areas ceded to the resistance will be sub-jected to intensive bombardment which will continue to make an organized so-cial life virtually impossible. Parts of Laos may be effectively incorporated within Thailand, as George Ball sug-gested years ago. It may be that the willingness of the Administration to concede the 'presence of Thai mer-cenaries in Laos (in conflict with ex-plicit legislation designed to prevent this) reflects the need to prepare the public for this outcome. As the very knowledgeable Austra-lian analyst Peter King observes; such "successes" as have been achieved in this program are "no mystery": "It re-quires more than ordinary courage for civilians to maintain their political al-legiances openly in the face of a semi-genocidal counter-insurgent strategy" (Pacific Affairs, Fall 1971), the pre-requisite for Komer-stle "nation-building." It is this counter-insurgent strategy and its results that lead Gen-eral Westmoreland to believe: "I think particularly significant is that the en-emy does not have the strong infra-structure and the guerrilla forces in large numbers, well equipped and high-ly motivated, that he had in 1968" (Peter Osnos, Washington Post-Bos-ton Globe, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as King and many others recognize, "the durability of that success may be doubted." Given the insistence of the U.S. pub-lic on scaling down the direct Amer-ican involvement, it has been obvious for several years that it would become necessary for the U.S. to engage in some sort of political manipulations within the areas of South Vietnam that 'remain under U.S. control, or to "get ready for political competition in South Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Sam-uel Huntington put it in a paper be-fore the May 1969 meeting of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEA-DAG. This collection of scholars, who claim to be concerned with support for research on Vietnam, struggled manfully with the problem of how tc ensure control at the national level fen "our side," given that the NLF re-mains "the most powerful purely po-litical national organization," "the csontitued (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 April 1972 Corpora ion t: My Story by Anthony Russo f Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 ocaAjuued Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1 .APRIL 1972 (b)(3) IN THE MIDST OF WARS: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia by Edward Leary Lansdale Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50 Reviewed by Jonathan MirskY IN With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most valu-able eyewitness account of the inter-nationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the Iluk revolution in the Philip-pines. He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make pp its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man In Saigon. While the book's time span Is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippines and Viet-nam is genuinely important. There is only one difficulty with In the Midst of Wars: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public�and for $12.50!�several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and years after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of , our engagement in Vietnam. The lie on the jacket describes Lans-dale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. In-deed, on page 378�the last of the text�he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force." For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photo-graphs in his book attest, he certainly wore. its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior opera-tive of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of De-fense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as representing the CIA at a meeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina held on January 29, 1954. Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses re-peatedly it is "help"�and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer spontaneous assist-ance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help.... I voiced this to Ambassador. Heath. . Heath told me to go ahead." The in-formal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White." Further desires to serve inform Lans-dale's concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to ... move out before the :ommunists took over." These unfortu-nates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, Rider Major Conein, engaged in -efugee work in the North." "Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the,/ Times and Beacon editions of the Pentagon Papers (sec SR, Jan. I, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili-tary Assistance Advisory Gr9up1. for cover purposes." The secret . report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a 'para-military organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took. over . . . the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conches "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, On the surface." Aggression from the North, anyone? Lansdale expresses particular pleas-ure with the refugee movement to the Snuth. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South.. .. [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous par-ticipation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh take-%.1 x tit toe Hanoi region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled." The refugees�Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French�were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lans-dale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in a cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity." Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi-gan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot: Northerners, practically all of whom refugees, [have] preempted many of choice posts in the Diem government. [The] Diem regime has assumed the are the as-pect of a carpet bag government in its. disproportion of Northerners and Cen-tralists ... and in its Catholicism.... The (Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist vehemence of their North-ern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as un-reliable in the4communist struggle. . . . [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they al e gen-erally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and pro-vincial officials. Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet-nam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States." Wherever one turns. in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He re-ports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart�until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to Presi-dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional opera-tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad." Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. (At every step Diem was ad-vised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 tettt SATURDAY ni.,,TEw Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) SR: BOOKS Book Review Editor: ROCHELLE CIRSONI IN THE MIDST OF WARS: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia by Edward Geary Lansdale Harper 8: Row, 386 pp., $12.50 Reviewed by Jonathan Afirsky t:t With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most.valu-able eyewitness account of the inter-nationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the *Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the link revolution in the Philip-nines, He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make up its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippine S and Viet-nam is genuinely important. There is only one difficulty with In the Midst of Wars: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper &I Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public�and for $12.50!�several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and years after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam. The lie on the jacket describes Lans-dale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. In-deed, on page 378�the last of the text�he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force." For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photo-graphs in his book attest, he certainly wore its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior opera-tive of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of De-fense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as representing the CIA at a ineeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina held on January 29, 1954. Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses re-peatedly it is "help"�and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer spontaneous assist-ance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. , I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . Heath told me to go ahead." The in-formal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White," Further desires to serve inform Lans-dale's Concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to ... move out before the communists took over." These unfortu-nates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, under Major Conein, engaged in refugee work in the North." "Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the Times and Beacon editions of the Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972) .as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili-tary Assistance Advisory Group] for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a para-military organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took over . . . the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Concin infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, on the surface." Aggression from the North, anyone? Lansdale expresses particular pleas-ure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South. .. . [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous par-ticipation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite N'as held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh take-over .o t e anoi. region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled." rr he refugees�Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French�were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lans-dale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity." Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi-gan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot: Northerners, practically all of whom are refugees, [have] preempted many of the choice posts in the Diem government.... [The] Diem regime has assumed the as-pect of a carnet bag government in its disproportion .of Northerners and Cen-tralists ... and in its Catholicism.... The Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist vehemence of their North-ern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as un. reliable in the communist struggle, [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are gen. erally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and pro-vincial officials. Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet-nam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States." Wherever one turns in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He re-ports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart�until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to Presi-dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional opera-tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad." Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dal, Iloa Hao, and Binh Xuycn. (At every step Diem was ad-vised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic moment, even holds the weeping Chief of State in his arms.) Everything de-(b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2762462 WASHINGTON IDNTHLY .APRIL 1972 (b)(3) (6LyAmerican. 22`c232122 (b)(3) a review by Taylor Branch Two fa:theis of the Vietnam War published- their memoirs in March.* General Edward Lansdale's In the Midst of tWars and General Maxwell Taylor's Swords and Plowshares re-cord the.,,' statements of defense for men who!symbolize the two doctrines that combined to produce American counter-guerrilla strategy in Southeast Asia. More importantly, Lansdale and Taylor represent two distinct schools of war. supporters�those who saw Vietnain as a crusade and those who saw it as a'burden. Lansdale is America's first expert in counter-guerrilla warfare�the legend-ary figure who achieved fame in the fifties by teaching our cold warriors that the only way to defeat Asian revolutionaries,. the guerrilla fish in a sea of popular support, was to learn how to paddle around a little ourselves. Mixing modern "psywar" (psychological warfare) techniques with James Bond derring-do and the kind of cultural savvy that later was coveted by exponents of foreign wars and foreign aid alike, Lansdale mana-ged to position himself for exploits and lever-pulling in palaces and rice paddies, Asia's smoke-filled rooms. Lansdale's knowledge of the players and the bystanders�the French, the Americans, the local warlords who were beset with kaleidoscopic person-al intrigue�helped him contour Diem's strategy to fit both interna-tional politics and contending Viet-namese jealousies.. Lansdale became mysterious and controversial�two *In the Midst of Wars. Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row, $12.50. Swords and Plowshares. Maxwell D. Taylor. Norton, $10. Taylor Branch is an editor of The Washing-ton Monthly. novels, The Quiet American and The Ugly American, are modeled on his doings. He helped move American military strategy from the conven-tional concerns of how you position your armored divisions, tanks, artil-lery, and nuclear weapons, to more political questions like where you put your psywar leaflets, why you need pacification teams, and how to � win the hearts and minds of the people. As a counter-guerrilla man long before the fashion, � Lansdale contributed about half the ideas that led to Vietnam. General Taylor symbolizes another idea, flexible response, which, floating on a common sea of anticommunism with Lansdale's doctrines, helped direct troop ships across the Pacific. At the apparent end of a long, successful military career that began at West Point under Superintendent Douglas MacArthur,Taylor, found him-self a very dissatisfied Army Chief of Staff from 1955 until 1959. :He dissented from the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of massive retaliation (which essentially promised to nuke the communists if they made a �move anywhere) because he considered it unlikely that the Russians would believe our threat to blow up the world if they seized the post office in Nairobi. Of course, Taylor also had bureaucratic reasons to oppose the Eisenhower nuclear strategy: the Air Force was getting missiles, the Navy was in line for nuclear subs, while the Army was getting little but budget cuts. His development of the flexible response posture paralleled a.series of frustrated battles for more Army funds, which Taylor implies were lost because conservatives like Treasury Secisetary George Humphrey wanted balanced budget so badly that the persuaded Ike to stick with a bargain basement nuclear strategy. Taylor retired from the Army ii 1959 to write The Uncertain Trumpe and thereby take his case for flexibt response to the public, where it wa well-received because most peopt were chilled by so much talk abou the bomb during the Eisenhowe Administration. A powerful fear tha nuclear vertigo might draw our leader toward the button was activated especially among liberals, and its nem endings .remained exposed until afte the Goldwater-Johnson race in 1964 When President Kennedy and hi' dandies came to Washington in 1961 they regarded Maxwell Taylor as cultural and strategic ally. Alread) alarmed at Khrushchev's speech pro claiming an open season for wars o. national liberation, the President per suaded the general to become. hi! military counselor (when Tayla turned down the top post at the CIA, to help the Administration enshrim flexible response as official dogma am to apply this wisdom in trouble spot: like Southeast Asia. Lansdale wa: already in Washington, working tit Vietnam, and the Pentagon Paper record that by July, 1961, Lansdah presented Taylor with a long, classi fled report "in response to your &sir( for early in on unconven tional warfare resources in Southeas Asia." The two vials were beinl poured together, and the Kenned Administration bought both flexibh response and counter-guerrilla warfan in a logically compatible package symbolized by the Green Berets. Against the background, of flu Eisenhower years, the thoughts of thi two generals appear quite harmonious rising to the top of the ne� administration, but the memoirs shoN that their personalities were sharpl: different. While Taylor is a reserve pragmatist, Lansdale is a true believe. a gung-ho cold-war missionary, a ma of action, whose writing calls fc frequent crescendos of the nation; Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 012t 1j0 ci A, L.". 11T Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1 AFK 1V/4 (b)(3) aiging Reviewed by Ron Riden hour �In 1969 the reviewer wrote ,a' letter to the Secretary of 'Defense and other highly placed persons that led to .,the revelations of the My Lai ! massacre and al/ that fol-lowed. He is now a student i_at Arizona State � University �and writes for New Times, i an underground newspaper. It came as a bitter shock to most Americans when the :nation's young began filling 'the streets in protest against : the Vietnam war, leveling �_ charges against our own government and military that had traditionally been reserved for only our vilest adversaries. They were charges. few Americans could accept. But in November, 1969, Seymour M. Hersh, an en-terprising free-lance jour-nalist who specializes in cov-ering the military, rocked the nation and the world with a series of articles ex-'posed what became known as the My Lai massacre. The series won Hersh the Pu-litzer Prize and later be-came a probingly thorough book. Although most people refused to believe it, it ,,began to look as if the worst charges made by the anti-war groups were true. Now Hersh is back with a -second book based on My Lai. It is potentially more . explosive than the story of the massacre itself, raising -serious questions that cut to the core of the military as an institution and laying open to question the integ-� rity of our top military and .civilian leaders as well as the American brand of justice. "Cover-up" Is based on .28,000 pages of testimony and documents gathered by the Army's investigation of the My Lai affair by a much ballyhooed blue-ribbon panel named after its chief, Lt. -Gen. William R. Peers, plus Hersh's own extensive inves-tigations. The purpose of the Peers inquiry was to dis-cover what happened at My -Lai, why it happened, and how it could have gone so long undiscovered. Army Was reacting, accord-ing to Hersh, to charges of a whitewash. The public was promised full access to the Peers discoveries after the military trials, barring the usual "national security" catch-all provision. The trials are now over except for Calley's appeal, but the Pentagon still refuses to re-lease the report. The reason, Hersh lays, is that the investigation of the whitewash, is itself a cover-up. �Hersh shows the Peers group collecting detailed ev-idence of a second massacre on the same morning by an-other company from Task Force Baker, Charlie Com-pany's parent unit, but Gen. Peers denied any knowledge of it at a press conference announcing the investiga-tion's results. ' 'He shows Lt. Calley sent-enced to life imprisonment (later reduced to 20 years) while his two commanding. generals are let off the hook by a fellow general in a deal that smacks of the "old boy" syndrome�even though each accuses the other of ul-timate responsibility and both their testimonies are full of holes and hedging. 'He shows wholesale de-struction and alteration of records by privates through generals. 'He shows the CIA's shad-owy hand in operation and the part a CIA agent played in planning the My Lai op. ration. �He shows aloose, unoffi-cial but fiercely loyal alli-ance of field grade officers willing to break all the rules over-up o hr, ewash of a . Books � COVER-UP. By Seymour M. Hersh. (Random House, 305 IV., 55,95) to protect their fellow offi-cers�even those they've never met. Beyond these revelations, however, lies the deeper question of command re-sponsibility, not only for My Lai but for all the undiscov-ered�publicly at least�massacres and atrocities of the war. Implicit in the han-dling of the My Lai affair by the administration and the Pentagon is the assumption that the massacre was an atypical incident, a kind of horrible aberration caused by a freakish and compli-cated combination of factors that could never be re-peated. "Cover-up" indicates that the atrocity syndrome was widespread throughout the Americal Ijivision, at least, and that the military poll-cies then in effect. policies designed in the highest mili-tary echelons made them inevitable. In the chapters Hersh devotes to the sub-ject, one is struck by the identical line that issues from a variety of witnesses from numerous echelons: "Kill, kill, kill". If they are to be believed, the official emphasis was on body count and little else. There is hardly any conclusion left to draw except 'that as far as the brass Was concerned; what really mattered was not who was killed, but how many. In Hersh's final analysis it becomes clear that not only was My Lai inevitable, but so was its cover-up and the cover-up's cover-up. Perhaps the most disturbing issue he raises is that what made it all so inevitable is integral to the United States Army today. And that raises some questions. Hersh threads the story of My Lai and its sister massa-cre at My Khe, their investi-gation and the double cov-er-up, into a broad tapestry tightly stitched together with the most damning evidence of all�the testimony of the men who participated at every level and every stage of the whole sordid affair. Years from now, when schol-ars attempt to understand the Vietnam phenomenon, "Cover-Up" is the one book to which they will all turn. And they will ask them-4 selves, I suppose, why the vital questions raised by � Hersh about an institution as powerful in and impor-tant to America as its army were allowed to go unan-swered�as they surely will in a nation that has had the war up to here. . � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 WARM-P(71'1W rT,g_v-: Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1 APR 1972 (b)(3) 1,e[iy5's Form .Grip Cm . VEenfl By HENRY S. BRADSIIER Star Staff Writer SAIGON � In the.half-year since South Vietnam's presi-dential .elections ended with a whimper instead of a bang, this country has been political-ly more quiet than at any time in recent years. The quietness is a sign of President Nguyen Van Thieu's political mastery, of the de-moralization of his opponents, and of preparations for a pos-sible eventual political contest with the Communists. And it might also be taken as a sign of the narrow focus of Vietnamese politics on a small handful of people, with the bulk of the population knowing little abont them and caring less�in the normal way of underdeveloped coun-tries with strongman tradi-tions. . In the offices and villas of ,those persons who consider themselves Saigon politicians, there is some desultory discus-sion these days of new politi-cal alliances. Thieu might once again be interested in gathering the support of some politicians, instead of spurning them all. i The An Quang pagoda group � of Buddhists is busy cleaning house, the student movement is hardly visible, and war vet-erans are being taken care of fairly well. These are the groups that have caused the most political turmoil in re-cent years, but not now. Few Pay Attention Retired Gen. Duong Van Minh, the self-appointed savior of Vietnam from both Thieu and communism, has issued a few statements since deciding in August not to fight a losing presidential election cain-paign. Not many people pay atten-tion. Vietnamese politicians, Journalists and other observ-ers find it hard to imagine any future developments which could bring to Minh the call to national leadership that he � wants. The other man whom Thieu maneuvered out of the presi-dential race, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, plays tennis and talks with his military cronies. Now outranked by a former subordinate, he cannot return to command of the air force which he held before becoming premier seven years ago. Be-sides, Thieu seems disinclined' to give Ky any position of au-thority�not surprisingly, since Ky threatened in September to "destroy him and all his clique." Ky is not so easily written off as Minh, however. He has more determination and, at 43,� he is younger. He can wait for the next presidential elections in 1975, when Thieu will be constitutionally unable to seek another term. Way Charter Reads Or at least that is the way the Constitution reads at the moment. But that American-inspired limitation may prove no more realistic for Vietnam than other ideas copied from the U.S. Constitution and later abandoned, like an independ-ent judiciary. Few observers would want to predict as far ahead as 1975. But if Thieu is still running the same kind of government then, it seems likely that he might decide to emulate Presi-dent Chung Hee Park of South Korea. A few years ago Park found himself so indispensable that he had to force through his parliament a change in the American-inspired two-term limitation. Thieu works from behind a screen of Oriental aloofness. He tours the country exten-sively to meet with local offi-cials, who form the basis of his political power, but he does not try to establish a popular image with the masses. He has made little effort to explain his policies. The presi-dential palace provides almost no information to the Vietnam-ese press about what it is doing. More than just a retic-ence, there seems to be an absolute hostility toward the American press. Parties Too Fractious � Thieu dickered in 1969 with the idea of uniting seven politi-cal parties behind his pro-grams. But they proved too fractious. By early 1970 he was denouncing all politicians as would-be leaders without any followers.-Now, however, there are signs that the president might be coming back to the idea that organized political sup-port can have a value beyond his use of local officials and army officers to rally popular backing and turn out voters. The three parties that show signs of coalescing behind Thieu are the Workers' and Peasants' party, the Progres-sive party, and the Revolution-ary Greater Vietnam party. The first is primarily com-posed of union members led by Tran Quoc Buil. He has had , strong American support since the days when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency financed "No one has the right, through ill-considered acts, to go counter" to the constitu- . tion, Huyen said. Thieu's pro-posal to let the Communists contest elections Would violate the anti-Communist provisions of the Constitution. Cautiously Quiet the creation of anti-Commtthist unions abroad. The second party unites pro-fessional tnen and civil serv-ants. Its highly respected lead-er, Prof. Nguyan Van Bong, was assassinated in Novem-ber, weakening the party. The third, part of the old Dal Viet semi-secret political movement, is led by a former minister of the interior, Ha Thuc Ky. Position Strengthened Thieu gave these parties some help of dubious legality in August's elections to the lower house of parliament, and they strengthened their position. Now, he might be looking toward next year's lower house elections. If a constitutional amend-ment is to be passed allowing a third term, . Thieu would need more parliamentary sup-port than he now has. The president is still pre-senting a stoutly anti-Communist determination to the world. But he has gained politically � and weakened his critics � by offering in Janu-ary to resign and fight presi-dential elections against the Communists. This helped Thieu to capture much of the credit for favor-ing peace which had been held by various opposition groups. It has at the same time caused concern. After a six-week silence, the president of the upper house of parliament, Sen. Nguyen Van Iluyen, who would run the country tempo-rarily under Thieu's plan to resign for new elections, ex-pressed guarded disagre e-ment. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 The opposition groups which had voiced desires for peace have been cautiously quiet. The most interesting devel-opment among the opposition is an attempt by the An Quang Buddhists to purge Communist sympathizers from their own n r ks, especially their student io ovements. After denying bvernment accusations that they often served communist purposes, the church leaders now seemed concerned about this. Their supreme patriarch re-cently accused both the Saigon and Hanoi governments as "merely acting as puppets for foreign powers." This even-handed condemnation was a change from attacking Thieu while being polite to the Com-munists. . ,_ \ LOS 111,;GF.Y1l:s Tins; CIA Agent . Blath�for My Lai:.Error ' Author Seyrnour Af, Hersh said an agent for thq.Cen-tral Intelligence Ageney misled the planners f the 1968 attack on My Lai by telling � them they would: find a Viet Cong battalion. : there. The agent denied it. The assault units met only old men, women and children in the South Viet-namese vill a g e. Many were killed by the Ameri-can troops. Hersh, who won a Pul-itiei�Prize� for breaking the My Lai story, identi-fied the agent in A new book, as Robert B. Rams7 dell, nOw a private inves-tigator in Qrlarido, :-.. "Ramsdell refused to speak; specifically about the information he provid-ed Task Force Barker be-fore the My Lai 4 opera-tion, but acknowledged that his intelligence un-doubtedly was a factor in the planning for the mis-s i o n," Hersh wrote in "C ov er- Up," published Sunday by Random 1-louse. . Denies Charges In a telephone interview, Ramsdell denied Hersh's allegations and said that although he was working for the CIA in the My Lai area at the time of the kill-ings, he had nothing to do with intelligence reports to the Americans. .Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2 7 MR 1972 Of his role in the 'CIA, Ranisdell said, "My func-tion 'was with the Viet-namese. I had very little to do with the Americans." He said that informatiOxi. gathered by the South Vietnamese was at 'times relayed to U.S. troops, but added that he doubted those: reports could have become the basis for the m i s 1 eading information fed to planners of the My Lai assault. Viet Colig Sought ,�-� In the ,,My Lai courts-martial of Lt. William L. Calley Jr. and o hers, there was testimony that the attack was made in the belief the village was the' home 'of the 48th Viet 'Com,7.Battalion, -which pre-viously had inflicted hea-vy ,damage to American - The source of that belief. was alluded to only as "in-telligence reports." -Hersh said: The link between Ramsdell and the poor intelligence for the March 16 operation was never explored by the Peers panel (the exhaus-tive Army investigation headed by Lt. Gen. Wil-liam :R.Peers). For one thing, none of the high-ranking officers on it had any reason to suspect that Ramsdell was poorly in-formed about Vietnarb." Rarrisdell was sent into QUang Ngai 'Province, on, Feb. 4--�-40, days before MY Lai�to run -the...clandes-tine Operation Phoenix, h wrote Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 27 MAR 1972 (b)(3) iAroutul the Nation 4' CIA hi Mylai � vaxotaIglaila � Author Seymour M. Hersh says an agent for the Cen-'1.1'4 Intelligence Agency mis-led the planners of the ill-starred 1963 attack on My-� lai by telling them they . would find a Vietcong bat-talion there. 'The agent de-nies it. " The assault units met only old men, women and chil-dren in the South Vietnam-ese village. Many were killed by the American troops. �Hersh identifies the agent In a new book as Robert B. . Ramsdell, now a private in-vestigator in Orlando, Fla. Ramsdell denied Hersh's al-legations and said that al-though he was working for the CIA in the Mylai area at the time of the killings, he had nothing to do with in-telligence reports to the - Amereans.. , Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release:. 2018/01/30 CO2792462 By RICHARD CRITCHFIELD Star Staff Writer IN THE MIDST OF WARS. By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row. 386 pages. $12.50. When Edward Lansdale returned to an almost-defeated Vietnam in the fall of 1965, he was already a fabled figure, the legendary Asian hand who had been the mentor of the Philip. pines' great anti-guerrilla fighter, Roman Magsaysay, as well as Ngo Dinh Diem's first American political-military adviser in the mid4950s, Although he was. then 58, he still had an air of youthful Idealism; with his haggard good looks and brown hair only tinged with gray, he might have stepped out of the pages of Eric Ambler or Ian Flaming. One saw at once why he had inspired major characters in both "The Ugly American," by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, and Graham Greene's classic on the Indochina war, "The Quiet American." BOOKS � a In "The Ugly American," Lansdale was barely disguised as Colonel Edwin D. Hillandale, a haromonica-playing good guy who "loves to be with people, any kind of people." In a frankly admiring sketch, the authors wrote, "In 1952 Colonel Hillandale was sent to Manila as liaison officer to something ,or other. In a short time the Philippines fascinated him. He ate his meals in little Filipino restaurants . . . he even. 'attended the University in his spare hours to study Tagalog* The counsellor up at the American Embassy always spoke of him as 'that crazy bastard.' But within six months the crazy bastard was eating breakfast with Magsaysay and he soon became Maksaysay's unofficial adviser." � BUT THERE was another way of interpreting Lansdale and Greene turned it into literature in his bitterly brilliant :"The Quiet American." The novel is a despairing portrayal of .a young idealistic CIA operative who blunders tragically .through the intrigue, treachery and confusion of Vietnamese 'politics. Innocent and well-meaning, but naive, the American leaves a trail of blood and suffering in his wake. Greene's young American was sent to Indochina in the early 1950s to help create an indigenous political force that could resist a Communist takeover when the French pulled out. In May, 1954, John Foster Dulles dispatched Lansdale to Saigon with secret orders to see if anything could be salvaged from the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Lansdale became Diem's adviser at the time the Vietnamese leader was defying the Geneva agreements, which both he and the United States refused to sign, resettling almost a million refugees from the Communist north- and beginning to make South Vietnam a nation. In the novel, the Lansdale figure, after becoming involved in a terrorist explosion in Saigon � an incident that actually took place before Lansdale went to Vietnam � is murdered by the Communists. Thus when Lansdale came haek to Saigon in 1965, It was rather like Greene's quiet American coming back to Saigon in 1935, it was rather like Greene's quiet American coming to life again. Oddly, the Vietnamese started calling Lansdale "the phoenix" after one of their household gods. What would he do?. "What does a man do," Lansdale told us at the time, "when he returns to a country, 10 years later, with great stress on its social and political structure, great suffering,' great pain. I have no great plan. One's got to move in with tremendous gentleness; these people have been divided and hurt and a lot of clumsiness could divide and hurt them more. But there isn't much time. They need rule of law, consent of the governed in how they are governed and a life in which kids have some hope of tomorrow. I feel the Vietnamese are in their last quarter. This is the ninth inning and we either do it now or not at all." ' He was brimming with plans for sweeping land reform, rural electrification, bringing back all the able administrators purged for serving Diem, restoring Confucian ethics, putting strict restraints on American artillery and air strikes. But he was quickly stripped or any real authority. On Jan. 21, 1966; Philip Habib, now ambassador to South Korea who ran the embassy's political aection, sent Lansdale a memoran-dum, reportedly signed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, forbidding him further contact with the Vietnamese leaders. Lansdale the phoenix. Perhaps the Vietnamese should have remembered a line of Greene's in "The Quiet American:" if� � � but nothing nowadays is fabulous and nothing rises from its ashes." "IN THE MIDST of Wars" is his own discreet account of the years in Asia from 1950 to 1956, the brilliantly successful four he spent helping to defeat the Huks and elect Magsaysay president in the Philippines, the less successful two in Viet-nam assisting Diem to unite the feudal religious sects, defeat the.gangster army which ruled Saigon and begin a pacification effort against the budding Vietcong insurgency. It is an invaluable historical document and an exciting adventure story, and like the author himself, rugged, humor-ous, compassionate, baffling, naive and a little infuriating. In tho book's anti-climactical final paragraph, Lansdale briefly notes he returned to Vietnam again from 1965 to 1968, closing his book with the cryptic sentence, "But that's another story, quiet different from the experiences f,lescribed in this book?" Why another story? From his personal viewpoint, of course, he went back as a civilian in an enormous, disarrayed American mission torn by interagency rivalry in a war already going badly, and he was never allowed to come up to bat. But would his approach have worked if he had? The book's final chapter is devoted to Lansdale's belief that irregular war is not just another aspect in the art of fighting but is a complex primarily political struggle for political ends. "Fundamentally," he writes, "the people of a country are the main feature on a' battleground of Communist choosing, since the ensuing struggle becomes one between the Commu-nists and the government over which side will have the allegiance of the people. Whichever side wins that allegiance will win the country. . . In other words, a country's strength Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 :Rcv.a-tinvy4 rc war con �Mere Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462RLD 19 MARCH 1972 2ele.cted:piesident deSpite*..the 4 , Filipino political establishment. In South Vietnam, he did r � his best to perform the same role in a more difficult situa-tion with Ngo Dinh Diem. . . Throughout, Lansdale promoted his belief that democ-racy on the American model was exportable, desirable,. and an effective method of countering Communist "peo-ple's wars." In his view, the theories of Washington, Jeffer-son, and Lincoln were both morally and tactically superior to those of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and his evangelism was unabashed: - sharing our - ideology while Making others strong ; enough to embrace and hold it for their own, the Amer'. can people strive toward a millennium when the world will be free and wars will be past. - In the Midst of Wars � An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. By Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper &Row. Illustrated. 386.pp. $12.50 'Reviewed by SHERWOOD DlCKERMAN To.. Graham Greene's jaundiced British eye, he was a � inodel for Pyle, the na�ly dangerous "Quiet American." . Burdick and Lederer took an approving, American view . a him as Colonel Hillandale of The Ugly American. In -Jean Larteguy's Yellow Fever, he was Colonel Teryman,.� astute, somewhat sinister and, of course, anti-French. Now Major General Edward Geary Lansdale has finally 'written his own book about himself. In the Midst of Wars -covers the six years from 1950 through 1956 when Lans-dale, in the Philippines first and then in South Vietnam, ivaS Washington's leading agitprop agent for American-style democracy and against communism. An Air. For�ce Antelligence officer well connected with the Central In-�V telligence Agency, Lansdale was a cold war cendottiere.� Sherwood Dickerman spent five years in Southeast Asia as a foreign correspondent. Madame Nhu, Dm, Lansdale, 1956 who became possibly the most influential single American in Southeast Asia and certainly the most controversial. As . the close friend and adviser of Ramon Magsaysay, Lans-dale helped to defeat the Communist Hukbalahap rebellion The Washington officials to whom Lansdale addressed this message were, he notes, "not toe happy" over it. In the sadder and wiser America of tie 1970s, perhaps most Americans would not be happy ,,sith Lansdale's sense ,of global commitment to democratic panaceas. (Yet the Lansdale spirit is not so dated as it may sound; it survives, perhaps in more sophisticated forais, among able and in-telligent men at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and else-where.) . In trying. to realize his ideal, Lansdale was ingenious and ruthless. He was an early student of Maoist military theory and psychological warfare. "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," he writes, and the premise is that the other side played dirty first. Thus he writes approvingly of a Filipino psywar squad that drained the blood of an ambushed Huk through punctures in his neck to terrify the man's corn. rades of d vampire. Lansdale also recalls his success in causing a mass work .stoppage in Hanoi at the time of the Communist takeover� there-through distribution of phony leaflets proclaiming a' one-week victory holiday. - He does not tell all, however, which is probably one 'reason why the book by Lansdale reads less melodramat-ically than the ones about him. Through the Pentagon Papers, it is known that Lansdale's American agents in Hanoi also sabotaged the city's bus fleet at that time to embarrass the Vietminh and .that American-trained Viet-namese guerrillas, the "Hao" -and "Binh" teams, were in-filtrated into :Haiphong under his direction for anti-Com-niunist underground activity. It may not be surprising for a retired career officer to omit such secret and sensitive material, but in Lansdale's ease there are grounds for sus-pecting that he may have omitted more than he put in. His protests about exaggerated news reports of his activity in - .Vietnam sometimes have a hollow tone. Certainly Lansdale's 386-page book is no comprehensive record of the U.S. involvement in either the Philippines or Vietnam during this period. Neither are there any major historical revelations. What does emerge strongly is the personal philosophy and style of America's best-known ".`nation-builder" in Southeast Asia at a time when the nation-building concept was generally accepted and ap-plauded. Anecdotes, alternate with moralizations. Out of these, Lansdale app7.ors as idealistic and courageous (he notes offhandedly at' at lie was marked for assassination in both Manila and Saigon), a warmly sentimental man to-in the Philippines and to' get the idesli,iie Magsaysav ward Asian friendg nnd 51 quick-study improviser and - � - - Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2 MAR 1972 (b)(3) ['Jou ac� ta Daily World Combined Services � American B-52 heavy bombers yesterday made their heaviest attacks in two weeks against the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In Saigon, more evidence of political skulduggery emerged, in the case of a Saigon puppet general fired by puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu at the beginning of the week on the "recommendation" of U.S. adviser John Paul Vann. Gen. Le Ngoc Trien, eommand-er of the Saigon. puppet 22nd In-fantry Division, was relieved of his command on Monday by Thieu at what was described as a "high-level" military conference at Nha Trang, 190 miles northeast of Saigon. Nha Trang was formerly U.S. Special Forces headquarters in South Vietnam and is also a center of U.S. Central Intelligence Agen-cy operations. Vann, the U.S. adviser � not otherwise described � recommended that Gen. Trien be fired because he was suffering from "a case of nerves and can't hack:it." Trien's forces are stat-ioned in the Kontum-Pleiku region of the Central Highlands and the coastal province of Binh Dinh. Tied to U.S. elections What made thp U.S.-inspired move by Thieu significant was that Thieu on Monday tied in the defense of the vital Central High-lands region to Nixon's reelection goal. Thieu asserted that "the Communists" would try to defeat Nixon by gaining military victor-ies in the Central Highlands and thus disproving Nixon's "Viet-namization" scheme. The firing of Gen. Trien therefore is a move within the context of U.S. domes-tic politics. Thieu's remarks appeared on Tuesday in two Saigon news-papers: Tin Song, which is financ-ed by his own private secretary, bang Duc Nha, and the news-paper Chinh Luan, which was de-scribed by United Press Inter-national as having a "special relationship" with the (Saigon puppet) presidential palace. Chinh Luan is also known to be in the good graces of the Saigon National �Police. Thieu declared, according to . these papers, "1972 is the last year for the Communists to achieve final success. To help bring about Nixon's defeat, North Vietnamese must try to demon-strate the failure of Vietnamiza-tion by inflicting a crushing mili-tary defeat." He asserted that the "Commu-nist thrust" would be aimed at Gen. Trien's area, and thus Trien was being fired. It was not until yesterday that U.S. newsmen dug up the fact that Thieu's action and the reas-ons behind it all originated with the U.S. . � The Central Highlands region of South Vietnam has been a cen-ter of fierce struggle against the Japanese, the French colonial-ists, the Saigon puppets and their U.S. masters. In the 1946-54 war against the French, the Central Highlands were regarded by the French com-mand as a center of Viet Minh strength; among the French lower ranks, being posted to the Central Highlands was regarded as the equivalent of a death sentence: In the 1954 Geneva discussions, the Vietnamese patriots argued that the Central Highlands should be included in the area under their control but agreed to the region temporarily being assigned to the French zone until scheduled elections were held in 1956. The elections were never held. Heavy fighting was reported raging yesterday in the Central Highlands and the adjoining Binh inh coastal province. Seven separate B-52 air strikes were called in a single, 450-square-mile area in the region, while in other areas, U.S. fighter-bombers were called in to drop napalm and bombs around encircled Saigon puppet army units. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 7-Forrnii: U.S. Sen. Wayne I Morse Of Oregon told a Western I Washington State College au-dience Tuesday, numbering noj more"than 100, that the nation is I Well on its way to "government' by executive supremacy and se-crecy." More, one of the Senate's earliest doves, used the series' of "presidential wars" as an ex-ample of presidents exceeding then...constitutional authority. , "The President has no power 'to make war�that power , is solely invested in the Con-gress:" he said. He blamed the present situatien on political cowards in Congress. lie is currently a candidate for the Senate seat of Sen. Mark Hatfield.) Back to Wilson BELLINGHAM, WASH. HERALD MAR 1 1972 E - 21,494 8 -22,543 r-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Morse warns students of executtve supremacy . . _ � � By HUNTLY GORDON Morse,.. considering himself E Of The Bellingham Herald strict constitutionalist. said o� constitutional law: "I didn'� teach it ,all my life to walk ow on it." Morse retraced the years ot his obstruction on the Senatei Foreign Relations Committee, during which he called the Eis-enhower administration's top. men "liars." . He accused then Secretary of State John. Foster Dulles of sit-ting at the conference table in Geneva working out a peace far: Indochina while secretly seek-ing alliances from Britain and France to perpetuate � the war, and Eisenhower of "honey-I combing" Vietnam with CeLit.W.1 / Intelligence Acrencv agenrS7 if � He criticize the U.S. action following the 1954 treaty, which created only one Vietnam. Product of U.S. "South Vietnam was the prod-racing his premise of grow- net of the U.S., set up in Saigon ing executive supremacy. he with a puppet ruler, he said. took it back to the tune of Pres- He also � criticized the con-ident 'Woodrow Wilson. lie said version of the 17th parallel from that if Wilson had used the con-- a military demarcation into a stitutional provision of the ad- :political demarcation. vise and consent clause in ad- He moved on to criticize the vance of his peace measures. Formosa resolution of 1955, the world could have been dif- 'which, he said is now causing ferent today. ,the nation embarrassment in its He rapped Presidents John new relationship with China. .Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and He rapped Kennedy's escala-Richard Nixon for not sending:.tion of the Vietnam war, but up a war mesSage seeking clec-' added that shortly' before his laration Of wdr in Vietnam. He i death, he had seen "his errors," said they didn't dare to seek a and would have pulled out mili-declaration , of war because the tarily had he lived. Morse said.i action is ,"untenable and The Gulf of _Tonkin resolution gal." He said "the mess we're in Asia" began in 1953 With te Eisenhower military .taimment policy in Asia. policy � to stop communism was not constitutional, Morse, said: "Eisenhower didn't get his power from the Constitution, if he got it from God. he 'never re- � leased the text of the conversa-tion," the still - peppery Orego-_ Wan said, � he criticized because the entire incident had been falsified, he, said. He said the ship which had been attacked wasn't 65' miles at sea and�its mission had been spying. He said because of the nature' of the ship, the international doctorine of hot pursuit pre-vailed. 4 And secrecy, too He criticized government se-crecy which made the resolu-tion possible and said: "If 5 per cent of the truth had been known, it would never have got-ten out of committee." Although he criticized Con-gress for failing to halt presi-dential power encroachment, he was just as tough on the courts. He said the Supreme Court has failed to take cases which examine' presidential ursurpa-tion of constitutional power. � He said a free and open press is necessary to the proper con-duct of government. He praised Daniel Ellsberg for exposing the Pentagon Papers and Jack An-derson for releasing classified documents so the people could really know what was going on. "This afternoon. we're in-. volved in a major war -in -Laos,' There are American officers and mercenaries fighting an il-, legal war, which we continue to fight," he said. Only with the secrecy stripped away from government can the Congress, let along the4 people, know what is going on,:erl, (b)( 3) Approved for Release: 2018/61/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b) GREENSBORO, N.C. RECORD MAR E 33,470. 1 1972 Editor, The Record: Because Americans so much ant to believe their president and want to believe that what is happening in Indochina is all right and that our position is improving, if slowly, it is hard to keep the basic facts of the situation in f u 11 perspective. What are these facts? 1. In Cambodia most of the countryside is in the hands of . revolutionaries of many types, ; including hard core communists and also followers of Prince Sihanouk. They are consolidat-ing their positions and setting up an infrastructure so- that when they take over the capital that they can set up an effective government and resist attacks. The Lon Nol regime is maintain-ing its precarious position on the basis of support from the U.S., by using mercenaries and for-eign, troops, and by training Cambodian soldi e rs in South Viet Nm under the 2. clients in Laos are alSo in �a stea '131 worsening position. The Royal Laotian Army is es-sentially moribund. The forces holding the communist Pathet Lao at bay are: a, Thai troops and the threat of further Thai commitments backed by the U.S., b. Mao tribesmen (an eth-nic minority) under the pay, support and direction of the C.I.A., and c. U.S. air power. The Mao tribesmen have been worn down to using even nine year olds as soldiers. The com-munists now have sophisticated anti-aircraft defenses and, de-spite heavy air a ttack st are making increasing use of artil-lery and tanks and thus over-running government positions previously considered se cu r e. Our bombing has depopulated much of nort hern Laos and caused intense hatred of remain-ing and displaced tribesmen. 3. In South Viet Nam the "new" army of Thieu and oth-ers has given up to sorties into Cambodia and other contested areas and has basically with-drawn behind a ring of Ameri-can air power to take up def en-sive positions around population area s. Thieu has still not established any significant pop-ular support other than the land-lords, and has had to use ex-treme measures to repress stu-dents, workers, Buddhists a n d Catholics some of whom still dream of setting up a genuinely neutral "third force" govern-ment and thus stopping the kill-fl In sum, the military, political and economic situation in all three of our client nations is not good, is deteriorating, and is being sustained by massive American aid, This situation is not deteriorating so fast that it will embarrass Nixon be f or e November. His reelection game plan just might work. But let's be clear just what is happening. We are prolonging the agony of millions of local peoples in Indo-china, killing and maiming un-told numbers in our "unin-volved" air war. We are still draining our treasury and killing our youth. We are continuing to damage our military morale. We � are still dividing our own nation in deep and long lasting ways. We are delaying return of Amer-ican prisoners of war. We are deflecting national attention and energy from many severe do-mestic needs. We are prolonging the draft . and all its attendant problems. Is it worth all this 'just to get Nixon reelected? Can people really support a politician like Nikon who would place his own political future ahead of so many crucial national needs. The coming primaries in North Carolina will be a good indica-tion of just how badly America wants to forget, to put out of mind, our national agony. PATRICK W. CONOVER. Greensboro. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 mina T TETTITUD ThIrr ATACPT trrerrrtr. sirr iroRNIA Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 `""" "JattAJ ALI 1 ',larch 1972 RICK GLIDSTADT r 9 rAN [jVi) aftcl clop .V.r[itmEy. Not long ago the counter-culture's own superstar; Allen Ginsberg, appeared on the Dick Cavett Show. After first chanting a Hindu psalm for some two minutes (watch out, Dick, your ratings are slipping), Ginsberg began weaving an enchanting web of mystery, high intrigue and crash exploitation�a tale of the CIA's involvement. .in the heroin trade of Sbutheast Asia. in a straight forward manner Ginsberg told of a coektail party, a la radical chic, which he attended with the CIA's chief, Richard Helms. It seems the two made a friendly v, T...er. Ginsberg accused the CIA of maintaining an open market for opium (from which heroin is derived) at Long Cheng, a CIA-built stronghold in Laos. Helms denied this, and so they made the bet. If Ginsberg lost, he was to turn over his Hindu scepter. If, however, Ginsberg's accusations were correct, Helms was to meditate every day for a year�a thought as frivolous as watching Richard Nixon turn on for a national television audience. As Ginsberg was rapping this bit of people's folklore, he was all the time waving that very same Hindu scepter, as if he was exorcising the evil powers-that-be with -a magic wand. The rest of Ginsberg's story is history�past and future�as set out boldly in the May, 1971 issue of Ramparts. � Such an open market for opium, in the true capitalistic sense, does in fact exist �at Long Cheng�with the open blessings of the powerful, clandestine CIA. This much has been told by as many as eight journalists who have managed to slip past the ultra-high security structure of Long Cheng, as the Far Eastern Economic Review reported last year. , Carl Strock, one of the reporters, gave an eye-witness account tells of "American / -crews loading T-28 bombers while armed CIA agents chatted with uniformed Thai soldiers and piles of raw opium stood for sale in the market (a kilo for $52) ..." Where much, if not most, of this money earned from opium goes is towards the support of "friendly" capitalistic governments in Southeast Asia. For example, Newsweek has said that General Duane, former chief of the Laotian general staff, was forced into a premature retirement due to excessive exposure of his role in thd opium trade. General Duane, who, the New York Tomes said, "has never denied allegations that he is in charge of the opium traffic in Laos," even confided to news-men that supporting opium traffic is a "good thing." Not only does this occupation provide the Meo tribesmen with a livelihood, Newsweek reported Ovane as saying, but it keeps them from the control of the Communist Pathet Lao. It is by now common parlor talk that these same Meo tribesmen are equipped and instructed for warfare, In a most thorouah manner, by the "freedom-loving" CIA. Although not as clearly documented, there is a preponderance of evidence of dealings in opium traffic at the highest level of South Vietnam's government. In . a broadcast reported by the N.Y. Times, NBC charged President Thieu and Vice President Ky with profiting from the drug traffic, and the Vietnamese police were accused of pushing illegal drugs (note the parallel with New York City). In that � same broadcast NBC reported that the biggest pusher was said to be Thieu's closest 'adviser and special assistant for military and intelligence affairs, Lieut-Gen. Dang Van Quang. All NBC's charges were attributed to "extremely reliable sources." Su much for a mere spattering of the suspected truth. What all this suggests, incredible as it might seem, is that the United States government, directly or indirectly, is supporting a procedure which results in the heroin addiction of hun-dreds of thousands of American citizens. We should all know that Nixon has proudly proclaimed a "most significant" deal with. Turkey, a country which, according to Nixon, exports two-thirds of the world's heroin. This fact is somewhat contradicted, however, by a -report by the UN Commission on Drugs and Narcotics. Referred to by both Ramparts and Ginsberg, this report stated that since 1966, 80% of the world's 1,200 tons of illicit opium comes �not from Turkey, but from Southeast Asia. , evnfintl&I Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 23 FEB 1972 Viet Prisoner-Rescue Unit to Be Disbanded Fate of Secret Squad Parallels That of Other Clandestine Operations in S.E. Asia BY GEORGE McARTHUR � ' � � � Times Staff Writer . � SAIGON�A secret corn-. mand of American sol-diers specially trained for prisoner rescue raids in hostile ,territory is sched-uled to be disbanded some time this month. According to an officer long involved in clandes-tine operations, the move will take from the U.S. command in South Viet-nam its last cloak-and-dag-ger outfit specifically honed to fight its way in and oht of prisoner camps. (The secret unit being disbanded was trained for use in the jungles of South Vietnam, Laos and Cam-bodia and not for such spectaculars as the unsuc-cessful raid on Son Tay in North Vietnam in Novem-ber, 1970.) Scattered ArOund Though there are. plenty' of toughly skilled Ameri-cans in Sbuth Vietnam to mount such. raids if the chance arises, they are 'scattered among many Units. There are also small outfits � like Navy seal eteams�available for such things, but they are not specifically trained and kept in readiness for pris-oner rescue grabs. Consequently the stand-down of the secret prison-er rescue group has stirred heated words within the headquarters of U.S. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams. Abrams, who has an ill-concealed suspicion Of the value of elite units super-imposed on the Army's reg-ular structure, has repor-tedly resisted arguments to go lightly on the with-drawal of such outfits. Since the prisoner rescue unit was formed af-ter the big influx of Amer-ican .troops in 1965-66 it has not succeeded in res-cuing a single American' prisoner held by the Viet' Cong, though it has helped 5.earch a� small number of. S .o u t h Vietnamese cap-tives from jungle camps. The unit had a parallel mission of saving downed pilots in cases where ground commandos might be required in addition to the crews of Air Force rescue helicopters known as Jolly Green Giants. If any such operation was ever mounted it has not been_ revealed. Some offi-cers hint, however, that some operations of this type took place. Not Many Captives One reason the unit has few successes ,to its credit is that it was used sparing-ly and under the strictest limitations. To avoid en-dangering the lives of any captives with "fishing ex-peditions," special raids were ordered only when intelligence turned up hard and immediatennfor-mation on the location of Viet Cong POW camps. Thus, while the unit had few successes . it could equally boast few failures in the sense of botched or. sloppy efforts. - The number of Ameri-can captives in Viet Cong .camps is also very small. Casualty figures list 463 Americans missing in South Vietnam. The Unit-ed States claims 78 of these were known from various sources to have been alive at the time of their capture and were consequently listed as war prisoners. Of these, however, only 20, have been acknowledged by Viet Cong propaganda _broadcasts as prisoners. The justification for the Approved for Relea S p e cial prisoner -rescu commando of a relative sidiary unit known as th handful of men it there-- 11-57 De6chment precipi fore small in the face of tated what became know as the Green Berett, case the overall troop with-That case � which in drawal demands�the U.S. volved the execution of force level is now 127,000 suspected double agent men and the current goal blew the cover on how ex-is 69,000 by May 1. tensive clandestine opera-The withdrawa I, tions had grown in South however, underscores the Vietnam. It also caused a unpublicised decline hi all number of heads to roll eland estine operations within the U.S. establish, which has paralleled the meat and resulted in a pullout of regular troops. general hunkering down .CIA Cutback of cloak-and-dagger types. This actually be ga n Military spokesmen say / about 1960 when the Cen- that a number of SOG per-tral Intelligence Agency sonnel have been drib-began to sharply trim bling out for several its involvement in many programs. Part of this was caused. by Abrams, who disliked hav-ing Army types under CIA command as was the case in several areas. At any rate, the CIA began to withdraw provincial agents from the Phoenix program�aimed at root-ing out and killing Viet Cong, "Phantom govern-ment" officials�and quit funding (and controlling) such programs as the training school at Vung Tau which turned out government Revolutiona-ry Development cadre. Though the CIA's tenta-cles still reach all the sen-sitive areas of control in South Vietnam, the em-phasis now is less on "operational" areas and more on pure intelligence gathering. Paralleling the CIA's .ap-preciably lower silhouette, the, Green Beret troopers of the 5th Special Forces Group were pulled out a year ago�their clandes-tine operations being ab-sorbed by an outfit known as SOG�the Studies and Observations Group. SOG is a cloak.- and - dagger grabbag at Abrams' head-quarters, incorporating a dozen or so outfits which inontns. Its tuture will probably be sharply di-minished within the next several months when the troop withdrawal program enters its final phase. Paralleling these de-clines in the "secret war' is the increased use of sen-sors and computers re-quiring fewer men in the field and more brainpower at headquarters. Long-range patrols into Cambodia, Laos and even NorthVietnam have been virtually eliminated by the seeding of the Ho hi Minh Trail with electronic sensors. Much of the cern-.puterized analysis on the readouts from these sen-sors is now done from a se-cret Air Force establish-ment in Thailand and not in South Vietnam (though the results are still chan-neled into 7th Air Force headquarters at Tan Son Nhut where the air. war -egr tinues to be run). While clandestine oper-ations on the ground have lessened, the Air Force has also cut the number of planes that were part of the "secret war." These planes were in conglomer-do everything from super-. ate outfits .known as spe-cial operations squadrons. They included everything from helicopters for drop-ping penetration agents to r a die -.packed executive jets equipped to pick up The operations of SOG radio in from are noticeably less visible agents deep in enemy today �than their. were a land. The squadrons also se: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 - - secret long-range patrols to analyzing documents a n d interrogating top-rank prisoners. Less Visible ... a (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 THE NEW REPUBLIC 19 FEB 19/2 The CIA put your brother in Vietnam. CIA heroin traffic turned him on to smack. You are paying the CIA $ 6 billion a year for these social services. EA magazine EARTH Magazine - The Agriculture Building The Embarcadero at Mission San Francisco, California 94105 Please send me a one-year subscription to EARTH. I enclose cash, check or money order for $8.00. NAME ADDRESS CITY & STATE ZIP Mcn rt-th To 175. Approved for Release:.2918/01/30 CO2792462-nv cohccrintion to EAR-PH. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 DA LY Vi CID 18 'FEB 1972 Activities of Nixon's aides _ President Nixon's promise of a "generation of peace" should be considered in the context of the latest war moves from Washington. They include: VIETNAM: The indefinite postponement of the Paris peace talks by Ambassador William Porter. This follows on the jingoistic declamations by the forme it -CIA agent at the meetings in the past couple of months, and his filthy slander of the Versailles confer-ence last weekend. . VIETNAM: The prolonged and massive bombing of South Vietnam. A new dimension has been added to the barbarous destruction of the land, its people; dwellings, means of livelihood. Hitherto, the air assaults have been carried out from Thailand and the three U.S. carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Beginning Monday, B-52s recently flown to Guam and based there have been assigned to the so-called "Limited duration" devastation program. GREECE: Establishment of a U.S. naval base at Pir-aeus. . In return for U.S. support, the dictatorial junta has agreed that the U.S. establish a home port for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and for 10,000 Naval personnel and dependents, at the port for Athens. SOVIET UNION: In preparation for the Defense Department's campaign to extract new billions from the Federal Treasury, Secretary Melvin Laird has pitched higher the Administration's hysterical warnings of Soviet peril and has demanded billions for new weapons, includ-ing a one-billion-dollar appropriation for a new advanced missile submarine: These and other manifestations of the glaring contra-diction between Nixon's words and his government's deeds ,have moved the Senate to enact � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � VIS1V) 104 .346 JO� Spockal . By SHERLEY UHL , Press Politics Editor There may be more activity - on the outside than on the inside at the Republican Na-tional Convention in August, but any demonstrations will be peaceful, Dr. Benjamin Spock predicted here today. The widely recognized pe-diatrician, running for the ; -presidency on . the People's Party ticket, said anticipated protests in San Diego are "well ajong, in plannings." Permits Sought He said youth groups eve'l now are negotiating with offi-. dials there for permits am other arrangements necessary to conduct "nonviolent" dem-onstrations at the convention. "It won't be a civil disobedi-ence type of thing," he ex-plained. Instead, he insisted, it will be an orderly attempt to "keep the pressure on" in demands for troop withdraw-als and peace. Spock said he Is not aware of what might occur at the Dem-ocratic convention in Miami Beach, but he described the 1968 demonstrations in Chica-;, go as "infinitely worthwhile." . "They radicalized tens of. � millions of young people," said Spock. "It was brutal . . . � America will never be the tame." � Spock, one of the godfathers of the youth protest move-ment, was in Pittsburgh to rustle up not only interest in his candidacy, but also signa-tures on petitions, yequired to put his name on the ballot. March 8.Deadline � The peoples Party needs $6,000 signatures by March 8, and, said Spock, it probably will be necessary to.� c011ect 65,000 to overcome all chat-. - lenges. At a. news conference, he Outlined his platform, includ-;in i m late halt in edc'efld; VS DR. BENJAMIN SPOCK Won't be "intimidated." withdrawal of "troops, merce-nary and paramilitary (Cen-tral Intelligence A g eller fuses." . 1 He also would withhold eco-nomic support from the Thieu government. Spock contended it was "out- . rageous" for presidential as-sistant H. R. Haldeman and � others to impute treasonous motives to war critics. "The American people voted for his (Haldeman'S) boss be-cause Nixon promised a quick end to the war in Vietnam," said Speck. "I hope American people won't be intimidated by that kind of rubbish." In response to questions, Spock said he is dedicated to _ the U. S. and, "It's our govern-ment that is lousing up our relations with other nations." He speaks at 8 p. m. today st Lawrence Hall, Point Park College, downtown, and lateii?. will attend a beer lest at Peg/ pies Party headquarters Oakland. �el . � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 BE L. flP CO Available Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 FEBRUARY 1972 Ctql;7,1:{0 I A VID 10 � 1 ri9incraiibile, ma' chi e uscita be-tie dalla rivelazione del farnoso Rapport� McNamara � sul Vietnam, e stata proprlo la C.I.A. Questo ente misterioso e colossale, sfuggente e onnipresente, temuto, ca-lunniato, dalle leggende false e pro palate ad arte quale schermo per ye-rita che battono le invenzioni roman-zesche, danito ii delinquente min�-. rile della politica estera americana �, dalle recenti pubblicazioni di documen-ti segreti sal conflitto chc hanno divi-so e sconvolto gli Stati Uniti, risulta schierato la maggior parte &lie_ vol-te eon le � colombe � anzicliC con falchi �, sprezzante le illusioni di go-vernanti e di militari sulle possibilita di vittoria. E anche contrario ai born-" lc, determinante quella conversio-ne del niiiiitro della Difesa Robert McNamara clic turbo graveinente ii Presidente Johnson c costituisce uno dei drammi .psicologici della nostra e-poca, coerente insomnia con quella ri-volta popolare, giovanile, dci beatnik, dgli hippy, clegli intellettuali e degli irregolari che indusse Lyndon Johnson a non ripresentarsi candiclato e che e ancora attualmente c potenzialmente al cuore della crisi americana. .Si direbbc che la C.I.A., organ� di spionaggio c azione scgreta, abbia pre-ferito combattere in Asia sudorientale da.sola, una guerra personale � co-me l'aveva concepita c voluta John Kennedy, (pale si era iniziata fra bar c le abitazioni galleggianti di Sai-bardamenti del Vietnam tt t ! be hate a mano, pugnalate, voltafac-cia e tregue, con ragazzini portaordi-ni e belle figliole che distraevano gli avversari, anziche ridurre la rivalita con i comunisti a quell� che ii poeta Auden chiarna revento stypido e- grossolano delle battaglie Non ci Si meravigli Sc i misted, le operazioni e le delusioni della C.I.A. evocano citazioni letterarie: l'immagi-nazione 6 inclispensabile per penctrar-la, per indovinare da quell� che ine-sorabilmente trapela quanto ci sia di vero c tremendo nel groviglio an fin-ziamenti, nomine, impiegati, agenti pa-lcsi e segrcti, cadaveri. II defunto se-natore democratic� Richard B. Rus-sell, che era presidente della Commis-sione per le forze armate e sostenito-orm r dr fiumo Arlekano con born-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO279246 r dei massirno riserbo sulk attivita 2e 70ntintiod ) yrvitr went, 'Tonere Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 80 DEC 1971 (b)( 3)` � U.S.DiplomatsinWetnam' Said to Face Moral issue I. WASHINGTON, Dec. 29�As-signments to Vietnam�par-ticularly to the pacification programs there�have caused By BENJAMIN WELLES Special to The New York Times �wnen we're given the facts," a Pentagon spokesman said, "we always look into atrocity charges." The magazine article is mane many young career diplomats with the name "John Cray-to face a serious "moral dilem- more," a pseudonym, the jour-ma," according to an article in nal explains, for a former dip-the December issue of the For- lomat who served in Vietnam and whose primary reason for eign Service Journal, subsequently resigning from the The critical question, the ar- Foreign Service was "disagree-tide says, is how far they men with United States policy should go in exposing incidents on ECutheast Asia." "which they knew to be CLigressional and diplomatic wrong." . One Foreign Service officer, now back from Vietnam and on his way to another overseas assignment, is reported by the article to possess a file of "documented atrocities, includ-ing Photographs." "He has written extensive reports on these apparent wan crimes he investigated in Viet-nam," the article states. "As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the , guilty, it says. � The article, which is entitled "Vietnamization of the Foreign Service," goes on to say that the owner of the file will not make his information public because he is a "supporter of the President's Vietnam policy and fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy." He is also "aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects," the earticle states. . Press Reports Cited State Department sources! said that the alleged atrocities' were investigated by the de-partment and were also re-ported in the United States press on Jan. 12, 1970. They are said to have concerned the South Korean "Tiger" Division, one of two South Korean infan-try divisions serving in Viet-nam, and not United States forces. A State Department spokes-man said that "implications in the article that United States forces were involved or that there was a cover-up by the State Department are just plain Inaccurate and misleading." A Pentagon spokesman said that officers in its Southeast Asian section had not been able to obtain the current issue of the Foreign Service Journal and thus could not comment. "The artiele Says that the Vietnam experience has "sharp-ened the generation gap" be-tween young and older diplo-mats. The younger officers, it says, often returned disillu-sioned with what they regard as deliberate suppression by senior officers of criticism eith-er of the Vietnamese authori-ties or of the United States military. The political section of the huge United States Embassy in Saigon is especially subject to riticism on these grounds, the article asserts. "Almost all foreign service officers who served in the paci-fication programs and most jun-ior members of the embassy staff itself give examples of how their reporting was distort-ed and suppressed in Saigon in order that the embassy might be consistent with the "to 'line' in dispatches vto Washington," the writer de. gram in Vietnam from 1966 to dares. � 1968 and later resigned to be-, Combat Experience come a foreign policy consult-ant to Congress. Mr. Marks has "Statistics they knew to be confirmed his authorship. I merely worthless were con-Thestantly being quoted by the Foreign Service Journal ! ''d f the United St , has a circulation of approxi- !as an indication that progress mately 10,000 copies through- was being made in Vietnam," out the executive branch and in !it says-Other points made in the , article included these: CWhile there was no clear 'State Department policy, most !Foreign Service officers in the field were expected to bear arms. Many participated in icombat operations and even e ry firalledie n m n on enemy sit es pooraiorntisl-; CThe State Department de-sources have identified the au-thor as John. D. Marks, who served in the pacification pro-Congress. It is published month-ly by the American Foreign Service Association, a voluntary group comprising approximate-ly 8,000 active and retired Foreign Service personnel. The article notes that nearly 3 million Americans have now served in Vietnam, including career diplomats, or approxi-mately 20 per cent of the For-eign Service. Approximately 350 � the great majority of them junior officers�have been assigned to the pacification program, known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. They have functioned as advisers to the South Vietnamese civilian and military administration � try-ing, the article says, to make the Government of South Viet-nam "a viable force in the countryside." Generation Gap 'Sharpened' Service in Vietnam, the ar-ticle says, is a unique experi-trice. In no other country have perhaps 20 per cent of the foreign service officers experi-mented with soft drugs, but of disagreement with the Viet--"that is the case in Vietnam," nam war, but "they are deli-it asserts. :nitely the exception and in "And in no other country," it each known case they have adds, "do foreign service offi-cers have their own personal been very junior officers." automatic weapons and receive The article maintains that, training in how to fire a gee_ despite the difficulties in re-nade-launcher before they go,,, cruiting _ Foreign Service per-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 cided during President Lyndon B. Johnson's second term that it must contribute 150 diplo-mats to the approximately 1,000 United States personnel military as well as aid, in-ytelligence and other civilians�in the CORDS program. Its pol-icy of making duty in the pac-ification program mandatory f of� junior officers split the Foreign Service until it was scrapped last August. Now as the United States presence in Vietnam is reduced, only vol-unteers who have previously served in at least one other diplomatic post are being sent. 'CA few Foreign Service offi-cers have resigned as a result sonnel for Vietnam, "the ma\ jority enjoy the experience once they go." Living conditions often are pleasant and, the article says, they find "the country and especially the women fascinat-ing." When these officers are as-signed elsewhere, it states, "the return to a more traditional Foreign Service assignment is often a letdown," (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 26 DEC. 1971 (b)(3) e5 okra S. Knight's NedeDoolz WITH THE PASSING of an-other Christmas, joyous for some and not so happy for oth-ers, my thoughts turn to our prisoners of war in Vietnam and the cumulative casualty lists since the beginning of our folly in that tragic land. Since 1961, 45,626 of our youth have died and another 302,367 are listed as wounded in a jungle war fought for unattain-able and mistaken objectives. The cruel drama of this re-pulsive war, together with the fateful decisions taken during the Kennedy administration, has never been more vividly por-trayed than in NBC's "Vietnam Hindsight," a remarkable two-part documentary which strip-,away all of the noble self-serving rhetoric and bared the bones of an unspeakable trage-dy. , First With Diem � IN THE Eisenhower adminis-tration, several hundred U.S. ad-visers were in South Vietnam to assist Ngo Dinh Diem, the first provisional president who was afterward reelected in 1961. President Diem was an ex-traordinarily strong ruler and a despot in deed and fact. Eisen-hower promised Diem financial aid and military training for Diem's Army, provided South Vietnam's ruler made a number of indicated land and other re-forms. Sadly, no reforms were ever made. � In the United States, Diem had the strong support of Joseph P. Kennedy, patriarch of the family, the late Cardinal Francis Spellman together with organi-zations of Americans determined to "stop communism" in South-east Asia. Later, Vice President Lyndon Johnson was to � call Diem "the Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia." Pressures Greiv FOLLOWING John F. Kenne-dy's election in 1960, the pres-sures for U.S. intervention be-came greater. By 1963, we had 16,000 troops in South Vietnam and were facing some very diffi-cult decisions indeed Jack Kennedy was a sorely. troubled man as he contemplat-ed his earlier statements that the struggle in Asia was net worth the life of a single American, and the growing awareness that the United States had become pre-cariously involved. His chief concerns arose from Diem's absolutism, rumors of a planned Coup against Diem and the chilling news that Sai-gon was losing the war. Within the White House. Kennedy advisers were divided on how to proceed.. After many fact finding missions to South Vietnam and long consultations with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a reluctant and torment-ed Kennedy -decided that Diem must go. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 contileaala letnarn Bloody Plot �THE CIA'S principal agent in Saigon had been in close contact with Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, leader of the plot against Diem. He informed "Big Minh" that the signals were green and on the first days of November, 1963, the Diem regime was over-thrown. Although President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had been offered safe conduct by Ambassador Lodge, Gen. Minh, by a vote of the conspirators, or-dered their assassination. A third brother, Ngo Dinh Can, was also executecion May 9. Their blood was on our hands. In effect and by not op-posing the coup, the White House had decreed their fate. Within three weeks of Presi-dent Diem's murder; John F. Kennedy � 35th President of the United States � was shot. and fatally wounded by an as-sassin as he rode in a motorcade in downtown Dallas. Bad Judgments THE NBC documentary fur-ther reveals In stark detail the appalling degree . of confusion and mistaken judgments which led tp Lyndon Johnson's escala-tion of the war in 1965. � Cabot Lodge is shown to have been a man rigidly inclined to imperious dictums. Defense Secretary McNamara was fight-ing a war with computers and Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 25 DEC � 1971 (1D)(3) A Canadian Perspective Amnesty When? Toronto At his November 12 press conference, Mr. Nixon was asked if, once the war was ended, he would grant am-nesty to young American men who went abroad to avoid the military draft. He was .obviously unpre-pared for the question. He had no circumlocutions or rhetoric at hand. He replied, "No." There are approximately 50,000 American war re-sisters in Canada, most of them "guilty" of breach of Selective Service or military law. They have been flow-ing across the border in a steady stream since the mid-sixties. Canada has granted those who qualify by edu-cation, skills, job offers, etc., "landed immigrant status" leading to citizenship. No question may be asked concerning their draft or military status in the process of "landing." Once landed, they are not ex-traditable by Canadian-US treaty. They have not com-mitted an offence punishable within Canada. They are a mixed lot. Some are educated, reflective young men who after attending Vietnam war sit-ins, rapping with their political science professors, and hassling the Selective Service system as long as pos-sible, have come to Canada prepared and have as-similated quickly. Others, less privileged, poorly edu-cated, who got caught up in military service and who split for Canada impulsively when on order to Viet-nani, have naturally had greater difficulty in adapting. What the articulate among them are saying goes something like this: "Amnesty is not ouF problem; it is the problem of guilt-ridden American liberals. We have done nothing for which we need to accept for-giveness. In a choice between being criminals in South-east Asia, being treated as criminals in American pris-ons and stockades, and a new life in Canada-. we chose Canada. The land of the free and the home of the 'brave has killed, crippled, jailed and exiled thou-sands of its young. Those Americans who find this fact hard to live with will try to make partial amends by amnesty or 'second chance' legislation. The likeli-hood of their succeeding in time to benefit any appreci-able number is negligible. If and when amnesty comes, we shall be launched on Canadian careers; have Cana-dian Wives, and Canadian children. Amnesty will mean being able to take the kids to visit their grandmother, instead of her having to visit them here. Americans in Canada with their heads screwed on right are not making any decisions concerning their future based on talk of amnesty." Rather than amnesty, war resisters in Canada prefer to focus upon what they call "repatriation." Repatria-tion is the right to return to the United States without any recrimination for breach of Selective Service or military law. It is amnesty with the Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 cepting forgiveness removed. Discussion of repatria-tion among expatriates is usually in the context of the realities of the ongoing war. All they see happening is a change in the color of skin among some of the ground troops. American boys are being returned in time and in sufficient numbers to affect the '72 elec-tion, while the horror continues unabated. Those who took a stand against the war and chose exile are saying that when the war ends completely � all troops, planes, advisors and CIA agents withdrawn � then and ohly then, the right of exiles to return may be considered along with other matters � US war guilt, release of political prisoners, reparation to the peoples of Indo-China. Repatriation is not thought of exclusively in terms of the return of exiles. The word is used to in-clude the release of prisoners and the surfacing of those who have gone underground. If the reaction of exiles is negative to amnesty pro-posals implying their guilt, imagine their, feelings about proposals which link them with war 'planners and criminals. There are suggestions abroad which call for amnesty for all war-related offences � for the Lt. Calleys as well as draft and military offenders. As a Women's Strike for Peace newsletter recently ex-pressed it, "This would solve the problem of war guilt by sweeping everyone under the rug together � those who refused to kill along with those who killed indis-criminately. Then we could forget the past and march on united to even greater national glory." The ideal of repatriation which the exiles hold up as just will never be realized. The US is not going to con-fess criminality, stage its own Nuremberg trial, and acknowledge the right of unqualified restitution to those who broke its laws resisting this war. The US may grant amnesty when it is politically expedient to do so, and when it can pass it off as a gesture of mag-nanimity and strength. That is what Senator Robert Taft, Jr. seems to have in mind, when he proposes amnesty for these "however misguided" young men who "are entitled to a second chance." When will this be? Perhaps when the political fight to renew Selective Service legislation the next time around does not seem worth the effort. 1974? A ges-ture of largeness of heart in the bicentennial year of 1976? In the meantime, young Americans in Canada are not holding their breath. Nor are they, in the nice phrase of one Vietnam veteran and deserter, "standing here at the border crying." Robert Gardner MR. GARDNER has been travelling across Canada this year, visiting, helping, interpreting young American exiles. He is the coordinator of the ministry to US draft age immigrants, sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches. no-. � Joky� ,�`. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 DEO 1971 (b)(3) � By JUDY BACHRACH .9t is in the interest of the U.S..government that the coup 1.shall succeed." Cable from John F. Kennedy to Henry Cabot Lodge. Well, last night gave us part II of the illustrated Pentagon Papers, otherwise known as Hindsight. And if anything, NBC's second episode was More fascinating than the " first. Yesterday's segment dealt with the events, the decisions, and the non-decisions that led up to the death of Diem. It focused less heavily on early Sixties footage than did the previous segment, preferring ..to concentrate almost exclu� sively on testimony from men who were then involved in our - complicity to overthrow a � government that had turned against us. And according to the show, our complicity was well nigh wholehearted by the time the coup of the generals took place. � Chief among the subjeris .1( was Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, a key CIA agent in Vietnam who 'now claims that as early as .August, 1963, he was given or-ders not to thwart a possible Coup of the Diem regime. It's hard to remember when there has been a more avid testifier . than Colonel Conein, or one more anxious to relay contem-porary history as he knew it and lived it. It was embarrassing In 1963, the United States �was growing increasingly dis-satisfied with Diem. He was getting repressive, he insti-tuted martial law, Buddhist monks were immolating them-selves, . it was embarrassing. Also, Diem was starting to make deals with North Viet-nam, and this was more than a little distressing to our gov-�ernment. "His brother told me" said Colonel Conein, "that IfDieml was dealing with the A documentary that really4 turns pack time HANS CONREID people of North Vietnam. So the generals knew this too. And they considered this a danger, because what were they fighting for if he negotiat-ed behind their back?" What indeed? Diem wanted above everything else to reuni-fy his country. Mr. Kennedy and his advisors were appalled at the idea of supporting a man who would sell them down the river. But the first coup was never pulled off. Robert Kennedy wanted ta get out of Vietnam totally arid some advisers concurred that withdrawal would be prefera-ble to supporting Diem. Only Robert S. McNamara wanted to delve a little deeper into the situation, and tripped off on a visit to Vietnam. According to Roger Hilsman, President Kennedy let him because he wanted to avoid divisiveness among his cabinet. From that time on, however, it became too late to remove ourselves entirely from a situ-ation that even the President. � � � was having second tnougnts about. We had 16,000 men in Vietnam; we had Henry Cabot Lodge, who seemed anxious to stay. And, as the program im-plied, by that time there were only two alternatives: to re-form Diem or to overthrow Diem. We withdrew our aid to Diem: As George Ball said, this was a hint to the rebel-lions generals "to go ahead and try another government . This was inevitable." - It became too late Watching last night's show, one was almost completely un-, aware that it was a documen-tary. And that's probably the highest compliment you can pay any documentary. If this year's economy has resulted in a. paucity of news specials, and the political pressures in an even greater paucity of good news specials, Hindsight' more than made up for the deficiency. �o--it's exceedingly difficult to speak about the unspeakable. WBAL-TV aired a children's special (translate "cartoon") last night. Very likely the crudest animation I have seen in a long time; clumsy draw-ings, insipid story line, and a few sad voices, the most nota-ble of which belonged to Hans Conreid. There's nothing like hearing those prophetic words "Wait till the Messiah comes. 11 fix those guys," to make. ou doubt your sanity. And if I see one more dog who woofs on command, I'm notifying the city pound. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 VEASHL.C4i Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 1%ti � M C Claims lem Death Inside Story Seventeen - generals and - colonels of the South Viet-namese army voted unani-mously to kill President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, and were not particularly discouraged by a high - ranking U.S. CIA official, an NBC report scheduled to be telecast to-night discloses. , The report is Part 2 of "An NBC News White Paper: Viet-nam Hindsight,'" and deals .with the origins of America's involvement in that Southeast Asia, country. The report presents the first supposed inside � account of . Diem's assassination, disguised as a political coup, and in-cludes statements by Alvin Davis, associate producer of the program, and Lt. Col. Lu-cien Conch), the key CIA man in South Vietnam during the time of the coup. It is "quite inconceivable" :to Conein that Gen. Maxwell ;Taylor and others were not !aware of the timing of the coup, Conein says on the pro-gram, which depicts Diem's death as a Diem maneuver that backfired. � The decision to kill Diem Is reported to have developed over a series of eight meet-ings and arguments, and, fi-nally, a vote. Three who would have voted to save Diem were 'assassinated before the vote was .taken. Four others, in-cluding the present ' Prime Minister, Khiem, were deliber-ately excluded from the vote. Many among the 17, how-ever, wanted him killed from the start, and the only over-heard phrase spoken in French rather than in Vietnamese was by Big Minh, might-have-been presidential contender in the. October, 1971, election, woh said, "The pig must be killed." After that, the vote went like this: Big Minh: kill; Gen.. Don: kill; Gen. Xuan, kill. Col. � Nghia, kill. At the end there was total unanimity, and a vow of silence was taken, The si-lence is to be broken tonight, Davis says. Diem had asked for full honors, and a "graceful" exit from �Vienam to exile in an-other country, but refused to -ask Big Minh�who in turn was furious at the 'slight. Between 6 and 9 p.m. Nov. 2, the day of Diem's death, he refused again to speak to Minh, then finally spoke to him on the telephone, but Minh, outraged, hung up. On the third try, Diem gave in,. asking only for safe conduct. At this point Col. Conein said he was told by Amtas-sador Henry Cabot Lodge not to instigate, encourage or dis-courage a coup, which was in the planning stages through-out October, 1963. But Diem, Conein said, had his own plans for a phony coup, after which he and his family would be brought in honors, by popular acclaim, back to Saigon from their place of exile, Pleiku. What happened, apparently, is that both the phony coup and the real one came off at the same time, fooling Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Conein, in an attempt to get Diem out of the country, says he asked his embassy for a plane, but was told that he would have to wait 24 hours for it. "I spoke for the U.S. gov-ernment and I was authorized, and I informed the junta' (Diem's organization) that I had an aircraft, but it would take me 24 hours to have that aircraft on the ground." "Instead?" Davis asked. "Instead, he was shot by a major in the Vietnamese army," Conein says on the telecast. .-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 . rATIONAL MUT-MT /X Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 5 DF(.: 1P71 17 '17 C) . 17. � Tx-) 7 77 7v) 717 ; 7(76\ 7/i-11_1 LYZIJ/Li. ,11.1*�� AgiTA f. \-7 VIETNAM-CAMBODIA President Nixon was busy stepping up the we::: lest week, sending Asian client troops into battle'.. the CIA's infamous 'Phoenix" program, A sign ! on three fronts. hiside Cambodia about 20,000 posted by the "Seals" at one of their bases on the : Phnom Penh troops were thoroughly defeated; Mekong Delta said: "People who kill for money on the Cambodia-Vietnam border 25,000 are. professionals. People who kill for fun are ' some are Saigon soldiers couldn't find the "enemy" alleged sadists. People who kill for money and fun to a meeting of the China-Cambodia to- be operating there; and in South Vietnam . some 15,000 Saigon troops ware sent into the Friendship Association in Peking Nov.. 9, 18th - . anniversery of the independence of the Kingdom Central Highlands on Nov. 27. Reports of the drive were not published until several days after of Cambodia, a report on the excellent battle � situation end filch morale of the liberation forces it occurred and a week afterward there was still .r.g Sery, special envoy of the no word on its results. (Under new press tules put was made by long into effect Nov. 30 in Saigon, no news of the war .� Celmbc-)d'an government in exile. He said, "Under may he published unless it is released by high the leadership of the National United Front of Cambodia...our people are determined to unite U.S.-Saigon officials or their spokesmen.). � on a wide scale, wage resolute struggle, overcome all difficufties � and hardships, win more. and greater victories, make no compromise or retreat, wipe out the enemy, smash the enemy's espion-age activities and psychological warfare and-. defend the liberated areas. Imbued with firm�-' revolutionary optimism, the Cambodian people and the people's armed forces of national libera-tion are confident of the inevitable defeat of U.S. imperialist!) and its running dogs, the Lon Nol-Sink Matak-Son Neoc The.nh tyaitorous clique." American 'pilots reported last week that for the -first time since 1935, North Vietnamese MK; fighter planes fired air-to-air missiles at U.S. B-52 bombers. The pilots' report---not confirmed by �� � � GI TOLL: 350,437 � . .The following casualty figures for � china are based on .U.S. government statis-tics. They are lower than U.S. casoaltie.s � reported by the liberation forces. Figures - are from Jan. 1, 1961 to Nov. 27, 1971. Figuies in fmrenthoses are for the week - 20 to Nov. 27. Killed: 45,613 (9); 'on- - � combat" deaths: 9054 (7); Wounded: . 302,283 (78); Missing, captured: 1617. ' the U.S. command�said North Vietname.39 Rus� � sian- and Chinese-built MICs had made about 10 passes in the last two weeks at U.S. bomlears flying over Leos. Said a senior pilot in Saigon in en interview with the New York Times, 'I'crsay the Ml Cs represent a seriOus new threat, not a ; potential threat but a real one. "....With Indb-chime doing all the. fighting, U.S. troop with: drawels are continuing. By Nov. 30 there were 1827,400 GIs in Southeest Asia. The' lest of the Navy's "Seals" are also leaving Vietnam. The operations of this special unit were stopped, according to the Times, "because some members . of the coinnlando teems in the field have become afraid their activities might bring down on them the kind' of prosecution that convicted U. William .Calley in the it-lessee:fa of civilians at Mylai." The "Seals' " work included support of ! z (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 602792462 ApproveTfQJIT4Wle-al'se: 2'81c8rN/01/30 CO2792462 1 4 IJEU � (b)(3) - _ GC. 0 � talit E1 L 1,13 � By Peter Osnos But - �considering the p. These reports, along with province and police officials. Washington lost Foreign Service portance. attached to Phoe- the cloak and dagger aura of misuse their authority to .: � SAIGON, Dec. 13 � The .nix as recently as a year ago . CIA involvement and spe- settle grievances and inno-Phoenix program, devised :and the fact that only a few .eiallY trained and paid Viet-four years ago by the CIA hundred Americans were in cent people are jailed or, namese agents. known as , . as the way to wipe out the volved even at the peak, the PRU (provincial reconnaiss- vorse. . Vietcong's political infra- -.pullout at this stage is seen ance . units), gave the pro-. In Angiang, the country's structure, remains today one ' by many observers as an ad- gram a sinister reputation .most pacified province, a that overshadowed 1 man was recently trun-of the most notable failures mission that there is shnply . its con-of the war. . very little more that can be tinning inability to accom- cheoned to death before it was � This is the view expressed 'done. plish the job it had been as- - ' dis -'�oovered that he had 'by many senior members of "The military didn't know signed, been picked up by mistake. . The killer was an enlisted -the U.S. establishment here, how to advise the program "The most impo.rlant . thing about Phoenix,' a man in the militia assigned sometimes in the boldest and the Vietnamese didn't official. commented early in to the local intelligence. possible terms. "It's a lousy - want to learn," said an Amer-.failure," one top-echelon � lean . civilian who has 1970, unit.-. "is that it is not work-� a The case . was reported in American said loudly at a watched Phoenix closely. ing." reception the other night. Official Vietnamization Reason Foi� Trouble .. the Vietnamese press and informed U.S. sources said a . . -Despite the recognized im- figures Show that about One reason frequently of- sergeant had .acted on his. portance to the Saigon gov- 20,000 agents -are "neutral- fered for Phoenix's troubles own without authority and .ernment's future of climi- ized" (killed, captured or is that it involves an ex- would ,be tried later. mating the Vietcong's clan- rallied to the government traordinarily complex mesh- HoW many of these incl. . destine Poltical apparatus, it side) each year. But, Ameri- ing of information and per- dents go undiscovered is Is apparently no longer con- cans acknowledge that prac- sonnel from any number Of anybody's guess. "This is an sidered an achievable goal. tinily all of this probably Vietnamese military, para- undisciplined country at � The Vietcong infrastruc- inflated figure were low- military and civilian groups. War," said a high-ranking Lure consists . of enemy level village and hamlet op- Leadership is nominally U.S. pacification official, agents responsible for re- eratives and P-le basic lead- vested in the national polic, "and Plioeni> is about what � cruiting, collecting taxes, ership still remains, and its elite special branch: you'd have to expect." spreading propaganda, infil- A very small percentage In fact, the military often" trating legitimate groups of even these are killed or predominates. The interest and generally undermining captured because Phoenix and personality of the prov-government influence, The - intelligence ferreted them ince chiefs and their princi-cache of about 70,000 called out. What usually happens i3 pal aides are also instrumen- . VCIs are homegrown and that persons rounded up in taL deeply rooted. : routine military operations Information is gleaned � This summer the U.S. and are subsequently listed as from a variety of sources. - South Vietnamese officials ' VC's* including armed sources "Statistics show that for ganda teams, revolutionary decided to offer bounties as every one neutralization of development, cadre and high as $11,000 for high- a previously identified VCIplain villagers. The data is 'ranking VCIs. The plan was . we are neutralizing fear collected and Maintained at never carried out, sources that were not previously district and province intelli-Identified," the senior Amer- gence and interrogation cen-said, because it was realized . lean adviser. in Binhduong that it wouldn't work. ters. . . Province wrote recently. Plaids are entrusted to the "The , Vietnamese are Phoenix (known Properly PRU, . the CIA-sponsored never going to turn their by its Vietnamese name squads who are the action .own people in," . said an Phuong Hoang � all-seeing arm of Phoenix, sometimes 'American with many years bird) has been in trouble militia units and the police of experience in Vietnam, from the start. It was drawn, harei also f involved. American e icop ers are used fre-"and they certainly won't. up by the CIA as a "system- quently to ferry the PRU. take sides politically until . the outcome of the war is atic effort at intelligence cc-Country' - abSolutely clear." ordination and exploitation" . In cases where wanted "Survival (in South Viet- � a way to prevent clumsy VCIs a r e apprehended,' nam) has often meant and_ overlap. It was turned over trials arc conducted by prov: largely still means sitting on to the Vietnamese in 1968, incial security councils, - the fence," explained one � made up of the province young official. ,' Agents were to be identi-various police and lied, apprehended and pun- chief,ie.f, military officials and whom-Advisers Withdrawn ished by local authorities. � For sonic months now, - War critics in the United ever the province chief. se-American military advisers states promptly attacked lects. . to the program have been Phoenix as a counterterror In practice, all this turns gradually withdrawn, effia organization, utilizing assas- out to be a haphazard busi-cially as part of the overall sination and torture as itsaca ''_., Among other things, Phase.out. A small comple- principal tools. Periodically," i merit of men from the Ccn- there were reports on such officials said, suspects fro-sq tral Intelligence Agency will abuses. , - .� � _ quently bribe their way out, remain. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 LA Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 MIAMI, FLA. HERALD ii3Ec 1 3 1971 � M � 380,828 � 479,02 Jack Kofo6d Says eqs�,fe. � � Is the Secretive C orth the Ex The Central Intelligence Agency has laid off 5,000 spies, and only 134,000 em-ployes are left on the payroll. Nobody knows how much the CIA costs us, because it doesn't have to account pub-licly for its spending. The ex- � penditures run into billions. � The spies, who manned to keep their methods secret for years, haven't been success-ful at that recently. It has been disclosed in Vietnam that torture is one of their gimmicks for obtaining infor-Mation from close-mouthed people. They've ordered mur-der, as in the case of a dou-, ble-crosSing agent in Viet- , nam. The CIA apparently is V answerable to no one, which makes it the most dangerous government agency the Unit-ed States has ever known. The intelligence beagles 'haven't been as successful as they'd have us believe. Pearl Harbor should have been an-ticipated. Douglas MacAr-thur scoffed at Chinese inter-vention in Korea two days before the Reds moved in. His G2 should not he saddled With all the blame, for the 142.111412... Haris of the CIA were supposed to know. ' And, what about the Bay of Pigs? There was a perfect-ly fouled up job, based on completely unreliable Intelli-gence. We don't seem to be getting adequate information for the billions we're spend-ing. ense? Approved for Release: 2018/01./30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 12 DEC. 1971 (b)(3) 1..) teal 'Pr It. k ral teL It'n��Y, - \.;.`..) L. Id !iir,7500tenTo Pea' 2? tiNLiT ORMAN MAILER and Rip Torr \el flounder together in the island grass, Mailer bleeding from his hammered head, Torn's ear half 'bitten off. They- rise and exchange maledictions: Mailer: Kiss off! Torn: Walk on! Mailer: Kiss off! � Torn: I'll leave the hissing to you! - The lights come up. The preview audience at the Whitney Museum moves xlisbelievingly toward the out-er gallery 'where cocktails and cana-pes await them among Edward Flop-per's melancholy seascapes. I spot , Jose Torres,. Buzz Farber, Mailer himself and then, suddenly, Daniel Ellsberg and his wife, Patricia. We wave and shrug our shoulders. Only a few days before, the Ellsbergs had agreed to let me trail them about for p�few weeks; but I'M not scheduled .to start until the following day. � "L ask Ellsberg what he thought of the film, Mailer's "Maidstone." He :says he was struck most by the two-page mimeog,raphed prospectus � handed out at the door which said "Maidstone" was created out of "a .deep and revolutionary conviction" that a film must probe "the mystery of life, in all of its fathomless com-plexity." Ellsberg �says it read like "all those prospectuses, the Govern-ment prepared for the pacification program in Vietnam�how they were going to win the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese people. This time it's the minds and hearts of the audience. .The guys in Vietnam never realized J. ANTHONY LUICAS, a staff writer for The Times Magazine, is the -author of "Don't Shoot�We Are Your Children!" :how badly they:failed. Do you think Mailer realizes how he failed?" Abruptly, he's off on a different tack, his blue-gray eyes snapping eleetrically. An enthusiastic amateur photographer, he's intrigued � by the cinema verite technique in the film. "All through. It I kept jabbing Pat and saying, �'If Mailer can do it, any-body can do it.' Maybe I should I Marx, the millionaire toy manufac-turer).. The Ellsbergs; who now live in Cambridge; have kept it as a New York pied a. terra and refuge for Patricia in case Dan goes to jail after his trial next spring for unlawful possession and use of the Pentagon Papers. Meanwhile, it's quite a pied a term. Three large windows . � present a spectacular view of .� the East River. The decor is expensively Modern. Two deep brown leather couches con-, front each other across 'a square glass coffee table un-der a silver lamp arched half-t.1 L. IL __I,-_ I ��� n "Th. 1%./ � � �"N\ r�el wif 1 I:11, S prearranged I reach the Ells-/I bergs' 14th-floor apartment on Sutton Place South at 1:15 P.M., in time for us to dash to the airport and .catch the .2 P.M. shuttle to Washing-ton where Dan is scheduled to re-ceive the "Federal Employe of the Year" award that- night from the Federal Employes for Peace. But I find him far from ready to leave. He has mislaid a spiral note-book containing his notes for that evening's speech. For 15 minutes, he ransacks briefcases, bookshelves and a desk piled high with notes and documents for the book he is doing (ono:anon and Schuster. "This is ter-.rible. I know I had it with me when went to see the lawyer yesterday." But no luck. We're going to miss our plane, so I phone for reservations on a 2:30 flight. (I'm reminded of the afternoonl phoned to broach the pro-posal for a magazine piece. Ellsberg said he had to catch a train and. couldn't talk long, but he talked near-ly 10 'minutes. Then . he called an hour later to say, "We missed the train. You might as Nvell come over now.") We are to be joined on the trip by Peter Schrag of the Saturday Re-view who has been interviewing Dan that morning. While Ellsberg contin-Lies his hunt, Schrag, and I admire the apartment, actually PatriCia's bache-dining.. table. near the win-dows, a French 'maid has now set � .Melon, chicken, .tomatoes, ginger ale. But we barely have time to munch some chicken before rushing to the. airpeat. JeN the taxi, Ellsberg betrays 'some disappointment, about this evening's event. Leaders of the Federal -Employes for Peace report difficulties in rounding up an ..audience. Most Government agencies have. refused to let them post notices on their bulletin boards. "We, too. bad," he says. "I'd hoped they could use ray appearance, .to _do some real recruiting-o-particu-lady at State, Defense and the...C.I.A. I wanted to see posteta with my picture on theta all over the Pentagon: 'Come hear Dan Ellsberg speak for peace.'" � About half an hour before. the .banquet is due to begin, we� enter the ballroom of La Cemma, a catering hotel four blocks from the Whiteliouse. Eilsberg learns to his delight that the evening is a sellout, more .than a thousand people are expected. Now, he's a lit-tle worried because he never found his notebook and still hasn't written his speech. "Couldn't I just find a little room here W:lefe I could eat alone and write?" he asks. lor digs. (she is the daughter of Louis .� ach no,n says Susan Strauss, one of the evening's organizers. "All these people want to watch you eat." At 8, the ballroom is packed with lawyers from the Justice Department, 'desk officers from _State, tax men from In-ternal Revenue and squads of fluttery secretaries. When Ellsberg milts onto the ros-.trum they give him a stannial3 -ovation. � I find rayaelf sitting next to Richard Strout of" The Chris-tian SCiCriCe 1.1011107.- is the New Reouhlic's way. nrrn e Slrout tells me that back in _ Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 phone call from 1--Linn- 4,.". (b)(3 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2, DEC 1971 � A p�-�.7 . , � e 12. Tr Eh' � lf v...} "g 15 6 � � �, 4 k ritr-,--) Lit ti-ft,-L/Ci t!kti � kJ 4.,.cif.1)0 � �71 , -717 -9 0 _II - . . .. . . ... . : "To emphasize the point that we are not seeking to find . � l villains and assess blame, as there is blame enough for every--!one,:the.ti.tie was changed td "An NBC News White Paper: Viet . ;Nam..Hirrdsight." -.- -. �� : . , , . - 1 . � Thus did Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, announce ! that a..doeumentary originally entitled '"The Death of Diem; :An ; �� !NBC News White Paper on John F. Kennedy and the Viet Nam : ! War" -'would be expanded and the. emphasis changed. In an earlier announcement, the network. described the doe- 1 umentary as "television's first attempt to document the deci- ; , sion-making process. that 'led to the nation's deepening in-volvement in the Viet Nam ; war during the Kennedy ad.: i .- -1 �: ministration." , I The broad5ast, which was . � ,,. to be an hour long and cover the period 1961 to 1933, has now ' been expanded . to two hours. The first hour, entitled "How It Began," will be seen at 7:30 p. m. Dec. 21, and the second, "The Death of Diem;"-will be seen at 9 p. In. Dec. 22. 'Transcripts of the two pro-grams will not be released un-til just prior to 'broadcast, but , it is said that key ifeures. in -' the decision-making process veill appear with their recollec-tions. ..,,,,g .. u,. Producer Fred .1'1-ad is . - No Dinh DiQm - said to have obtained new in-formation on the assassinations of President Ngo Dinh Diem . � iand his. brother., Nhu, and the role played by United States intelligence officers. . . _. ' . . - "As the material developed not only in volume but in ' . scope,' said Prank, '[hose. 'a! u5 who watched it come in were ' struck by its importance and powerful narrative thrust. New : material was corning out .about a time of unique significance in ' � recent American history and new in�ighis about information] - , eight, nine, and 10 years .old that .was ig,nored .or . at, least , . . underestimated at the time. � , . "Perhaps the most interesting insight," Prank continued,' ,.."was that after President Diem and his brother *died, in the coup, Viet Nam and all related problems were in the forefront .of American attention. Until then such problems. as Berlin, the Cuban-' missile crisis, and even Laos were Considered more , ' important." . . �- I Some- 20 officials' involved 'in Viet Nam- war strategy have i been. interviewed by NBC News. Among the participants are. .Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's military adviser and dater chairmen .of the Joint 'Chiefs of Staff; Gcn...Ten That Dinh, who commanded troops in the Saigon area 'at the time of the coup; � . Rufus Phillips, who directed the. strategic hamlets program in� � the-Delta area of Viet Nam and ran U. S. aid missions; Freder-ick Nolting, ambassador td the Saigon government until August, . 1903, when he was replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge; George. Ball, acting secretary of stale; John Kanto:Ur Galbraith, who . "told President Kennedy the U. S. could not win in Viet Nam 'N vith Diem, that we should not ..sc.n-A in U. S. troops"; and- Michael Porre0al. 'the PApproved_for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2 DEC 1971 � t Li I " L I ."-Nt7 C\ f (7,1,71 r"7,-Tj In 30 months of power, with Ins "vietnaraization of the. war" aimed at implementing the "Nixon doctrine" in this part of the world, President Nixon not only obstin-ately continued and-prolonged the' war of aggression in South Vietnam, but. also embarked on new military ad-i Veeturea...teeainst the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam, overtly extended the U.S. war of aggression into Cambodia and Laos, whose undertakings were accompan-ied by innumerable crimes against the peoples of the three Indochinese countries, and seriously jeopardized peace in Southeast Asia. � , I. In carrying out "Vietuarnization," the Nixon ad-ministration prolongs the U.S. war of aggression with countless concomitant fresh crimes against the South Vietnamese people. 1)- The Saigon array feverishly beefed up and an im-portant contingent of U.S.. troops maintained in South Vietnam. Under the U.S. plan, the Saigon junta feverishly draft-ed. troops from 15-year-old adolescents to fifty-year-olds-to raise the strength of their army from half a rnillioni to a million-odd men. Besides, it reorganized the police into an armed force with 20 men per village, 300 per. dis-trict, 3,003 per province, and tens of thousands at the central echelon to lay an iron grip upon the population and repress. them. Over a million people, mostly aged, Women and children were forced into "civil defense" units. . With a great sense of urgency, the U.S. equipped the Saigon army with all types of weapons and war means. Since the beginning of the "Vietnamization" program alone, it has supplied 610,000 M.16 rifles, 20,00 machine-guns, 34,000 grbriade-throwers, 870 guns, 10,000 81mm mor-tars, 210 M41. tanks, Lem armored vehicles, 44,000 military lorries and 40,000 transceivers.... � As regards the Saigon air force, the U.S. provided it with some 850 planes of various types and has intended to bring this figure to 1,200 by 1972. To the Saigon navy, the U.S. turned over an estimated 1600 shipe� and craft of different kinds. The annual credit allocated by the Nixon administration to the Saigon junta for general expenses was brought to 2 billion dollars. Up to June 30, 1971, the Nixon administration still kept in South Vietnam about 240,000 U.S. troops, not in--eluding nearly 20,000 men in the 7th Fleet and Coast-guard units and 32,000 others in the USAF stationed at American' airbases in 'rhetoric!. 2) Relentless furtherance of "pacification" work backbone of the Nixon administration's "Vietuarnination" along with intensified bombardments and sweeps against civilians. � � The U.S. government has just earmarked an additional $1 billion and entrusted the U.S. Defense Department and ly in South Vietnam. . . The French newspaper Le Monde. on 'July 29, 1970 stated: in 1970, on an average, the U.S. discharged on the Indochina theatre a quantity ef explosive equivalent to 11 20-kiloton A-bombs, the sort released by the U.S. on Hiro--shima in 1915. - The U.S. command in Saigon 'unilaterally delineated "free fire zones," making of entire large populated-areas its targets.. ..B-52 strategic bombers, in particular, redoubled their carpet-bombings - without distinction of targets. In March 1039,� right after taking office, U.S. Defense Secretary Me Laird decided to ask for an addi-tional credit of 52 million dollars in 1959-70 to increase B-52 activites from 1,503 to 1,853 missions a month. . . . Over 2,500 artillery pieces of all calibers., positioned everywhere on the mainland and based on warships. Everyday, tens of thousands of shells of different calibers were pumped into villages and hamlets. Quang Tri alone, in a single day, received over 20,003 shells... Sweeps against civilians, villages and hamlets ' In the period under review (January, 1939-June, 1971) U.S.-Saigon and satellite troops mounted over 50,033 mopping-up operations of battalion size upwards through-out South Vietnam, blotted out more than one-fourth of the total of hamlets in the South, and perpetrated hundreds of new Son My-type massacres, many of which had been disclosed by GI's themselves. ..In the two provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, our of 870 hernlets, nearly 500 were levelled.,... � . In Quang Da province, till late 1970, out of 441 hamlets, 351 were .erased. Bien Ban district- had 20 of its 27 vil-lages flattened: Go Noi area, composed of 6 villages with 40,000 inhabitants. was razed to the ground. The sur-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 long by 10.45 miles wide. I. the CIA with the direct conduct of' a new "pacification" effort called "rural defense and local development" pro-gram, beginning May 1, 1971. According to an assigned quote, within a year, the Saigon agents have to liqUidate 14,003 patriots and force four million more people into the "civil defense" organization.� Following were the principal measures taken to imple-ment the Nixon administration's "pacification" program': In 20 months under Nixon, the U.S. used in South Viet-nam an amount of explosive equal to the total of U.S. bombs expended in both 4 years' World .War II and two years' Korean War (Bomb tonnage used in the Europe. and Pacific theatres: 2,682,244 tons; that used. in .Korea: 635,003 tons). - Under Johnson, the yearly average of U.S. bombs used in both South and North Vietnam ran to 800,000 tons. Under Nixon, the qtiantity of bombs dropped on South, Vietnam alone yearly average 1,377,000 tons. According to. the U.S. Defense Department's data from the beginning of 1959 to August 1970, the U.S.. rained 2,131,334- tons of bombs and fired 2,292,125 tons of shells in the Indochina theatre, most-, � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 were turned into no-man's land. In Ben Tre provincenm 1969-1970 alone, the U.S.-Saigon troops launched 6,003 sweeps, slaying 4,300 people, -maiming 3,590, imprisoning aver 4,990, burning nearly 4,003 houses and levelling bun-lreds of hamlets. The periphery of Saigon, stretching CO miles from Sai-�;on to Tay Ninh, was cleared off. Twenty villages along the Vain Co Dung river, Long An province, were changed into deserts. Many an operation lasted for months on end, such as the raid beginning December, 1958, and ending late in April, 1959, on numerous areas in My Tho arid Ben The provinces, during which the soldiery killed and wounded almost 3,039 people, burnt 1,000 dwellings, blotted out (lozens of hamlets and herded tens of thousands_of villag-ers into concentration camps.... ...The "II Minh campaign" from Des:sernhner let, 1.0i73 to late April 1971 in Ca Mau and Rach Gin, supported by hundreds of U.S. aircraft and artillery pieces, during which the troops, according to their own profession;� murdered 2,411 civilians, injured hundreds .of others, ab-ducted hundreds of people, impounded tens of thousands in concentration camps and set on fire tens of square miles of forests.... In Ca Mau 'alone, from pril 1970 to pril 1971; the raiders raped or killed 575 people- of female Sex, including children and wounded 334 others.. . Data from the U.S. Senate, stated (though still below the reality) that the 'U.S.-Saigon forces in 1970 killed or. i.njured 125,000 people, one-third being children under 13 ;years of age. � I Colby, the man in charge of the US. � "pacification" program in South Vietnam, admitted on April 21, 1971, that from the beginning of the war to April, 1971, 5,900,090 civilians (one-third of the South Vietnamese population) were killed, injured or made homeless. 3) Stepping up population concentration to control and exploit them and to squeeze manpower and material sources for the U.S. war of tiggressien. ' The U.S.-Saigon forces carried out indiscriminate bombings and strafings, chemical sprays and sweeps against the civilians, used , series of huge bulldozers of over 20 tons with special "Rome plow blades" against houses, gardens and hamlets, thereby levelling whole vil-lages into no-man's lands. . . With inch atrocities, millions of inhabitants were made homeless end forced to leave their villages, and mine away in disguised concentration camps. . . Once the people were cooped up there, "purification'.' programs started and "Vietcong" or "Vietcong" suspects were exectited: A network of spies, scouts, civil guards, policemen and "pacification" men was set up in such car:erre,tocenteol and supervise the detainees and spot, arrest and assass-inate those who did not submit to the enemy during the so-called 'Phoenix" Or "Swan" campaigns. About the "Phoenix" campaign, the Baltimore Sun wrote on May 26, 1971: the campaign dragged on for 3 or 5 years and an average of Loo people 'were killed or jailed in a month, surpassing the plan by 1,223. In Ka, a monthly average of 1,850 _people were disposed of. . . . Early in 1971, some. 10,090 minority peonle in CO ham-lets on the High Plateaux were forced into concentration camps in the lowland... � _ Those who demanded to return to their villages and refused to suffer such harsh conditions were persecuted. A case in point was the airbornbing of 359 detainees in Kong-Ho-Rirh concentrating-1 cerrsa in nreseeturret ply/I:errs on Feb. 22, 1939. Repression and persecution in urban c-enters. The U.S.-Saigon rulers also carried out the "pacifica-tion" plan in urban areas... . In operation "Thach Loc" "fa) in Hue-1 Q.ZanZ.7, Ti provincial capital and Dong 114 township, the enemy arrested, tortured or threw in jail oven 30,C90 COiC arid forcibly enlisted 1,599 young people.; . . All repressive measures were taken against students movements, such as closing down schools and forcing them to take military training..or go into the army, en-circling or brutalizing their meetings, demonstrations or sit-ins. The crackdown of the press was still more blatant. In 1959, the Saigon papers were confiscated 40 times... In 1970, 230 times, and in the first six months of 1971, 250 times. The Ting Sang (Morning News) has been barnted 127 times since March 13, 1970. ' Higher taxes were imposed on townspeople. Living, costs rose in proportion. According to official statistics, in 1959 the living costs shot up 09 percent as compared with 1958. In 1970 they again soared by 70 per-cent. 100 kg, (220 lbs.) of rice of the best quality in 1969 cost 590 piastres but this year 10,090 piastres, the price of an egg grew from one piastre to 22 piasters. The U.S. magazine Look VTOtC on June 11, 1970�since ,1965 (when the U.S. expeditionary corps was directly in-volved in the war of aggression) the living cOsts in South Vietnam had gone 900 percent higher. . 4) Continued chemical warfare cotsplenel with at-tempts to deceive public oniniore Alongside bombings and strafings, the Nixon atins,in-istration Continued chemical warfare...Toxics laid waste over 1,880,000 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acre) of rice and 'other crops, orchards and jungles: poisoned nearly 900,000 people, mostly women, chAren hundreds of them lethally. . . ...The .U.S. wantonly lobbed gas or chemicals, bon-lbs � and shells on villages. Gas and toltic chemicals v,Tre - also sprayed by U.S, and Saigon troops into ur:dergro::r,d trenches, shelters, houses, wells and other drinkirn water sources during their actions. In the 1970-1071 liskell year, the Nixon administration spent 8 billion dollars on chemical warfare and has planned to drop 1,300,000 more gallons of "Blue" and "White" agents on South' Viet-namese soil. Since the beginning of this year, U.S. aircraft have been flying more chemical sprays over numerous areas in the provinces of Quang ,Tri (March, 1971), Thna Thien (May, 1971) Phu Yen (March and April, 1971), Tra Vinh (February, 1571), Rach Gia (February, 1971), Ca Mau . . (January, March and April, 1971), etc. ...The Nixon administration is training the Saigon army and equipping it with chemical warfare facilities to continue such atrocities in South Vietnam. The continued and intensified use of chemical products in high concentration and on vast areas for many years by the U.S: in South Vietnam has had serious effects on the population and the environment there, effects unforesee-able for the immediate or distant future. The U.S. chemical war crimes in South Vietnam were exposed nnd strongly condemned by the Paris Inter-national Conference of Scientists (December 1970) and the second session of the International Commission for Inquiry into U.S. war crimes held in Oslo (June, 1970). � Harsher prison regime and medieval torture Beside a sum of 86,761,900 for paying U.S. advisors on� prison and covering the cost of the maintaining of prisons in South Vietnam, the Nixon administration has spent 103 more million dollars for the enlargement of the prison system. After the denunciation of the 150 "tiger cages" in Con Son island (July, 1970) the Nixon administration, on the one 'hand; ordered the abolition of the "tiger cage" re-gime, but on the other; has secretly built 334 new "tiger cages.".. . AFP estimated on April 29, 1971, at 400,000 the South Vietnamese prison Phpulation. Current were such horrors as applying electricity to the breasts of women detainees Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 007nt1nu2ili Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 � and to the genitals- bf men prisoners, driving nails into their fingers and toes, immersing them in water, strap-pado, tearing out their teeth with pincers, driving skew-ers into the privy parts of female inmates includiez teen-aged girls, repeatedly for many days. Phain The True, a member of the Saigon "parliament" testified that in. the first six months of 1971, in inh Thuan province alone, nearly 6,000 civilians were unwarrantedly imprisoned and savagely tortured. According to Kieu iTiong Thu, a woman member of "parliament," the ward-*ers at Tan Hiep jail used quick lime and acid against. women -prisoners, inflicting grave injuries on many of them. . . . ... � .. . . II.Contintitti and serious encroachments on the soir--: ereigaty and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In blatant violation, of the U.S. Government's commit-ment to end definitively an; unconditionally all bombard-ments and other acts of war against the DfaVN, in the thir-ty months of its rule, the Nixon administration (ordered the following):.:. .aircraft of various kinds, including B-52 stategic bombers, and its artillery based south of the demarcation river and on the Seventh .Fleet in repeated. reconnaissance flights and murderous bombing and shell-ing missions against many heavily populated areas in -"North Vietnam. . . U.S. planes flew 31,215 reconnaissance sorties over 25 provinces and Cities in North Vietnam, and the tempo of such flights had not ceased growing: From a monthly average of 650 in 1959, it went up to 1,150 in 1970 and 1,000 in the first half of 1971: U.S, tactical aircraft made 2,714 and B-52 strategic planes 601 strikes releasing a total of 184,167 demolition and blast bombs, 2,853 cluster-bomb units (CBU) many -missiles, rockets and 20:nm shells on many populated areas from Vinh Liah (17th parallel) to Vinh Phu province (21st 'parallel) and even letting off missiles" and rockets on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong. : On March 21, 1971,40 waves of jet planes includ-ing F4, F-105 and other types in 15 air actions in succes-. sion dropped 150 demolition and blast bombs and 22 CBUs, �fired many missiles, rockets and 207am Shelia on popu-lation centers in Ky Anh and Hnoug Nile districts; Ha Thin province, killing or wounding over 30 civilians, destroying 27 houses and a primary school. --... The rate of U.S. air strikes increased day after day. In 1059: the monthly average of tactical aircraft missions was 50, that of B-52's was four. ,In 1970: the figures rose respectively by 150 and 45. . times. In the first half of 1071 the monthly rate*was 137 times for tactical planes and 46 for B-52s. - '� - III. Direct inVasions of ,Cranbesilia and Laos extend the Nixon administration's war of aggression to the whole Irealechina. . To salvage its "Vietnamization" program in South Vietnam,. the Nixon administration not only continued to -violate the sovereignty and threaten the security of the :Democratic Republic of Vietnam but also eapaucled the aggressive war to Cambodia and Laos, thereby adding to its records fresh war crimes against the Indochinese. . On March 13, 1570,- following the U.S.-masterminded ceup d'ettat against Head oinStato Norodom Siixnouc Can Nixon administration set up a lackey administration in Phnom Penh. At the end of April 1970, it hurled tens of thousands of U.S. and Saigon troops into an invasion of Cambodia.... Thea Nixon administration continued to introduce military personnel, weapons and strategic goods into Vietniane to step up its special war in Laos. The Central Intelligence Agency-speot hundreds of millions of dollars on the organizing, training and officering of the mercenary army of the Moo nationality headed by Wing Pao for inroads into the liberated mile of Laos. The U.S. also brought 17 battalions and continued to being more battalions of Thai mercentaries to Laos to join the rightist array.... The U.S. kept a high level of bombing in Laos. U.S. senator Paul McCloskey recently disclosed that the ton-nage of bombs dropped on Laos had doubled since Nixon assumed office. Since September 1970, it has been flying a daily average of 500-000 tactical aircraft and 50-60 B-52 missions against Laos., Early in February, 1971, the Nixon administration mobilized. nearly 2,000 planes, more than 40,000 U.S. and Saigon troops in aggression against Southern Laos. How-ever, the disorderly rout of this aggressive army after losing an important part of its manpower vividly demon-strated the bankruptcy of "Vietnamization," whose pur-pose is to shift on to the Saigon army the war responsibil-ity of U.S. troops. � Along with these � criminal -operations, the *Nixon ad-ministration has' endeavoured to instigate the *rightist party in Vientiane to torpedo every effort of the Lao Pa.-: triotic Front to solve the Laos issue peacefully. . IV. Universal indignation of the heinous crimes of U.S. imperialism and tie Vietnamese people's resolve to carry on their resistance till final victor/. The past 30 months of the Nixon administration have been thirty months of progress along the path of the neo-* col,onialist War of aggression against Viet Nam and the -whole Indochinese peninsula.... . According to the estimates of William Wallace Ford, retired. U.S.' Army Brigadier (New York Times July 2, 1970) in South Viet Nam alone, the U.S. war of aggression has had the following. consequences: 300,00 civilians killed, over 1,000,050 others injured, 105,050 incapacitated, 253,000 orphans and 6,050,000 D.P.s and homeless:. .. Wherever and whenever the crimes or U.S. imperial-ism were brought to light, they triggered off outbursts of anger against the Nixon administration's flouting of all :norms of morality and international practice and .untold crimes against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cam-bodia. These have played havoc among .the present gen-erations of these countries and will have incalculable ef-fects -on the future generations. They have leached the level of genocide and of systematic destruction' of life and the living environments. . Together with the progressives in the United States who have been courageously and persistently pushing up their actions against the policy of aggression and the crimes of war of the U.S. ruling circles in Indochina, a front�of the world people has practically taken shape to back the just fight of the Indochinese peoples under the comMon slogan urging the Nixon administration to stop immediately its aggression in Viet Nam and Indochina, bring home speedily all the U.S. troops and let th Viet-namese and. the other .peOples of Indochina settle their own affairs without U.S. interference. . � � Recently, the disclosure- Of the Pentagon's "secret study" on Viet Nam by the American press has further substantiated the denunciations : made by the Govern-ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam- over many years past concerning the root cause of the Vietnam war, and the aggressive nature of the United States. For their part, the Vietnamese people from South to North; while being deeply grateful for the allround sup-port of the fraternal socialist countries, the nationalist countries and the forces of-peace and democracy through-out the world and eagerly longing for peace which, how-. ever, must be a peace in real independence and freedom, are determined with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia at their 'side to keep up their war of resistance to U.S. ag-gression for national salvation; till complete victory., - Over the past two and half years, defying all: diffi-culties and hardships, the Vietnamese people in conjunc-tion with the successful fight of the Lao and Cambodian 00UtinUela Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 peo71es, have inflicted heavy reverses on the U.S. ag-gressors and their henchmen more than 1,150,030 enemy troops including 365,000. GIs and tens of thousands of tons of weapons and a considerable amount of. war materiaN of the U.S. have been put out of action. The bellicose and corrupt lackeys of the U.S. In Saigon �are more isolated than ever. Over the same period, 138 U.S. aircraft have beeh shot down in the Democratic Re-'public of Vietnam, bringing to 3,335 the totai of U.S. planes grounded between August 5, 1934, and June 30, 1971. - raThe accanzran_nan:: 2Nixcu Adralnri,c,=t-icn crimes in inanlcelf-ma, circolnt-ell as an official document by the. United Natons, will be an eye-vaener for many Arnerico.ns who believe Ntaen is "winrf3ag down" the Vicanin war. The Derneera2ic Republic el Vietnam in this mennesiowsthnt, un 22 cover c2 "V the U.S..' hns steopedC7 tEn:a war in every way.. The DRV study covers the 30 months from January, 139,. to June, 1971. In that period, the U.S. has had its puppet Saigon regime more than double the size of the Saigon army, from 500,000 to more than a million men, and furnished it with hundreds of new warplanes and' ships, hundreds of thousands of new weapons. A new. U.S.2sacnsored "pacification" pnognran has been started, hacked by $1 billion in U.S. funds; bombing and shelling of South Vietnath has sharply escalated, involving hun-dreds More air raids and tens of thousands more bomb-tonnage dropped. On the ground, hundreds of hamlets have been destroyed and their inhabitants massacred. - During the Nixon years, millions of South Vietnamese have been herded into concentra-tion camps and prisons, while the entire countnyside has been sprayed with poisons, destroy-ing several, million acres of crops and affectir.g t'00,C3D-people. New invasions of Cambodia arid Laos' were carried out under Nixon orders, broadening the war. The air war against Cambodia and Laos�hs.'s risen in intensity every month, and there have been renewed air attacks against the.DRV. D2SDitO the Ninnon acFn'ression, "Vietnnnaizadon" his failed and the peoples of Indochina have continued to inflict severe reverses On the U.S. and its puppets. The Vietnamesealao and Cambodian peoples are determined to fight on- until complete victory, and have the sup-port of all the world's peace-loving forces. s. Tine De-Tanen:tic Republic of Vint-,..TlitYS memorandum on Nizca war crimes' in Indochina. was circulated to all United 1\ZOinns mamber-states on Oct. RI, by UN Secretary-General U Thant at the. request .of Dr. Zdenek.Cerniln UN Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. �D.W. Foreinn Dennrtrnent � Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 002792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 DECEMBER 1971 (b)(3) "CORDS comes home to Washington, Pacification has just begun, � Still so many hearts and minds to be won." �from "Songs to Alienate Hearts and Minds By" EARLY three million Americans have now served in Vietnam. Of these, about 600 have been Foreign Service officers. Thus, roughly .20 percent of the Foreign Service has been exposed to many of the stimuli which have turned "nice" kids from Middle America into peace freaks, hawks, junkies, and even assassins. For the FSOs, however, the ex-perience generally has not had the radicalizing effect that it has had on many of the military men. The FSOs tended to be older and less malleable than the American sol-diers in Vietnam, and their personal thought processes were more subtle and less striking than those of the GIs. Some FSOs were essentially untouched by the whole experience, reacting no differently than if they had been in Paris or Rome. But for most, and especially the young, Viet-nam meant change. It meant a violent breaking away from the tra-ditional diplomatic life and an ex-posure to the realities of war. About 350 FSOs have been as-signed to the Pacification program (CORDS). They functioned as ad-visors to the Vietnamese civilian and military administration in an effort to make the Government of Vietnam a viable force in the coun-tryside. Few, if any, had any back-the ftreign S3rvce JOHN CLAYMORE John Claymore is the pseudonym of a former FSO who served in Vietnam. The primary reason for his resignation from the State De-partment was disagreement with US policy on Southeast Asia. He is not using his real. name because of a limitation on publishing in his current job, but he would be glad to correspond or meet with any-one interested in discussing his article. photographs. He has written exten-sive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam. As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty. Because he is a supporter of the President's Vietnam policy, and because he fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime con-troversy, he has not chosen to make his information public. He also is undoubtedly aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects. His example is extreme, but it points up the fundamental proposi-tion that serving in Vietnam is not like serving elsewhere. With respect to no other country could it be said that perhaps 20 percent of the FSOs had experi-mented with soft drugs, but that is the case in Vietnam. And in no other country do FSOs have their own personal automatic weapons and receive training in how to fire a grenade launcher before they go. Vietnam is different. undoubtedly sharp-the generation gap between young and old FSOs. In some of the junior grades, a disproportionately large number have been to Viet-Int-11/Ainanm. Almost all return with a Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 ground for this assignment; yet most have acquitted themselves well, within the context of the programs they were working in. Nevertheless, FSOs have been affected by .the same pressures that have been widely reported in rela-tion to the military. Many served in proto-combat roles with command responsibility. While not participants, they re-ceived reports of war crimes and what often seemed like the unneces-sary loss of human life. Some were faced with the moral dilemma of how far they should go in exposing incidents which they knew to be wrong. One HO currently serving in Washington possesses a file of VIETNAM has ened A ripw r,T,DirtiT'Vrt: Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 ( I\ U !V I � .. r791 o. 11i:11;TC.r?' kci 1-17-)� 11.%.ichard Nixon does not intend "to see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history," and the corollary of that is that he does not intend to preside over the collapse of our client regimes in Indochina. But in the modern world not even the most super super-power can indefinitely maintain 'satellite governments 8000 miles from its shores (6000 miles, if we are thinking of Hawaii). And. even assuming the viability and the reliability of the governments Of our choosing and our financing in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambo-dia, the .PLneiican people �are bound to become increasingly skeptical about whether the huge invcstinents required are worth it. Other great powers have played this game --,the French, the Italians, the - British, the Germans. Japan tried .to make it work as late as .1940; Portugal is 'still at it: But remote control by money and technology has a limited life. The Nixon Doctrine will soon seem aS antiquated as. . Empire or. the co-prosperity sphere. Meanwhile, the President thinks he can pull it off: winning a civil war in Southeast Asia by repeated, 'heavy doses of US air and naval power, and aid, and disarming his domestic critics by keeping the casualty rate low and bringing most of . the combat troops home. In the short run- he might succeed -7 getting Thieu through '72 and Nixon too. In the longer run he won't. The Asians will take charge.. - "Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form," the President told the press on November 12. It took form initially with the in-vasion of Cambodia by US forces in April 1970, Staged, the Presi-dent reported, "to protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guar-antee the cOntinued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization . program." A week later, he remarked that if he .were to follow the advice of the doves and simply withdraw from Indochina, the. enemy would "come into Vietnam and massacre. the civilians there. by the millions.": Four days later he judged the Cambodian expedition an "enormous success," so much so that he thereupon requested an ad-ditional. $250 million in aid for Cambodia (about $240 million more than was authorized the preceding year), and. invited "third doun7 tries ..*. to furnish Cambodia with troops or material." The $250: million,. the' President said, was "probably the best investment in foreign assiStance that the US has made in my political lifetime." In. the following year and a half, he withdrew a substantial number of t riu Approved for for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 combat soldiers from Vietnam. He also requested $341 million for Cambodia for fiscal '72, which suggests that the, fewer the number of men whose withdrawal must be protected, the more it will cost. The $341 mil-/ lion is not all that will be spent, of course. It does not si include CIA operations, or the surplus arms and equipment the" US will turn over to the Cambodians. Nobody knows how much in' the way of surplus arms has already been dumped into Southeast Asia. Sena-'tor Symington has been trying for months to find out, without much success. Senator Fulbright has asked for a monthly report from the Pentagon on exactly what we are doing, what we' are putting into Laos and Cam-bodia; he is not told. Bureaucracy is expert at passing the buck. "A slarge part of the data requested bY you," the Pentagon informed Fulbright earlier this month, "is not known to the Dept, of Defense because it con-cerns the operations of other government departments or agencies." What we do know is that the amount is enormous . and the end is not in sight. 'Whatever the Nixon Doc-trine promises, it doesn't promise total withdrawal. "This idea that somehow. or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia,-Mr. Laird says, "is a great mistake because that isn't part of the partnership theory under which we � are operating." The President adds tivt in the absence of a � negotiated settlement, we must keep "a residual force" over. there, "in order to continue our role of leaving South Vietnam in a position where it would be able to defend itself from a Communist. takeover." However, that is not Mr. Nixon's only reason., 'A very ,primary reason" for keeping a residual force in Vietnam; is that we must have "something. to negotiate with, with re-.gard to our prisoners." Five hundred thous-and Ameri-can troops could not pry the prisoners loose, but 50,-000 might help de) it! At no, time has the President bothered to acknowledge or treat seriously Hanoi's repeated statement that once he sets a withdrawal date, it will'provide for the safety of our forces as they pull out, guarantee the release of all POWs and prevent .reprisals. The President would not like to have it put this way, but in effect Hanoi has given him a choice between abandoning Thieu or abandoning the pris-oners. He thinks he dare not give up either; that is his dilemma. And not his only dilemma. For his doc-trthe requires constant transfusions of dollars and arms to anti-Communist military regimes in Southeast Asia, while he simultaneously seeks a detente with those bil-lion Chinese, in fear of whom 'the US intervened in Indochina a decade ago. Some idea of the costs can be glimpsed by suryeying past and planned military assistance to the three Indo-chinese states. The figures the public has access . to ,understate the reality, for they do not include a variety of hidden expenditures. Even so, whereas aid to Cam-bodia in fiscal 1970 was $8.9 million, two years later the requested authorization was over 37 times higher. e � For Laos, the 1970 aid bill Was $118.4 million; for the 'coining fiscal year it will be at least $189 million. Mili-tary aid 'for .South Vietnam in 1970 was $2,049,100,-000; in fiscal 1972 it is expected to be about tWo and a half billion dollars. The cost to the Indochinese is incalculable by any 'dollar measurement; they pay in the currency of refu-gees, orphans, cripples, corpses. From 1966 until June of this year, our fliers had flown 25,546 sorties over Cambodia; 280,000 over North Vietnam; 505,000 over Laos; 762,650 over South Vietnam. The air war goes ahead full speed. We are dropping about 70,000 tons of bombs each month over Indochina, and by the end of this year twice the weight of bombs will have fallen on this area the size of Texas � as were dropped in World War II and the Korean war. Congress could set the country on a different, less .destructive course, but not by such ambiguous and open-ended declarations on withdrawal as the one it attached to a $21.4 billion bill for weapons and Penta-gon research, and which the President simply dismissed last week as "without binding force or effect." . � In 1968, Mr. Nixon said he had a plan to end the .war. He 'did; be is following it; it is to. get peace by winning the war but without losing the next election � a refinement of an early and abandoned Lyndon John-son plan to let Asians fight Asians. In its "purest form," the doctrine is bull. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 7",11 7-�:(717.T.P.:; 'T'T � ,T-;',,77: Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2, 5 WI I / .1, � r), _ . �st. V I I I Ukii 1 33.17 STEWART EELLERMAN � VP1 51,-1ff Wrilor � SAICON----It was a rainy evening and the villagers - huddled in their wet straw huts warming themselves :by smoky fires. Outside, two. young Vietnamese' , crawled through knif e--sharp elephant grass to the outskirts. of the vil-lage. - one of the youths buried. an olive-painted claymore mine in the red-brown - mud of the only trail lead-ing into the village. The other strung a wire to a plunger hidden behind, a clump of bushes. . - The two youit-m.en----on the payroll of the U.S. .1 Central intelligence ..kgen-� cy (CIA)----could soon hear' the splash of footsteps as the local Communist polit-:Ical leader returned home 'to spend the night, with his � family. � . . They waited patiently, . rubber sandals sunk in the tmud.- The, moment the Comma niat leader reached the mine, they pushed down on the plunger, shat-tering the evening calm with a deafening roar. The killing was the work of the Phoeni. Program, tin allied project aimed at wiping .out the political leadership. of the National Libeeation. Front (NUN) with some of the same ter-rorist tactics the Commit-. nista have used against Saigon goyern.m.ent offi-� cials. .. ' U.S. Involvement, �� A U.S. Army intelligence officer described the in-cident to newsmen but de-manded the names, Idea-tion and date he kept se-cret. Ilis caution was typi-cal of American officials with 'knowledge of one of. . the most controversial and least -understood allied programs in Vietnam. , Reliable American .sources said the United States, which. thought up Phoenix almoat four years ago, is still deeply in-volved in it. Aside from CIA partici-pation, the U.S, Army (has helped set up a massive in-telligence apparatus which Critics claim has given the Saigon govern-ment "big brother" power over much of the popula-tion. The sources said U.S. Army intelligence officers also sit unofficially on hoards determining the fate of suspected Commu-nists. Officially, the object of the Phoenix Program is the "neutralization" of the 'Viet Cong In f-aastructure (V.C1), bureaucratic jargon Son the Communist sha-dow government in South Vietnam. . 1?.eason for 'Killings The program, started by South Vietnam in lf,`68 with the encouragement of U.S. intelligence ex -pelts, claims to have neu-tralized .8309 Commu-nists . since thent-20,036 40,580 jailed and 22,083 talked into switch-ing sides. Allied officials working in the Phoenix Program usually say the killings have been the result of suspects resisting arrest. "We don't want to 'kill any of them," one U.S. ad-visor sTid. "We want live ones. A dead man is just a statistic. He can't give us any information. And we have to bury him." U.S. officials working in related programs and some former Phoenix ad-visers, however, occasion-ally tell a different story .when speaking anon y-mOUSly. "r)f re- we'ee --ng lot cif VC and torturing a lot of them." one Ameri-can said. "What else can we do .it We're just doing the same thing to the ene-my as tl�vt-- to us." C 0 iu munist teiT01:151. ha v'e 111i1(10, life just as dan-gerous for government of-ficials. The Saigon. govern-ment lists I 1,680 Commu-nist terrorist incitients last -st 'year a 1 0 n e, principally against local officials and - their relatives: � It was suppertinic in a t mall, rice-farming village in the central highlands of _ South Vietnam. . The kitchen sounds�' scraping of pots clinking � or glasses and clacking of iplatea--drowned out the noise f two young Com-munists walking :toward the village: .� . 'Family Gunned Down The two youths, dressed in black. pajamas and car-rying Soviet-reade walked down the only path leading. into town, their ru'bber tire sandals slapping against the earth. WithouChesitation, they pushed open the doof: of the biggest building--an unpainted wooden shack where the Saigon govern-mere. village chtef had. just sat down for supper with his wife and two. children. The men then mechanically e rn p tied their rifles into the 'room and casually walked out of the. village, leaineobehind four bodieS Slumped across the. table. between pieces of broken dishes and glaases: It was one more Com-munist te.:-.:arist attack against local -government offieials, village council-men and dedinary civilians In South Vietnam, Dozens of � tertorist. attacks take place every day across the country, � "It's easy tor somebody to stand tip. in Congress back In the States'. and eorn plain about .hotv immoral - the Phoealix Program is, one U.S. official said. . "But Once' you've seen the VC gain' down:- -chiefs, kilt innoc.ent women- and children, you don't feel that � way anymore: They're just animals and they've got to be -destroy:, ed. 'The only- way to fight thee ..7ellinals is to kill thern," a U.S.. police 'advt.' set� =said. 'it's too bad but we haven't clont.'; _enough killince around here lately: ll,re only got loan of them in my district last month." Controversial Grojtp Withont a doubt; ti most controversial: men on the Phoenix team are the PRUs, members � of pro-vince reconnaissance units organized and financed by the CIA, according to Al-lied intelligence sources. Thie sources said the PRU% Mainly former ell-minals and Communists recruited from jails, are tho triggermen for. the program's political assas-sinations. They said the PRUs are also used to ar-rest especial!yt. dangerous suspects and to administer the rougher tortures. At the 'start of the pro-gram, the typical assassin-ation squad would be made Up of four ,PRUs and two Americans, the sources ..said. .Nowadays, however, the PRUs 'usual-ly work alone. They said the PRUs used to get paid piece rates--; that is, by the head. But the CIA ..switched them ovct? to straight salaries�substantially higher than pay _scales fol.. South Viet--nair430, soldiers and po-lice. lIrogrann - Unit is a' poor . farmed. Ile grows rice on an acre of land. near the, South China 'Sea. He lives with his wife and -three chil-dren � in a cramped hut made of stray.' and nufd. millions of others---has been :forced. by tho South 'Vietnamese government- to spy On his own family for -the Phd--an-ix Prograth, � .! "I don't- want to get into trouble," LinIcsaid fit vo ugh- -a Iran slat er. 'That's why I Jell the government what h y want. I don't tell. them ev-erything, of couese. Just as ranch as I have-to." � This Phoenix Program has tried to get ea gin int ong (fainily head) like Linh to report in � every hut, house and shanty in South Vietnam. They're .the lowest rungs on a thaa-Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 'WASHINGTON POST Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 11W+ (b)(3) By Mark Frankland London Observer SAIGON�The It oman Catholic community in South Vietnam, once consid-ered to be the nation's anti-Communist hard-core, is now providing some of the most vigorous opponents of President Thieu's regime. e� There are young Catholics .among the student militants who - have been burning American. ears on the streets of Saigon these past few :weeks. Tin Sang, the major opposition newspaper, is run by. a group of .young Catholic deputies. Even the more moderate Catholic politicians in the Senate, led by the Senate's 'Chairman, protested against President Thieu's one man re-election. A group of -young Catholic priests pro-Aided the opposition with an Intellectual backing more ;radical than that of the. Blidelhist monks associated with the militant An..Quant pagoda. It never was true that the Catholics, who make up one-tenth. . of South Viet-nam's population of 17 mil-lion, were all aggresSive anti-Communists. This repu-tation was really won by the .Catholic Communities who emigrated � to the Smith when Vietnam was divided into two zones at the Ge-neva Conference in 1954. . Inevitably these groups, which resettled as communi-ties still under the leader-Ship of their- old parish priests, were eager allies of the Saigon government; all the more so becalise. that government was headed from 1954 to 1963 by the .pious �Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem. - The Diem gOvernment set-tled a good many of the ref-ugees from the North around Saigon, and the nearness of these .militants,. Who were always ready to take part in demonstrations in the capital, gave the im-pression of an entirely miii-uon. Why do they think so differently from their par-ents? One very important. 'reason is that they have come to look very critically at the whole history of Viet-namese Cathlicism. Catholicism. was, � .of course, brought to Vietnam by European missionaries. It was the most eminent of these who gave the Vietnam-ese language its Roman script. A French bishop be-came the first great Western interferer in Vietnamese af-fairs by helping put the Em-peror. Gia Long on the throne of a united Vietnam � In 1806. Gia Long's successors were less friendly towards the Catholics and the cries of help from 'French mis-sionaries encouraged France to take the country over. - The young Catholics today know that the fate of Chris-tians in South Vietnam has been often used to justify the present war against the Communist. They know, too, that many Catholic& have collaborated closely with the Americans in Viet-nam. This alliance with for-eigners against the Vietnam-' ese is, of course, a serious crime in the eyes of many people. (One of the easiest Ways to destroy someone's reputation in Saigon today is to call him a CIA agent.) Like many young and in-tellectual people the radical � Catholics feel a strong sense of guilt about their church's association first with the French and now with the - (It) I1(11 en fir:6 \LI le.) \LI � St' 1'r-it' . - _ But in fact the southern-born Catholics were often different. eThose that lived in the countryside often had to co-exist with the National Lib-eration Front. Sometimes . the Communists' attitude to-� wards these Catholics was tough; it was accommodat-ing. In either case the Cath-olics. and their priests had to 1 PI L i ii r:-).., . _.. Americans. It explains why they, more than any other opposition group .(excepting of course the ,Vietcong) are prepared to accept the Con-sequences of a total Ameri-can withdrawal however un-pleasant they may be. The militant Buddhists are far less certain on this point. Perhalps this is partly because they do not feel they have any guilt to ex-learn to live with the Corn- plate. But it is also because munists as best they could, many educated Catholics, Today children of the, and mit Only the radicals Northern ' emigres , are among. them, believe that among the most active of the churen will survive in the clerical and lay opposi- some form or other what-ever happens. The Buddh-ists, with no world-wide. or-ganization to give moral support from outside, are. considerably more gloomy about their future in a Corn- . numist South Vietnam. . But the -young opposition-minded �Catholic! priests are also left wing They . wel-come the egalitarian ideas of the Communists and feel the true church has nothing to lose by them. "If you have nothing to lose you have nothing to be. afraid of," said one of them. � What counts most for Vi-etnamese Catholics is the'at-titude of their bishops, and the bishops are usually con-servative. But even among them there are signs of change. The Pope's conference at Manila last year, when he proclaimed a "Church of the Poor" authorizes a move to the left. The bishops clearly do not want to be identified with the present Saigon re-gime just because President. Thieu is a Catholic. They have given, and will give, no endorsement to Thieu'a. � uncontested re-election. The Archibishop is not going to back the radicals in the church openly: He is too cautious a man for that. But ori-te of -the young priests elieve .� he accepts that theirs may be the way of the. future. Whether that is true or not the church' has, po-tentially, a far more ,open mind about the future than many have -suppoed in the past. Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 2 1 EH 1971 (b)(3) �! TT? �..1_ r, By hOn 11.20r0t7U����� � . . kt,fifal-D- l'he- writer does interpreting and p12,otOgraphy for ne WaShington Post's - iT ,Saigon lF b:ttrieEaNn.D 'an /3o always -. - .' � � '111 tY-� � 0 ' , �. 11110113 � knew when .1 'entered Ins house --..even though he wasblind. It .Niias a, �, !thatched house with a mud floor; typi-% GT .13 07) (En of Buddhist dwellings in the Me--J,-)CELL .ii (tkong Delta. The walls .were made of V. cardboard and -decorated with U.S.-- niagazi.ne ads.. The. focal point of the, 3 front .roora. was '11:ie ,family altar, on, which were placed artificial flowers . . and fruits, pictures, of deceased fore; 'fathers and. a bright., sawed-off artil-, lery shell for incense: . I- had come to Vietnam as :a -volun-- teer:lor International Voluntary Serv-.ices (IVS) in mid-1969 from the Univer-� sity of California at Berkeley, where' .-Vietnam had been the main :topic of cOnversation. Everyone had pet theo-ries on the war, but no one had been By 1ton Moreau A lion Hao vitlager -51110 4-CS 111(1711Uttila frour -a ware/ pipe mode out of an American beer Call... there. 1 wanted .to be there. had opposed U.S. intervention in .Vietnam and had been peripherally in-.:Volved, in, the antiWar Movement. My .draft board granted me conscientiouS --objector status, -accepting INTS service in Vietnam as a satisfactory alterna-tive to military;duty.-lIoa Hao (pronounced web-how) ,village where I Stayed for 11/2 years, in � Vietnam's fiat delta region near the Cambodian border, most foreigners were viewed as intruders, tolerated � Only for their money.. Naked and rag-ged children would shout, 'Americalf, American" in: Vietnamese, pointing and occasionally throwing objects as rode past. The older ,people generally would ignore me. lint after I learned .,Vietnamese and --local customs, I gained a -.degree of acceptance, and I V.made 'a few Close friends. Eao,' a 60--year-old farmer, farmer, was my best friend. - . I lived in a marketplace some five � 'miles from him, and I kept ray motor-bike .at his house on a bumpy dirt road that followed the river. The rural delta � people do not live in clusters as In most other regions of Vietnam. Rather,, the delta houses extend along the int* bate canal network that rims tendril-like through the region, ' When -I Would arrive 'at Bao's house, he would invite me to sit down for tea.: Some of the furniture ,was ' fashioned out of empty rocket crates. Local cook-des L1.3ado of rice flow and a pet of tea were placed on the table by his daugh-ter, who greeted me with downcast . . � . � � . 0-0:atinue4 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 CO2792462 (b)(3) COLUMBUS, OHIO IS P AT CR 2267 s 33.8,040 H q/D,:, , ,-;,-ri)/\, 1 7 rrp .iiin (r)l-i 9,(r: (--�6 I ' lq) 1-1 Al - ' Pyj .(-1.7 '' ..,.;L. ii..

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